

ISSN 0870-4147

FACULDADE DE LETRAS DA UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA
INSTITUTO DE HISTÓRIA ECONÓMICA E SOCIAL

Revista Portuguesa de História

TOMO XXII



COIMBRA/1985

THE *ESTADO DA ÍNDIA*, 1663-1677:
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE
AND THE EAST (*)

In comparison with other periods, very little research has been done on the *Estado da Índia* for the years 1663-1677. The reasons for this historiographical oversight are varied. The legacy of Manuel Godinho's «pigmy»-like description of the post-1663 *Estado*, and the unfortunate acceptance of the dictum of «stagnation and decline» for this period have certainly helped to discourage scholarly scrutiny over the years. The plethora of literature on the sixteenth century *Estado* admirably attests to the academic validity of the cliché «everyone loves a winner». Conversely, the post-1663 *Estado*, because it has been viewed as a «loser», has never attracted much attention. Other, less important, factors have also contributed to this dearth of literature. Manuscript source material for these years is not quite as complete as it is for other periods; while several key documents, such as the 1680 *Orçamento*, and data on the *Carreira*, are only available in Goa (*) and thus have not been particularly accessible to non-Indian historians.

This lack of interest in the years immediately following the loss of the Malabar possessions to the Dutch is unfortunate. That the *Estado* was reduced in size is undeniable, equally so is that problems and setbacks continued throughout the 1660s and 1670s. However, this should neither detract from nor obscure

(*) Este artigo, na sua maior parte, foi apresentado como uma comunicação no IV Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa, em Lisboa, no mês de Novembro de 1985.

O Historical Archive of Goa, Panjim, Índia, *Livro de Registro dos alvarás etc., de diferentes feitorias, 1667-1684*, fis. 1-27.

the fact that the years 1663-1677 were important ones for the *Estado*, that witnessed a gradual stabilization after the ravages of the preceding two decades. A notable effort was made under *Príncipe Regente* Pedro and Viceroy Luís de Mendonça Furtado, in the years after 1671, not only to conserve what remained of the *Estado*, but to initiate measures that would allow it to regain a degree of stability after some very difficult years in Europe and the East. These policies were grounded in the belief that the remaining Eastern possessions, if properly administered, along with the development of the rich *Rios de Cuama* region ⁽²⁾ could serve as the basis for a profitable and viable *Estado*.

Of particular importance in this process of stabilization was the attitude adopted by the Portuguese Crown with respect to the French attempt from 1668-1672 to lure Portugal into an anti-Dutch alliance in the Indian Ocean. This intriguing offer came at a crucial time for the Portuguese ; peace had finally been won and a rash decision could have proven disastrous both at home and in the *imperio*. By wisely avoiding entanglement in the Third Dutch war, Pedro and Mendonça Furtado were, instead, able to utilize this time to introduce reforms within the *Estado*. Their European rivals in the Asian trade, busy warring against one another, were consequently unable to offer effective resistance to the gradual implementation of these key policies. This article will briefly detail some of the more important steps in this process, that took the *Estado* from near extinction in 1663 to a hard won, if still somewhat tenuous, stability by 1680.

The problems that confronted the succession of Viceroys and Governors from 1663-1667, beginning with Antonio de Mello de Castro and culminating with Luís de Mendonça Furtado, were both numerous and serious. Mello de Castro describing the situation in the East at the beginning of this period wrote : «são tantas e tão grandes as necessidades deste Estado e... não há... hum só real para acudir as despezas forçosas e necessarias» ⁽³⁾. Besides being financially distressed, the *Estado* faced a host of commercial and military adversaries including, but not limited to, the English, the Dutch, the French, the Omani Arabs, Shivaji, Bijapur,

⁽²⁾ Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon, *Códice 17*, fis. 122 V.-124.

⁽³⁾ H. A. G., *Livro das Monções do Reino*, 28-A, fl. 157.

the Nayakas of Ikkeri, Aurangzeb, Golconda, and a series of rulers in littoral Africa. This state of affairs was exacerbated by the continuing continental struggle with Spain that hindered Lisbon's attempts to provide substantial reinforcements down to 1668. The resulting lack of manpower in the East for the *fortalezas* and *armadas* was heightened by an inadequate system of quartering and wages that encouraged desertion among the newly arrived recruits into the waiting arms of the *Religiosos* on the one hand, and the armies of the *Reis Vizinhos* on the other (4).

