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THEOGNIS(*)

(*) This study is dedicated to my countryman Prof. Dr. P. J. Enk on the occasion of his seventieth birthday.

The authenticity of the miscellaneous poems which have been collected under the name of Theognis has been called into doubt by most modern critics (a), at least the authorship of Theognis has been denied for parts of the collection. We may sum up the following particulars which have given special offence to most critics and which seem incompatible with ascribing the work to one and the same author (1). In the collection the same lines or maxims have often been repeated or have been given for the second time with some slight alterations (2). 2 Passages of other elegiac authors (Solon, Tyrtaos, Mimnermos) are to be found in the collection, going by the name of Theognis. Mostly these passages have undergone a few alterations in view of the new context (3). 3 The character of the second book (11. 1231-1388), which has been preserved only in the codex Mutinensis, seems to be incompatible with the remaining part of the collection. For this book contains erotic poetry, whereas the other parts of the

(a) This article was completed in May 1954. Unfortunately, since all the time I have at my disposal is occupied by studies on the text of the Iliad, I have not been able to take account of the literature which has since appeared. I especially mention A. Peretti, *Teognide nella tradizione gnomologica*, Studi Class. Univ. Pisa Vol. IV 1953, 400 pp.

(1) The bibliography on the subject can be found in J. Carrière, *Théognis de Mégare*, Paris Bordas 1948 (to be quoted as «Carrière»; Carrière's edition, Paris 1948, will be quoted as «Carrière, Ed.»). We also refer to H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des fruhen Griechentums* (New-York, 1951, to be quoted «Fränkel, Dichtung»).

(2) The doublets have been defended by E. Harrison, E. L. Highbarger, T. W. Allen (for the bibliography cp. Carrière pp. 296 ff.) and by F. Dornseiff, *Echtheitsfragen antik-griechischer Literatur* (Berlin 1939), pp. 5-30. The above critics defend the unity of Theognis' poems.

(3) For the defence of these insertions, cf. Dornseiff, 6 f.

collection are mostly of a serious and admonitory character (1). 4 What seems most contradictory to the unity of the collection is the fact that sometimes passages occur which offer completely different views on the same subject. We refer e.g. to 1.1041 f. and 1.1217 f. where the poet alternately invites to sing drinking-songs even in the company of mourners or expressly refrains from doing such a thing (2).

It is, therefore, understandable that critics have expressed the view that Theognis' poems formed a collection of paraenetical and other sayings, made by different authors, which can only in part be ascribed to Theognis (3). I think that we may accept such a reasonable hypothesis, if a careful study of the poems, and of the conditions in which Theognis may have lived as well as of the mentality underlying the different parts of the collection, shows that the unity is untenable.

With respect to the unity or inauthenticity of the Collection three points are of special interest. I The passages which have been taken over from other elegiac authors. II The Proem. III The subdivision of the collection into different parts.

I The theory that Theognis' poems should form a collection of paraenetical poems, gleaned from different authors, is made less likely by the following objection. It appears that sometimes a passage which has been taken over e.g. from Solon is followed in Theognis' collection by another poem which gives a variation on the same subject (4). Thus Th. 1253 f. (= Sol. 13) is followed by Th. 1255 f. which treats the same topic. Likewise Th. 1003-6 (= Tyr. 9, 13-6) is followed by Th. 1007-12 which is closely connected with the preceding poem (5). Two solutions

(1) For the defence and explanation of this fact, cf. e.g. Allen, *Rev. Phil.* 1936, 202. Carrière pp. 155 ff. has rightly pointed to the sober and restrained character of the erotic poetry, found in Book II.

(2) Cf. for it e.g. Fränkel, 528 N 32.

(3) Another solution has been given by Carrière, pp. 38 ff. He offers the ingenious hypothesis that our mss. present the result of a fusion of two different collections of Theognis' poems. This view has been rightly rejected by Kroll, *Gnomon* 1953, 394 ff.

(4) I cannot accept Dornseiff's explanation (p. 6 f.). The latter thinks that in 1.233 f! Theognis directly alludes to the person of Solon, himself. However, with *ἀκρόπολις καὶ πόρος*. Theognis alludes to his own person (see below).

(5) Tyrtaios has called courage a *ζυγόν ἐσθλόν*, Theognis refers this predicate to the enjoyment of life and of youth. For the importance of the idea of the *ζυγόν* in those times, cf. also Heraclitus, cf. e.g. VS 22 B 2.

present themselves to the critic. I The poems of the elegiac authors have been the subject of a vivid discussion. Accordingly, anonymous authors have expanded on the same subjects and have offered variations on them. II The anonymous author (s) must be identified with Theognis. The latter, when composing his admonitions to Kyrnos also made use of the sayings of previous authors, incorporated them into his work and offered variations on the same theme. The latter solution is the most likely on the strength of the following arguments. Sol. 5, 9 f. offers: *τίκτει γὰρ κόρος νβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὀλβος ἐπῆται ἀνθρώποισιν κτε.* Theognis 153 f. offers the alteration *οἷ ἂν κακῷ ὀλβος ἐπῆται ἀνθρώπῳ*, a variation which is characteristic of Theognis, as we know him from his poetry. For it is not to be contested that for the historical Theognis a trenchant distinction existed between the plebeian *κακοί* and the aristocratic *αγαθοί*. Accordingly, the passage of Solon has been altered to bring it into line with Theognis' own and particular views (1). We further refer to Th. 935-8 = Tyr. 9, 37-40 and to Th. 1003-6 = Tyr. 9, 13-6(2). In the latter passage Tyrtaios says that courage is the finest characteristic of a young man. Theognis replaces the *νέος* by the *σοφός*, a change which can be explained from Theognis' mentality. For in the opening lines of this very part of the collection (cp. for it below), 11.769 f. Theognis had proclaimed himself a servant of the Muses who has the task to propagate wisdom (*σοφίη*). Thus the poet is to be considered a *σοφός*. In other parts of the collection, *σοφίη* and its possession are highly praised (3). As to the other passage, Tyr. 9, 37 ff. depicts the happy life of the courageous warrior who has survived the various dangers of the battles. Theognis takes over and adapts the lines in order to describe the life of the man

(1) We also refer to Th. 325-9— Sol. 1, 9-12, a passage on the wealth of the *κακοί*. Theognis has replaced *αὐτοῖς* (meaning the *κακοί*) by the more expressive *τοντοῖς*.

(2) It is not fortuitous that Tyr. 9 should have been taken over by Theognis. For especially in this poem Tyrtaios offers general views on arete. Thus it was eminently suited to authors of paraenetical poetry.

(3) Carrière, Ed. p. 73 n I says that *σοφός* is more general and is addressed to a wider circle than Tyrtaios' words. Though this may be true, it cannot be denied that the word is very suitable in the frame of Theognis' work, where the *σοφίη* is exalted very much. We refer e.g. to 11. 1157-60, cp. also the Proimion, 1. 19 *σοφιζομένῳ μὲν ἐμοί* (for the explanation of the word, cp. Allen, Rev. Ph. 1936, 201).

who possesses both *ἀρετή* (here probably to be taken as «strength and courage in battle», cp. Th. 867 f.) and *κάλλος*. Among other things Tyrtaios had said of the courageous warrior *πολλὰ ὁὲ τερπνὰ παθὼν ερχεiai εις Αἶδην*. Since the Spartan poet had a practical end in view and tried to exhort his countrymen at all costs, he reminds them also of the *τερπνὰ*, which will be their share. Theognis, however, though closely following the passage of Tyrtaios (1), omits the line. It is obvious that the paraenetical poet found fault with the saying as being less suitable for his purpose (2). We further refer to Th. 1020-2, as compared with Mimn. 5 (3). The situation is somewhat complicated, because in Theognis' poem three lines precede which are wanting in the text of Stobaeus, whereas Stob, adds two lines which are not found in Theognis. A reasonable solution, however, can be found. In the lines, preserved by Theognis, the poet describes his discomfiture at perceiving the disappearance of his youth. Thereupon he describes the disadvantages of old age, on which theme the text of Stob, adds further particulars. Since Stobaeus has preserved Mimnermus' poem in a passage *περί γήρωος*, it is understandable that he omitted the first three lines which dealt with youth. Accordingly, thanks to Theognis, we have this time a more complete text of Mimnermus at our disposal (4). Theognis, however, omitted Mimn. 5, 4 f. For in this part of his collection he gives symposiastical poetry (see below) and wishes to emphasize the short space of youth, for which he takes over the very characteristic lines of Mimnermus. The more detailed description of old age, however, he omits, as being unnecessary for his purpose (5).

(1) For the passage, cp. also Carrière 66 f.

(2) Perhaps one will be suprised at this omission, because in Theognis* col* lection frivolous passages can be found. This is true. However, these passages are to be found in the symposiastical part of the collection. On the other hand, the paraenetical passages in Theognis are serious.

(3) For the passage, cp. also Carrière p. 66 N 2, and now Carrière REG 67, (1954), 64 f.

(4) Brunnck already attributed Th. 1017-9 to Mimnermos. Diehl, Anth. Lyr. I³ 51 has been wrongly influenced by the authority of Wilamowitz, when rejecting this solution. Also Carrière, 1. 1. is rightly inclined to this interpretation.

(5) Mimnermos is very sensitive to the disadvantages of old age, because he is growing old himself. Theognis, on the other hand, is not especially addressing old or elderly persons.

The line, found in Th. 472 *παν γάρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμα ἀνηρον εφν*, is quoted twice by Aristotle (with the variation *πράγμα* for *χρήμα*) from Euenos of Paros. This is surprising, because Aristotle was acquainted with Theognis and quotes his poems. However, a solution is readily to be found. First of all, one might suggest that Aristotle, in quoting from memory, has made a mistake and has wrongly attributed a passage of Theognis to Euenos (1). The following solution is more likely. Euenos was not a very original poet, as far as we can judge from his poetry. Therefore, as Theognis took over passages from other poets, Euenos, too, may have borrowed a line from the well-known paraenetical poet. Aristotle, in his turn, may be excused for quoting the line from Euenos, if it occurred in both poets. For it was not his duty to discern with which poet the line was original. It is probable that the passage of Euenos has particularly struck his imagination, at least more than the passage of Theognis (2).

I think that another passage, Th. 425-8 must also be discussed in this connection. In them the poet gives the well-known (3) pessimistic lines about human existence which have been often quoted by later ancient authors or have been alluded to by them: *πάντων μὲν μὴ φνναι επιχθονίοισιν ἀρ ιστόν*. In this form the text is given by the mss. of Theognis and by a few authors who quote the passage (4). Several other testimonies, however, transmit the maxim in the form: *ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φνναι κτε*. The solution seems to be obvious this time, viz. *ἀρχὴν* is a corruption of the text which has found its way into the testimonies. However, serious difficulties obstruct this explanation. First of all, it is surprising that a corruption should have arisen which occurs in several testimonies and of which not the least trace is to be found in the mss. of Theognis. More serious still is the fact that the reading *ἀρχὴν* is finer and less common than *πάντων*. Therefore, one will have to admit that a corruption of *ἀρχὴν* into the trivial *πάντων* can be more easily imagined than the reverse. Accordingly, we can try to vindicate *ἀρχὴν* as the original reading of Theognis. In

(1) Elsewhere I hope to give examples showing that Aristotle often quoted from memory and accordingly made mistakes.

(2) For the passage, cp. also Carrière 61 f. and Dornseiff 16 N 2.

(3) Dornseiff in Gnomon 1942, 139 even points to Oriental parallels.

(4) For the testimonies, cp. Carrière 72 f.

this case, however, the authority of the mss. of that author would become very dubious.

Of course it is possible that original readings may have disappeared completely from the mss. However, I do not prefer that way of explaining the difficulty, if another solution is possible. Therefore, I draw attention to the fact that among the testimonies, offering *ἀρχήν* Cert. Horn. (Allen, 228, 78 f.) is mentioned (1), a text which only gives 11.425 and 427. Critics have thought that the Certamen presents a passage and an idea which has been taken over from Theognis. However, it is equally possible that the Certamen presents an old maxim which already existed independently of and before Theognis (2). In this connection, we point to Th. 255 f. The well-known maxim, given here, *κάλλιστον το δικαιότατοι!* was to be found on the temple of Leto in Delos, according to the explicit testimony of Aristotle (cp. Carrière 60 f.). Since we have no reason to call into doubt Aristotle's trustworthiness, we can state that Theognis has borrowed a well-known maxim and has inserted it into his collection (3). This is completely in keeping with Theognis' practice of taking over passages from Solon, etc., which we could trace above. Therefore, I think that here, too, Theognis has taken over a well-known maxim and that, unconsciously, he altered *ἀρχήν* into *πάντων* which was less original but more emphatic and, therefore, could easily obtrude itself to an emotional poet such as Theognis (4). If the views exposed here are true, they tend to show that we have not to deal with a collection of poems, placed together at random. On the contrary, we find the characteristics of an individual

(1) Stob. 4, 52, 22 (Hense IV p. 1079) equally quotes two lines beginning with *ἀρχήν*. He mentions as his source: *ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλκιόδαμαντος Μουσείου*. In view of the explanation, offered below, one will understand that I think Hense, App. Cr. to be wrong, when he says «Usus est Alcidas Theognidis versibus».

(2) It is possible that the old saying gave only two lines (thus the Certamen and Alcidas) and that Theognis has expanded the text.

(3) For the fact that these lines are probably placed at the beginning of one of the parts of the Collection of Theognis' poems, see below.

(4) It is surprising that Stob. 4, 52, 30 (Hense IV p. 1081 f.), though expressly quoting Theognis, offers *ἀρχήν κτε*. It is, however, possible that Stobaeus' text has been influenced by the well-known version of the maxim. We also observe that Sophocles and Aristotle seem to have followed the text of Theognis (cp. Carrière p. 72 N 3). The testimony of Cicero is of no importance, because he follows Aristotle.

poet who has largely made use of material already existing and has adapted it to his purpose.

The Prooimion, 11.1-26 has often been criticized (1) and parts of it have been athetized, wrongly, in my opinion. The poet first of all addresses himself to Apollo and Artemis. When invoking Apollo, he uses (cp. 11. 1-4) terms which remind of the Homeric Hymns (2). The lines which follow and which describe the birth of Apollo have been thought to be intrusive (3). However, if one compares 11. 1-4 and 11. 11-4 one will have to admit that Apollo is praised in higher terms than Artemis. Nevertheless, of Artemis a detail is narrated (the erection of her image by Agamemnon), whereas of Apollo nothing has been mentioned, if we cancel the above lines. This makes it probable for 11. 5-10 to be genuine. Of Artemis a less important detail is mentioned, whereas of Apollo his divine birth is narrated. The style of the passage reminds one of the Homeric Hymns (4).

We also see that divine things have extraordinary proportions which is, in my opinion, an archaic peculiarity (5). Thus the *γαῖα πελώρη* and the *βαθύς πόντος* rejoiced, while Delos is called *ἀπειρεσίη* (6). Apollo and Artemis are invoked for material blessings. Thereupon, the poet addresses the Muses who sang *οὔτι καλόν, φίλον ἐστί*. By it he intends to say that his poetry too, may be blessed by the

(1) Cf. especially J. Kroll, *Theognisinterpretationen*, Philol. Suppl. Bd. 29, 1 (1936). I observe that the authenticity of 11. 5-8 has been also defended by Chantraine, *Rev. Phil.* 1937, 410. For Kroll's views, cf. now also Gnomon 1954, 394 ff. (review of Carrière's book).

(2) Cp. rightly R. Keyssner, *Gottesvorstellung und Menschheitsauffassung im griechischen Hymnus*, p. 13 f. and H. Meyer, *Hymnische Stilelemente in der frühgriechischen Dichtung*, pp. 43 ff.

(3) Cp. for these lines and for the whole Prooimion Carrière 143 f. The lines have been defended by Pohlenz, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1932, 415 f.

(4) Cp. Ho. Hy. Ap. 135 ff. and especially Ho. Hy. XXVIII (to Athene). Here, too, at the birth of the goddess, earth and sea are astonished. Theognis has not taken over the idea from the Hymns, but reflects the same mentality.

(5) We refer to Homer, where e.g. in E 744 Athene's helmet has extraordinary proportions.

(6) With regard to the genuineness of this passage, we also point to the fact that Apollo in 1. 1 is called *Λητοῦς υἱέ, Δῖός τέκος*. Thereupon, in 1. 5 he is exaltingly addressed by his own name *Φοῖβε ἀναξ*.

Muses and may be *καλόν* (1). After the gods have had their due, Kyrnos, too, is addressed in the Prooimion, 11. 19-26. In this passage Theognis finds an opportunity of mentioning his own life and its principal theme viz. he is famous by his poetry but he is unhappy in his relations to his fellow-citizens (2). The way in which gods and men are connected in the Prooimion, reminds us of Pindar, in whose odes the history of the victor is interwoven with stories of gods and heroes (3).

We must admit that the Prooimion is very elaborated and directs itself to several persons. This makes us suppose that the book to which it serves as an introduction will be of considerable or reasonable size. On the other hand, if the collection must be attributed to different poets and if, for instance, only the elegies directed to Kyrnos are Theognis' work, the importance of the Prooimion is not in proportion to the size of the book.

With regard to the words *Κύρνε σοφίζομένω μὲν ἐμοὶ σφρηγὶς ἐπικείσθω τοῖσός⁵ ἐπεσιν*, I think that they must be explained with reference to Kyrnos. The latter's name will be the sphregis of the poems. In this connection I refer to the following facts (4). 1 Theognis addresses himself successively to the gods and to Kyrnos. He asks the gods to give him prosperity, etc. We expect that Kyrnos, too, will have a task. This will be the fact, if Kyrnos' name will serve to characterise and to preserve Theognis' poems. 2 Critics will object that in the majority of the poems Kyrnos' name is not to be found. We observe that the constant mentioning of that name would have

(1) Cp. also Harrison, Cl. Rev. 1938, II. In connection with the Charités, mentioned here, we refer to Ho. Hy VI (Aphrodite), 19 f. Here Aphr., the goddess of charm and beauty, is asked to give charm to the poem.

(2) This theme, concerning the unfavourable opinion of one's fellow-citizens, is often mentioned by Theognis. One is reminded of Milton's «though fallen on evil days and evil tongues». The theme itself is anterior to Theognis, cp. Sol. I, 4 and Archil. 9.

(3) Cp. also B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes (Hamburg 1948), p. 58 f. It is interesting to compare the Prooimion of Hesiod's Theogony. For the latter excuses himself, when he mentions his own life and person. In Theognis' Prooimion, however, Kyrnos is mentioned without hesitation by the side of the gods.

(4) For this question, cp. Carrière p. 114 f. Allen, Rev. Ph. 1950, 137-40 thinks that the sphregis refers to the character of Theognis' style, a view which had also been proposed by Pohlenz, Gött. Gel. Anz. 1932, 415 f.

been tedious. It would also have been difficult for metrical reasons and because Theognis often took over passages from other poets. On the other hand, poems in which Kyrnos is addressed occur in all parts of the collection, even in the erotic part(1).

With regard to the subdivision of Theognis' poems we can observe that most critics agree on the following point. They admit that the collection can be subdivided into different parts (2). Thus critics have rightly observed that 11.757 ff. are the opening lines of another part of the collection. Scholars only differ with respect to the attribution of that part. For some critics hold the view that this part has been made by a poet different from Theognis who must be dated in the fifth century, since he seems to have alluded to the Persian raids in 490 B.C. Critics have also observed that 11.237-254, which are addressed directly to Kyrnos, either form the beginning or the end of a part of the collection. We may begin by observing that, in our opinion, the collection must be ascribed to one and the same poet. We will try to show that in the collection a definite line of development is followed in the different parts.

The first part contains 11.27-236 and must again be subdivided into 11.27-128 and 11.129-236. Since the Prooimion is meant for the whole collection, we can understand that Theognis here wishes to present to his young friend, the nobleman Kyrnos, different pieces of advice which will be of importance for the latter's practical conduct. It can be easily seen that 11.27-128 follow a definite pattern, since the poet here discusses the election of friends and companions and also enlarges on the general political and social situation in Megara. Then, in 11.129 ff. general words of advice are given which form the basis of moral life and of man's relation to the gods. One would have expected Theognis to have treated first of all the relation to the gods, etc. instead of discussing the election of friends, etc. However, the arrangement can be accounted for. For Theognis himself is an intimate friend to Kyrnos. The collection itself again and again shows that friendship is one of the leading and basic principles of those times, at least in the circles in which Theognis moved. Moreover, in those

(1) It may be that Theognis makes a kind of pun by saying «ο Kyrnos, let the sphregis be on my words» which can also be interpreted as «Let «ο Kyrne» be the sphregis, etc.».

(2) This has already been suggested by Jacoby SBBA 1931.

days (sixth century) in which the cities were torn asunder by strife, great importance was attached to which faction one belonged, what friends one had. Therefore, Theognis first of all treats this point. He also discusses in that part the general situation in Megara, because by the internal discords the distinction between the classes had been altered. Therefore, the poet warns Kynos and instructs him on this point. Otherwise he might be mistaken in choosing his friends, because persons who, by their wealth and social position seem to be *αγαθοί*, are in reality *κακοί*.

As we observed already, 11.129 ff. then give general words of advice about life and conduct. We must pay attention to the fact that the opening and closing distichs of the different parts of Theognis' collection are of special importance. In this passage, in 1.129 f. Theognis says that *tyche* is most important and even surpasses *arete* and wealth. We should bear in mind that Theognis himself has severely felt the vicissitudes of life and thus is especially attentive to the *tyche* (1). We must not forget either that *tyche* indicates the power of the irrational factors in life. Now 11.131-172 belong together. They stress the importance of the gods who act according to their own wishes and often contrary to the expectations of man (2). One can understand that in this opening part Theognis wishes to discuss the principal facts which underly human life; the principal things which must be observed by man. One will also understand that an archaic poet such as Theognis begins by drawing attention to the power of the gods. In this connection, we point to 11.133-140, 141 f., 155-8, 161-172, lines which sufficiently show that the gods are omnipotent and that man's efforts are useless. This part very suitably ends with the advice of praying to the gods (1.171 f.) (3). After it the principal pieces of advice for the conduct of man are given. For even though the gods are powerful, man has a personal responsibility, too, and must, therefore, be cautious in his conduct.

