

REVISTA
PORTUGUESA
de HISTÓRIA

tomo XXVIII



COIMBRA 1993
FACULDADE de LETRAS
da UNIVERSIDADE de COIMBRA
INSTITUTO de HISTÓRIA ECONÓMICA e SOCIAL

AN ELUSIVE PARTNER: PORTUGAL AND COLBERT'S PROJECTED ASIAN ALLIANCE, 1669-1672

On 2 February 1669, the ship *St. Jean Baptiste* anchored at Port Louis, the harbor of the burgeoning port of Lorient, after a difficult nine month voyage. The arrival of a single 700 ton flute at one of France's many ports on a mundane winter's day would not, in itself, seem to merit serious scholarly attention. On closer examination, however, the voyage of the *St. Jean Baptiste* was no ordinary voyage; her cargo indeed no ordinary cargo; the events engendered by her arrival far from mundane. The flute had not returned from a routine passage along the French coast, or the familiar waters of the Channel or the Mediterranean. Rather, it had returned from the warm, distant waters of the Indian Ocean, from the rich Gujarati entrepot of Surat. The *St. Jean Baptiste* was owned by the *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* and was the first Compagnie ship laden with much prized Asian commodities to return from the "East Indies" proper. This was no small achievement given the huge distances involved, the inherent nautical and climatic dangers on the Cape route, the dearth of experienced French pilots, and the fact that the Compagnie had already sent some nineteen ships to the Indian Ocean since March of 1665. Louis XIV and Colbert were of course delighted with the news: the cargo of pepper, other spices, saltpetre, and indigo had been purchased in

India at a cost of 279,665 livres, but were expected to fetch much more at auction in France. The Compagnie Directors were summoned from their offices on the Rue St. Martin to the Tuileries to hear the glad tidings. In consultations with Colbert, it was soon decided that a much needed 6% dividend from the proceeds from the sale of these coveted goods was in order for the long suffering investors, and 113,000 livres was soon distributed (1).

The most important cargo aboard the *Si. Jean Baptiste* was not, however, the pepper purchased and loaded along the Cañara coast or Gujarati cotton piece-goods. It was a series of letters compiled by Colbert's minions in Asia; men like the erstwhile Dutch Director-general François Caron, lured to the service of the French Compagnie in 1665 by an array of "real and honorific" privileges, and the noted adventurer-physician François Bernier, who had spend nearly a decade obtaining unrivalled knowledge, for a European, of the military, economic, and political structures of the powerful Mughal empire (2). Their reports contained the first substantial news that Colbert received on his developing Asian strategy. Unfortunately, these *mémoires* outlined the truly grim situation confronting the young Compagnie and Colbert's cherished plans; nearly

(1) For events surrounding *the arrival of the St. Jean Baptiste* and its cargo, cf. *Archives Coloniales* (AC), Paris, C² 62, Caron to Colbert, 21/1 V/1 668; and C.W. Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism* (2 vols., New York, 1939) 1: 508-09.

(2) Caron had been attracted to the Compagnie by an offer that included naturalizing him as a French subject in July 1665 and giving him the title of director-general at a salary of 18,000 livres a year. His wife was also guaranteed a pension from the Crown, and their children were presented at court. Louis XIV even paid a dowry of 20,000 livres for one of Caron's daughters to marry a "gentilhomme qualifié" from Normandy. Cf. AC B¹, fos. 26v.-27, Colbert to Caron, 3 I/III/1 669; *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, edited by Pierre Clément (7 vols., Paris, 1861-82) III²:471; C.R. Boxer, ed., *A True Description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan & Siam by François Caron and Joost Schouten* (London, 1935), pp. 150-51; and Cole, *Colbert*, I:506. For Caron's early letters to Colbert, including those aboard the *St. Jean Baptiste*, cf. AC C²62, especially fos. 27-36, Caron to Colbert, 21 /IV/1668. For Bernier's Indian experience between 1658-68, cf. *Travels in the Mogul Empire by François Bernier, translated and edited by Irving Brock*, (2 vols., London, 1826). For Bernier's *mémoire* to Colbert, cf. AC C²62, fos. 14-25, 25/m/1668.