The excessive local power and abuses of the captains throughout the *Estado*, but especially in Mozambique and Sofalla, was another problem that had to be addressed during this period. The *Carreira da Índia* in the final years of the Dutch conflict was also in a state of disarray. Extraordinary expenses for fortifications and the raising of the yearly fleets to the *Norte*, Cañara* and the Straits also posed constant difficulties. All of these problems were complicated by abuses and corruption within the administration at Goa. Finally, there was the question of the *Religiosos*. «Entre as Grandes misérias que padece há muitos annos neste Estado da Índia não hé a de menos peso a multidão de Relligiosos que há nelle, porque são ricos, se vão fazendo Senhores de tudo, e os que são pobres, se sustentão com as esmollas dos que estão mais pobres que elles» (5). This was Antonio de Mello de Castro's view, in January 1666, on some of the less desirable effects of spreading the faith in the East. Such complaints against the *Religiosos* were common among the secular authorities throughout these years. The sole exception to this rule being the Viceroy Conde de São Vicente, who held them in high regard (6). Both his predecessors and successors criticized the *Religiosos* for various abuses ranging from gross inefficiency in instructing the indigenous population due to ignorance of native languages to the misuse of funds by the Franciscans on the island of Manapassa in the *Norte* (7). The Jesuits drew criticism for their actions of opposing

(4) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 35, fis. 149-149 v.; 37, fl. 199.

(5) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 35, fl. 149.

(6) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 33, fl. 21 and fl. 265.

(7) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 33, fl. 174; 37, fis. 88-88 v.; 38-A, fis. 113-113 v.; and 41, fl. 59.

the extension of the *Colecta* in 1671, of opposing the *donativo* for the peace with Holland, of organizing feiras in Salcete that diverted *rendas* from the Marquês de Fronteira, for doing a poor job with the sick in the *Hospital Real*, and for taking possession of lands with out license from the Crown (8). A more serious religious problem for the *Estado* as this period wore on, however, was the flight of Hindu merchants with their families and *fazendas* from Goa and the *Norte*; largely as a result of abuses relating to D. Sebastião s decree concerning the taking and baptizing of *gentio* orphans.

Commercially, the loss of the Malabar ports to the Dutch in 1662-1663 obviously posed problems with respect to procuring pepper during this period. This situation was made even worse by Dutch actions during the remainder of the 1660 s that prevented the re-occupation of the Cañara ports. The entrance of the capital rich *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* of Colbert into the trade after 1664 also caused problems. The most important of these was rising prices (9). However, French actions on Madagascar also threatened re-nascent Portuguese plans for developing Mozambique. Increased competition among the European powers also necessitated the greater efficiency in business practices. On the Malabar coast, for example, this increased competition allowed native suppliers to demand prompt payments in silver. As Mendonça Furtado pointed out, this periodically put the Portuguese at a disadvantage as silver was not always forthcoming from Lisbon (10).

Given this wide range of problems, concrete measures were necessary if the *Estado* was to survive. Many of these same difficulties, along with the protracted Restoration struggle in Europe with Spain and in the *imperio* with the Dutch, had prompted the Portuguese Crown to conclude the 1661 treaty with Charles II in an attempt to save the *Estado*. By 1668, however, the Lisbon hierarchy recognized that internal regeneration not external dependency on another power in the trade was the answer for the problems in the East. Anglo-Portuguese relations

(8) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 30, fl. 11; 31, fis. 32-33; 33, fl. 330; 36, fl. 403; 47, fl. 62 and fl. 85; 38-B, fl. 287; 40, fl. 66; 41, fis. 45-47; 42, fl. 3.

(9) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 37, fis. 139-139 v.