Now we see that in 1.131 f. respect for one's parents is inculcated, while in 1.143 f. regard for strangers is stressed. We must

(1) For a somewhat similar view, cp. also Archil. 8 *Πάντα τύχη καὶ Μοίρα, Περικλέες, ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν*.

(2) This, too, may make it intelligible that in the opening part *tyche* is extolled, see also 1.165 f. and 1.171 f.

(3) We point to the fact that the important word *θεοί* is thrice repeated here.

not forget that these points are important in archaic religion, because transgressions against parents and strangers are reckoned amongst the greatest sins (1). We can also understand that in 11.145-8 the poet admonishes his friend to cultivate *ευσέβεια* and *δικαιοσύνη*, the two cardinal virtues of man (2). Nor is it surprising that Kynos is admonished to cultivate arete and to avoid hybris (11.149-54), since hybris is one of the greatest dangers to archaic man and is exposed as such from the time of Homer onwards. LI. 155 ff. then warn Kynos, lest he should scorn other men for their poverty and make himself guilty of boastful words. We know that archaic man was very sensitive on this point (3). If now we take together 11.131-172 and draw our conclusion, we can say that they form a closely coherent part and offer a kind of catechism which Theognis has expressly placed at the beginning of his personal admonitions to his friend. For the preceptor draws his attention to the principal factors of life viz. the power of the gods and the principal duties of man.

In the remaining section, 11.173-236, the discussion of the social conditions takes the most important place. After Theognis had drawn attention to the principal topics which must absolutely be known, viz. the basic notions for the ethical conduct of man, he was now free to discuss other things. It is easy to understand that he first of all thinks of the social position and begins by discussing the disadvantages of the *πενία*, 11.172-183. For this state of life would be foremost in his mind, because he was himself subjected to it (4). Directly after it two passages, 11.183-92 and 193-6, expose views on marriage. The connection

(1) We refer to our observations on this point, given in *Mnemos.* 1942, 118, where the testimonies have been offered. We add *Hes. Op.* 327 ff., a passage which is interesting. For here Perses is warned to beware of these two sins and at the same time he is admonished to offer sacrifices to the gods. Thus we see that here, too, the relation to the gods and the avoidance of these cardinal sins are connected. We further refer to the representation of the Hades by Polygnotos in Delphi (cp. *Paus.* X, 28, 4 f.). Here the punishment of a man who has sinned against his father and of another who has robbed a temple are represented beside one another.

(2) For this I may refer e.g. to my observations on Odysseus in *Mnemos.* 1952, 273 N 4.

(3) We refer to *χ* 411 f., where Odysseus refrains Eurykleia from boasting of the victory.

(4) We see that in the opening line (173) the *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός* is mentioned. Aristocrats like Theognis were especially thwarted by the *πενία*.

with the preceding passage is apparent. For by their poverty the aristocrats were forced to marry the daughters of rich plebeians, a custom which Theognis could not approve of but which he could not stop. It is understandable that Fränkel, *Dichtung* p. 514 thinks that

1 1.183-92 and 11.193-6 must be attributed to two different poets who combat one another's views. For in the first passage the poet severely criticizes the conduct of his fellow-aristocrats who marry the daughters of rich plebeians. In the second passage, however, the poet says that the aristocrat contracts such a marriage, because he is forced to it by *κρατερή ανάγκη*. In fact, this point contains one of the most severe objections which have been directed against the unity of the collection (cp. above Nr. 4). The apparent discrepancy between the two passages can, however, be explained. For it is characteristic of the polaric mentality which often can be found in Theognis. We may point to the following most typical examples. In 11.743-752 the poet argues that Zeus' reign is unfair and unequal, because the just are oppressed, etc. Then the following passage (11.753-6) while expressly referring to the preceding passages (*παντα μαθών*), exhorts Kynos to be just and equal (*δικαίως χρήματα ποιον*). We further refer to 11.383-92, a passage which will be more fully discussed later on. However, here the following point may be already brought forward. It is well-known that Theognis again and again observes how only the aristocratic *ἀγαθοί* are righteous and observant of justice and equality. In the above passage, however, the poet admits that the *ἀγαθοί*, too, will proceed to unequal deeds, as they are forced by *κρατερή ανάγκη* (1.387)(1).

In view of these facts I think that it cannot be contested that 11.183 ff. and 11.193 ff. must be attributed to one and the same viz. Theognis (2).

As to the remaining part of this section, we observe that 11.197-208, 221-6 and 227-32 deal with the acquisition of wealth and thus with

(1) Theognis' polaric mentality can be explained by his emotional character. We must take account of the fact that the poet is not steadfast but rather unbalanced and prone to different moods. Those who have studied his poems will often have been struck by this characteristic. We refer in this respect to his views on the *πενία*. It is understandable that the poet regards it as the greatest evil (cp. 11. 173 ff.) and often highly extolls the *πλούτος*. However, in 1.145 f. he prefers *ευσέβεια* *ὀλίγοις συν χρήμασιν*.

(2) For the attribution of this poem to Theognis, we also refer to *τλήμων νοῦς* (1.195). We observe that the idea of *τολμάν* is characteristic of Theognis, cp. e.g. Fränkel, *Dichtung* p. 533,

the social position of the citizen. LI. 197 ff. express the same view as Sol. 1,7 ff. viz. that wealth which has been unlawfully acquired, cannot be permanent (1). LI.221 ff. then observe that the just man, too, knows ruses and tricks but disdains to apply them. In the final passage of this section, dealing with wealth, Theognis, with some slight alterations, takes over Solon's impressive lines about the dangers of riches (Sol. 1,71 ff.). The passages are characteristic of Theognis' mentality. For it appears that just as Tyrtaios' general elegy on arete (Fgm. 9), Solon's poem on wealth and its acquisition (Sol. I) had made a great impression on his contemporaries. Thus when Theognis makes observations on wealth, he appropriates ideas and views of his predecessor. This is the more apparent, because in Theognis the final distichs or poems of a section on a certain topic are nearly always the most important. In this section, Theognis, when giving his final views about wealth, takes over the end of Solon's elegy. However, he alters the latter's ideas in order to bring them into line with his own pessimistic views. For the main theme of Solon's elegy was concerned with the acquisition of wealth, a thing for which he expressly invokes the gods. (I. 3). Solon declines riches, acquired by fraud, because they are inconstant and bring punishment (11.9 ff.). Thereupon, he circumstantially illustrates the uncertainty of human life (11.33 ff.). He wishes to indicate by it that the acquisition of wealth is also uncertain (11.65 ff. and 71 ff.) and depends on the will of the gods. Theognis, when altering *κέρδεά τοι Ονητοῖσ' ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι* (Sol. I, 74) into *χρήματά τοι θνητοῖς γίνεται ἀφροσύνη*, takes a more pessimistic view. The great social changes have hit him personally.

In the remaining poems of this section other domains of human life are treated. Thus 1.211 f. speak of the wine and of the symposion, while 11.213-8 and 219 f. deal with the interco'jrse with friends and with fellow-citizens. The symposion is an important topic in those times. Many passages in Theognis' collection contain symposiastical poetry. Thus we can understand that in this general section this subject is also mentioned. Likewise, we can understand that the topic of friendship, etc. which had been extensively dealt with in the first part, 11.53 ff., is here mentioned briefly. The closing distichs 1.233 f. and 1.235 f. deal with Theognis' relation to the citizens and with the fate of the city. We should bear in mind that these distichs form the

(1) It shall be admitted that Solon's passage is more poetical.

conclusion not only of the part which contains 11.130-236 but of the whole section, 11.27-237. For we see that in 11.237 ff. the poet begins with a new prooimion. Therefore, he wishes to bring to a close the preceding part here (11.233 ff.). If we bear this fact in mind, the situation becomes clear. For in the opening passages of the whole section, 11.39 ff., 43 ff. etc., Theognis had spoken about the dismal situation in the city, while in the Proimion he had mentioned his relation to the fellow-citizens. In the closing distichs of the section, he comes back on this subject. If we review 11.129-236 again we see that the main topics which are of importance to Theognis have been treated in this section, which forms, in a way, the opening part of the poem. For the poet has discussed the relation to the gods, to virtue and vice, has paid attention to the social position and the acquisition of wealth and has also touched upon the relation to friends, fellow-citizens and the companions at the symposion.

LI.237-254 form an elegy, in which Theognis directly addresses Kynos. The poem has a proper function in the frame of the whole collection (1). Since with 11.757 ff. a new part of the collection begins, 11.237-756 can be taken together, while 11.237-254 can be considered as the prooimion of this part. At the beginning of the whole collection Theognis had placed a prooimion in which the gods were invoked, as was customary (2). In the opening part, 11.27-236, general rules on friendship and on human conduct had been given. It is to be understood that in 11.237 ff. he adds a new collection in which diverse topics are treated more circumstantially. At the same time, he finds

(1) For this poem, cf. Méautis in REA 51 (1949), 22-5 and against him Carrière, REA 52 (1950), 11-17. Especially interesting is the discussion of the question of the *αὔλισκοι* (mentioned in 1.241). The situation is uncertain and, therefore, the occurrence of *αν λιακοί* cannot be used as a positive argument against the authenticity. Carrière especially takes exception to 1.253 f. and observes that no erotic poem of book II is addressed to Kynos. He adds that the view of Kynos having been *ερώ μένος* of Theognis is only based on the testimony of Suidas. In speaking so, he misjudges, in my opinion, the tendency of the poems and the mentality of the poet. Out of decency Theognis on purpose does not address erotic poems to Kynos in the second book. For the latter had been the very friend to whom he had addressed his admonitions in the first book. We must not forget that the archaic poet is still reserved and cautious with regard to erotical questions. For a new discussion of the poem by Carrière, cf. now REG 67 (1954), 48 f.

(2) See e.g. Sol. 1, 1 ff., the Prooimia of the Iliad, the Odyssey and of the works of Hesiod.

an opportunity to open the main part of his book by a new prooimion. Since the gods have already had their due, he can turn straight to his friend Kyrnos, for whom the whole collection is destined. In the great prooimion he had already addressed Kyrnos (1.19 ff.), but there he had mentioned his friend in order to introduce in a clever way his own person (11.19-26). We may compare Hes. Th. 22-34 where the poet, when extolling the Muses also finds an opportunity to connect with them his own person. LI.237 ff., on the other hand, only intend to glorify Kyrnos (1). In the great prooimion the Muses are invoked in order to give charm and persuasion to Theognis' poems, Kyrnos is addressed in order that the poet himself may be mentioned. Thus the great prooimion has its proper function. For it introduces poem and poet. Theognis has acted very wisely in keeping a more circumstantial mentioning of Kyrnos for another part of his collection (2). Further we see that this part, just as the section beginning with

1.129 f., opens with a general maxim (1.255 f.). Thereupon, three poems are given which, in my opinion, must be taken together, though they treat of different subjects. For they are connected by the fact that each of them contains a pun. In the first poem, 11.257-60, the pun is easy. For an aristocratic woman is compared with a horse (3). In the other poem the pun is less apparent and has been explained very well by Carrière (4). LI.266-70 in a fallacious way seem to treat of the same theme as the preceding poem. For the reader who had just heard about the aristocratic woman who had contracted a misalliance

(1) The end of the Prooimion in which the poet complains of Kyrnos' lack of respect (*αἰδώς*) against his preceptor, seems surprising. Unfortunately we know very little of Theognis' personal circumstances and hardly all we know must be deduced from his poems. The lines in question seem to suggest that Kyrnos was less accessible to Theognis' friendship, especially with regard to his erotic proposals (For *αἰδώς*, as being connected with erotic feelings, we refer to 1.1266). We should bear in mind, however, that Theognis is pessimistic, cp. in the great prooimion, 11. 24-6 the complaint about his fellow-citizens.

(2) Since Kyrnos is addressed in a special prooimion, and the mentioning of Kyrnos in the first prooimion, 11. 1 26*, is only perfunctory, the gods cannot be offended by the fact that a mortal should have been ranked with themselves.

(3) For the fact that a woman is compared to a *ἵππος*, cp. bibliography by Herter in *Gnomon* 17 (1941), 329.

(4) Cp. Carrière, Ed. p. 105. Young in *Cl. Rev.* 60 (1950), 15 wrongly calls into doubt the interpretation offered by C.

cannot but think that this time an impoverished aristocrat is speaking who longs for the favours of a *παῖς τερείνη*, but who is ousted by a plebeian (*πολλὸν ἐμοῦ κακιών.*) The pun is very successful, since in reality a pitcher seems to have been meant. The third poem then offers a pun on the *πενία*, 11.267-70, a state of life which is familiar to many so that a pun on it will interest the public. In my opinion, these poems are placed at the beginning of this section not because of their subject-matter but because of their form. For a pun is apt to excite curiosity and to rouse interest. Therefore, the poems are placed at the beginning in order to draw the attention of the public to the things the poet has to say(1).

After these introductory poems Theognis speaks about the ill-treatment of parents, 11.271-8, a topic which is very important, as we saw before and is also discussed at the beginning of the preceding section (1.131 f.). The four following poems then treat of the relations in the city, the unreliability and undeserved successes of the plebeians.

I think that also 1.293 f. must be reckoned to this part. The lines speak of a lion who sometimes is hungry and subject to *αμχανίη*. The poet alludes to the aristocrats who, though being lions, must accustom themselves to the thought that they must experience setbacks (2). It is to be understood that a poet like Theognis who was very much concerned with the internal strife in the city, discusses at the beginning of the main section the situation in the city and the unreliability of the plebeians (3).

(1) The device which to us seems simple, occurs in other archaic poetry, too. We refer to the opening Chapter of the prophecies of the Hebrew prophet Amos. The latter begins by speaking about the doom and calamities of neighbouring peoples and in this way attracts the attention of his public, so that he can speak about the transgressions and doom of Israel and Juda.

(2) I think that the poet expressly speaks in covert terms and makes use of the metaphor of a lion, because he does not wish to expose the adversities of his friends, the aristocrats.

(3) We refer to 1.281 *δειλώ γάρ τ' ἀπάλαμνα βροτῶ πάρα πόλλ' ἀνελέσθαι πᾶρ ποδοσ κτε* an image which is influenced by Hes. Op. 287 *την μὲν γάρ κακότητα καὶ Ἰλαδὸν ἐστὶν ἐλέσθαι*. (One must reckon with the fact that Theognis often imitates Hesiod or is influenced by the latter's diction). The rendering of *ἀπάλαμνος* as «reckless, lawless» by Liddell-Sc.-J. is not entirely correct. *Ἀπάλαμνα* are things without *παλάμη*, i.e. without real power or significance, cp. Sol. 19, 12 a man who has grown up no longer does *εργ' ἀπάλαμνα* «insi-

As for the remaining part, two observations can be made which are vital for the understanding of the whole section. I Within the section subdivisions can be made into parts containing poems which are connected and which treat of the same or similar topics. For the understanding of a poem it is often of vital importance to see in which part it is placed. II Since this part is by far the longest of the collection and maxims and admonitions of all kinds have been given here, it is not always possible to find a coherent line of thought which connects the poems. Thus 11.540-658 contain a part in which several maxims and observations of different kinds are given. Sometimes the poems are connected only by catchwords as in 11.615-28(1). However, it must be pointed out that, in the main, coherent parts can be singled out which treat of definite subjects.

First of all, we draw attention to a coherent passage, 11.337-406. In it the impoverishment of Theognis and his relations to his enemies, who have deprived him of his wealth, are treated. It may be observed that 11.337-350, in which the poet hopes for revenge, contain the most vehement outbursts of the whole collection. In the following pages I will try to prove that the part, beginning with 11.757 ff., is not addressed direct to Kyrnos but to the fellow-citizens in general. Therefore, one will understand that it is precisely in the above part, in which the poet addresses his intimate friend that he is bolder and more out-spoken than in 11.757 ff. For this reason he has inserted in this part the poems dealing with his personal vengeance. 11.337 ff. and 341 ff. are intimately connected. In the first poem he addresses Zeus indirectly (*Ζευς όοίη τίσιν*) and hopes for victory over his enemies. In the second poem, he invokes the god directly (*Ζεν τέλεσόν μοι*) and prays for bloody retribution. We also see that the poems very aptly illustrate the characteristics of archaic mentality. For in 11.341 ff. the deplorable situation of the poet is depicted elaborately and in a realistic way, whereas in 11.337 ff. nothing has been said of it. The reason is that

significant and worthless things». Thus we see that, according to Theognis, the performances or actions of the *δελίδος* have no real importance.

(1) Critics have rightly observed that 1.615 f. and 1.617 f. are connected by the words *ούδένα* and *ούτι*. Likewise 1.619 f., 621 f., 623 f. are connected by *πόλλ' πα5, παντοίαι*. L. 625 f. and 627 f. are connected by the fact that they begin respectively with the words *άργαλέον* and *αισχρόν*. Both words have an ominous meaning. We refer to Tyrt. 8, 17 and 19, where also the distichs respectively begin with these words.

the poet, when invoking Zeus, wishes to attract the god's compassion by a picture of his miserable circumstances. Fortunately we owe to it a few interesting details about Theognis' personal situation (1). We should further bear in mind that 11.337 ff. form a kind of introduction to 11.341 ff., a phenomenon which we will also observe with respect to 11.731 ff., as compared with 11.743 ff. For Theognis is somewhat abashed when directing himself to the supreme god and, therefore, he first addresses him indirectly (11.337 ff.) and only then ventures to communicate his wishes directly (2).

After having complained in the following poem, 11.351 ff., about poverty, he gives in 11.355 ff. the advice of bearing and enduring the evils (*τολμάν*), which is in fact one of the principal themes of Theognis' philosophy (3). However, this time, he apparently does not content himself with it. For after having presented a few distichs treating of vengeance (11.361-6) and of the relation to one's fellow-citizens and friends (11.367-72), he again addresses Zeus and criticizes the god's government of the world, because the righteous are oppressed and vice versa (11.373-380)(4). The remarkably confidential tone of the poem (*Ζεῦ φίλε, θαυμάζω σε* 1.373) can be best explained, if we compare 11.731-52. Here we should bear in mind a principle to which we already pointed above viz. the tendency and trend of a poem is determined by the section in which it has got its place. Thus 11.731 ff. are placed nearly at the end of the section which, as we observed, is addressed directly to Kynos. One will admit that this place is significant, because a poet will be inclined at the end of a section to treat of topics which are of special importance to him. This is confirmed by the above instance, since

(1) Theognis' indignation suggests to him a fine detail *εγὼ δὲ κύων ἐπέρησα χαράδρην* (1.347 f.), for which we are thankful, because it shows his poetic skill. The text has been rightly explained by Carrière, Ed. p. 44 N 1 (less correct Fränkel, Dichtung p. 527). The dog is the image of scorn and contempt in antiquity (cp. already Homer). Thus it is suitable in order to characterise the poet's deplorable position and so to awaken Zeus' sympathy. For the image of the *κύων*, cp. also Archil. 79a, 9.

(2) We also refer to the fact that in 1.342 Theognis over against the innumerable *κακά* modestly prays for *τι αγαθόν*, cp. also 1.14. The attitude of the archaic poet with regard to his god is humble and respectful.

(3) The idea already occurs in the Odyssey and is the principle of the *πολντλας* ⁹ *Οδυσσεύς*. Later on, it is found in Archil. 7, 6 ff., cp. also 67a.

(4) For this passage, cp. also W. C. Greene, Moira (Cambridge 1948), p. 403. Greene defends its authenticity against Edmonds.

in 11.743 ff. Theognis complains of the adversities of the righteous and the successes of evil-doers, one of the fundamental problems which are treated in his collection. This time, too, as we observed above,

11.731 ff. are meant to serve as an introduction to 11.743 ff. For

11.731 ff. discuss one of the details of the government of the world by the gods. The poet observes that it is unfair for good children of evil parents to be punished for their fathers' misdeeds, a topic on which Theognis' contemporaries will have agreed with him. Therefore, it is to be understood that the poet addresses the god with a respectful prayer in order that this evil may be abolished: *Ζεν πάτερ, εἴθε γένοιχο θεοῖς φίλα κτε* (1). The prayer conveys a wish which is completely justified. In fact, however, the poem has been inserted with the clever intention of paving the way for the discussion of a problem which is of far greater interest to Theognis, because it concerns his own position. Since the preceding observations had been right, he now can venture to touch upon another evil in the management of the world and says: *καί τοντ , αθανάτων βασιλεῦ, πώς ἐστι δίκαιον κτε*. We must observe that even when mentioning this kind of mismanagement the poet remains very cautious. Thus the most offensive words: *Τις δη κεν βροτός ἄλλος, ορόν προς τούτον, ἐπειτα ἄζοιτ ἄθανάτονς κτε* (1.747 f.) are not placed at the end of the poem but in the middle. Accordingly, they are less offensive and show that the main tendency of the poem is not directed against the god but against the *κακοί*. We should also bear in mind that the following poem, 11.753-6, which forms the end of this section, expressly admonishes Kynos to be righteous (2). If we compare 11.743 ff. and 11.373 ff., we see that the tone of the former poem is solemn, as indeed becomes a poem which nearly forms the end of a section. For Zeus is addressed as *ἄθανάτων βασιλεύς* (1.743) which shows that the poet is in full earnest.

In 11.373 ff., on the other hand, the tone is lighter and more confidential (3). Thus even if nearly the same objections are directed against Zeus, the situation is somewhat different. This appears the better, if we admit that 11.373 ff. must be closely connected with

(1) For the passage, cp. also Carrière pp. 204 ff.

(2) It is apparent that Theognis, though uneasy at Zeus' government, still submits to his domination.

(3) Harrison (cp. Carrière, Ed. p. 45 N 3) wrongly thinks that the tone is irreverent, a feature which is not in conformity with Theognis' religious attitude as revealed from the collection. The poet rather addresses Zeus here as an old friend.