500,000 *livres* had been squandered from 1665 with little to show for it save for several tenuous trading factories at Madagascar and along the Indian coast. A lack of familiarity with the nuances of the trade, the entrenched opposition of the Dutch, English, and Portuguese, and inter-cine quarrels among the Compagnie hierarchy had all conspired to frustrate nascent French ambitions. As Gerald Aungier, the English Company President in Surat informed London: "The French have utterly lost their Credit as well for Merchants as Souldiers by their great debts and Indiscreet management of their affaires"⁽³⁾. Jan Maetzuijcker, the Dutch Governor-general in Batavia, summarized the French position in much the same terms: "They are doing no business whatever. M. Caron and his first advisor are still quarreling, they even go so far as to indulge in free fights among themselves and partisans"⁽⁴⁾.

Colbert had begun his bold challenge to Dutch preeminence in the Asian trade, much like he had begun his internal economic reforms of the 1660's, with the hope that it might be possible to undermine the much vaunted position of the *Verenigde Oost Compagnie* (VOC) by means of "peaceful" economic competition. Operating within the theoretical constraints of mercantilism and its tenet of finite global wealth, he judged the Indian Ocean trade to be the most lucrative in the world, the "only considerable one," which yielded the Dutch burghers over 12,000,000 *livres* annually. This enormous front of merchant capital was not only the cornerstone of the Dutch global commercial edifice, it was also the root of many of France's economic ills⁽⁵⁾. To address this festering inequity in overseas trade, Colbert had formed his own Asian Compagnie in September 1664, replete with a mirror image of the corporate structure of the VOC, a nominal capital pool of 15,000,000

⁽³⁾India Office Library (IOL), London, *Original Correspondence* (OC) 3515, Aungier to Directors, 30/XI/1670, fo. 21.

⁽⁴⁾IOL *Hague Transcripts* (HT) XVII 3/58:752. Batavia to Heeren XVII, 31/1/1670, fo. 3.

⁽⁵⁾Cf. Colbert, *Lettres* VII:240-51; II'xclxvi; *Bibliothèque Nationale* (BN). Paris, *Mss. Cinq Cents de Colbert* (CCC) 204 fo. 7; and Cole, *Colbert*, 1:477.

livres, and monopoly privileges for 50 years. Fleets totalling 14 ships had been sent out in 1665 and 1666 at a cost of over 2,765,000 *livres*, and Caron had begun the daunting task of attempting to entrench the French in the trade (6). The letters aboard the *St. Jean Baptiste* constituted a damning judgment on the first four years of the Compagnie's existence, as well as Colbert's original strategy of peaceful competition. The seminal question of the spring of 1669 was: how could the French overcome this plethora of early difficulties?

In a March 1668 *mémoire*, Bernier advised a somewhat moderate course of action. "I have no doubt that if there is one thing that our Enemies have made known at [the Mughal] Court; it is that the French have a very Powerful king, [and] that it is a Warlike and Imperious Nation". To offset the impression that the French would not trade peacefully, a formal embassy should be sent to Agra with generous presents for Aurangzeb and his powerful Grand Vizir Jafer Khan and sufficient funds to finance a permanent resident at the Mughal court to lobby for French interests (7). In his letters Caron argued that a more forceful strategy should be adopted in order to achieve what he viewed as a fundamental precondition for a powerful French presence in the trade: the foundation of a string of fortified Compagnie entrepôts at strategic crossroads of the trade, and especially on Ceylon and the island of Bangka in Indonesia. To achieve this goal, Caron echoed earlier advice that Colbert had received from the adventurer La Boullaye le Gout (8). In April 1666, this royal envoy to the Persian and Mughal courts had

(6) For details on the early years of the Compagnie, cf. Louis Pauliat, *XIV la Compagnie des Indes Orientales* (Paris, 1886) pp. 79-100; Jules Sottas, *Histoire de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales* (Paris, 1905) pp. 8-14; Henry Weber, *La Compagnie française des Indes, 1604-1875* (Paris, 1904) pp. 99-132; Paul Kaeppe lin, *Indes Orientales et François Martin* (Paris, 1908) pp. 1-7; and for expenditure figures, Dem is. *Recueil et collection des titres, etc. concernant la Compagnie des Indes Orientales* (4 vols., Paris, 1755-56) 1:170-72.

O Cf. AC C² 62, fos. 14-25.