(10) H. A. G., *Monções do Reine*, 40, fis. 200-200 v.

from 1662-1668, if nothing else, were sufficient to convince Lisbon and Goa of this fact. The treaty with England, quite simply, had not lived up to the early expectations of D. Luisa de Gusmão and her advisors. Antonio de Mello de Castro and his successors discovered that the English were unwilling to keep their part of the *quid pro quo* that gave them Bombay, and other concessions, in return for military protection against the Dutch.

It is debatable, in fact, whether the English were capable of offering substantial military assistance to the Portuguese in the East, even if they had wanted to do so. As Mello de Castro noted in the mid-1660 s, «os Inglezes tem neste Oriente tão pouco poder... que lhes hé necessario viver a nossa sombra» ⁽ⁿ⁾. Colbert, similarly, dismissed the English as weak during this period, and absolutely no threat to his rising ambitions in the Asian trade ⁽¹²⁾. The English Company was plagued by internal problems in this period, like Sir Edward Winter s mutiny in Madras, that exacerbated warring with the Dutch. As early as December 1662, Mello de Castro wrote to Lisbon criticizing the behavior of the English and asking for «socorro de importancia» to compensate for the lack of English military aid ⁽¹³⁾. As the *Monções* correspondence makes clear, the English were also far from ideal neighbors in India during these years. Beginning with the occupation of Bombay in 1665, they appropriated Portuguese *fazendas* in the surrounding districts at a fairly rapid rate. By 1668 alone, these losses to Portuguese subjects were estimated to total close to 160,000 *xerafins* ⁽¹⁴⁾. The English, by offering freedom of conscience in Bombay in opposition to the work of the *Santo Officio*, also tried to lure indigenous merchants away from the Province of the North.

The promise of «deliverence» for the *Estado* based on the English alliance was revealed as, indeed, empty. Charles II, short of funds, had merely accepted a cash and property offer that

⁽ⁿ⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 28-A, fl. 107.

⁽¹²⁾ H. A. G., *Códice 782, Livro das cartas e ordens, 1666-1668*, fl. 103 v.

⁽¹³⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 31, fis. 72-73; 35, fl. 94.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Archives Nationales, Paris, Archives Coloniales, *Ordres du Roy concernant la Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, B¹, fis. 174-184 v.

had originally been turned down by Louis XIV. The English were under no delusions about the sacredness or permanence of the Portuguese alliance. Clarendon writing to Richard Fanshaw in Lisbon in May 1663 was willing to bid «farewell to the friendship with Portugal»; the Portuguese «are not to wonder if they hear that we and the Dutch are united in the East Indies and that we do all else to their prejudice» (15). The crucial factor for the policies of the Portuguese Crown from 1668 on, and what differentiates them from the mentality that prompted the 1661 treaty, is that Lisbon recognized the folly of attempting to avert disaster in the East based on the dubious assistance of one of her competitors in the trade. This was fortunate, because beginning in 1669 the Portuguese received another offer of friendship that promised security in the East against the Dutch, in return for territorial and trading concessions. This offer came from the representatives of Louis XIV. The French, after a long period of somnambulism in the East were suddenly, under Colbert, committed to securing their «rightful» place in the trade. For the Portuguese, this offer came at an important time when peace had finally been attained at home and in the *imperio*. Lisbon's response to Colbert's demands, in large part, set the stage for the policies carried out by Pedro and Mendonça Furtado during the 1670 s.

Colbert's thrust into the Indian Ocean was by no means the first French attempt to establish themselves in the trade. The years before 1664, however, had witnessed few French successes due mainly to a series of internal and continental struggles that diverted most of the formidable energies elsewhere. The years 1661-1672 offered a promising set of circumstances that gave France both the desire and ability to challenge for a share of the trade. The relative peace of the first decade of Louis XIV's reign, when combined with Colbert's economic and naval reforms, set the stage for the Third Dutch War in both Europe and the East. In 1664, the French Finance Minister created the *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* with a nominal capital pool of 15 million

(15) Historical Manuscripts Commission of Great Britain, *The Manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote* (Norwich, 1899), vol. 50, pp. 90-91.

livres; and by 1669 he was completing plans to despatch a large royal fleet to the East ⁽¹⁶⁾. This fleet, the so-called Persian Squadron, was charged with establishing France as a power in the trade, by securing a series of bases from Madagascar to Banca ⁽¹⁷⁾. An important part of Colbert's strategy was his attempt, from 1669 on, to extend the 1667 treaty with Portugal into a full-fledged anti-Dutch alliance in the Indian Ocean.