11.383-392(1) and form a kind of introduction to these lines. This poem is of special interest, because it presents one of the most curious specimens of Theognis' mentality. He begins by deploring the poverty of the righteous men, a topic with which the readers of the collection are familiar. Then he depicts the consequences of the *πενίη* which is accompanied by a *κρατερή ανάγκη* (2). For the calamities lead astray the *φρενες* (3) of the *ἀγαθός*. The latter hazards (*τολμά*) to bear disgraceful things, since poverty and want teach him evil things viz. *πρεῦδέα τ' ἐξαπάτας τ' ονλομένας τ' ἐριδας* (4). The reasoning is intricate and cautious, but the meaning is unmistakable. For the poem says no less than that even the *ἀγαθός*, when impoverished, does unrighteous things. The diction is typical of Theognis. For he says that the *ἀγαθοί* *τολμώσιν* (1.388), a word which is ordinarily used by him in order to show the resignation of the *ἀγαθοί*. This time, however, the *ἀγαθοί* endure dishonest things i.e. they do them. The honour of the *ἀγαθοί* is saved as much as possible. For they do dishonest things against their will and only because they are forced to do them by *πενίη* and *ἀμηχανίη* (5). The poem is an interesting document of archaic mentality. For it shows that according to Theognis, most righteous men remain irreproachable, as long as they are wealthy. Dire want and poverty, however, bring them down to the level of the *κακοί*(6). We now return to 11.373 ff., where the

(1) Frankel, *Dichtung* 517 thinks that 1.381 f. must be directly linked with 11.383 ff. At any rate, the view of Carrière, Ed. that the beginning of the poem is missing, is wrong. Carrière often adheres to this theory which, in my opinion, is incorrect.

(2) We refer to 1.195 which we discussed above. We further refer to 11. 1013-6, where the poet calls the persons happy who die *πριν τ' ἐχθροῦς πτήξαι καὶ ὑπερβῆναι περ ἀνάγκη* i.e. before they commit transgressions forced by necessity. Here, too, we have the same idea which is not common in those times and, in my opinion, is typical of Theognis. This feature, too, shows that this part of the collection (11. 1013 ff.) must be attributed to Theognis.

(3) Cp. Horn Hy. VIII (to Ares), 13 *καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπατηλὸν νογὼν ἄμψαι φρεσιν ὀρμήν*.

(4) Cp. 1.67 where similar transgressions are mentioned to characterise the plebeians.

(5) We must pay attention to the fact that the poem expressly ends by pointing to *πενίη* and *ἀμηχανίη*. In this way the poet avoids to lay stress on the actions of the *ἀγαθός* and rather points to the evils which force him to do them.

(6) It is interesting to compare Euripides' views on this point (viz. the behaviour of the *ἀγαθοί* under the weight of *ανάγκη*). For this, cf. Schadewaldt, *Hermes* 80

poet had addressed the supreme god in a familiar way and had reminded him of the inequality of human fate. For the undeniable evils which seem to be sanctioned by Zeus himself may excuse the *ἀγαθοί*, if they, too, do not persevere in their righteousness.

It is interesting to note that the following poem, 11.393-8 (or 400) illustrates the same topic from a somewhat different point of view. For here the poet says that it is precisely poverty which shows the difference between the *δειλός* and the *ἀγαθός*, because the latter remains righteous. Though the ideas of the two poems seem to be contrasting,

I think that the difference must be attributed to Theognis' polaric way of reasoning of which we already adduced some examples. We should also bear in mind that the poet is wrestling here with a difficult problem, the more difficult, because he has to grapple with the hard realities of life and cannot consider them serenely from behind his desk. Therefore, it is to be excused that he does not give one and the same answer. LI.383 ff. showed to what frailties and faults the impoverished *ἀγαθοί* were exposed. LI.393 ff. retract this disheartening view somewhat. One can also say that 11.383 ff. show the *ἀγαθοί*, when acting under the weight of circumstances, whereas 11.393 ff. make it clear how they act when they are following their own nature. In 11.383 ff. the emphasis is laid on the *πενία*, in 11.393 ff. on the *ἀγαθός*. The text of 11.393 ff. is somewhat uncertain, because the latest editor, Carrière, athetizes 1.398 and likewise cancels 1.399 f., a procedure which we must reject. It is true that the turn of the poem in 1.398 is somewhat unexpected. For we would have thought that the poet, after having characterised the *ἀγαθός* in 1.395 f., would have equally characterised the *δειλός* in 1.397 f. Instead in 1.398 the poet again turns to the *ἀγαθός*. However, we should pay attention to the following facts. The *δειλός* is characterised in the poet's usual way as a man who can neither bear successes nor misfortunes (1.397). If we compare 1.443 f. and 1.1162 cd, we see that in both passages the *δειλός* is characterised in a similar way and we can also see that the *ἀγαθός* is contrasted with him as a person who is resigned (*τολμά*, cp. 1.442 and 1162 b). Thus

(1952), 64. We also recall Isocr. Paneg. § 47. The latter improves on Theognis' views: *Φιλοσοφία...τάς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γινομένας συμφοράς καλῶς ἐνεργεῖν ἐδίδασκεν* (In this connection, cf. also Steidle in *Hermes* 1952, 277 N 1). Isocrates in some way continues the traditions of the gnomic poets.

we see that the idea expressed in 1.398 is completely in conformity with Theognis' practice and mentality (1). We also saw that in this part of the section Theognis especially wishes to characterise the *ἀγαθός*. Therefore, it is to be understood that he returns to him, in 1.398.

LI.399 f. are no doubt authentic. For first of all, the idea of paying respect to one's friends is typical of Theognis. The latter, as we saw, devoted the first section of his poem to the relation to one's friends. It is also important that the respect for one's friends is connected with the wrath of the gods. For since friendship is especially important to Theognis, it is interesting to see that he considers it as sacred and as vindicated by the gods. The fear of the oath is also typical of the sixth and the first part of the fifth century (2). Some critics have connected 1.399 f. with the preceding poem. I should think that the distich is independent (3). However, it equally refers to the *ἀγαθός* and draws his attention to some very important things which he must observe. We may make the following statement. It is true, as Theognis observes, that the *ἀγαθός* will sometimes commit transgressions. At any rate, however, he must beware of the transgressions, indicated in 1.399(4).

LI.407-424 again form a coherent part, in which the relation to

(1) Carrière, Ed. p. 46 N 3 unduly finds fault with *τά τε και τά* in 1.398. The words refer to the *κακά* and *ἀγαθὰ* of 1.397. For I think that *κακοῖς* and *ἀγαθοῖς* must be referred to a neutral subject, cp. also 1. 1162 cd. The connection of these ideas with *ἐπεται* is not surprising, because in archaic poetry personification is applied on a large scale.

(2) Cp. the well-known example from Herod. VI 86, where the oath is in fact *ολεσθήνωρ*. For a different view at the end of the fifth century, cp. e.g. Plut. Vit. Lys. 8.

(3) The fact that the poem opens with *δε* in 1.399 is not surprising. We refer to O. Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heraklit (Leipzig 1935) p. 1, where several examples are offered of *δέ*, occurring at the beginning of a work. In Theognis the particle is the more explicable, because it may serve to connect the different poems with one another.

(4) I think that in 1.400 we must read with A (accepted by Diehl) *ἐντράπελ'*. Carrière gives *ἐντράπελ*. We must render the word «paying attention to something», «with due attention» (Liddell-Sc.-J. less correctly «shameful»). The poet lays stress on the fact that the *ἀγαθός* must avoid the wrath of the gods with due care and attention. *Ἐντράπελ'* («easily») would be less respectful with regard to the gods.

the friend is discussed (1). In the opening distichon Theognis says to Kynos, 1.407 f. *Φίλιτατος ὃν ημαρτες ἐγὼ δε σοι αἴτιος οὐδέν κτε.* «Although you are my most intimate friend, you have committed a fault, etc.». One would expect, because of the intimacy of the relations existing between both friends and because of the fact that Theognis is Kynos' preceptor that the poet is responsible for his pupil's faults (2). Theognis, however, absolutely rejects the responsibility for Kynos' deeds. The distich is interesting, because it shows the relation between the *εράστης* and his friend, at least in Megara. LI.413 f. reveal the genuineness of Theognis' friendship. For even when he is under the influence of wine and when accordingly the intimate thoughts of men are revealed, he will not say an evil word about his friend.. Likewise 11.415-8 show that Theognis is the ideal friend, to whom no other one can easily be compared. I think that 1.419 f. *Πολλά με καί συνιένχα παρέρχεται ἀλλ' ὅπ' ἀγνάγκης σιγῶ* must be explained with regard to friendship. For a friend like Theognis will be likely to give advice on all kinds of subjects. Therefore, he observes that he would be able to treat still more topics, but that he must be cautious in view of his vulnerable position (3).

Also 11.425-466 form a coherent part which is held together by the word *νοῦς* as the leading idea. We refer to 1.439 f., where a person is admonished to pay attention to his own *νόος*, and likewise to 11.453-6, where the defects of the *νόος* in some persons are exposed. Therefore, I think that also 11.457-60 which discuss the marriage of a young wife to an old man, must be explained in this way. They are given as an example of *απροσόνη*, the more surprising in an age in which one ought to be more thoughtful and sober-minded. The three final distichs of this section, 1.461 f., 463 f., 465 f. are closely connected with one another. First of all, in 1.461 f., the poet observes that a man must not exert his mind (1.461 *νόον ἐχε*) and strive after *απρηκτα*. The inherent conclusion of the distichon is that man must only exert himself for those

(1) L. 409 f. form an exception in this section, because they treat of respect, the most precious inheritance which a man can leave to his children. It is possible that Theognis has sometimes inserted lines on different subjects in order to avoid monotony.

(2) We refer to the fact that in Sparta the *erastai* were punished for the faults of the *ερώμενοι*, cp. Plut. Vit. Lycurg. 18.

(3) L. 421-4 are connected with 1.419 f., because both poems treat of the topic of silence and loquacity.

things which are of real value. L.463 f. then go a step further and observe that things of real value cannot be easily acquired (1). Thereupon, 1.465 f. present the final conclusion that man must exert all his powers (cp. *τρίβον*) to acquire the *ἀρετή*. The distichs express the leading idea of the section.

For it is clear that men who have brains and make use of them will exert themselves in order to acquire the *ἀρετή*. The admonition given here is very suitable as a conclusion and may be compared with 11.753-6, where a somewhat similar advice is given at the end of the whole section. The conclusion is the more interesting, because in the opening part of this section, 11.425-8, Theognis presents a very pessimistic view of human life. It seems that in this section the poet wishes to deal briefly with the whole range of human life and the importance of the intellectual capacities with regard to it. Therefore, in 11.425 ff., he begins with birth, and says, probably adapting an old maxim, that life is not desirable. Thereupon, 11.429-438 form a suitable continuation, because they deal with education. According to the leading idea of the section the lines discuss education or growing up from the angle of the *νόος* or the *φρένες*. We should bear in mind, when studying this section, that the above words not only denote intellectual but also moral qualities and capacities (2). It is to be understood that here, too, Theognis takes a pessimistic view and underlines the fact that *φρένες* and *σωφροσύνη* cannot be acquired by education. The two passages are thus closely related. For 11.425 ff. observe that the best thing is not to be born. 11.429 ff. add that even education can bring no relief, since persons of an evil character remain bad (3). We also see that in the well-known contest between *φύσις* and *διδασχὴ* (4) the conservative aristocrat

(1) See for this view already Hes. Op. 289 ff.

(2) We also observe that *φρονέω* sometimes does not indicate «intellectual activity» but sentiment or mood, cp. e.g. Archil. 68, 3. In Heracl. 22 B 17, however, it denotes intellectual activity.

(3) I cannot accept the explanation, offered by Carrière, pp. 224-6. I admit that Theognis does not deny the great merits of education. However, in his opinion, education is only profitable to persons whose character, is in reality good. Thus the young *ἀγαθός* can profit by learning, cp. 11.35 ff.

(4) The sophists and the adherents of the new ideas, on the other hand, prefer the *διδασχὴ*. We refer to Democritus VS 68 B 242 (cp. also B 33), to Antiphon 87 B 60 and to Kritias 88 B 9. For the meaning of the *physis* in this respect, cf. also F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945), p. 101, N 36 (bibliography).

Theognis gives preference to the *φύσις* (1). L.441-6 treat of the difference in mentality and character (*νόος* or *θυμός*) between the *ἀγαθός* and the *δειλός*. The former is characterized by resignation, the latter *ὄντ' ἀγαθοῖσιν ἐπίσταται ὄντε κακοῖσιν θυμὸν ἔχων μῖμνειν*. The passage is repeated with a slight alteration in 1162 a — f. Here 1162 d offers *θυμὸν ὁμῶς μίογειν*. The idea of a corruption of the text is, in my opinion, excluded (2). L.1162d offers an interesting

example of the archaic view of the thymos. The *ἀγαθός* can adapt himself to success and misfortune; the *δειλός* cannot adapt himself to either of these situations. In order to express this idea Theognis says that he cannot mix his thymos with them (3). In 1.443 f. the idea is, I think, as follows. The *ἀγαθός* remains steadfast (cp. 1.395 f.) even in his misfortunes. The *δειλός*, however, cannot remain steadfast (*μῖμνειν*), retaining his thymos (i.e. the same thymos) (4). The *δειλός* is either too much elated or too much depressed according to the circumstances; his thymos does not remain the same (5). In this section only 11.447-452 which deal with the relation to the friend remain to be discussed. I think that the meaning of the passage is that Theognis' *νόος* always remains loyal to his friend.

In connection with our observations on *νόος* we add that the person who has the right *νοῦς* is characterised by *φοονεῖν* and by

(1) It must be admitted that Theognis to a certain extent makes allowance for the influences of the bad example, cp. 11.305-8. However, one of his fundamental ideas is that bad persons cannot be altered. Thus e.g. the *δειλοί* are never thankful, cp. 11.955 f. and 105 ff.

(2) We observe that *μίσγειν*, which is uncommon in Attic, is not likely to be a corruption of *μῖμνειν*. On the other hand, *ἔχων μῖμνειν* is not likely to be a corruption of *ὁμῶς μίογειν*.

(3) To Theognis one of the principal characteristics of the *ἀγαθός* is the fact that he can adapt himself to circumstances. This may, however, lead to a frame of mind which is less recommendable. We refer to 11.213 ff. and 1071 ff., where the pupil gets the advice to acquire the versatility of the cuttle-fish. On the other hand, we must not forget that to Theognis steadfastness is also a characteristic of the *ἀγαθός*, see below N 5. For *θυμὸν μίσγειν* we refer to *οργήν συμμίσγων* 11.214 and 1072.

(4) Carrière, Ed. in translating «ne sait rester maître de lui-même» seems to take *ἔχων* as *κατέχων*. I think, however, that we must take it literally here.

(5) The *δειλός* does not adapt himself to circumstances. His mood is either above or below them. For the steadfastness of the *ἀγαθός*, cp. already Odysseus in τ 211 (cp. the explanation offered by Plutarch 442 DE).

σωφρονεῖν. While *φρονεῖν* may already concern man's practical conduct (1), this idea is especially expressed by *σωφρονεῖν*. For the *σώφρων* is the person who, by his practical conduct, gives the practical application of his *φρονεῖν* (2) and thereby he shows that his *φρένες* are sound (*σώφρων*). This fact explains that the word *σωφροσύνη* has a moral significance which has later on been limited to an even narrower sphere. The original meaning of the word is best illustrated by Theogn. 699 ff. In that passage the poet offers a catalogue of human qualities and virtues. He begins by saying in 1.701 f. οὐδ' εἴ σωφροσύνην μεν εχοις 'Ραδάμανθος αὐτον, πλείονα δ' εἰδείης Σισύφον Αἰολίδεω. We should bear in mind that the principal virtue is the *σοφία* which is highly estimated by Theognis (3). In this passage, this virtue is subdivided. For Sisyphos, though being *σοφός* (cp. 1.702), does not apply his *σοφία* in his moral and practical conduct. He is only cunning and not *σώφρων*. Therefore, he is preceded and surpassed here by Rhadamanthys who is *σώφρων* and is mentioned at the beginning of the Catalogue. The latter is wise and applies his wisdom by being righteous. In this connection, we may observe that in Heraclitus 22 B 112 the word *σωφρονεῖν* has been wrongly called into doubt. For the philosopher wishes to say in that fragment that the greatest virtue consists in the practical application of the *phrenes* (4). Accordingly, as we observed

(1) This has been pointed out by W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the early Greek Philosophers*, pp. 113 and 229 N 16. The practical meaning of *φρόνησις* can still be found in Epicurus.

(2) The word *σωφροσύνη* has been discussed by G. J. de Vries, *Mnemos.* 1943, 81-101. Snell, *Entdeckung des Geistes* p. 154 N 1 thinks that the word is first to be found in Alkaios 24 B 12, where, however, it has been supplemented. We especially point to the fact that *σώφρων*, *σωφροσύνη* are often found on archaic Attic inscriptions, cf. P. Friedländer, *Epigrammata* (Los Angeles 1948), p. 15 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ σώφρονος ἀνδρός, cf. also p. 79 and Nr. 136. For the practical meaning of *φρόνησις* cf. (at present) also *Hermes* 1952, 261.

(3) See above p. 70, N 3.

(4) Kranz' translation «Gesund Denken, etc.» is misleading. For Heraclitus is not thinking of intellectual qualities but of man's practical conduct. Also in Heracl. 22 B 116 *σωφρονεῖν* seems to denote practical conduct. I think that the idea expressed here in the word can be best compared with Democr. 68 B 40 εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθοσύνη καὶ πολυφροσύνη where intellectual and practical qualities are united. Originally, *σωφρονεῖν* may indicate intellectual as well as practical capacities. The context must make the meaning clear. Thus in Democr. 68 B 67 it indicates intellectual capacities. In 68 B 291 and 294 it seems to denote practical conduct,

already, we see that 11.425-466 deal with the practical conduct which is dependent on the *vovç*. Therefore, Theognis can end this section by pointing to the value of the arete.

LI.467-510 (522)(1) contain symposiastical poetry. In the first part of his collection, Theognis, as we saw, had to give important paraenetical admonitions to his friend. Therefore, he then did not enlarge on the symposion. It is, however, easy to understand that in the main part of his collection, he did not omit to treat of this topic so important to the ancients. In other parts of the collection, too, several symposiastical poems are to be found, as we will have an opportunity to discuss. It is interesting to see that when Theognis for the first time inserts a coherent piece of symposiastical poetry he gives very realistic pictures of the symposion (2). We also see that other persons than Kynos are addressed here. Thus we can state that 11.467 ff. and 11.511 ff. are successively addressed to Simonides and to Klearktos. These passages have given special offence to several modern critics; some of them have even thought that the historical poet Simonides was addressed here by some unknown poet (3). However, we must not lose sight of the following points. It is likely that Theognis had many friends and it is also understandable that in his variegated poems he had occasion to address himself to some of them.

II Kynos stood in a special relation to Theognis. For he received from the latter paraenetical admonitions which should regulate his conduct. Symposiastical poetry, on the other hand, has decidedly no paraenetical character but rather shows human life from a quite different side. We can even see that the boisterous revelling of the symposion was thought to be less becoming for a young man (1.1351 f.). However, if Theognis had omitted his symposiastical poems, he would have bereaved his collection of many lively scenes and witty representations. Thus we can understand that these poems in which the symposion was depicted in a realistic way, should have been directed by the poet to other persons such as Simonides. I think it possible that they may have been the poet's coevals and if they have been influenced by the

(1) LI. 511-22 are connected with this section, because they treat of the reception of a friend returning from a voyage.

(2) It is understandable that symposiastical poetry by its very nature tends to be realistic.

(3) Cp. Carrière, Ed. p. 110.

wine to such an extent as Theognis describes, they surely were likely to be «remnants of themselves». We must not forget that the miscellaneous character of Theognis' collection, in which severe admonitions are found by the side of exuberant and wanton utterances, would be unthinkable in a modern poet. However, they form the attractiveness of Theognis' poetry.

In 11.523-658 maxims, admonitions and observations on different kinds of subjects are given. As far as I can see, we can find no coherent sections here. It is understandable that the poet at the very beginning extolls *Πλούτος* (1), complains of his fellow-citizens (1.541 f.), deplors that no *ἀγαθός* is left (1.615 f.) and that *αἰδώς* has disappeared altogether (1.647 f.). These complaints are familiar to the readers of the collection. We draw attention to the following passages (2). In 1.579 f. *Ἐχθαίρω κακὸν ἀνδρα, καλνυσαμένη δε πάρειμι κτε* Carrière, Ed. p. 113 is wrong in thinking that the poet alludes to mythological facts. Theognis depicts a woman who is molested by a man who has less virtuous intentions. Therefore she draws her veil over her face and passes as

(1) Sometimes successive poems can be connected with one another. Thus in 11. 641-6 three poems deal with friendship. Since the final poem 1. 645 f. says that there are few true friends, 1.647 f. can be probably connected with it. For here the poet presents the same pessimistic view, when saying that *αἰδώς* has disappeared. We also observe that 11.595 ff. and 11.599 ff. offer examples of a false friendship. Thus it is probable that the *εργα* and *ὑβρις* of 1.603f. also refer to false friendship. In 1.541 f. the *ὑβρις* is also mentioned. Here, it especially refers to injustice and unlawful actions. This appears from the example of the Kentauroi and from the following poem, 11.543-6. For in this poem Theognis observes that (unlike his fellow-citizens) he must remain just and equal. Also 11.527-534* can perhaps be taken together. First of all in 1.527 f. the poet complains of the disappearance of youth and physical strength. Then in 1.529 f. he observes that his psyche is not slavish and that he has never betrayed a friend. I think that here bodily and spiritual qualities are contrasted. For though the body will lose its strength, the psyche remains stable. We again see that to Theognis the principal spiritual quality is loyalty to one's friends. Thereupon, 1.531 f. and 533 f. observe that the heart of the poet rejoices in feast and symposion.

(2) We draw attention to Allen's defence of the text of the mss. in 1.533 *νῦν ἀνλητήρος ἀκονων* (Rev. Phil. 1935, 290. The reading has even been neglected in Diehl-Beutler's accurate edition of the Anth. Lyr. Gr.). I think that Allen's position is unassailable. First of all we cannot see why an original *ἀείδων* should have been altered into *ἀκονων*. Further we observe that Theognis depicts his conduct at the symposion. He likes to be either a listener (1.533, cf. for a similar attitude Odysseus' words in 17 ff.) or to be a performer himself (1.534).

soon as possible (1). The following distich apparently forms a repartee by observing that there are loose women, too.

