Para a teoria das ideologias

Abstract

The point of this essay consists in showing the reason of the non-existence so far of a science of ideology as well as in pointing out a possible and necessary way leading to the building-up of such a theory. This in spite of acknowledging the existence of numerous and sometimes relevant set of essays, mostly in the areas of sociology, phylosophy of science. Though ideology is defined as a social and mental practical system, closer attention is given to the last of these dimentions, the division of the two being metodologically legitimate. Having mentioned some of the most striking readings such as those of L. Althusser, François Châtelet, François Michaux, Eliseo Véron, Stuart Hall, M. Horschermer among others, we start from a theory that will elaborate a scientific system about human knowledge in general and about scientific knowledge in more detail. From this personal reading we claim the existence of different types of ideas, some cognitive (in scientific, philosophic and common knowledge and still in aesthetics) and some non-cognitive; we claim that the ideas that build ideologies as such are «non-cognitive ideas»; still, in every ideologic system, cognitive ideas are necessarily present, although dependent on the structure of the ideologic discourse; we point out the way to, as nowadays scholars on the area of philosophy of science try to sort out ideologic conceptions from scientific discourse, thus in a theory of ideology we’ll have to separate it from cognitive discourses. We claim moreover the difference between a scientific theorization of ideologies and philosophy of science — which doesn’t — make it less significant as well as in other Sciences of Man, like Sociology or History. We make then a digress though History to illustrate the existing limits and explain the theoretical reasons of the up till now impossibility to build a general theory of ideology. At last we draft the theoretical and methological conditions required for such a building-up, such as the exact delimitation of the ideological phenomenon, and still its differences from gnosis, its need of a place in the social and historical process — this goes also for the mental dimention approach — and still the absolute need to consider the global structure of ideologic discourse and its differences from other phenomenons, such as «mentality» and «rationality».