The potential for such an alliance looked promising. Dutch gains at the expense of the *Estado* had logically raised voices in Lisbon and Goa calling for revenge. Colbert and his emissaries tried to utilize such sentiments along with the religious affinity of the two Crowns, the poor performance of the English as allies, and French influence at court in Lisbon to achieve this end. In instructions of 16 March 1669 ⁽¹⁸⁾, the French ambassador to Lisbon, the marquis de Saint-Romain, was given orders to seek a commercial union in the East based on reciprocal trading rights, the granting of part of the *Estado* to France, and permission to build a naval magazine on the Tagus. Saint-Romain presented the French case first in April 1669, and then again towards the end of that year. Meanwhile, he tried to convince Pedro to include pro-French clauses in the *Regimento* of Mendonça Furtado who was being sent to India as Viceroy in the spring of 1670 ⁽¹⁹⁾.

The French ambassador held a series of conferences with Mendonça Furtado before the Viceroy's departure for Goa. As Saint Romain later wrote: Mendonça Furtado «n estime pas qu'on puisse diminuer le commerce des Hollandois dans F Inde sans leur y faire la guerre» ⁽²⁰⁾. The Portuguese Viceroy also detailed various strategies to defeat the Dutch militarily or which would, at the very least, cripple their trade. Given Mendonça Furtado's vast experience, and his subsequent statements on the power of the

⁽¹⁶⁾ A. N., Archives de la Marine, B² 9, fis. 130 v.-132.

⁽¹⁷⁾ A. N., Archives Coloniales, B¹, fis. 174-184 v.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Given in *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, ed. by Pierre Clément (Paris, 8 vols., 1861-1882), n², 456-459.

⁽¹⁹⁾ A. N., Archives des Affaires Étrangères, *Correspondance consulaire*, B¹ 644, fis. 110-110 v.

⁽²⁰⁾ A. N., Archives des Affaires Étrangères, *Correspondance consulaire*, B¹ 644, fl. 119.

Dutch (21), it is probable that during these meetings he was simply doing everything he could to encourage the French to attack the Dutch in the East. Such a move was eminently soitable for Portuguese interest: the French would be doing the «dirty work» of attacking the V. O. C., while the Dutch, thus occupied would not be able to interfere with attempts at rehabilitation undertaken by the Portuguese Crown. The *Estado*, in fact, was destined to benefit from this exact set of circumstances. During the course of the Third Dutch war, the V. O. C., already facing hostilities with the French and the English, treated the Portuguese with courtesies not seen in many a year (22) and did little to obstruct the work of Mendonça Furtado and Pedro.

The official reaction of the Portuguese Crown to Colberts offer was summarized in a *consulta* of the *Conselho Ultramarino* of 30 August 1669 (23). This *consulta* called for a strict adherence to the 1667 pact, but little more. Thus, while Portuguese commanders in the *Estado* were given orders to receive the French favorably and to assist ships in need, special trading privileges were denied. Saint-Romain did, however, win the concession of a naval magazine in Lisbon, which was subsequently established. The Portuguese judged correctly that in an open test of strength in the East the French, despite gains under Colbert, were still no match for the Dutch. Involvement, therefore, in an anti-Dutch alliance could only place what remained of the *Estado* in grave danger. When Colbert's grand fleet of 1670 called at Goa in January 1672, on its way to final defeat at St. Thomé two years later, Mendonça Furtado provided the French with supplies, but avoided any action that could have involved Portugal in the hostilities (24). By wisely declining Colbert's offer of yet another war, Pedro and Mendonça Furtado were, instead, able to utilize the years 1671-1677 to introduce a series of measures designed to regain stability within the *Estado*.

(21) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 37, fis. 203-203 v. ; A. H. U., *Documentos avulsos relativos à Índia*, Caixa 28, Document 171.

(22) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 37, fis. 276-277.

(23) A. H. U., *Documentos avulsos relativos à Índia*, Caixa 28, Document 71.