Interesting are also 1.637 f. *Ἐλπίς καί κίνδυνος ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὅμοια κτε*. Ordinarily, critics attribute here to *κίνδυνος* the meaning which it has in classical Greek («danger»), which is wrong. We must not forget that hope and *κίνδυνος* are closely connected here and that the word, therefore, must indicate something which is uncertain and may be either successful or unsuccessful. We know that *κινδυνεύω* also in Classical Greek has the meaning «to take a risk, make a venture» (cp. Liddell-Sc.-J.). Therefore, it is probable that *κίνδυνος* here has the meaning of «risk, hazard, venture» (2). The sense of 1.637 f. now becomes transparent. For Theognis observes that «hop₂ and risk are identical. Both are difficult gods». The above meaning of *κίνδυνος* also appears from 11.557-60: *Φράζεο κίνδυνός τοι ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ἴσταται ακμῆς*. «Sometimes you will have much, sometimes little. Therefore, you must steer a middle course, being not too rich and not too poor». The poet says «Taking a risk is always to stand on the razor's edge, etc.». In fact, if one takes a risk one stands on the edge and may either be successful or lose everything. We further refer to 1.1257 f. in the erotic section: *Ῥοπαῖ, κινδύνοισι πολυπλάγκτοισιν ὅμοιος ὀργήν, ἄλλοτε τοῖς, ἄλλοτε τοῖς φίλος εἶ(3)*. Hazards and risks are in fact versatile. For they sometimes favour a person, at another time they are favouring other persons (4). Thus the *παῖς* is unsteadfast like the *κινδύνοι*.

LI.667-728 mainly discuss the problem of *πλούτος* and *πενίη*, a

(1) Because the speaker is a woman she cannot defend herself but must fly like a little bird (*σμικρά* unlike *ολοῖνοι* who are not shy. It is well-known that in Homer the pigeon is an example of shyness). *Κοῦφος* is not disparaging here, but is suitable to the little bird. Cp. also 1097-1100.

(2) As I see, H. J. Mette, *Hermes* 80 (1952), 409-19 supposes that *κίνδυνος* originally has the meaning «dice». His hypothesis that *κίνδυνος* seems to be Anatolian is attractive, cp. *λάβρυς*. For *κίνδυνος* cp. also Fränkel, *Dichtung* 311 N 28.

(3) *Φίλος εἶ*, offered by Carrière (cp. also Diehl-Beutler) makes a reasonable sense. It would be equally possible to give *τοῖσι ψιλῇ*. *Κιμμερίοισι*, given by Carrière, is clearly wrong, while *κιλλονροισι* (Diehl-Beutler) is not attractive either.

(4) The *κινδύνοι* are called *πολυπλάγκτοι*, an epithet which in Homer is applied to pirates. Therefore, it is possible that Theognis alludes to risks taken by seafaring people. For the poem, cp. also Fränkel, *TAPA* 1946, p. 140 N 33,

phenomenon which was foremost in Theognis' mind in view of his personal situation. The section forms a proper introduction to the final part of the poem, 11.743 ff. In the opening poem, 11.667-82, the poet deplors the loss of his riches by which he is hampered in his political functions (1), a theme which is repeated in the following poem, 11.683-6 and which finds its climax in 11.699-718. For in this poem he observes that wealth is almighty and is appreciated most of all. It is interesting to see that in the following poem, 11.719-28, which forms the end of the section, a different view is defended by the poet. For here, taking over well-known lines from Solon (2), he observes that a moderate income is sufficient. For wealth cannot ward off death and illness. The line of thought is again typical of Theognis' polaric mentality and shows the turmoil of his inner feelings. I think that in correspondence with the end of the whole section, 11.753-6, the poet did not wish to end on a desponding note. Therefore, 11.699-718 show the climax of his pessimistic views about wealth, whereas in the final poem he discusses the question from another side.

Pessimistic again is one of the final distichs of this section, 1. 729 f. *Φροντίδες ἀνθρώπων ελαχον περὰ ποικίλ' εχονσαι, μνρόμεναι ψυχής εἵνεκα και βίότου*. In Homer, the psyche is lamenting (*γῳάσα*) at the approach of death, because she has to give up life on earth (77 856 f.

(1) The poet expressly narrates the bad political situation in Megara in the form of an allegory — the image of the state as compared with a ship is wellknown and occurs in other archaic authors, too — The allegory is given, because Theognis appears to be cautious, cp. 1.815 and for its explanation see below. We notice the same attitude in Hes. Op. 202-12. Hesiod hesitates to express his view about the injustice of the *βασιλείς* directly and, therefore, makes use of the image of hawk and nightingale.

(2) Whereas Sol. 14, 3 gives *καί φ μόνα ταυτα πάρεσην*, Thgn. 721 offers *καί φ τά δέοντα πάρεσι*. He has altered the original to bring it into agreement with his own views. For to Theognis it is a vital idea that man can be content, when he can meet his needs. We see that Stobaeus offers a variant *τάδε πάντα*, perhaps inspired by a reminiscence of Solon's text. It is possible that the text has been expressly altered in Stobaeus, because *τα δέοντα*, as only referring to erotic pleasures, seemed less decent. It is interesting to see that an Anthology such as that of Stobaeus rather quotes the poem from a well-known paraenetical collection such as the poems of Theognis than from the original text of Solon, though Theognis has falsified the original idea and has given it a strange turn, Horace, too, seems to make use of Theognis, cp. also Carrière 67.

and X 362 f.). In Theognis the sorrows are represented as winged (1) so that they can go everywhere. I should think that Carrière's interpretation of the distich is no doubt the right one (2).

Above we already had an opportunity to observe that most critics attribute the section, beginning with 11.757 ff., to a poet different from and posterior to Theognis (3). We may sum up the reasons which adduce us to connect this section with Theognis himself as follows. The section has again a solemn prooimion in which in 11.757-68 Zeus and Apollo and in 11.773-82 Apollo are invoked respectively. The poet addresses these gods in order to pray for the safety of the city and the welfare of the citizens. We can understand that the poet not only intends to address himself to his friend Kyrnos, but that he also wishes to impart his advice to his fellow-citizens in general. To Kyrnos Theognis addressed himself in his quality of friend and for educational reasons. To his fellow-citizens he speaks as a poet (1.769 *Μουσῶν θεράπων και ἀγγελος*) who is in possession of wisdom (*σοφίη*) and who wishes to impart this wisdom to his fellow-citizens so that they may profit by it (4). Thus we see that the opening poems, 11.757-68, 773-82 and

(1) I think that the distich draws its inspiration from Hes. Op. 90 ff., where the adversities are represented as winged. Theognis offers the original image that the wings are multi-coloured (*ποικίλα*), whereas one would have expected the wings to be represented as being black, cp. e.g. Synesius, Hymni IX, 44 *φροντίδας μελαίνας*. By it Theognis expresses very well the differentiation and multitude of the sorrows. One should also bear in mind that archaic poets have a preference for epithets denoting colours, see Simonides (e.g. Fgm. 13) and Bacchylides. I add that Allen, Rev. Phil. 1935, 239 f. offers *ελακον* for *ελαχον*. The suggestion is not attractive. Theognis' image of the winged sorrows reminds us of Fénelon «des petits soucis voltigeants».

(2) Carrière, Ed. p. 61 N 2. On *ψυχή* as used by Theognis in the meaning of «inner life» cf. 1.910 *καὶ δάκνομαι ψυχὴν και δίχα θυμόν εχω. Υἱζεψυχή* and *θυμός* are nearly identical. Thus Theognis testifies to the fact that *ψυχή* gradually takes the place of the Homeric *θυμός*. Carrière's interpretation of *ψυχή* «des aspirations profondes de l'être» is not correct. The word rather indicates «inner life» i.e. the fears, hopes, delights, disappointments, etc. *Βίωτος* indicates «possessions» a, meaning which it has already in Homer (not «la vie quotidienne»).

(3) Cp. e.g. Fränkel, Dichtung 515 and Carrière 144 N 6 (bibliography).

(4) We may compare Sol. 3, 30 ff. *Τὰ πάντα διδάξαι θυμός ᾿Αθηναίους με κελεύει*. In Solon's poetry, too, we find elegies, directed to individual persons such as Kritias, Minnermos, etc. and advice offered to his fellow-citizens,

11.769-72, are completely suitable for a poet who addresses himself to his fellow-citizens. This is confirmed by the remaining part of the opening section. For it is understandable that in a poem of the kind described above, the poet first of all expresses his love for his country, 11.783-8. In view of the opening distichs of other sections (cp. 1.129 f. and 255 f.) we expect Theognis to present maxims which concern those things that are most important in human life. In fact, in 11.789-92 he wishes above all things for arete and sophia, while in 11.793-6 he admonishes to wrong neither *ξείνοι* nor *ενδημοι*. It is instructive to compare these poems with the parallel passages in the other sections, 1.129 f. and 1.143 f. In 1.129 f. he had stressed the importance of *tyche* above all other things in human life. When comparing the two opening poems, we should bear in mind that in 1.129 f. the poet speaks to an intimate friend to whom one can speak without reserve. When addressing his fellow-citizens in 11.789 ff., the poet is more cautious and reserved. He represents himself as a typically virtuous man, to whom *ἀρετή* and *σοφία* are dearest.

Likewise to Kyrnos he had only given the advice to wrong neither *ξείνον* nor *ικέται*. For in the party-strife at Megara the aristocrats thought themselves no doubt entitled to make use of all kinds of opposition in order to crush their opponents. However, when speaking to his fellow-citizens Theognis pays attention to the relation to the *ενδημοι*. The remaining poems of this opening part, 11.797-804 speak of a man's reputation, a topic which is especially suitable in this section.

Perhaps one will adduce the counter-argument that nothing proves the collection to have been made by Theognis himself. For one may suppose that it has been made by another poet who was well versed in Theognis' poetry. In view of this I wish to draw attention to the following point. It is highly probable and, in my opinion, certain that 11.757-804 and 11.805 ff. must be attributed to one and the same poet. For just as in the first part of the collection, Theognis in 11.757-804 gives a general introduction where he speaks about the most important points. Then, in 11.805 ff. he discusses other subjects. In that part, however, the poet who is speaking addresses himself again and again to Kyrnos (cp. 11.806, 812, 817, 820). So one would have to assume that the other poet had imitated Theognis so closely that he had even taken over the motive of the allocution of Kyrnos. If it is argued that even this is possible, I draw attention to the contents

of 11.805-20. It appears that very evil circumstances have befallen the poet, who even wishes to die. One will have to admit that this representation closely corresponds with the situation of the actual Theognis of the first part of the collection. Therefore, I think that we cannot separate this section from the other part of the collection. We can even find a definite line of thought and a kind of development in the successive parts of the collection. We had already an opportunity to observe that in the section which was directly addressed to Kyrnos, the poet mainly gave poems and admonitions which have a paraenetical character. We can understand that in the section addressed to the fellow-citizens also paraenetical poems are given and that accordingly elegies from the previous section will have been repeated. This may account for the fact of the repeated poems, detailed examples of which will be discussed later on. On the other hand, one will understand that in 11.805-1220 which have no direct educational aim, the poet is more free with regard to his subject (viz. paraenetical poetry).

Thus we can understand that this very section contains a great deal of symposiastical poetry. Besides the symposia, the erotic relations to young men were very important in those times. Though the relations to Kyrnos were undoubtedly of an erotic nature, the poet has, however, banned erotic poems from the section, directed to Kyrnos. He has even separated them from the remaining part of his poetry and has placed them in an independent book (Book II). Thus we see that Theognis had a special reserve with regard to this topic and did not place it even on a level with his symposiastical poetry.

We need not be surprised either that in the section, directed to the fellow-citizens, poems often occur in which Kyrnos is addressed. For Kyrnos is an intimate friend to whom the whole collection is directed. Moreover one can understand that especially when very intimate and personal events of his life are narrated (cp. e.g. 11.811-820), Theognis prefers to direct himself to his intimate friend. One may say that he communicates the above events and the impression which they have made on him, by way of Kyrnos.

In my opinion, 11.805-36 must be taken together. Theognis begins by discussing the position of the theoros, sent to Apollo in Delphi, 11.805-10. It is understandable and in agreement with our observations on other parts of the collection that first of all matters of the gods have been treated. Moreover, this poem is particularly suited to the section, directed to the fellow-citizens. For we know

from other Dorian cities that the oracle of Apollo in Delphi had a great importance with regard to the government of the city and that accordingly the theoroi sometimes had important functions in the administration of the city (1).

After it Theognis at once proceeded to passages dealing with his personal circumstances, 11.811-20. It appears that he had had bitter and evil experiences which had been nearly as evil as death (2). Some kind of treason seems to have been committed against Theognis (1.813). Since he is cautious, he does not divulge the actual situation, 1.815 f (3). We must pay attention to the fact that these poems have been placed in the section, directed to the fellow-citizens. Therefore, it is probable that the poems allude to political events and to the upheavals during the party-strife. After these passages he again returns to general topics. Just as in the first section (1.131 f.) he first of all discusses the relation to the parents (1.821 f.) (4), to which he adds a distich on the relation to the tyrannos (1.823 f.). The reason for this composition is obvious. For to the fellow-citizens the relation to the head of the city is very important and, therefore, this topic is immediately treated after the distich on the parents. LI. 831-6 again treat of personal circumstances and the loss of Theognis' possessions.

In the following section, 11.837-872, first of all three poems on the symposion and the power of the wine are offered, 11.837-44. Thereupon some general topics are treated which were foremost in Theognis' mind. The poet deals with the relation to the *δήμος* (5), to friends and companions (6), and characterises the *δελιοί*.

(1) For the importance of the Delphic oracle for the government of Sparta, we refer to Tyrt. 3a and 3b. Further we observe that in the neighbouring Dorian Aigina the annual official functionaries had the name of «theoroi», cp. e.g. Gnomon 1942, 302.

(2) For contrasting statements which are, as we saw, peculiar of Theognis, we refer to 1.811 as compared with 1.820.

(3) We refer to our observations on 11. 667-82, cf. p. 97 Ni

(4) See another aristocratic poet Pind. Isthm. 1, 5 *τί φίλτερον κεδνὸν τοκέων ἀγαθοῖς*. For the placing of these topics at the beginning of a section, cp. also below p. 112.

(5) It may seem surprising that in 11. 847-50 the poet violently inveighs against the *δήμος*, since this section, as we observed above, was directed to the fellow-citizens. We must consider, however, that the poem does not occur in the introductory part of the section.

(6) Carrière, Ed. p. 123 takes the view that 11. 861-4 contain a riddle. I think that he is right and that this view cannot be called into doubt. The preceding poem

Thereupon 11.873-88 (or 894) present symposiastical poetry (cp. also Carrière, Ed. p. 124 f.). The poet very well characterises the various moods of the symposion. The opening poem, 11.873-6 *Οἶνε, τὰ μὲν αἰαλίο, τὰ δὲ μέμφομαι... εὐθλόν καὶ κακόν ἴσα* is very moderate; the poet speaks in decent terms about the wine. Soon, however, the real sentiments of the companions, who are assembled at the symposion, come to the fore. Already in 1.877 f. he gives the advice to enjoy life. In 1.885 f. the companions at the symposion set aside all thoughts of war and in 1.887 f. the merriment and elation are so general that they do not even pay attention to the call to battle (1). The utterance gets a personal turn, because Theognis has lost his fields, and thus has no reason to exert himself for the defence of his country (2).

It is remarkable that the careless utterance is directly contradicted by 1.889 f. We must not only take into account Theognis' polaric mentality but also his aristocratic sense of honour. 11.887 f. were inserted by him, because they excellently characterised the carelessness of the symposion. They were directly contradicted, lest any one should misunderstand the poet's feelings and should doubt his honour.

Symposiastical poetry is also to be found in the majority of the poems, contained in 11.939-1022. In the opening poem, 11.939-42, the poet excuses himself and says that his voice will not be clear, since he is still feeling the after-effects of the symposion of yesterday-evening. By this excuse Theognis intends to win the favour of the public. Thereupon, in 1.943 f. he takes his place at the side of the flute-player and invokes the gods. It is obvious that he begins his declamation.

11.857-60, had exposed the instability of friends. It is understandable that in the following poem Theognis seemingly continues this topic and even repeats part of a previous line (1.575) in order to deceive his hearers. Carrière thinks that the moon has been meant and I admit that this is the most obvious interpretation. I only think that the «friends» do not indicate worshippers of the moon but rather the sun. (For the theory that the moon receives its light from the sun, cp. Thales VS 3 A 6 and Anaximenes 13 A 16). For the sun betrays the moon *ἀνδρῶν φαινόμενον* i.e. when the day begins and men awake, cp. He. Op. 580 *ἥώς, ἣ τε φανεῖσα πολέας ἐπέβησε κελενθον ἀνθρώπων*. We may observe that in reality the riddle is only applicable to the full moon. In this connection, I refer to Horn. Hymn 32. In this poem, which is addressed to Selene, the poet is also forced to represent the goddess as the full moon (cp. 1. 11).

(1) Cp. for a similar statement 1.1044 f.

(2) It is also possible that the poet is banished, cp. 11.1209 f. and 1211 ff.

LI.945-8 then say that Theognis is following the right road, respects his country, etc. The lines serve as an introduction to the public. For when beginning his declamations, the poet says that his principles are honourable. In accordance with this we must explain 11.949-54 as an introduction and information to the public about Theognis' personal situation. By way of different images the poet says that he has exerted himself to the utmost, but has not enjoyed the fruit of his exertions. The lines are especially suitable to Theognis' circumstances. For as far as we can judge from his poems, he has taken a lively part in the internal quarrels at Megara and has been a loyal companion to his partisans. It is clear, however, that the aristocrats have lost the battle and that Theognis has lost his possessions. When Theognis speaks about his principles, 11.945 ff. he could do so openly. When speaking, however, about his personal circumstances and adventures he expressly makes use of a *γρίφος*, a device popular in those times. LI.959-70 then discuss the relation to others. Carrière, Ed. p. 71 N I is again right, when interpreting the *κρήνη* in 11.959-62 as the *ερώμενος* of the poet who has deceived him. We may compare for this the following poem, 11.963-70 which equally deals with an unfaithful friend whose true character has revealed itself by experience (1). Again the poet expressly makes use of a *γρίφος* to depict an erotic relation. As we observed already, in the first book erotic subjects are avoided (2). Where they have been inserted, they have been represented in the form of a *γρίφος*. On the other hand, sometimes seemingly erotical subjects are treated such as in 11.257 ff. and 861 ff. The hearers could not but think that in these passages an erotic subject was going to be broached and thus were especially attentive. In reality, they were cunningly deceived by the poet.

LI.979-82 wish for a friend who will not only be a companion at the symposion but will prove to be a true friend. In this connection, we must not forget that the symposion and the power of the wine wipe from the mind nearly all other things (3). However, one thing cannot

(1) In 11.963 ff. Theognis says that he first put trust in a person. Later on, when learning his *ῆθος*, he saw that the latter was faithless. In the same way, he says that he first thought the water of the well to be limpid; later on he saw it was muddy.

(2) Only 11.1063-6 speak openly of *ξυν ὁμήλικι πάννυχον εὔδειν*.

(3) We refer to 1.887 f. and 1044 f., to 11.1003-12 and to 11.1049-58 and also to 1.1041 f. poems which will be discussed later on.

be forgotten even at the symposion. It is true friendship (cp. our observations above on 1.413 f.). Thus we can understand that friendship is the principal device of Theognis' life. In 11.1003-6 a passage of Tyrtaios is quoted. The latter had said that courage is a *ζυνόν*. Theognis quoted the poem in order to say in the following poem that in reality merriment and enjoyment of life is a *ζυνόν* (1). Thus the passage excellently characterises the mood of the symposion. We may compare 11.1049-54, which also occur in a symposiastical section. The poet gives a paraenetical advice to his young friend *Οἶά τε παιδί πατήρ* (1.1049). The following poem then says, 11.1055-8 *Ἐλλά λόγον μὲν τούτον ἐάσομεν, αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ οὐκ αὖλει*. On both occasions the passages serve to indicate the exuberant mood of the symposion, where one does not attend to Tyrtaios' admonitions or to earnest advices. We can also understand that the section about the symposion ends with a poem taken from Mimnermos, 11.1017-22. For Mimnermos' poetry is characterised by its levity and was therefore eminently suited to conclude this part of the collection.

We observed above that the poems concerning the symposion, (11.757-1022) especially occur in this part. We can also see that the passages, expressing the brevity of life and the enjoying of the pleasures of life, mainly occur in this part (cp. 11.973-8, 983-8, 1007-12, 1013-16, 1017-20). This can be explained, if we assume that Theognis himself has divided his collection into different parts. If, however, the collection formed a kind of «Kommersbuch» and the different poems had been placed at random and fortuitously, the fact would be unexplainable. For then we would have expected that the above poems would also have occurred in the first part of the collection. One of the most typical examples which shows that a poem of Theognis must be judged according to the section in which it has found its place is offered by 1. 1041 f. as compared with 1.1217 f. In the first poem the poet invites his revelling companions to go into the company of mourners and to laugh at their affliction. In the other poem, the poet admonishes never to revel in the company of mourners. In my opinion, both poems must be attributed to Theognis. LI. 1041 f. are to be found in a section, containing symposiastical poetry. It excellently serves to

(1) For the passage see also Dornseiff p. 7.

characterise the utmost wantonness of the symposion. For the revellers have become so elated by the wine that they do not take heed of the rules of common decency. They want to stimulate their merriment by a very wanton action, since they wish to continue their revelling in the company of mourners. It is understandable that in another part of the collection (1.1217 f.) which has no symposiastical but a paraenetical character, Theognis gives an advice which is quite contrary. We may refer to a somewhat similar example which is to be found in 11.213-8, as compared with 11.1071-4. Both poems are nearly identical and give the advice to adapt oneself to one's surroundings. In 1.218 the poet ends by saying *κρέσσων τοι σοφίη γίνεται ἀτροπίης*, 1.1074 offers *καὶ μεγάλῃς ἀρετῇς* instead of *ἀτ ροπίης*. Critics have thought that in one of the passages the text has been tampered with. Thus Fränkel, *Dichtung* p. 518 N 17 thinks that 1.1017 gives the original text, a view which is understandable. For the idea expressed in 1. 1071 is much bolder and, therefore, seems to have been altered in 1.217 into a less offensive expression. Since, however, the word *ἀτροπίη* is scarce (1), it is not likely that such a word should have been substituted by a corrector in the text. The situation is explained by the context. 11.213 f. occur in a paraenetical section. Therefore, Theognis is cautious and compares *σοφίη* only with *ἀτροπίη*. 1.1071 f., on the other hand, form the end of a symposiastical passage in which poems such as 1.1041 f. are to be found. Thus it is to be understood that the more wanton sentiments of the symposion are reflected here and cunning (2) is estimated even higher than *ἀρετή*.