(8) Cf. AC C² 62, fos. 27-36, Caron to Colbert, 21/IV/1668.

written that to establish French power in the trade, it was above all "necessary to despatch men-of-war of the king" to make his power known, "sparing neither powder, nor cannonballs," in order to combat "the pride of the Dutch" (9). Other crucial advice that Colbert received came from the Portuguese Jesuit Damião Vieira, who had long served in the *Estado da India* and possessed valued information on the region. The cleric had returned to Europe in late 1668 and headed for Paris. There, he met with Colbert and compiled various reports on the vexing question of how the French could break into the trade. Vieira argued that there were three keys for establishing a powerful French presence in Asia: to impress local rulers with "la reputation des forces" of Louis XIV, to prepare for the spirited opposition of the VOC by concluding alliances with indigenous potentates, and finally to conclude a firm alliance with the Portuguese that would serve as the basis for everything the French hoped to achieve(10).

Colbert's response to all this advice came in his March 1669 "Mémoire sur l'estât présent de la Compagnie Orientale de France dans l'Isle Dauphiné et dans les Indes", which sought to address these "grandes et considerables" problems and portended a more aggressive Asian policy (11). The packets aboard the *St. Jean Baptiste* had reached Paris at a crucial time in the history of the reign. Colbert's economic campaign against the United Provinces had already escalated from the relatively benign reforms

C) Cf. AC C²62. fos. 4-6, La Boullaye le Gout to Colbert, 1/IV/1666.

(10) For details on Vieira's arrival in Paris, cf. *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo* (ANTT)ME/LPPI, fos. 36-36v., Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo to Pedro. 23/X/1668. For the Jesuits projects, cf. BN *Mélanges de Colbert*(MC)31 fos. 297-99, "Devis d'une expedition navale contre les Hollandais au Cap et aux Indes avec une carte des possessions hollandaises et portugaises dans l'Inde;" and fos.300-10., "Mémoire de l'Etat présent des affaires des Indes, pour ce qui concerne le commerce desdi veres nations de l'Europe, et les facilitez, et moyens d'establis, et affermir celuy de la France en ce pays la, tire des relations du R. P. Damianus Vieyra, d'Aureou, Portugais." Details on Vieira's return to Lisbon and his actions towards facilitating such an alliance can be found in *Affaires Étrangères* (AAE), Paris, *Correspondance Consulaire* (CC) B'644, fos. 159-59v., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 16/V/1670; fos. 161 -62, Saint-Romain to Colbert,30/V/1670; and fo. 165, Vieira to Colbert. 28/V/1670.

(11) Cf. ACB'fos.43-59v.

embodied in the tariff of 1664 to the more bellicose provisions of that of 1667. Thus, it should come as no surprise that his "outré-mer" projects also became more bellicose as the Dutch War approached. The chief minister's personal power was still in the rise on the *conseil d'en haut*, and he had little trouble convincing Louis XIV that an escalation of the Asian project was in order ⁽²⁾. The young king, anxious to win *gloire* for his person and realm, was in the midst of preparing for his own showdown with the Dutch "ingrates" and was thus receptive to any plan that postulated aggressive actions against a primary source of revenue for the United Provinces ⁽³⁾. This conjuncture of events explains Colbert's decision in the spring of 1669 to alter his original strategy and instead dispatch a large, wellarmed royal fleet to the Indian Ocean charged with once and for all establishing French economic power in that region at the expense of the Dutch. As I have argued elsewhere, this decision marked the culmination of Colbert's Asian strategy. It was perfectly timed to take advantage of, and complement, Louis's approaching campaign in the Low Countries, a campaign that the chief minister firmly supported ⁽⁴⁾.

One aspect of this escalating anti-Dutch strategy that has not hitherto received much scholarly attention was Colbert's attempt from 1669-1672 to form an anti-Dutch alliance in Asia with the Portuguese Crown to facilitate the work of his so-called "escadre de Perse" ⁽⁵⁾. As Perry

⁽¹²⁾In January 1669, Louis XIV had honored Colbert with the post of secretary of state for the royal household, while in March his secretariat was given formal control over the navy in an exchange of functions with the secretary of foreign affairs. The treasury was over flowing and Louvois was not yet a serious threat. Among others, cf. Paul Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War* (Cambridge, 1988)pp.52,58,and 82.