(24) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fl. 459; 37, fis. 129-129 v.

One such initiative was directed at the traditional problem of the desertion of *soldados* to the *Religiosos* and the *Reis Vizinhos*. This chronic difficulty for the secular authorities in Goa robbed the *Estado* of badly needed manpower for the fortresses and the yearly fleets to the *Norte*, Cañara, and the Straits. As early as April 1669, the *Príncipe* had tried to address this problem by issuing firm orders that all infantrymen, as soon as they arrived in Goa, were to be put in the forts of Panjim, Mormugão* Aguada, and Gaspar Dias where they were to be formed into Companies. Special orders were also made necessary before the recruits could visit the *Velha cidade*, where it was believed they were corrupted into deserting (25). A 9 December 1669 *consulta* of the *Conselho Ultramarino* (26) dealing with the problem of insufficient military forces in the *Estado*, recommended that a permanent *Terço* of 500-600 men be re-established financed with money from the *donativo* for the peace with Holland. The *Príncipe*, in a series of letters from 1670-1672 (27), wrote that his firm desire «de acudir a Índia» had prompted him to accept the advice offered in this *consulta*. Mendonça Furtado was told to use all of the money from the *donativo*, nominally 130, 000 *cruzados* a year; to form the *Terço* and for other defense expenditures for the duration of the contribution to Holland. Despite financial problems relating to shortfalls in the *donativo*, the *Terço*, was eventually formed with an experienced officer corps from the *Reino* and the East.

Other initiatives were undertaken throughout the late 1660 s and 1670 s to restore a semblance of control over the outlying areas of the *Estado* that had largely fended for themselves during the final years of the Dutch conflict. This re-assertion of effective royal control was a necessary precondition to stabilizing the *Estado* both politically and economically. As an April 1662 letter made clear, Macao «tão distante deste Reyno e também desse Estado... e tão empedida de Inimigos» was, indeed, in dire straits during what C. R. Boxer has described as the years of crisis from

(25) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 34, fl. 181.

(26) A. H. U., *Documentos avulsos relativos à Índia*, Caixa 28, Document 87.

(27) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fl. 56; 37, fl. 75.

1662-1666 ⁽²⁸⁾. Various attempts were made, first by Antonio de Mello de Castro who sent the *galeão São Francisco* there and later by the Conde de São Vicente, to improve the situation in the Far East during the 1660 s. These measures, however, had little effect. Accordingly, the *Principe* in letters of February 1670 and March 1671 ⁽²⁹⁾ reiterated the need to reinforce Macao and to conserve Solor and Timor for the «faith», and particularly their traditional trading ties with China. Mendonça Furtado was instructed to give special attention towards the augmentation of the Far Eastern trade; and charged «dar a forma ao governo civil, militar, eclesiástico de que totalmente estão faltas» in those possessions.

The Portuguese Viceroy agreed that it was very important to conserve Solor and Timor for their commercial benefits, especially with respect to Macao ⁽³⁰⁾. Despite limited resources, he attempted to re-establish regular voyages to the Far East at the expense of the *fazenda real*. These voyages had been «extintas» for many years, and the attempt to restart them was not an easy task. In May 1672, Mendonça Furtado despatched the ship *Nossa Senhora da Guia*. This vessel carried João Antunes Portugal, the new *capitão* of Solor, with orders to call first at Macao, and then to proceed south to Indonesia ⁽³¹⁾. At the same time, Antonio Mesquita Pimentel was named captain for the voyages to Manila, permitted under the 1668 treaty with Spain; while a *Junta* was established to oversee the trade. Naturally, the problems to overcome were great: the abuses of Crown officials in the area were widespread, the «scandalous» actions of the *Religiosos* Of *São Domingos* on Solor and Timor posed problems ⁽³²⁾, and there was also opposition among important merchants of Macao who resented this attempt to re-assert royal authority in the trade. In spite of setbacks, including the shipwreck of the *Nossa Senhora da Guia*, the Viceroy persisted. Down to 1674, no fewer than

⁽²⁸⁾ *A Índia Portuguesa em meados do século XVII* (Lisboa, 1980), p. 68; H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 28-A, fl. 140.