Another coherent passage is formed by 11.1081-1160. The tendency of the section appears from the poems which occur in 11.1082c-1102. For all these poems concern friendship. Since in 11.1109-13 the political situation in Megara and the victory of the plebeians are discussed and also in the opening poem 11.1081-82b the political situation is brought to the fore, we understand that by friendship in this section the political

(1) We may compare Democritus VS 68 B 100, where *δύστροπος* is used of the relation to friends. The comparison with Theognis shows that in Democr. the word must have the meaning of «intolerant, of bad temper». The opposite notion is given in 68 B 67 *ἢ τον ἡθεος εντροπίη*, cp. also 68 B 61 *τρόπος εντακτος*.

(2) I cannot accept Allen's view (*Rev. Phil.* 1937, 286) who thinks that in those times the meaning of «cunning» cannot yet be admitted for *σοφία*,

companionship of the aristocratic partisans is meant. We must not forget that amidst the dangers and vicissitudes of the party-strife the loyalty and mutual faithfulness of the partisans is of the greatest importance. This is confirmed very well by 11.1087-90 which contain a solemn invocation to Kastor and Pollux, the twin-gods, who were connected by an intimate friendship. The poet, while invoking these gods, is ready to expose himself to their curses, if ever he betrays a friend. Nowhere in the collection do we meet with such a solemn poem concerning friendship. Thus we understand that this passage will bear a solemn character. For it illustrates the bonds of friendship (cp. also 1.1083 f.) in connection with the party-strife. This also appears from 1.1085 f., in which lines a certain Demonax is addressed, of whom it says: *σοι πολλά φέρειν βάρύ*. For the latter only wishes to perform things which are according to his taste. We understand that the party-strife demanded heavy sacrifices and intense exertions. Therefore, a comrade who is not ready to endure hardships, must be rejected or scolded. Also other poems of this section show that unfaithful companions were often found (1).

Now the opening poem, 11.1081-82 b can also be more easily explained. For this poem is a repetition of a previous passage (11.39-42). It is understandable that critics have thought that some interpolator has inserted this passage here or that it has been wrongly repeated by a confusion in the arrangement of Theognis' collection (2).

In this connection we have to observe that Homer also repeated the same lines, if they suited his purpose. Thus Theognis may be excused for the same device which is the more understandable in this poet, since he does not possess a very fertile imagination, a fact which is shown by his taking over poems of other elegiac authors.

The above passage offers an alteration which shows us that Theognis has adapted it to its special surroundings. For in 1.40 he calls the potential tyrannos *εὐθοντήρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετερης*, whereas in 1.1081 he calls him *υβριστήν, χαλεπῆς ηγεμόνα στάσιος*. In the beginning of his collection Theognis gave a picture of the general situation in Megara.

(1) Thus it is probable that the *ὑβρις* mentioned in 1. 1103 f. concerns the faithlessness of companions (cp. for it also above p. 95 Ni. On the other hand, 11. 1104a6^{*} observe that the experience of the party-strife shows the true friend.

(2) For the repeated lines in Theognis, we point to Carrière pp. 41 ff. whose views, however, we cannot accept.

Because he is not content with the victory of the plebeians, he expresses his fear that the hybris of the citizens will be punished by the rise of a tyrannos. In that part he speaks in his quality of citizen and tries to frighten his fellow-citizens. In 11.1081 ff. he is speaking from the standpoint of his party. Now he is afraid lest his party should be crushed by the rise of a tyrannos, the leader of the hostile faction (1). The same observations can be made with regard to 11.1109-13, lines which have also been partly borrowed from the preceding 11.53-60, and which have also been adapted to the special surroundings. In 11.1109 ff. Theognis depicts the impoverishment of the aristocrats and the wealth of the plebeians who have been victors in the party-strife (see 1.1107 f.). In 11.53 ff. the poet had offered a lively picture of the previous situation and hardships of the plebeians, a description which is missing in 11.1109 ff.

The reason is to be found in the fact that in the opening part of the collection Theognis gave a general picture of the situation in Megara. In this poem, however, he lays special stress on the situation of the *ἀγαθοί* (2). Whereas in 11.53 ff. he took a special delight in depicting the hardships of the plebeians, he refrains, for very obvious reasons, from representing the present wants of the aristocrats and speaks of them only in general terms (cp. 1.1111).

The results of the party-strife have been disastrous to Theognis. Thus we understand, when he observes that his fate is now connected with the *πενίη*, to whose *ἀρχή* he is subjected, 1.1114 ab. The following lines, 11.1119 ff. and 11.1129 ff., seem to be of a somewhat different character, since they speak of the longing for youth and of the merriment of the symposion. The clue to these poems is offered by 11.1123-28. For here the poet wishes not to be reminded of his misfortunes which have been as manifold as those of Odysseus. Now we are able to understand the situation. Theognis, though in bad circumstances, wishes to dissemble his adversities. Therefore, he says in 1.1129 *ἐμπύομαι πενίης ὃν μελεδαίνων* and prefers to think of youth and joy (1.1119 ff.). One expedient is left to the poet and to his companions viz. to make the best of the situation. For the situation is, indeed,

(1) It is a well-known fact that in the sixth century the rise of the tyrannoi was often due to the fact that they defended the rights of the plebeians. It is understandable that Theognis sees in the leaders of the plebeians the future tyrannoi.

(2) We point to the fact that in 11.57 ff. the poem begins with the *δειλοί*, in 11.1109 ff. with the *ἀγαθοί*.

critical but not hopeless. In this connection 11.1133 f. and 1135-50 are relevant. For in the first poem he wishes for an end of the reign of misery and prefers to seek for expedients. The other poem has been inspired by wellknown passages of Hesiod (1). Here, Hope is celebrated as the great goddess. The other goddesses Πίσσης and Σωφροσύνη have left the earth; only Hope has been left. The poem is a true reflection of Theognis' circumstances and gives a new and interesting turn to the Hesiodic original. In fact, for the defeated aristocrats hope is the only device. The closing distichs then again come back to the leading themes, friendship and wealth.

We come back to 11.1123 ff., because we cannot agree with the explanations, offered by Carrière, Ed. p. 128 f. Two things are mentioned of Odysseus. He has killed the suitors and he has gone to the house of Hades. It is understandable that in Odysseus' wanderings the imagination of posterity was mostly captivated by his descent to Hades. In 1.1124 the text says: *Ἀἶδεω μέγα ὀώμ⁵ ἤλυθεν* he went to the large house of Hades, *εἰζαναδύς* «being saved from it» i.e. and was saved from it (2). Just as Odysseus went to the house of Hades and was saved from it, Theognis and his companions have to bend under the yoke of their adversaries but hope for victory (3).

L.1160a-1178b again seem to offer a coherent passage which is closely connected with the section discussed just now. The clue to this section is offered by 1.1161 f., lines which repeat and vary an idea which had already been expressed in 1.409 f. In the latter passage Theognis had given a general maxim: *Οὐδένα θησανρόν παισὶν καταθήσει ἀμείνω αἰδοῦς, ἢτ' ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, Κόρν/ επεται*. L.1161 is a

(1) Theognis has followed two different passages viz. Op. 197 ff. and Op. 90 ff.

(2) We should bear in mind that the Partic. Aorist, on principle does not indicate time; in this passage it does not refer to preceding facts.

(3) In 1.1128 τε is especially vexing. However, I do not believe that the poem is incomplete. In my opinion, it is rounded off. For it says that Odysseus went to Hades and that Penelope waited for him, while he went to Hades. I suppose that metrical necessities have prompted Theognis to a less advisable construction.

One should think that he wishes to connect *γῆς μυχοῦς* and *δειμαλέονς μυχοῦς* i.e. ⁵ *Ἀἶδεω μυχοῦς*. Thus τε γῆς is given for metrical reasons instead of γῆς τ\ I only venture to give this solution, because in other places, too, Theognis' diction is careless. I refer to 11.1160ab and to 1.1161, where for metrical reasons he had admitted faulty constructions (*τίΟεσο* and *καταβήσειν*). For another solution, cf. Allen, Rev. Phil. 1935, 241. Allen reads γας (Accus. Plur).

repetition of 1.409(1). The following line then says *αἰτοῦσιν δ' ἄγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, Κύνε, δίδον*. The poems differ in that 1.1161 f. do not offer a general maxim. For the idea that *αἰδώς* is a fine heritage to one's children (1.409 f.) is eminently suitable to paraenetical poetry. On the other hand, the view that a man should not spend his money in behalf of his children, but should rather leave it to the *ἄγαθοί* is peculiar and cannot be called ethical. Therefore, the distich can only be explained as an adaptation, purposely made for the context (2). If we look over the whole section, we see that the poet sometimes refers to the *ἄγαθοί* with special praise. Thus in 1.1165 f. the reader is admonished to have intercourse with them, in 1.1167 f. their words and deeds are praised, while in 1.1163 f. likewise the *συνετοί* are praised. If we compare the preceding section (11.1081-1160), we can get a proper idea of the tendency of the section which we are now discussing. For the preceding section draws our attention to the fact that Theognis and his companions have been defeated and have lost their wealth. They retain, however, an advantage, since they belong to the *ἄγαθοί*, as Theognis often states in his collection. Now it is a common reaction in a person to consider his position from a more idealistic stand-point in proportion as his material prospects are less favourable. This is confirmed by the section under review. For it is destined to present an ideal image of the *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός*.

Thus 11.1162 a-f repeat a previous poem in which the difference between the *εσθλός* and the *δειλός* is expressed very clearly. LI, 1163 f. say that the actions of the *συνετοί* i.e. the *ἄγαθοί* are controlled by their mind (3). LI. 1164 a-d give the image of the ideal friend

(1) We observe that *καταθήσειν* and *αμεινον* are offered instead of *καταθήσει* and *ἀμείνω*. The readings clearly show that 1.1161 f. are secondary with regard to 1.409 f., cp. rightly Carrière p. 51 and Fränkel, *Dichtung* p. 531.

(2) Stob. 3, 31.16 (Hense III p. 672) offers from Theognis: *οὐδένα Θεσσαρόν καταθήσει ἐνδον ἀμείνω αἰδοῦς, ἣν ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, Κύνε, δίδως*. The version is a contamination. Bergk and Buecheler wrongly think that Stobaeus had a better text than the mss. of Theognis. It seems that Stobaeus' source originally followed 1.409 f. and supplemented it in the line of 1.1162.

(3) For the interpretation of the distich we refer to Carrière, Ed. p. 81 N 1. We should bear in mind that the breast i.e. the centre of the body is the place where the *φρένες* are located and where accordingly all mental actions are supposed to take place. The *δειλοί* are characterised by their rashness (cp. 1.365 f.), whereas the *ἄγαθοί* only act after due consideration,

who is a real *ἀγαθός*. LI. 1164 e-h, which have already occurred elsewhere, are very characteristic. For the poet says that he can find no other friend who is equally loyal to his companions, as experience has proved, as Theognis himself. I think that the lines have been repeated with a special purpose. For Theognis gives us to understand that in fact he himself is the real or ideal *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός*. LI. 1171-6 praise the *γνώμη* as the most important quality. In the preceding section, in 11.1157-60 *πλούτος* and *σοφίη* were praised as the most important qualities. In that section Theognis who had experienced the loss of his possessions in the party-strife, naturally attributed great value to wealth which he placed on an equal footing with wisdom. In this section, however, where he is depicting the ideal *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός*, he wishes to stress that the latter is not subservient to material factors. To him the *γνώμη* is of importance. If now we come back to 1.1161 f., we can state that the sense of the lines is no longer doubtful. The statement is, in our opinion, extravagant but excellently expresses the tendency of this section. Theognis surpasses in it the statement given in 1.409 f. which was already idealistic. For here he says that the best thing one can do is to leave one's money to the *ἀγαθοί*. Thus he gives us to understand that the *ἀγαθοί* are the only men on earth who are worthy of attention and respect.

In the two final distichs, 11.1177 f. and 1178 ab Theognis, as is usual with him, gives the most important advice. In the first distich he presents a definition of the true arete which exists in avoiding the *ἔργα αἰσχροά*. With respect to these *ἔργα* one must remain *ἀπαθής και ἀεργος*. In the second poem he observes that man has the duty to endure (*τολμάν*) and to pray the gods for delivery. For a good understanding of these poems we should bear in mind that these poems form the end of the section which began with the solemn prooimion of 11.757 ff. This section, as we observed above, was destined for the fellow-citizens.

In the preceding part Theognis had given paraenetical pieces of advice to Kyrnos. In this section it was his main object to present to his fellow-citizens a view of his own life and ideals. Thus this section very aptly ends with the picture of the ideal *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός*, offered in 11.1160a78-b. At the end of the other section, Theognis had given in 11.753-6 an excellent advice for a young man viz. to practice justice (1).

(1) For the fact that the section is addressed to Kyrnos we refer to 1.755 *a hī tónōd' ἐπέων μεμνημένος*. This advice that Kyrnos must always bear in mind

In this part he presents his own ideals. The arete of the *άνήρ άγαθός* consists in the fact that he does not commit bad deeds and does not fall a victim to them either. The distich is a typical expression of Theognis' philosophy. For we have already seen before that the *αγαθοί* when they are themselves the victims of inequity, are apt to demoralize (cp. 11.383-92). This appears to be the highest level to which Theognis' (pre-Socratic) philosophy could reach. However, this distich is not the last poem of the section. For in the final poem, as we saw, Theognis points to the metaphysical side of existence (1.1178 b) and to its hopes.

We further refer to the opening poem of the section, 1.1160 ab, which is again a repetition of a previous poem, 1.1095 f. It is understandable that critics have thought that this poem is a clumsy corruption of 1.1095 f. (1). It says: *Ἦ νέοι οἱ νῦν ἀνδρες' εἰμὶ γὰρ μὲν ὄντις ἀνάγκη ταῦθ' ἐρδεῖν. τῶν μοι πρόσθε χάριν τίθεσο*. In the previous poem (1095 f.) he refused to give aid to one of his companions, because he had already aided him on a former occasion and had received no thanks for it. This time Theognis is addressing the young men of his time, when he gives the important section on the *άνήρ άγαθός* whom he represents as an ideal. He therefore, says: «*ὦ νέοι οἱ νῦν ἀνδρες*» (2). He himself has no need to perform those things. Let them be thankful for what he has done».

The meaning of the distich is obscure, unless we take into account the special situation of the poet. I think that he wishes to remind his hearers of the exertions and hardships which he has endured for the good of the city. His fellow-citizens must be thankful for what he has done already. He does not need to exert himself to become an *άνήρ άγαθός* (*εἰμοί ὄντις ἀνάγκη ταῦθ' ἐρδεῖν*). For he has already proved that he is such a person (3).

the admonitions given by his friend, is very suitable, when taken as a final word directed to Kynos.

(1) Cp. Carrière, Ed. p. 80 N 2 whose explanation is wrong. It seems that the elder and experienced poet is speaking to the younger citizens.

(2) Theognis is addressing himself to the young men who will soon be the future citizens. Though we know from Diog. VIII, 1,10 that Pythagoras is said to have defined the full-grown man as *νεηνίης*, this view must be discarded here as for the interpretation of *νέοι*.

(3) For the careless construction of *τίθεσο*, cf. above p. 108 N 3,

In my opinion, with 1.1179 a new section begins which runs as far as 1.1220. This brief section is meant to serve as a conclusion to the whole collection of the poems which are contained in book I. It is to be expected that the poet, just as he has given an independent introductory section, will also give a separate concluding section. In this connection we refer to the two opening poems which respectively treat of the relation to the gods (1.1179 f.) and to the tyrannos (1.1181 f.). We refer to previous observations to explain the fact that in an opening part the gods and the tyrannos are likely to be mentioned (1). Then

1.1184 ab offer a repetition of a previous distich which concerns the reputation of a man with his fellow-citizens. This topic was important to Theognis and has already been touched upon in the prooimion,

II.23-6. Further, some general themes are treated such as the excellence of the *vovς* (1.1185 f.), which was also a topic dear to Theognis. 1.1195 f. give the advice not to take a false oath or to deceive a person by fraudulent actions. This general observation on human conduct is the only advice of this kind which is given in this section. This is understandable, because the section is concise. In the remaining part in 1.1207 f. mention is made of the *κώμος* and the symposion. Thus we may expect to meet with symposiastical poetry in this section. I think that the symposiastical poems extend from 1.1203 to 1.1218. In the opening poem Theognis says that he will not go to a tyrannos nor invite him. The tyrannos is the most important person in the city. It is to be understood that in the opening poem the poet refers to him and says that he will not go to his symposion. I think that it is clear that 1.1211-16 must also be placed at the symposion. For Theognis has been ranted at the symposion by a slavewoman (2) because of his less enviable social situation. Also 1.1209 f. in which the poet introduces himself (3) are to be placed at a symposion. The end is formed by 1.1218 f. in which lines Theognis gives the serious advice not to trouble the sorrow of mourners. If one compares this section with previous symposiastical sections, one is struck by the dignified and solemn tone of this part.

(1) See our observations on 11. 821-4 (above p. 101).

(2) We may compare Odysseus' altercation with Melantho. Apparently one of the servants has been so bold as to abuse the poet.

(3) Carrière has rightly observed that Theognis refers to Odysseus' surname Aithoon. Perhaps Theognis does not mention his real name because of his position as an exile.

Wanton utterances such as occur in the other symposiastical sections do not occur here. It is quite natural that the poet should give a solemn character to the closing section of his collection. We also observe that the symposiastical section forms the end of the whole section and is only followed by a closing distich. This fact is also easy to understand, because the symposiastical poetry forms the least dignified part of Theognis' work. Between the general and the symposiastical part,

11.1197-1202 are placed which complain of the loss of Theognis' former possessions (1). Further 11.1187-90 and 1191-4 discuss the inevitability of one's fate and the wish for a little happiness in life. In both poems the brevity of human life is touched upon. Differently, however, from previous occasions the thought of the brevity of life is not used as an incitement to pleasure. As we already observed, we can see that the tone of this part remains solemn. If we survey the general section,

11.1179-96, we see that its division is in keeping with Theognis' usual practice. For 11.1181-84 b concern the relation to the citizens. Then one of the most important things in human life (this time the *vous*) is mentioned in 1.1185 f. Thereupon 11.1187-94 give general observations on human fate, while the section very aptly ends with an advice for the ethical conduct (cp. for a similar conclusion of a section 1.753-6). The closing distich 1.1220 f. makes a strange impression, especially if we bear in mind that it is destined to form the end of the whole collection of book I. For it only says that it is difficult to deceive an enemy and easy to deceive a friend. When comparing the other closing distichs of the different parts of Theognis' collection, one would have expected the poet to have extolled here the importance of arete or something of the kind. One might suppose that the text has been corrupted and that authentic passages have been left out. For it is well-known that especially the end of a work was

(1) At the end of the poem the *ναντιλίη* is mentioned (For *τῆς ἀλλῆς μνηστῆς*, cf. a suggestion, offered by Allen, *Rev. Phil.* 1935, 242). I cannot accept Carrière's view (Ed. p. 83 N 1) when the latter thinks that the text of the poem is incomplete. Since we are little acquainted with Theognis' personal adventures, we are at a loss to reconstruct the events of his life. It might be that after the loss of his possessions he has like Solon tried his fortunes at sea. In this connection we may point to 1.1375 f., where the man who, when being in love, is not at sea, is called happy. We also refer to the *κίνδυνοι τιολύπλαγκτοι* which may refer to dangers at sea,

particularly liable to corruption and omission. However, the text is sane. For to Theognis friendship is the most important experience in human life. Moreover, the collection has been addressed to an intimate friend. Therefore, the collection had opened with a section on friendship (11.27-128) and closes with a distich which also treats of this celebrated topic (1).

The statement is of importance for the textual criticism of the collection. For Athenaeus and Stobaeus have preserved a few distichs which are ascribed to Theognis and which have not been preserved in the mss. which contain our collection (11.1221-30 of our text) (2). Since Kynos is personally addressed in these distichs it is highly probable that the poems must be ascribed to Theognis. It is understandable that critics should have put forward the view that the lines stood in a passage which originally occurred at the end of the present collection (3). This theory is, however, excluded by the evidence. For we see that the section which was directed to the citizens, 11.757 ff., ended with a climax, 11.1160a-l 178b., in which the ideal *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός* was depicted. This section, which had a special character, cannot have contained the above poems. They cannot have occurred either in the section which contains 11.1179-1220 or in a section which followed it. For the study of this section has shown that after 11.757-1178b, the poet wished to add a final section in which the general topics, discussed in the collection, were again mentioned and discussed concisely. We also saw that the closing distich on friendship is completely suited to Theognis' mentality. Therefore, after 1.1219 f. no other distichs treating of other subjects can be mentioned. Neither can we expect

(1) We may also point to 1.1079 f. which is the final distich of the general part of the section, directed to the fellow-citizens (With 11.1081 ff. Theognis proceeds to the discussion of the party-strife and of the *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός*). In this distich, too, the relation to friend and enemy is discussed. With regard to the pessimistic tone of 1.1219 f. we observe that Theognis' character is pessimistic. For his pessimism with regard to friendship we refer to the end of the Prooimion, addressed to Kynos (1.253 f.).

(2) Among these lines I point to 1.1221 f. For I think that Alien's explanation in Rev. Phil. 1937, 286 is wrong. He interprets *λόγος* as «reason». Carrière's interpretation «La parole fait commettre aux mortels des fautes en faussant leur jugement» is not right either. The meaning of Theognis' words is clear. «When men's reason (their *γνώμη*) is troubled, their words become incorrect, too. The *λόγος* is to be taken as the utterance of the *γνώμη*».

(3) Thus e.g. Carrière p. 40 f.

that after the concluding part, 11.1179-1220, which, as we saw, was precisely meant as a conclusion, other sections have been added. Therefore, two possibilities remain. It is possible that the distichs had a place in some other part of book I. Or else we must assume that in antiquity other poems of Theognis existed by the side of those which have been preserved. Unfortunately the situation is disappointing (1) and darkness hangs over the abyss.