⁽²⁹⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fl. 44 and fl. 268.

⁽³⁰⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fis. 269-269 v.

⁽³¹⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 37, fis. 123-123 v.

⁽³²⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fis. 269-269 v.

four ships were sent from Goa to Macao, while a similar number reached the Mandovi from the Far East. After 1675, the increased importance of Mozambique and the *Rios de Cuanta* resulted in a dropoff in traffic, nevertheless, an important step had been taken to re-establish regular communication with the Far East after a long period of virtual isolation.

During the 1670's, attempts were also made to check the various abuses of the *Religiosos*. The most important of these attempts related to problems resulting from the taking and forced baptism of Hindu orphans. As Mendonça Furtado pointed out in a letter of 24 January 1673 ⁽³³⁾, it was vital to curb this abuse and to encourage Hindu merchants to live within the *Estado* due to the very favorable effect this would have on trade in general and *alfândega* receipts in particular. The Portuguese Viceroy, writing with the experience of over twenty years in the East, stated «todos os mercadores juntos de Europa não tem tantos cabedães como qualquer dos gentios aquelles chamão Ricos». These rich *gentios*, wielding the economic power of «legues de pagodes», dominated «o comércio de todos os portos de India». The Europeans, in comparison, controlled only a small part of the Asian trade, and were frequently dependent on the goodwill of native princes to maintain even this foothold. Mendonça Furtado's letter makes it clear that a key component to European success in the trade was the ability to lure and keep important indigenous merchants in the ports they «controlled». The competition for attracting such merchants was also becoming more intense during this period. The French had entered the trade in earnest; while the English, in Bombay from 1665 on, had been doing a credible job of luring indigenous merchants away from the Province of the North.

The *gentio* merchants of Baçaim, in a June 1671 letter to Mendonça Furtado ⁽³⁴⁾, protested against the taking of *orfãos* and estimated that this abuse had led to such an influx into Bombay from the *Norte* that the tobacco *renda* in the English enclave had increased fourfold in less than six years. The Portuguese, to compete in such circumstances, clearly had to modify their reli-

⁽³³⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 37, fis. 274-274 v.

⁽³⁴⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fis. 259-259 v.

gious policy with respect to the indigenous merchants. Petitions like the one from Baçaim in 1671, and another from the *povo gentio* of Goa in 1676⁽³⁵⁾, when combined with these economic pressures ultimately forced the Crown to issue orders against such abuses. The *Príncipe* also instructed that a *Junta* be held on the subject, at which a representative of the indigenous population be present⁽³⁶⁾. This *Junta* eventually took place under the auspices of Mendonça Furtados successor, D. Pedro de Almeida. Almeida wrote in January 1678 steps had been taken to guard against abuses relating to D. Sebastião's decree, however, it is difficult to determine the effect this move had in checking the flight of indigenous merchants from the *Estado*⁽³⁷⁾. It is almost certain that the abuses continued. The willingness of the Crown to order this *Junta* with indigenous participation reflects, at the very least, the economic power that these native merchants enjoyed. Moreover, it attests to the realization, by men like Mendonça Furtado, that such economic concerns had to take precedence over religious zealotry if the *Estado* was to survive.

The *Carreira da Índia* during the final years of the Dutch conflict was erratic at best. From 1668 on, the Portuguese, freed from the drain of continental warfare with Spain and avoiding entanglement in the Third Dutch War, were able to re-establish stability in the *Carreira*. Clearly, it operated at reduced levels from the sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries. A regular correspondence, however, was set up once again between Lisbon and Goa, and this is the primary consideration. Though information for this period is scattered, it appears certain that at least 17 ships reached Goa from the *Reino* between 1668 and 1677, and that a similar number made the return voyage⁽³⁸⁾. The return cargoes of these ships need further analysis, but pepper remained a staple with nearly 2000 *quintals* despatched in 1674 alone. Francis Parry, an English diplomat in Lisbon at the time, gives a

(35) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 41, fis. 181-183.

(36) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 42, fl.110.

(37) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 42, fl. 136.

(38) H. A. G., *Livro de Registro dosalvarás etc., de diferentes feitorias*, fis. 27v.-36; *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa* (Lisboa, 5 vols., 1960-1967), IV, 3-35.

vivid description of the great joy there in the summer of 1672 at the arrival of three «richly laden» ships from the East; «which is soe good a fortune as hath not been knowne here since Portugall hath been a kingdome of itself e» (39). The years from the mid-1660 s on also witnessed the regular raising of the fleets for the *Norte*, Cañara, the Straits, and, after 1671, at least two ships a year for either Mozambique, Mombasa, or Macao.

Such actions, as early as 1667, prompted the Dutch Governor-general in Batavia to write: «it seems the Portuguese are making serious efforts to regain their former reputation on the coast of India» (40). Gerald Aungier, the English President in Bombay, writing in 1674 described traditional Portuguese problems of bad government and the abuses of the *Religiosos* and the *fidalgos* «but», he continued, «the prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much: both in one and in the other» (41). The same year Aungier wrote: «The Portuguese follow their trade as well in India as Europe vigorously, they have sent this yeare fewer shippes full laden for Lisboa, two or three shippes for China, some to Mossambique, Mombass & Patta, & in October last they sent an Armada consisting of 5 shippes & about 10 small frigatts well-manned to the Persian Gulph» (42).

Such statements attest to the strides made by the Portuguese from the mid-1660 s on to revive their maritime position in the East.

Another initiative undertaken during these years related to the development of Mozambique and the *Rios de Cuanta*. Antonio Alvares Pereira, in a 1661 letter to the Crown, reiterated the need to exploit this area that was rich in minerals and other resources (43). Antonio de Mello de Castro, Viceroy at that time, agreed that «não há duvida ser grande coisa e de muita importancia a terra dos Rios» (44). He promised to do all he could to develop the region as long as it did not interfere with the *contracto* of the * S.

(39) Public Record Office, London, *State Papers, Foreign, Portugal*, S. P. 89, vol. 12, fis. 134-134 v.

(40) India Office Library, London, *Hague Transcripts*, 734, fis. 13-13 v.

(41) I. O. L., *Original Correspondence*, 3929.

(42) I. O. L., *Original Correspondence*, 3939, fl. 1 v.

(43) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 28-A, fis. 150-150 v.

(44) H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 28-A, fl. 149.

Captain in Sofalla. More pressing needs in the *Estado*, however, diverted the relatively scarce resources at Goa s disposal elsewhere, and matters remained much the same in the *Rios* until the late 1660 s. Interestingly enough, it was at least in part the work of Colbert s *Compagnie*, in nearby Madagascar that prompted the *Principe* and his advisors to take a more active interest in developing the *Rios* and re-asserting royal power in this region ⁽⁴⁵⁾. This fear of possible French incursions was heightened with the departure of Colbert s large fleet bound for the Indian Ocean in March 1670.

This perceived threat, when combined with reports from Goa on the riches and bad administration of the area, ultimately prompted Pedro to suspend the *contracto* in 1672, and to introduce *comercio livre* for Portuguese subjects on the east coast of Africa. Mendonça Furtado, in a series of letters ⁽⁴⁶⁾, argued against this move stating that projected *alfandega* receipts would not equal the revenue lost by suspending the *contracto*. The Viceroy, instead, called for the trade to be taken over by the *fazenda real* under the auspices of a *Junta*. In 1673, the *Tribunal da Junta do Comércio de Moçambique e Rios* was formed; «fazendas de Lei» like ivory, gold, cloth, gunpowder, and firearms constituted a Crown monopoly, while «fazendas livres» could be imported and distributed by private individuals. Almost immediately after the establishment of the new *Junta* silver samples from the *Rios* reached Goa, and fueled further speculation on the richness and potential of the area. Even before this, rumors of the mineral wealth of the region had reached Europe. Saint-Romain, in a February 1670 letter based on this information ⁽⁴⁷⁾, suggested that the *Rios* merited investigation by Colbert s 1670 fleet. Nothing much, however, was actually done by the French fleet on the east African coast. The promise of such riches also led to increased calls for new fortifications and the need to populate the area. Beginning in 1672, ships were sent

⁽⁴⁵⁾ A. H. U., *Documentos avulsos relativos à Índia*, Caixa 28, Document 94; H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fis. 318-319.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ H. A. G., *Monções do Reino*, 36, fis. 265-266; 37, fis. 193-193 v.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ A. N., Archives des Affaires Étrangères, *Correspondance consulaire*, B¹, 644, fis. 123 V.-124.

from both Lisbon and Goa to the *Rios* carrying *soldados* and military engineers. By 1676 the need for settlers to convert the region into a *colônia* was acute.