Between the two symposiastical sections, 11.873-94(2) and 11.939-1022, the section containing 11.895-938 invites our attention. The section is interesting because of the principal poem which occurs in it, 11.903-30, a poem which has been athetized by most modern critics (3). In my opinion, the athetesis has deprived the collection of one of the poems most characteristic of the poet's mentality. One of the main objections of the critics has been directed against the dialect and the diction and style of the poem. For it contains a few words which are otherwise only known from Attic. Therefore, scholars have dated it at the end of the fifth or even in the fourth century. In defence of the poem we may refer to the following points.

First of all we refer to points of correspondence with Hesiod which are to be found in the poem. We especially refer to 1.919, where the words *καὶ μὴ δόμεν* are to be found in the same place of the hexameter as in Hes. Op. 354 (4). This shows that the poet was most intimately acquainted with the works of Hesiod (5). Now already we often had

(1) Since the remaining fragments are addressed to Kyrnos, one would have to assume that this collection was also directed to Kyrnos. However, this seems to be unlikely. Suidas uncertain and not wholly trustworthy statement speaks of different books of elegies, but mentions only one book directed to Kyrnos. According to Suidas the elegies should have contained 2800 lines which is twice the number of the present collection.

(2) I take 11.891-4 as being connected with the symposiastical section. For in 1.889 f. the poet speaks of the defence of the country by the valiant citizens. The poem in question then complains of the loss of a city which has been ruined by lack of valiance.

(3) Cp. Carrière, Ed. p. 125 f., where the bibliography is given and the reasons for the athetesis are mentioned.

(4) We further refer to Carrière p. 165 N 4 who has pointed to the correspondence between 11.920-2 and Hes. Op. 361-9.

(5) We may refer to Apollon. Rh., in whose Argonautika also parts of lines can be found which are taken from Homer and which occur in exactly the same place of the hexameter as in Homer. We know that Apoll. Rh. was most intimately acquainted with Homer.

an opportunity to observe that Theognis was very well acquainted with Hesiod, took over lines from that poet and was inspired by the latter's ideas (1).

We further refer to 1.911 *Ἐν τριόδῳ δ' ἔστηκα. δν εἰσὶ το πρόσθεν οδοί μοι*. One is reminded of the famous image of the two roads found in He. Op. 286 ff. I cannot understand how Diehl, Anth. Lyr. 2³ p. 55, because of the fact that the image of the *τρίδος* also occurs in Plato and Xenophon, thinks that the elegy must be dated in the time of the philosopher. For it cannot be denied that the image of the «road» is very popular in archaic poetry (2). I would only ask how the critics who think the poem to be an interpolation can give a satisfactory explanation of the context. For it is clear that the distich, 1.931 f. refers to the same theme as the preceding elegy. Thus the critics must assume that passage to have been equally interpolated. I also think that the study of the whole section, 11.895-938, proves the authenticity of the poem.

Two themes come forward in this section. Whereas 11.1160a-1178a give a picture of the ideal *άνήρ άγαθός*, who does not admit of compromises, in the above section a moderate way of life is recommended (3). We point to 1.901 f. (Nobody can excel in every virtue) and to 11.933-8 (Only few persons unite beauty and arete). When considering this point we can say that Theognis in this section does not present the code of honour of the *άγαθοί*, but wishes to make general observations on a moderate way of life (4). LI.903-30 are

(1) We remind the reader of our observations on Thgn. 1135 ff. We further refer to Thgn. 401 ff. For 1.401 has been made after Hes. Op. 694, while Thgn. 403 *σπεύδει άνήρ κέρδος διζήμενος* reminds one of Hes. Op. 22-4 (*εις αφενός σπεύδειν*). We further point to Thgn. 383 f. *τοί δ' άπο δειλών έργων ἴσχονται θυμόν*, cp. Hes. Op. 335 *τών μεν πάμπαν εεργε θυμόν*.

(2) Cp. O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges*. One is surprised to see that also Carrière, Ed. p. 125 relates the image to the time of Plato. For the use of the image we have only to point to Hdt. II, 20, 1 *τριφάσαι οδοί*. For the fact that the Hesiodic passage was famous, we point to Simon. Fgm. 37, who imitates it.

(3) We remind the reader of Thgn. 219 f. and 331 f., where also moderateness is recommended.

(4) For the advice of moderateness as a characteristic of archaic poetry we mention Simonides' well-known Fgm. 4 *ανδρ άγαθον μεν άλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν κτε*. We may say that in this part Theognis follows a similar line of thought as Simonides, whereas in Thgn. 1160a etc. a far higher ideal is offered.

in agreement with this tendency, since they tend to inculcate the view that a man must be moderate in his expenses. In the second place, Theognis in this section stresses the advantage of a right insight (*γνώμη*). Thus already in the opening lines (1.895 f.) he judges a right insight preferable to all other things. Likewise in 11.897-900 whatever their exact meaning may be(1), observations on the *νοῦς* are made by the poet. Now we see that also in 11.903-930 man is especially in need of a right insight in order to regulate his expenses.

We further observe that the elegy has a somewhat pessimistic character which is in correspondence with Theognis' mentality and with the views of Hesiod whom he imitates. For this character we refer to 1.909 f. and especially to the end of the elegy (11.928-930), where the poet says that nowadays it is best to have *χρήματα*. We may refer to Hesiod's gloomy views of his own time in Op. 174 ff. (2). We also observe that the idea that only *χρήματα* are significant, is

(1) I think that the best explanation of the poem has been offered by Allen, Rev. Phil. 1935, 240. Diehl-Beutler assume a lacuna after 1.897. However, one will admit that the conditional clause of the beginning *εἴ πάντα χαλεπαίνειν* (codd. *χαλεπαίνειν*) closely corresponds with the closing line of the poem *μέγα κεν πῆμα βροτοῖσιν ἐπὶν*. Moreover, 1.897 which speaks of a *μέγα πῆμα* which would happen, makes us suppose that in the preceding lines something has been indicated or discussed which is very difficult for mortal men. Now 1.898 (if we accept *γινώσκειν* of A) speaks of «like knowing the mind which everybody has inside him.» We know that Theognis often indicates or deplores the fact that the knowledge of the mind of other men escapes us (cf. e. g. 1.117 f. and 11.119 ff.). For this reason I think that Allen's explanation recommends itself: «If everything were as difficult as to know the mind, etc.». Though *χαλεπαίνω* does not occur elsewhere exactly in this meaning one will admit that the meaning «to be severe, grievous, etc.» is identical with or derived from the meaning «to be *χαλεπός*» (I refer e.g. to Od. ε 485 *ζόρη χειμερὶν, εἴ και μάλα περ χαλεπαῖνοι* «even if it was very *χαλεπός*»). Accordingly, in my opinion, we are entitled to explain with Allen: «If all things were as vexed, as difficult» (Theognis adds «for mortal men», because the gods are better able to know man's mind). As to 1.899 we can either retain *ῥω τε δικάϊφ τω τ* ἀδίκφ* i.e. «by the standards of right and wrong» or we can accept the emendation *δικαίων — ἀδίκων*. In this case *εῖ γ μ α τ α*, I think, refers to the future and must be explained «the deeds which *δίκαιοί* and *ἀδικοί* will perform». For in Theognis' opinion, as his poems show, the dealings of the *ἀδικοί* are capricious and unsteady fast. Neither are the deeds of the *δίκαιοι* always uniformly righteous (For this we refer to our above observations on 1.83 cf. also 1.831 f.). Therefore, Theognis can say that it is very difficult to know them.

(2) We remind the reader of the fact that the thoughts which have been expressed in that passage of Hesiod have been taken over by Theognis in 11.1135 ff.

understandable in Theognis, who often speaks about the disadvantages of the *πενία*.

As to the objections, directed against the dialect and the diction of the poem, we have to make two observations. First of all we are aware of the fact that the vocabulary of the archaic poets is only imperfectly known. Therefore, we must be very cautious in making statements or drawing conclusions on this point. We refer to Homer, in whose poems words like *φνσις* and *λόγος* occur only once or twice. Critics have thought that the original poet did not know these words and that the passages, in which the words are found, are recent or have been interpolated, a statement which is quite unwarranted. I cannot understand how Carrière, Ed. p. 125 can take offence at an image such as *δάκνομαι ψυχὴν* (1.910)(1) and can ascribe it to the time of Plato. For the *psyche*, in the time of Theognis, denoted the inner life and emotions (2). On the other hand, we observe that archaic expressions can be found in the elegy. We refer to *αἶσαν ἐμμνε* (1.907) for «to wait upon death» and to *βίотου τέλος* (1.905) which does not denote here «the end of life» but «the whole of life, the course of life» (3). In the second place, it would be explicable, if Theognis had admitted into this elegy words from everyday-life. We must not forget that this elegy treats of one of the most ordinary topics of common life viz. the expense of money. We can see that in this elegy Theognis has presented his views in a very lively way (4). Thus it would not be strange, if in agreement with the lively representation Theognis had also inserted here more ordinary words or expressions (5). Thus it is possible that in 1.918 *ουπιτυχών* (cp. for the word Hdt. 11,1) is a more common expression (6).

(1) The metrical scansion of *δάκνομαι* in this line is less easy to explain, cp. Carrière 1.1. I think that we are forced to state that Theognis has admitted the abridgement of the first syllable.

(2) One can equally say *κραδίην* here instead of *ψυχὴν*, see Thgn. 1209 *επάταξε κραδίην*.

(3) I hope to be able to discuss this point elsewhere.

(4) We may compare 11.467-96, where the poet has also given a very lively representation of the symposium.

(5) We may compare English literature. There we see that romantic poets such as Wordsworth admitted ordinary words into their poetry, though their immediate predecessors had banned them expressly from it.

(6) Cp. also 1.921, where one of the companions is introduced directly «*Υπάγω φρένα τέρψας*. We may refer to 1.487 where we notice the same fact.

In connection with the lively representation offered in the elegy we refer to the beginning, 1.903: *Ὅστις ἀνάλωσιν τηρεῖ κατὰ χρήματα Θηρών* (1). I think that the ³*Ἀνάλωσις* «the spending of money» is represented as a concrete person. For this we may refer to Thgn. 1137 f., where ideas such as *Πίστις* and *Σωφροσύνη* are also personified. The *Ἀνάλωσις* is a dangerous companion who threatens to get out of reach (2). Therefore, one must watch it narrowly (*τηρεῖν*) and one must hunt after it or try to catch it. Now when a person is racing, he must perform the race *κατὰ δύναμιν* «in proportion to his strength, as far as his strength goes». In the same way one must take up with the ⁵*Ἀνάλωσις κατὰ χρήματα* «in proportion to one's money». If the *χρήματα* are in accordance with the *ἀνάλωσις*, she cannot go out of hand.

The second book, which contains the erotic poems, only has a moderate size (11.1231-1388), as compared with the first book. One might suppose that the book, since it has only been transmitted by A, has suffered losses and omissions. However, this view is less probable, because it can be proved, in my opinion, that both the beginning and the end have been preserved in the form in which the author has given them. For in the opening poem the poet addresses the god Eros and sings his dangerous power. Likewise, at the end of the book he addresses one of the gods, Aphrodite, and celebrates her power, 11.1385-8. It is in line with archaic mentality, when in a poem, which celebrates the power of eros, both at the beginning and at the end the relevant gods are addressed. We also observe that in the introductory poem Theognis had spoken in less favourable terms about Eros and had pointed to the havoc which the god makes. The poet's views are understandable, since archaic lyrical poets were especially sensitive to the unhappy side of love (3) and since the poet's own experiences, as revealed in book II, appear to have been unhappy and unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the gods of love are dangerous poweres, whose wrath it is not advisable to attract. Therefore, at the end of the book Theognis addresses

(1) ⁹ *Ἀθύρων*, offered by Carrière, Ed. is wrong. As far as I know, the word is only used of the playing of children.

(2) Cp. for the same image 1.927: *τα χρήματα αποδραίη*.

(3) Cp. Archil. Fgm. 104 and 112. For the topic, cp. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, pp. 66 ff.

himself with special praise to Aphrodite (1) and thus neutralises the effect of the opening poem.

As to book II itself, Carrière (p. 16 f.) has already rightly observed that it cannot be separated from book I. In fact, both books reveal a similar mentality. We observed already that in the second book the poet is in the main pessimistic. We know that also in the first book Theognis was mainly pessimistic, when speaking of his material circumstances or his relation to his fellow-citizens (2). The identity of the authors of the two books is, in my opinion, also confirmed by a study of the repeated lines. For the connection between the repeated lines which occur in book II and their original counterparts in book I is very intimate. If book II must be attributed to a different author, this poet must have been extremely dependent on and servile to the author of book I. It is much more probable that both books must be attributed to one and the same poet, who just as in book I has repeated in book II previous lines and has adapted them to their new surroundings.

We refer to 1.1243 f., which form an adaptation of 11.595-8. In the latter passage Theognis is addressing a person who apparently has wished to become his intimate friend. Theognis, however, turns him off: *"Ἀνθρῶπ'* (3), *ἀλλήλοισιν ἀπόπροθεν ὦμεν εταῖροι* and adds *Δὴν δὴ καὶ φίλοι ὦμεν, ἀταρ τ' ἀλλοισιν ὀμίλει ἀνδράσιν*. The words are ironical. The poet seemingly wishes that their friendship may last long. This will be only the case, if the person in question will have daily intercourse with other men than Theognis (4), persons who are more in agreement with his own character (5). In this poem the words *φίλοι ὦμεν* and *ὀμίλει* form a contrast. In 1.1243 f. the poem is adapted to the different erotic situation. The poet says to the *ερώ μένος*: *Δὴν δὴ καὶ φίλοι ὦμεν' ἐπειτ' ἀλλοισιν ὀμίλει κτε*. Just

(1) We may compare 1.1383 f., where the poet says of Aphrodite that she can give *λύσιν ἐκ χαλεπών*, with the end of the paraenetical part, 1.1178b, where he equally speaks of *ἐκλναις*, given by the gods.

(2) We also refer to 1.1266, as compared with 1.254, directed to Kyrnos.

(3) The allusion is despising, cp. Soph. Ai. 1154.

(4) We may compare 1.1208 *ἀργαλέος παρεών, καὶ φίλος εἶτ' ἂν ἀπῆς*, where the same idea is expressed. Of course, *ἀρπαλέος*, offered by Bergk, is wrong.

(5) This is the meaning of 1.598 *οἱ τὸν μάλλον ἰοαῖ νόον*. To know a person's mind is to agree with him, cp. Homer's *ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς* i.e. to be *ἀθεμίστιος*.

as in 11.595 ff., the other person has a character which does not please Theognis (cp. 1.1244). The latter foresees that the friendship cannot be lasting. However, this time the other is not indifferent to Theognis, since he is a *παῖς καλός*. Therefore, Theognis, when taking over the lines from 595 ff., gives them a different turn. He wishes that they may be friends for a long time, i.e. that their erotic relation will not be too short. Nevertheless, the young man must go after a certain period to other *ἐρασταί*, he cannot become an intimate friend. The two poems agree in the central point, the unfaithfulness of the friend. They differ with regard to the signification which is attributed to the word *φίλος*.

L1.1275-78b offer a fine description of the coming on earth of Eros at the beginning of spring when everywhere life awakens (1). Then, the poet takes over a distich from book I and says of Eros: *ἮΟσης σοί βονλენσεν εμεν περί, καί σ' ἐκέλενσεν οἴχεσθαί κτε*, lines which have been wrongly athetized by Carrière, Ed. The distich again shows the intimate connection between books I and II. In book I the lines concerned the party-strife and the unfaithfulness of one of the comrades. In book II Theognis places the distich in different surroundings. Eros, when coming on earth, brings happiness everywhere. Only to the poet he is unfavourable, since he gives an unpleasant advice to the latter's young friend (2). The genuineness of the lines is also proved by the fact that the following distich, 1.1278cd, which has equally been taken over from book I, offers a similar thought. In book I the lines (949 f.) had been used in order to characterise Theognis' efforts in the party-strife which had given him no profit. In the same way in the erotic domain Theognis has exerted himself, but has not reaped the fruit. Likewise 1.1318 ab are, in my opinion, genuine. In Book I Theognis had said in 1.1107 f. that by the results of the party-strife he had become a *κατάχαρμα* to his enemies. In book II he applies these lines to his erotic adversities. The examples offered up till now are instructive, in that they show that Theognis has made use of ideas and expressions which he had formulated for the party-strife and has applied them to

(1) *Χάρμα* of Edmonds in 1.1278 is wrong. Eros, the great god of sexual life, brings seed (*σπέρμα*) on earth. For he is the fountain of new life, cp. Horn. Hy. V (Aphr.), 73 f.

(2) The poem again shows Theognis' pessimistic character. For ordinarily the advent of the god of love is favourable to the suppliant, cp. Sappho and Anacreon.

his erotic feelings and adventures. We learn by them that the poet moved in a comparatively narrow circle of ideas. We also see that the erotic domain and the adventures of the party-strife are in the poet's mind closely connected. Or rather we can say that the feelings which the poet has undergone during the party-strife have made an indelible impression on his mind. Accordingly, when in erotic matters he meets with adversities, he is at once reminded of the bitter experiences undergone during the party-strife (1).

With regard to details we observe that in 1.1377 *Καλός εὖν κακότητι φρένων δειλοῖσιν δμῖλεις ἀνδράσιν*, offered by Haupt, seems to be the most preferable reading. The poet refers to the baseness of the young man, who is *καλός* and at the same time *κακός* (2). In 11.1353-6 Theognis says that love is bitter and sweet *δφρα τέλειος ἐγί, Κνρνε, νεοῖσιν ἐρως*. I think that the meaning of the passage is: «As long as love is perfect for the young man» i.e. as long as he enjoys his youth (3). L.1381 f. is puzzling. Diehl follows Bekker and directly connects 1.1381 f. with 1383 f. which is, in my opinion, wrong. We should bear in mind that in the final distichs the power of Eros and Aphrodite is expressly celebrated. Thus we need not be surprised, when in two different poems *Κνπρογενής* is mentioned. I do not believe either with Carrière, Ed. that the poem is incomplete. For since I assume that book II must be attributed to Theognis and not to different poets, I think it not likely that corruption should have taken place. Perhaps the following explanation may be given. «The bystanders thought that you went to the altar of Aphrodite, because you possessed a gift from the golden (Aphrodite)». One goes to the altar either if one wishes for aid or if one has received aid or a favour. Thus the bystanders think that the person has been successful in his love (4).

(1) We also point to the fact, rightly underlined by Carrière (cp. above p. 69 N 1), that in his erotic poems Theognis is decent. We refer e.g. to 1.1323 *μέριμναι Θυμοβόροι*, whereas Hes. Op. 66 speaks of *γνιοβόροι μελεδώνες*. For the specific character of Hesiod's Opera, cp. Mnemos. 1953, 272 f.

(2) In the same way Theognis says that he has been disappointed (1.1380 *ἀέκων*) and that he has profited by his ill-success (*ὠνήμην*).

(3) Cp. 11.1323-6, where the poet asks to enjoy youth and to be *σώφρων*, when he has grown older. We observe that in 1.1355 f. *τελέση* («to fulfil») is used in a sense, different from the meaning of *τέλειος* in 1.1354.

(4) We underline the fact that our interpretation is only hypothetical. For *δώρον* may for instance also refer to the gift offered by the sacrificer.

In trying to make some observations on Theognis' poetry (1), we can point to the following facts. It is well-known that our author is no great poet. Critics have diminished his reputation still more by attributing a great part of his poems to other unknown poets. We observed already that a certain want of fantasy and imagination is to be found in Theognis which makes him borrow passages from other poets or repeat passages which he had already given before. Two other defects are quite obvious in his poetry. Not only did he take over complete lines, but often he did this very carelessly (2). I also think that his somewhat more extensive poems are less successful.

I refer to the poem on ³Ἑλπίς, 11.1135-50. The poet, who wishes to give here some more elevated ideas, is largely dependent on Hesiod. In my opinion, he has not succeeded in surpassing the original or in giving a new and fresh picture. The poem remains flat, whereas the short distich on ⁵Ἑλπίς (1.637 f.) is more poignant. I think that Theognis' longer poems are most successful, when they treat of simple subjects or topics from everyday-life, such as 11.467-96 on the symposion and 11.903-30 on the expense of money. In these poems he can insert lively pictures and scenes. In the poem on the symposion he can consult his own experience. It appears that he has an excellent power of observation. In 11.903 ff. he enlivens the picture in many ways. Thus he addresses his own thymos, introduces another person, and presents the image of the two ways, an idea which ultimately goes back on Hesiod (3), but has been introduced here with success. When comparing these poems, we come to the conclusion that Theognis has less aptitude for the general and abstract than for the individual and concrete.

This also appears from the following fact. Theognis is the poet par excellence of the party-strife and of the symposion. To this he was excellently qualified by his emotional and, as I think, unsettled and inconsistent character. Consequently he often makes statements which are contrasting. In this connection, we have to admit that the inconsistency of the poet is partly caused by the paraenetical character of his poetry. For in the general paraenetical maxims, no doubt, the advice was often given that man should be moderate and should steer

(1) Good observations on this subject are offered by Carrière pp. 189-98.

(2) See above p 108, N 3.

(3) See above p. 116 N 2.

a middle course (1). Thus when Theognis follows the maxims, he says (1.1155 f.) that neither wealth nor poverty are desirable but that it is best to possess a moderate income. However, when he thinks of his own poverty, he cannot but praise the power of *πλούτος* and long for it. Thus Theognis' own wants have enlivened his poems (2).

The symposiastical poems, too, belong to the best parts of the collection. The poet has succeeded very well in representing the exuberant and careless feelings which were common at the symposion. His symposiastical poetry is much better than his erotic poetry. Evidently he is more familiar with the boisterous and careless way of life in which even human sorrows have been forgotten than with the scala of different feelings which form the content and accompaniment of love.

In his political poetry we are struck by the intensity of his feelings and sometimes by their naiveté. The latter characteristic is partly due to the mentality and morals of his age. Thus he is unfair to the plebeians, cannot consider them as fellow-citizens, does not even treat them as fellow-creatures. To Theognis plebeians are untrustworthy and have no knowledge of good and bad (3). Though Theognis is

(1) Therefore, it is understandable that the distichs of Theognis often show agreement with the maxims given by Democritus, cp. e.g. Thgn. 439 f. as compared with Democritus VS 68 B 80.

(2) As for other passages which contain true and personal accents, we refer to 11.347 ff., 11.825-30 and 11.1197 ff. Especially 11.825 ff. are interesting. Unfortunately they are less clear by the lack of evidence about Theognis' personal circumstances. Thus they may refer to the city and to the loss of part of its territory (Fränkel, *Dichtung* 522; Carrière, *Ed.* 122) or they may refer to Theognis' exile (thus Carrière 1.1.). It is also possible that by the *γῆσοῦρος* (1.826) the boundaries of the fields which have belonged to Theognis and to his friends are meant. Then the view of the fields which he has lost reminds him of his misfortunes and galls his festivities.

(3) Cp. eg. Thgn. 60 *οὔτε κακὸν γνώμας εἰδότες οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν* Jaeger, *The Theology of the early Greek philosophers* p. 233 N 58 interprets *γνώμας* here as «norms» or «standards» which is not completely right, in my opinion. We must take into account that to the archaic mind abstract notions are difficult to represent. Archaic man always has a tendency to make them concrete and thus he divides them into different portions. Thus Homer speaks of *ἀθεμίστια εἰδὼς* «knowing rightless things» and in the same way Hesiod speaks of *τα δίκαια*, cp. *Op.* 217 and 280. Snell *Philol. Untersuch.* XXIX (Berlin 1924), p. 34 N 4 thinks that *κακὸν* and *ἀγαθὸν* must be interpreted as masculines («die Gesinnungen der Edlen», etc.) which is, wrong. As to Theognis' views on the plebeians we also refer to the characteristic

only following the prejudices of his class and age, his mentality has its dangers. For the man who does not put trust in the persons who do not belong to his class, ends by being distrustful of everybody. Theognis' collection presents the examples of this mentality and of its excesses (1). We refer to 11.213 ff., where the pupil gets the advice to assimilate himself to the persons who surround him (2). Thus he will be inclined to conceal his real intentions, to be cautious and cunning even amidst revelling companions (11.309 ff.) and to be fickle and distrustful of servants and neighbours (1.301 f.) (3). Amusing is his argumentation in 11.383 ff. where he is sketching a line of conduct for his companions and admits for the *ἀγαθοί* the very vices which he has condemned in the plebeians. However, this contorted way of argumentation forms the attraction and originality of his poetry. One may say that in its capriciousness lies its effectiveness.

The dating of Theognis forms a vexed point, especially because the social upheavals which took place in Megara in the sixth century cannot be dated exactly or even approximately (4). The notice of Suidas *γεγονώς εν τῇ νθ' Ολυμπιάδι* (544 B.C.) is dubious, since *γέγονε* can have the meaning «he was born» or «he flourished». The allusions to the dangers from the Persians, given in 11.757 ff., cannot be set aside. Since *γέγονε* can have the meaning «he was born», as Young rightly has observed (5), Suidas may refer to Theognis' birth.

11.279 f. The plebeian has no true knowledge of righteousness, because he has no fear of punishment afterwards. It appears that according to Theognis the plebeian has no true knowledge of the gods. He only lives in the present.

(1) Fränkel, *Dichtung* 513 goes too far when he says that Theognis is opportunistic. The latter only follows and exhibits the views of his class.

(2) For this poem, cp. Fränkel, *TAPA* 77 (1946), 139 f. He observes that the idea, expressed here, probably goes back on older epic poetry (the Admonitions of Amphiaraios). We observe that in that poem the advice concerns a person who arrives in another country, whereas Theognis extends it to one's behaviour with respect to friends.

(3) The dangers of this mentality are not fictitious, as appears from Democr. VS 68 B 91 *Μῆ ὑποπτος προς απαντας, ἀλλ' ευλαβῆς γίνου καί ασφαλῆς*, where a more recommendable line of conduct is presented to us.

(4) For the dating of Theognis, cp. also Carrière pp. 8-13. The dating of Theagenes is not so certain as Carrière would have us believe, cp. RE V A pp. 1341-5.

(5) Cp. *Class. Rev.* 64 (1950), 15 f. The solution, offered here by Young, is more likely than Jacoby's and Pohlenz' hypothesis, who think that the notice of Suidas is untrustworthy, cp. Gött. *Gel Anz.* 1932, 431 f. The explanation, offered

However, in my opinion, it is impossible to state precisely at which moment between 500 and 480 the Persian dangers to which Theognis alludes were prevalent. A dating of these poems between 500 and 490 is possible (1).

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by Young, 1.1. of the elegy celebrating *τοὺς σωθέντας τῶν Σαρακουσίων* ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ is unlikely. For *γέγονε*, cf. now also Carrière REG 67, 40 f.

(1) Thus Pohlenz 1.1. dates this section of the collection between 510 and 490.

B. D. E. Highbarger, TAPA 68 (1937), 88 ff. thinks that the poems refer to the Persian raids of 490. It is possible that social upheavals still occurred at the beginning of the fifth century. We refer e.g. to Gnomon 1942, 296, where the revolution of Nikodromos at Aigina (Hdt. VI 88 ff.) is dated in this time,

APPENDIX I

Above (cp. p. 114) we observed that part of Theognis' poetry may have been lost. To illustrate this fact we add the following passage. An oracular poem(I), often mentioned by ancient authors, after having summed up the outstanding qualities of different regions : *Γαίης μὲν πάσης το Πελασγικόν *Ἄργος ἀμεινον, Ἰπποὶ Θεσσαλικάι* ends by saying that the people that has consulted the oracle does not possess any qualities of note at all: *ὐμεῖς δ'Αἰγίεες* (or *ὁ Μεγαρεῖς*) *οὐδέ τρίτοι οὐ δὲ τέταρτοι κτε.* As we see the name of the people has been differently transmitted as indicating either the inhabitants of the small Achaian town of Aigion or the city of Megara. The situation of the transmission seems to be as follows. The Hellenistic historian Deinias (third century B. C.), quoted by Schol. Theocr. XIV 48, mentions Megara. The same is done by Callim. Ep. 25, 6 who alludes to the oracle and by AP XIV 73 who transmits it. Clem. Al. Strom. 7, 111 explicitly says: *ὐμεῖς <5>εα Μεγαρεῖς, φησὶν ὁ Θεόγνις, οὔτε τρίτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι κτε.*

Ion of Chios, on the other hand, mentioned the inhabitants of Aigion. This tradition is also transmitted by Steph. Byz. s.v. *Αἴγιον*, by Suid. and Phot. s.v. *ὐμεῖς ὁ Μεγαρεῖς*, by Zenob. I 48 (for the other Paroemiographers, cf. Leutsch-Schneidewin on Zenob. I 48), by Strabo X 449 and by Schol. Homer Iliad on Ψ 6. We see that the true grammatical tradition, as represented in Phot. Suid. Paroem. (2), Steph. Byz. and Schol. Iliad (3) has preserved the real facts (4). The grammarians were still able to expose these facts which had been fortunately preserved by Ion of Chios. On the other hand, as soon as we have left this safe guidance, we see that we meet with the false tradition. This is strikingly revealed by the fact that even the grammarians (Phot. Suid.), though offering the true tradition, quote the saying in the form: *ὐμεῖς ὁ Μεγαρεῖς*. We also see that AP XIV which transmits a number of oracular poems and consequently gives the impression that it has consulted sources transmitting this kind of poems, only knows the version mentioning the Megarians. We can conclude that already in Hellenistic times the Megarian version was preponderant.

In my opinion, the origin of the Megarian version has been fortunately preserved by Clem. Al., when he ascribes the poem to Theognis. First of all, we know that Clem. Al. had excellent sources at his disposal so that his testimony is not to be thrown aside lightly. Further, the ascription of the Megarian version to Theognis furnishes us with the only reasonable explanation of this version and is, moreover, completely in keeping with Theognis' mentality, as we have tried to expose it above. For we have already tried to prove that the taking over and adapting of poems of other authors or of well-known maxims was characteristic of Theognis. We further know that, in his collection, Theognis often most vehemently rebukes or inveighs against his fellow-citizens who had banished him or at least had bereft him of part of his possessions. Thus a poem in which the Megarians were represented as being utterly worthless people, is not alien to Theognis' mood.

Therefore, I think that the situation is as follows. In archaic times (5) there existed an oracle given by Apollo to Aigion. This oracular poem was taken over by Theognis just as the well-known maxim on the temple of Leto in Delos was taken

over by him (cf. above p. 73) (6). Since Theognis was a well-known gnomic poet his version has superseded the original one. Thus already in the third century the historian Deinias (7) only seems to know the version mentioning Megara.

Two questions remain to be answered. The poem in question has not been transmitted to us in Theognis' collection. Since, however, as we observed, all indications invite us to ascribe the version to Theognis, the conclusion seems unavoidable that part of Theognis' poems has been lost. We already had an opportunity to mention other examples of this kind. Perhaps, in antiquity, besides the two books of Theognis' collection which have come down to us, another book existed which has, however, got lost.

We might further be surprised that Theognis should even venture to take over an oracle of the Delphic god and while altering it slightly, should present it as his own poetry. We shall fail to understand this, if we do not pay attention to the specific position of the archaic poet. For these poets such as Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, etc. in their quality of poets, are no ordinary persons but servants of the Muses who interpret and convey the thoughts of the goddesses. The archaic poet is a kind of prophet and his position must be judged from a religious point of view. When Theognis even takes over oracles and maxims which were thought to have been given by gods, he has not been actuated in the first place by the idea of «Je prends mon bien où je le trouve». Archaic poets such as Solon and Theognis had the intention of being admonishers of their fellow-citizens; they had superior wisdom (9) at their disposal, imparted to them by the gods. Just as the old-testamentary prophets warn the people of Israel, so Theognis warns his fellow-citizens and his dearest friend, Kyrnos. To this end he feels entitled to take over warnings or ideas on life in general, given by other poets and even by gods. Already Hesiod had said that the man who listens to good advice and, we may add, follows it, is to be considered an *ἐσθλός* and ranks next to the man who sees the truth for himself (Hes. Op. 295).

We must not forget that Theognis had to reckon with the possibility that part of his audience might already be acquainted with the maxim of Leto or the oracle of the Delphic god. Therefore, when he took over these maxims, we must not assume that to himself this was an act of plagiarism. We should rather assume that the poet, for the benefit of his hearers, wished to divulge a saying which he thought to be important. This saying might have been delivered to him by the Muses or he might have found it among the sayings of another poet or of a god. Whatever might be the origin, the result is the same, for by it the people are warned or get a better understanding of several conditions of life (10).

Modern critics have often been hampered by the fact that they judged the poet according to modern ideas. In that case they are seriously surprised at the fact that a poet should have committed plagiarism to such an extent. Therefore, modern critics rather assume that Theognis' collection is a kind of *Kommersbuch* into which poems of different authors have found their way. I think, on the other hand, as I have tried to prove in the preceding pages, that everywhere in Theognis' collection we meet with a person of flesh and blood, the historical Theognis, who must, however, be judged according to the standards, applied to an archaic poet.

Resuming our views, put forward in this article, we may observe that in the main section of his collection, 11,1-756, Theognis presents himself to us as the Dorian

nobleman who is connected by an intimate relation with his *ερώμενος*. This connection was a physical one, as cannot be doubted, but at the same time it was of an ethical nature. The aristocratic code of honour did not allow the poet to touch the physical point. The ethical part is stressed, since in exchange for the charms of the *ερώμενος*, the *εραστής* deemed it his duty to impart to his friend his experiences of life and to give him advice and admonitions on every domain of life. Thus we see the phenomenon, not altogether rare in life, that evil has engendered good (11). For Theognis' collection, though it is a document of the relations of persons of the same sex, a phenomenon for which antiquity was notorious, presents it from the ethical side (12). Thus it has preserved for us admonitions of an archaic poet and gives us an insight into the mentality of the aristocracy of the sixth century which but for Theognis we would not have known.

The second part of the collection, as we tried to prove above, is the part in which Theognis directs himself to his fellow-citizens. The Dorian nobleman feels that he has a duty towards his fellow-citizens. As a poet, a servant of the Muses, he must be their warner and comment on the events which have taken place. A poet like Theognis whose life had been rich in events during the party-strife, could not but feel impelled to address his fellow-citizens. One of the strongest reasons for which I think Theognis' collection to be his own work, is precisely to be found in this section and especially in the final part, 11. 1160a-1178b. In that section, as we tried to prove above, Theognis pictures the ideal *άνήρ αγαθός* and gives us to understand that he himself is to be identified with that person. The critics who consider Theognis' poems to be a miscellaneous collection will not be able either to explain or to obscure this fact. I would like to hear how they can explain why this very part is to be found precisely in the place of the collection, where we expect to find it, if the collection is the work of one and the same poet. In our opinion, the explanation is easy, because Theognis has the intention to give here the climax of his collection and at the same time the apotheosis of his own person as being the ideal aristocratic citizen.

The erotic part (book II) which ends the collection is less important, as we observed above. This appears already from its size, which only slightly surpasses 150 lines. Though critics have been and will be surprised at this moderate size and have tried to explain it away, I think that the transmitted text is genuine and finds its confirmation by a right appreciation of Theognis' character. In my opinion, he can be best classified half-way between Solon on the one side and Ibycus and Anacreon on the other. In erotic poetry he is inferior to his Ionian colleagues. Two reasons are responsible for the small size of his erotic collection : 1 Theognis was less gifted than the Ionian poets mentioned just now. 2 As a Dorian nobleman of the mainland he felt himself more constrained to and bound by his surroundings. The Ionian poets are free and individual poets; Theognis, however, is the representative of a caste. Thus he has to take heed of the feelings and scruples of his aristocratic surroundings. Therefore, in Theognis' poetry regarding the relation to Kynos it is only the admonitory part that comes to the fore. This is not caused by the fact that Theognis is ethically superior to the other poets, but rather because he is more restrained by the feelings of his caste and surroundings.

On the other hand, in the relation to his fellow-citizens Theognis is inferior to Solon. While the latter is above all the admonisher of his fellow-citizens, Theognis

here, too, is the representative of his aristocratic caste. Only the smaller part of his collection is addressed to his fellow-citizens (11.757-1178b), whereas the greater part is destined for his young aristocratic friend.

It is the friendship between the members of one and the same aristocratic, society that is of paramount importance to Theognis. Therefore, as we saw above (p. 76 f.) friendship and the relations to one's friend are discussed directly in the opening part of the collection, 11.27-128, before all other things, even before the relation to gods and parents. A collection which opens and closes (1.1219 f.) with the treatment of friendship clearly reveals the mentality of its author. Whereas Solon was above all an Athenian and might even be thought not unworthy of a place in Zeno's cosmopolitan state, Theognis remains first and foremost an aristocrat.

To Solon the relation to an *ερώμενος* is existent (cf. Diehl Fr. 14,5) but unimportant; to the Dorian nobleman it forms the most essential part of life. I think it is of importance for us to be able to connect Theognis' collection with a real person of flesh and blood. For it is only by means of Theognis' poetry that we get some idea of the mentality of the aristocracy on the mainland in the era preceding the Persian wars. Thus it is a precious document disclosing circles which would otherwise be unknown to us.

NOTES

- (1) For this oracle, cf. also Bradeen, TAPA 78 (1947) p. 238.
- (2) Paroem. seems to go back on the same source which we find in Suid. Phot. We can see how in our paroemiographical sources the original version has been abridged.
- (3) The bT Commentary of the Iliad has preserved many important and trustworthy material,
- (4) It is not to be doubted and has not been doubted by modern critics either that only Aigion can have been meant. Megara was an important town up to the middle of the fifth century.
- (5) Bradeen 1.1. dates the oracle in the seventh century. The views and outlook of the oracle are still largely inspired by Homer. Thus Thessaly is called Pelasgicon Argos in accordance with the Catalogue of B of the Iliad; the Lacedaemonian women are praised because of Helen. Further the Argives are mentioned as being eminent warriors, partly I think because Homer calls the Greeks Argeioi.
- (6) I observe that already Bradeen 1.1. surmised that the original version had been changed by Theognis.
- (7) In my opinion, Callimachus, too, who, as we know from other facts, made use of Deinias was influenced by that historian in mentioning Megara.
- (8) Cp. above p. 98 on Theognis' *σοφίη*.
- (10) One might object that Theognis stresses his own renown, 1.22 f. This is true, but one must not forget that also the poet who is inspired by the Muses may win a particular renown. For this we refer to Odys. θ 497 f. We also refer to Horn. Hy. Apoll. 172 f. The archaic poet who, no doubt, thinks that he owes his ideas to the inspiration of the Muses, says nevertheless: *του πασαι μετόπισθεν ἀριστενοῦσιν αἰοδαί.*

(11) In antiquity this problem was touched upon by Plutarch, *De sera num. vind* 7.

(12) It is interesting to compare part of Theognis' collection with» *Les faux monnayeurs*» of André Gide a book, which is also based on the relation between persons of the same sex. I should say that Theognis in the comparison gains also (but not only) on the ethical side.

APPENDIX II

I should like to add a few observations on 11.523-658, because after a renewed examination of this passage, I think that here, too, some lines of development can be traced. First of all, however, I wish to say a few words on the following point, the discussion of which may also serve to illustrate the above-named section. We know and discussed already (cf. above) that the two following points are especially characteristic of Theognis' collection. Mostly two successive distichs or poems must be connected. Often these distichs express contrasting views on the same subject. We also saw that lines or distichs which had already occurred in a previous section of the collection were repeated afterwards or given with a slight alteration. It is well-known that these points form one of the main objections which have induced modern critics to reject the unity of Theognis' collection and its ascription to one and the same author.

Above we already discussed the repetition of lines and tried to prove inter alia that especially the alterations were so subtle and precisely fitted for the new surroundings that only Theognis himself could be held responsible for them. Here we will come back on this question in connection with the other item. As to this first point, we tried above (p. 79) to explain it by Theognis' polarity which is in fact, in my opinion, one of the causes of this phenomenon. I think, however, that the occurrence of contrasting distichs may also be explained by the special nature of this kind of poetry. Theognis' epigrammatic poetry is often paraenetical but before all it is gnomological. Thus, as the name already implies, one of the main aims of this poetry is to make an appeal to the *γνώμη*, the mind. The poet may give an advice (paraenetical poems) and thus he may make an appeal to the intellect of his hearers who are left to choose the right way. It also often occurs that by his gnomological poems he intends to call forth the hearer's wit. In this way we can understand that in Theognis' collection puns and *γρίφοι* occur and that, as we saw above, sometimes poems are found which seem to be erotic but which have another meaning.

Thus we can also understand how sometimes puns occur in a section which otherwise only contains poems of a serious content. I refer to 11.579-582, two distichs which contain puns on a loose man and a loose woman and which are to be found in a section discussing serious topics such as the untrustfulness of friends, the bad conditions of life, etc. To our modern taste the distichs would seem to be out of place in this passage.

In this way the occurrence of contrasting distichs may be explained. The hearers wanted the poet to captivate their intellect. Therefore, they appreciated the fact of the same subject being illustrated from different and even from contrasting sides just they appreciated a poet proposing a riddle or singing a poem

to them which had quite a different meaning from the one it seemed to convey. In all these cases the poet makes an appeal to the wit of his hearers. Of course it is easy to hold a redactor of a collection responsible for the juxtaposition of contrasting distichs which he found in different poets. By it we are furnished with a satisfactory solution. But the other solution cannot be set aside either and at the same time it enables us to attribute the collection to the poet to whom tradition ascribes it.

The phenomenon is not confined to Theognis' collection either, but may be taken as being characteristic of gnomological literature. I refer to the old-testamentary Proverbs 26,4 and 5 where two contrasting views on the fool occur. In this respect, therefore, Theognis seems to be heir to an older tradition and, in its turn, this gnomological poetry proves to be the forerunner of the sophists who discussed all topics from two sides. We must not forget either that in Theognis' time poetry was mostly oral. If a topic was discussed from two different sides, it became the better illustrated and could be better retained. In this connection, I may also refer to Goethe's Venezianische Epigramme Nr. 38 and 39. Here, we have two epigrams offering contrasting enunciations about the legs of the Venetian dancer Bettina. If this practice is still to be found in a modern poet, whose public had written poetry at their disposal it is the more to be expected in a poet whose public had to rely mainly on their memories.

The juxtaposition of contrasting poems may also be a device which is welcome to the poet, inasmuch as it enables him the better to bring to the fore the idea which is exposed in one of the poems. I refer to 11.1003-6, 1007-1012 and to 11.1049-1054, 1055-1058. In these passages, as we observed above (cf. p. 104), Theognis wished to expose the wanton mood of the symposion. It is understandable that in 11.1007-1012 Theognis says that a thing common to all men (a *ζυνόν*) is to enjoy life and youth. However, the reader will admit that this idea is better brought to the fore and will be the better appreciated by the hearers, because in Theognis' collection it is preceded by a poem of Tyrtaios (11. 1003-1006) in which it is courage which is mentioned as the thing which is a common good (*ζυνόν*) to all men. However, we cannot say that Theognis has plagiarized by taking over Tyrtaios' poem. On the contrary, he has inserted Tyrtaios' poem in order to correct the idea which was exposed in it and in order to emphasize the idea which he himself proposed.

The same fact may be observed in 1.332 ab which form a repetition of 1.209 f. One would be inclined to think that 1.332 ab form a clumsy repetition of previous lines and must be ascribed to a redactor. In fact, however, the repetition can easily be explained. The lines contain a well-known maxim on the adversities of the exile: *οὐδέεις τοι φεύγοντι φίλος και πιστός εταῖρος τῆς δε φυχῆς ἐστιν τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότατον*.

It is understandable that this general maxim should be found in the section, 11.129-236, which, as we saw above (p. 76), forms one of the introductory parts of the whole collection. For it is to be expected that in this part general maxim? on exile, the power of wine, the excellence of wisdom should be given (11.209-228). In 11.332 ab they are repeated by way of contrast to 11.333 f. At the same time, it appears that 1.332 ab are genuine, for, as we know, contrasting distichs often occur in Theognis' collection. This time the poet wishes to show the different aspects of exile and to make it clear that the exiles, too, have their faults. The second distich, 1.333 f., which speaks of the faults of the exiles and says that they do not remain the

same (humble and kind) persons, after they have been restored to their original position, reveals a keen insight and is worthy of a poet who wishes to reveal his wisdom. However, one will admit that the isolation of this utterance would have been less prudent. For in that case the distich would have attacked persons who were already in a less enviable position. However, since the poet caused it to be preceded by 1.332 ab, it became acceptable. Now we see that the poet feels sympathy for the exiles, but does not forget their faults. Thus we see that the repetition of a distich in this place is wholly accounted for and may be excused.