The problems in entrenching the *Junta* were many: a harsh climate, the distances involved, opposition from local magnates who favored the *status quo ante*, and problems with the *Reis Vizinhos*, were but a few. By the end of Mendonça Furtado's tenure, in 1677, advances had been made. The main thrust to pacify and colonize the region, however, came under his successor D. Pedro de Almeida. As a reflection of the importance that the *Rios* held in Crown policy by this time, Almeida was sent to the East with orders to take power in Goa, but then to proceed to Moçambique with as strong a force as possible. There, he was to rendezvous with a fleet of four ships that was being sent from Lisbon. This combined force was then charged with colonizing the region and dealing with any problems from the *Reis Vizinhos* that might develop. Almeidas subsequent actions have been detailed by Eric Axelson among others ⁽⁴⁸⁾. The important fact is that the Portuguese, by 1678, were even in a position to undertake such a move. Fifteen years earlier this action would have been unthinkable. In 1662 after all, Antonio de Mello de Castro had been forced to make his voyage to India in an English fleet commanded by the third earl of Marlborough. This difference argues convincingly for the success of the policies of 1668-1677 and the improved situation in both the *Reino* and the *Estado*.

The decision to avoid involvement in the Third Dutch War and the policies carried out by Pedro and Mendonça Furtado from 1671-1677 led to a degree of stability in the *Estado* that had not been enjoyed for many years. The fairly rapid decline of the mid-seventeenth century was finally halted and measures were introduced that helped the *Estado* regain a degree of economic solvency. The *Orçamento* of 1680, as opposed to the dismal financial situation of 1663, reveals that a healthy *saldo* was reached in the wake of the peace and policies of the 1670s for both the *Estado* as a whole and Goa and her dependencies. These *saldos* compare quite favorably with 1630 levels, especially given the

⁽⁴⁸⁾ Axelson, *The Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* (Johannesburg, 1960).

reduced size of the *Estado* and the fact that a *Junta*-run Mozambique was not included in the 1680 totals ⁽⁴⁹⁾.

Estado	Receipts	Expend.	Saldo (in xerafins)
1630	801,992	960,172	- 158,180
1634	1,185,264	1,115,455	69,809
1680	731,828	454,663	271,164
Goa and dependencies			
1630	321,923	409,232	- 87,309
1634	304,346	339,424	- 35,078
1680	359,579	211,485	148,094

These figures admirably demonstrate that the *Estado*, despite being reduced in size and periodic setbacks, was still capable of running effectively and profitably when properly administered by a competent Viceroy. The financial statistics contained in the *Orçamento* of 1680 also suggest that, proportionally, revenues remained fairly constant throughout the seventeenth century, and that when expenditures could be cut a healthy *saldo* invariably resulted. Mendonça Furtado, taking advantage of the relative peace of 1671-1677, succeeded not only in cutting expenditures but also in introducing measures that helped to overcome the losses of the preceding three decades. His actions in conjunction with the improved situation in the *Reino*, Pedro's commitment to a revived *Estado*, and the decision to remain at peace allowed the Portuguese to regain their footing in the East and to surpass the grave circumstances that confronted them in 1663. Clearly, much work remains to be done on this period. This article, it is hoped, has at least shown that such work is merited, and that all was not darkness and doom for the *Estado* after 1663.

GLENN JOSEPH AMES

⁽⁴⁹⁾ The figures for 1630 and 1634 are taken from A. R. Disney, *A Decadência do Império da Pimenta* (Lisboa, 1981), pp. 69-72. The 1680 totals are from H. A. G., *Livro de Registro dos alvarás etc., de diferentes feitorias*, fl. 27.