The same holds good for 1.211 f, repeated as 1.509 f. A general maxim on the power of wine occurs in the introductory part (211 f.). It is repeated in 1. 509 f. in order to give a contrast with 11.503-508 where the effects of inebriety had been pictured. One will admit the suitability at this moment of a distich observing that wine, when moderately used, is good (1.509 f.).

As for repeated lines I should like to discuss 1.115 f. repeated as 1.643 f., because this time the alteration of the distich is somewhat more incisive and since the situation is the reverse of that which was found in the two preceding examples. L. 115 f. say:

*Πολλοί τοι πόσιος και βρώσιός εἰσιν εταῖροι
ἐν δε σπονδαίῳ πρήγματι πανρότεροι*

1.643 f. offer: *Πολλοί πάρ κρητήρι φίλοι γίνονται εταῖροι κτε.*

I believe that this time the original version of the maxim is to be found in 1.643 f. One will admit that the distich contains a contrast. On the one hand, we have the *σπονδαῖον πρήγμα*, in which we have few friends; on the other hand, we have the *πρήγμα* which is not *σπονδαῖον* in which we have many friends. Nobody will deny that a typical thing which is not *σπονδαῖον* is the symposion. It is a common truth that friends in the wine are no durable friends. On the other hand, food and drink (1.115) form the main substance of life. So we do not think of them in the first place, when a thing which is not *σπονδαῖον* is mentioned.

One might object that 1.115 f. occur in the introductory part and consequently are likely to be original there. However, we remind the reader of the fact that we subdivided this part into two sections (p. 76). Only the second section, 11.129-236, contained general maxims; however, the section in which our distich occurs, 1. 127-128, discusses the relations to friends and citizens and does not contain general maxims. It occurs more precisely in a passage, 11.101-128, in which the *δελιοί*, the plebeian citizens of Megara, are pictured. In 1.113 f. the poet had given the advice to avoid the *δελιοί* at all costs, 1.115 f. offers a characterisation of the *δελιοί*: «Most men (i.e. the *δελιοί*) are our friends, when they can eat and drink with us (and one may add «at our expense»), but in times when we want them most they forsake us». The fact that a person is only a friend at the symposion and not in times of distress is no proof of ethical depravity. For the unsteadfastness of the person is caused by the wine itself. More serious is the fact, when a person partakes of our table and deserts us (cf. e.g. Psalm 40, 10). This is to be considered ethical *κακία* and thus it is characteristic of the *δελιοί*, who are pictured in 11. 101-128. Therefore, I do not doubt that 1.115 f. refers to the *δελιοί* and is to be considered the special adaptation of a general maxim to the section in question.

One might raise the objection that in this case the original version should occur only in the latter part of the collection which would be surprising. However, we may safely assume that Theognis had recited poems, before he composed his collection.

Thus distichs which occur in the collection would have been recited by him before and were already at his disposal. Moreover, Theognis may also have taken over distichs which were already current. In those parts, where we can check him, we can state that he has taken over poems of previous poets. Accordingly, other distichs of Theognis, too, may have been taken over from previous poems, which are unknown to us. So 1.643 f. may have been already a current maxim.

When passing on to the discussion of 11. 523-658 I think that the following lines of development can be traced. The opening distichs, 11. 523-534, treat of general themes, such as wealth and poverty, youth, friendship, the symposium. As we know from other parts of his collection Theognis liked to give in the opening parts a survey of general themes and thus this section is in keeping with his practice.

The lines which follow, 11.536-546, can also be taken together. In my opinion, these lines treat of the city, its government and Theognis' relation to his city. As we observed above (cf. p. 101 and 112), the relation to the city, magistrates and tyrant was one of the most important relations for Theognis and, therefore, it was always at the beginning of the sections that it was discussed. We see that here, too, after the introductory themes this topic finds its place directly. The first poem, 11.535-538, treats a theme which is dear to Theognis viz. the origin of the citizens. The poet exposes his well-known view that a person of humble origin cannot be a good man. Accordingly, only the aristocrat will be a good citizen. L. 539 f., thereupon, speak of a man who risks to make chains for himself. In my opinion, the distich cannot but be explained as a description of a person who seeks to become tyrant. In other parts of the collection, too, Theognis mentions the tyrant (11.39, 1081 f. and 1203 ff.) in the opening parts of the section. L.541 f. discuss the city in general and the hybris which is dominant there. Then, 11.543-6 deal with Theognis himself. This time he is represented as having an official function, since he has been appointed judge in a lawsuit. Theognis observes that he will have to pronounce his judgement righteously and has to take account of the gods. Now we see why 1.539 f. referred to the tyrant. The citizen who unjustly tries to become a tyrant, serves as a contrast to Theognis who is righteous in the fulfilment of his official function. The passage fits in with Theognis' mentality, for in 11.1161*-1178ab (cf. above p. 108) he represents himself as the ideal citizen, in 11.415-418 as the ideal friend. So here he poses as the ideal office-bearer.

In the part which follows, the first lines, 11.546-560 can be taken together. In this connection, we may make the two following observations. 1 The preceding parts, 11.523-534 and 11.535-546, had been introductory. Properly speaking, it is only with 11.547 ff. that the direct admonitions to Kyrnos begin. Thus we may expect that the first counsels, 11.547-560, will be of particular importance and will indicate the main trend of the section. 2 Above we observed that distichs which succeed each other immediately are mostly to be taken together. This rule is not without exceptions with Theognis. He also employs other schemes viz. four distichs or poems in which 2 and 3 and then 1 and 4 or in which 1 and 3 and thereupon 2 and 4 must be connected. We point to 11.331-336, in which 331f. and 335 f. must be connected. Both distichs present the idea that one should steer a middle course. Also 332ab and 333 f. must be connected. We further point to 11.577-584, in which 579 f. and 581 f. and, on the other hand, 577 f. and 583 f. must be connected. As for the last pair of distichs, we observe that in 577 f. Theognis says that it is easier to

make a good person bad than to make a bad person good. The apparent conclusion is that one cannot alter the past. Then, 1.583 f. proceed upon the same theme: «One must let the past for what it is and must rather concentrate his attention on the future».

Perhaps one would be inclined to think that the placing of these distichs is due to a faulty transposition which might have taken place during the transmission of the text. Thus we know that in Martialis, Book XIV, the transmitted text has suffered by faulty transpositions of distichs. This solution, however, must not be adopted here. We rather have to assume that Theognis in order to show his craftsmanship and also in order to variegate his subject-matter has applied different schemes. When taking account of this fact we see that in 11.547-560, 1.547 f. and 555 f. and, on the other hand, 11.549-554 and 557-560 must be connected. As for 1.547 f. and 555 f. we must bear in mind that they form the opening part of the direct advice and that accordingly they are likely to contain important advice which should form the basis of Kyrnos' conduct. This is actually the case, for in 1.547 f. Kyrnos is admonished never to wrong a person and in 1.555 f. he gets the advice to bear the adversities (the for Theognis characteristic word *τολμάειν*) he will meet with. Thus Kyrnos' main active and passive conduct is delineated here.

As for 11.549-554 and 557-560, the first poem speaks of a war-raid which is nearing the city and which must be averted. It is to be expected that after the inner government of the city has been discussed (11.539-546), the outer situation of the city will now also be mentioned. At the same time, the poem can serve as a counterpart to 11.557-560. For war is characterised especially by risks and hazards. LI. 557-560 then show that war is not the only domain where hazards are to be encountered, for in peace, too, human life is characterized by uncertainty. Thus the main ideas which Theognis wishes to bring to the fore in this section, are these: Life is uncertain and presents many risks. Kyrnos, however, has the duty to remain steadfast and righteous and to bear the adversities of life.

The same fundamental ideas (the risks of life mastered by the steadfast character of the aristocrat) are to be found at the end of the section, 11.629-658, where we also have to do with a coherent part. LI. 629-636 serve to illustrate the excellence of wisdom and of a man's *νοῦς*. Thereupon, 11.637-640 deal with *ἐλπίς*, *κίνδυνος* and *δόξα*. The meaning of this part is, in my opinion, as follows. Even if you have plenty of wisdom, you are dependent on chance (cf. 11.557-560, where we find the same idea). LI.641-648 discuss friendship, but consider it from a specific side which fits in with the trend of the section. Just as one may have plenty of wisdom and may nevertheless be disappointed by the experiences of life (11.629-640), so friendship often does not stand the test but proves to be fallacious. The poet ends on the desponding note that *αἰδώς*, one of the basic principles of friendship (at least between *εραστής* and *ερώμενος*) has disappeared. While 11.649-654 speak of poverty and wealth, 11.655-658 again express the fundamental idea which had been expressed in the beginning (1.1555 f.): Our griefs will not be borne by other persons, they must be borne by ourselves alone.

If we bear in mind this main idea of the section «Life is risky, the aristocrat must nevertheless remain steadfast» we can also explain a passage which would otherwise seem perplexing. LI.585-590 have been taken over from Solon 1.65-70. As we know, Theognis sometimes takes over passages from other poets and slightly

alters them. Here, the alteration seems surprising. Solon had spoken about the uncertainty of life and the risks which continuously present themselves. Therefore, says Solon, the person who thinks he is acting right, ο εὖ ἐρδεν περὶόμενος, meets with reverses, whereas the person who acts wrong, ο κακῶς ἐρδων, is blessed by the gods with success. One would think that these lines which correspond so closely with Theognis' own views on the uncertainty of human life, would have been taken over without alteration. Instead we see that in Theognis' version the reverse is the case, for this time it is ο εὐδοκιμεῖν περὶόμενος who meets with disappointment, whereas ο καλῶς ποιῶν is blessed by the gods with success. It is understandable that at first sight the reader should be apt to be bewildered by this chngement and to agree with those critics who think Theognis' collection to be a miscellany of poems by diverse authors. In fact, however, the chngement is entirely in keeping with the tenor of the section and so it can be no result of chance but has been deliberately brought about by the author of the section (Theognis). As we saw, this section depicted the steadfastness of the aristocrat amidst the vicissitudes of life. The true aristocrat is not dependent on outward appearances; he rather seeks to manifest his inner worth. For this tendency, besides the examples which have already been given, we draw attention to the following lines: L.571 f. discuss with disapproval the δόξα, the outward appearances which form a κακὸν μ᾽ ἐγα, whereas experience only can prove a man's worth. In the same way 11.641-646 expose that only the experience of the adversities of life proves which friends are true. We further mention 11.607-610, a poem which points to the evils of lying. Lies at first seem to be profitable; in the end, however, they prove to be pernicious. Thus these distichs tend to show that outward appearances are deceptive; it is the experience which shows the true value of a person. We also see that evil, though seemingly successful at first, proves to be wrong in the end.

Now we see that the same idea is brought to the fore in Theognis' version of Solon's poem. On the one hand, we see the εὐδοκιμεῖν περὶόμενος, the man who only aims at the outward appearances and who is disappointed. On the other hand, we meet with the καλῶς ποιῶν, the true aristocrat, who acts righteously, as Theognis has done (cf. LL.543-546). I should wish to ask the critics who think, Theognis' collection to be a miscellany of poems, how they can explain the curious fact that the version of Solon's poem such as it is found in Theognis, completely corresponds with the mentality of the section in which it occurs.

The poem which we have discussed just now and which, in our opinion, is the central poem of this section says that the person who acts righteously will in the end be successful and will be blessed by the gods. Critics will be ready to observe that this statement, as made by Theognis, is somewhat surprising, for in the collection we meet with statements which are quite to the contrary. We need only point to

11.743-752, which occur in the next succeeding section. Here the poet complains of the fact that righteous men are often oppressed and crushed by the evildoers. In my opinion, we can explain the facts, if we take account of the place which this section occupies in Theognis' collection and of the special aims which Theognis had in mind when giving it. We see that this section is the last but one of that part of the collection which is directly addressed to Kyrnos (11.237-756); after it there follows only one section, 11.659-756. Above we have tried to prove that in the part wick was directed to the citizens, 11.757-1220, the last section but one, 11.1160a-

- 1 7 8 ἰ β , offered a picture of the ideal aristocrat, who had to be identified with Theognis himself (cf. above pp. 108 ff.). We can understand and may even expect that !! both parts (the part which is directed to the citizens and that which is addressed to Kyrnos) a picture of the ideal aristocrat will be given by the aristocratic poet. However, one will also understand that the tenor of both pictures will be different. The fellow-citizens are Theognis' contemporaries who may need advice but who need not be educated. Moreover, Theognis has been ill-treated by them. Thus we may expect in that part a picture of the aristocrat, given by a person who has been bitterly disenchanted, but who may nevertheless cling to his ideals.

With Kyrnos the situation is different, for he is the young aristocratic friend who must be educated and who, in the future, must become a true aristocratic citizen, too. We can understand that Theognis who, on several occasions, had already spoken of the «good» citizens, should have reserved a special «section for the picture of the true aristocrat at the end of the part which was directed to Kyrnos. We must bear in mind that this time the attainment of that ideal must be the pupil's aim and that, accordingly, the picture will be idealistic. The enunciations saying that the true aristocrat is steadfast and only attaches value to the inner worth of man, are common in Theognis. The idea that he will also be successful in the end is peculiar to this section. It is, however, not surprising, for it constitutes one of the tenets of popular theology that the man who acts righteously will be blessed by the gods (cf. e.g. Hes. Op. 225 ff.). The contrasting of the righteous man with the *ενδοκιμεῖν περιώμενος* is characteristic of Theognis' own aristocratic views.

One will admit that to the pupil who had to be educated no picture of the aristocrat could be given which was disappointing. Accordingly, the different tenor of the two sections, 11.1160a ff. and 11.523 ff., is to be explained in the light of these facts. We may say that in 11.1160a ff. Theognis offers a picture of the aristocrat from the standpoint of a man who looks back to his past and to the disappointing experiences which he has lived through. In 11.523 ff. he gives a representation of the aristocrat from the standpoint of a man who points to the future and who exhorts his pupil to attain that ideal.

I also think that this section must be compared with the succeeding section, 11.659-756; the final part of the poems directed to Kyrnos. In many respects this section forms a contrast with the preceding one. I am of the opinion that in the part directed to Kyrnos it is precisely this section which bears a personal accent. Above we observed already (cf. p. 96 f.) that one of the main ideas of the section was concerned with wealth and poverty. One will admit that this problem was of special importance to the poet himself who had lost his possessions, but was of less interest to young Kyrnos. This personal accent may be also seen in 11.667 ff., where Theognis mentions the loss of his possessions, in 11.699 ff., where he gives vent to his disappointment at the fact that wisdom and virtue rank far below wealth and success. It also appears in the final poems, where the poet complains of the manifold sorrows of mankind 1.729 f. (cf. above p. 98) and directly addresses Zeus on the apparent mismanagement of the world, 11.731 ff. and 11.743 ff..

The trend of Theognis' feelings in this section also manifests itself in the opening poem, 11.659-666. The poet observes that no human being has a right to assert that a thing might not occur. On the contrary, all kinds of things are brought about by the gods, bad men are honoured, good men commit faults, etc. Thus

the tendency of the section is as follows. 1 All kinds of things may occur in human life.

This was also exposed in the preceding section in which the poet had observed that human life is risky. 2 One of the most crushing results of the uncertainty of human life is that righteous men are often unsuccessful and are exposed to the oppression of the evildoers. This is contrary to the idea expressed in 11.523-658 that righteous men are successful in the end. The contrast also appears from the fact that in the preceding section Theognis could mention the obtainment of an official function, 11.543-546, whereas in this section he mentions the loss of his possessions, 11.667 ff..

I think that the diversity of the two sections may be explained in the following way. In 11.523-658 Theognis depicted the attitude of the true aristocrat, which is in the main ideal. In 11.659-756 he depicts the realities of life which could be illustrated very well in the light of the adversities which he himself had met with. This picture is not idealistic like the preceding one but realistic. We may also observe that in the part directed to Kyrnos, Theognis had given different admonitions to his young friend; they culminated in the picture of the aristocrat, 11.523-658, which was held up to his friend as a model. However, Theognis knows from his own bitter experiences that life presents uncommon adversities and even makes man doubt of the government of the gods.

It is interesting to see that the part directed to Kyrnos, does not end with the apotheosis of the true aristocrat but rather with a section in which the poet discusses the major problems of life which have been brought home to him by his own adversities. Thus we may say that Theognis' adversities have made him a poet of a talent more diversified than if he had remained a peaceful citizen of Megara. In the latter case he would have only been likely to reproduce the common popular tenets and maxims, whereas now his adversities have inspired to him among other things the picture of the ideal aristocrat, 11.1160a-1178b, and the section on the problems of life which are incomprehensible to mankind, 11.659-756.

If we pay due attention to these facts we see that the end of the section is very appropriate, for at the end first of all Theognis observes that human life is characterised by sorrows (1.729 f.) which concern man's material position (*βίωτος*) as well as his aspirations and fears (*ψυχῇ*). Then, as we observed above, (cf. p. 85 f.) 11.731-742 serve as an introduction to 11.743-752 in order to enable the poet to pass a criticism though of a cautious nature on the government of the gods. We must not forget that we have to deal with an archaic poet who does not venture to criticize the gods unrestrainedly and who is widely removed from Euripides, when the latter makes the same problems the object of his criticism. Therefore, Theognis first of all directs a modest prayer to the gods for the abolition of a thing which in his time was commonly felt as a misuse viz. the punishment of children for their fathers misdeeds. We know that the oldtestament prophet Ezekiel who lives somewhat earlier than Theognis, but who equally belongs to the sixth century, also discusses the abolition of this misuse (Ezekiel Ch. 28). It is interesting to see how the Greek poet who pleads for the same cause, makes it, however, the starting-point for his criticism of divine government. For after having raised the problem which was commonly felt as a misuse, he now ventures to pass on to the problem of the suffering

of the righteous, 11.743-752. It is significant to see that the section directed to Kyrnos, almost ends with the presentation of this important problem.

We may resume our observations by saying that the two final sections of the part directed to Kyrnos, present the following tendencies. The first section is the idealistic and general; the other section is individualistic and realistic. In it the poet imparts to his friend those experiences which have made the deepest impression on him.

As for the remaining part of the section, 11.561-628, we observe that Theognis mentions different topics, such as wealth, friendship, symposion, etc. as he frequently does in other sections, too. Perhaps 11.611-614 do not constitute one poem, as critics are accustomed to assume (thus Carrière, Ed. and Diehl-Beutler, Anth. Lyr.) but two distichs. In that case the distichs offer characteristics of the *δειλοί* (For the fact that a distich can begin with *δέ*, cf. above p. 89 N 3).

ADDITIONS

To p. 74) For Thgn. 1.13, cf. also Friedländer, Epigrammata Nr. 136, inscription from Paros, early fifth century. Somebody is praying to Artemis: *τὼν γενεῆν βίωτόν τ' αἰεὶ ἐν ἀπημοσύνῃ*.

To p. 95 N 1) I think now that 1.647 f. which complain of the disappearance of *αἰδώς* must be positively connected with the preceding poems which deal with friendship. I refer to 1.253, where *αἰδώς* is used with regard to the relation of Kyrnos to his older friend Theognis. As a rule «aidos» has a wider range and denotes all kinds of feelings of shame and respect. (Thus e.g. Thgn. 291 f.). In 1.647 f., as appears from the context, it only denotes friendship. To Theognis friendship was the most important experience in human life, as we know. Thus we can understand that in his eyes «aidos» respect «can be represented as regarding only the relation of the younger friend to the older one. As for the fact that 1.291 f. and 647 f. are nearly identical, we know that Theognis liked to repeat the same lines in different sections of his collection and then often gave them a different meaning, too.

To. p. 115) I hesitatingly proffer the suggestion that Theognis' lost poems may have occurred in a book which had been composed after our collection had taken shape. I point to 1.1225 f., where Theognis says that nothing is sweeter than a good consort and adds that he himself can testify to this. So apparently he has been married. In our collection (cf. 1.1367 f.) he is still less enthusiastic about female connections.

To p. 115 N 1) For the text of Suida :, cf. also Th. Birt, Das: antike Buchwesen (Berlin 1882) p. 165 N 1 and p. 166 Nr. 32.

ADDITIONS

to p. 120) On *ὀμιλεῖν*, cf. also Hermes 80 (1952) p. 278 N 3.

to p. 120) On the correspondence of Book II and Book I and the fact that they reveal the same mentality, I would also like to point to 1.1371 f. The poet says that love offers *μνρία κακά* and *μνρία εσθλά*. It also offers *τις χάρις*. Unlike

party-strife, love does not only contain evils, but it also offers blessings. Theognis himself often acknowledges this fact. It is curious to see, however, that Theognis also attributes some *χάρις* to love. One would be inclined to think that this enunciation can only be interpreted as a contrast to the *μυρία κακά* of 1.1371. I think that we must compare this line with 1.342, where Theognis prays: *δοξ δε μοι ἀντί κακῶν καί τι παθεῖν ἀγαθόν*. Theognis has lived through many evils, in exchange for them he asks a few blessings. In the same way I should say that he parallelises the manifold evils of love with the modest *charis* which accompanies it, too. Theognis' main outlook on the erotic field is pessimistic. He seems to forget the *μυρία ἐσθλά* of love, though from habit he has mentioned them.

to p. 122) I now think that a satisfactory explanation of 1.1381 f. can be given. The poem contains a pun. For the explanation two points must be borne in mind. 1 The poem clearly describes a person who is going to an altar of Aphrodite. 2 The bystanders think that he has received a gift from Aphrodite. Since they only think so, they are apparently mistaken. One can offer a sacrifice for two reasons: For having received the aid of the gods or because one wishes to receive their aid. The person in question has offered a sacrifice to Aphrodite. The bystanders think that he has been successful in love. In reality he is not successful but needs the aid of the goddess in order to gain the favour of the *ερώμενος* \