⁽¹³⁾ On Louis's early interest in the project, cf. his letters in *Archives de la marine* (AM), Paris, B²⁹-B²¹¹.

⁽¹⁴⁾Cf. Glenn J. Ames, "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal", *French Historical Studies* XVI, N^o. 3, (1990) pp. 536-59; and "Colbert's Grand Indian Ocean Fleet of 1670", *The Mariner's Mirror* 76, No. 3, (1990) pp. 227-40.

⁽¹⁵⁾ At the same time that these negotiations were undertaken in Lisbon, Colbert was pursuing similar talks in London through the French ambassador there, his brother Colbert de Croissy, ideally to construct an anti-Dutch triple alliance in Asia. For details on the English negotiations, cf. BN CCC 204 Colbert to Colbert de Croissy: fos. 9v-11, 20/m/1 669: fos.44 v-46v., 1 /IV/1669; fos.70-71,27/1V/1 669: AAE CC B '754, Colbert de

Anderson reminds us, diplomatic history has its place even in the age of *histoire totale*, in part since the "secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the *political* - not at the economic or cultural - level of society " (⁶). Colbert's diplomatic campaign in Lisbon demonstrates that he was willing, if not forced, to utilize essentially political means and the apparatus of the developing Absolutist State to achieve his economic goals. These negotiations also offer useful commentary on the fundamental spilt between the traditional dynastic priorities of Louis XIV and Louvois, and the mercantile *outré-mer* objectives of Colbert, priorities that would ultimately be resolved during the course of the Dutch War (¹⁷). As Louis and Lionne sought to bully, cajole, or bribe themselves into an anti-Dutch alliance to facilitate their geo-political goals on the continent, Colbert was striving through traditional diplomacy for an overseas alliance that would forward his economic strategem in the developing world market economy. As C.W. Cole noted many years ago, the ultimate prize in this struggle was the "commercial domination of the world", but for Colbert and France the road would be "long, hard, and steep" (¹⁸). And so it was, even in Lisbon.

The Portuguese were an eminently logical choice as the object of Colbert's diplomatic desires: Portugal was of course the first European power to established itself in the Asian trade. Vasco da Gama's epic voyage of the last years of the 15 th century, and Afonso de Albuquerque's capture of Ormuz, Goa, and Malacca during the first decade of the following century had ensured decades of dominance over the rich spice trade to Europe. Profits exceeding 200% were sometimes made on the sale of spices by the Portuguese Crown during these heady years, and by

Croissy to Colbert, 18/IV/1669; AC B4 fos. 27 v.-28, Louis XIV to La Haye, 15/III /1672; AM B²23, fos. 132-35V., Colbert to Colbert de Croissy, 13/IX/1673; and AM B²24, fos. 255v.-57v. Colbert to Colbert de Croissy, 17/VT/1673.

⁽¹⁶⁾ *Lineages of Absolutist State* (4th ed., London, 1987) p. 11.

^(C7) On this process, cf. Ames "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy", pp. 557-59.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Cole, *Colbert*, 1:446.

1550 the annual traffic in these commodities via the Cape was c. 40,000 *quintals* (hundredweights) a year ⁽¹⁹⁾. This mercantile wealth had thrust an unprepared, and still essentially feudal, Portuguese state into the forefront of European geopolitical struggles. The impressive Manueline architecture of the monastery of Jeronimos on the banks of the Tagus at Belem, built with money from the spice trade, stands as a fitting testament to that golden age in Portugal's history. By the mid-17th century, all this had changed. As F.C. Lane has shown, the Levant trade began to revive as early as the 1570's. In 1580, Philip II's army had forcibly joined Portugal and her empire to the Habsburg dynasty, ushering in 60 years of Spanish "Captivity" that exacerbated Lisbon's imperial decline. By 1600, the Portuguese managed to import little more than 12,000 *quintals* of pepper via the Cape. Ormuz, the key to the Persian Gulf trade, was lost to an English-Persian attack in 1622. Malacca, a major entrepot for the Indonesian trade fell to the VOC in 1641. Ceylon, the locus of the lucrative cinnamon trade, was captured by the Dutch in 1658. In 1662-63, the Portuguese lost their remaining posts on the pepper rich Malabar coast of India to the VOC as well ⁽²⁰⁾. While the beleaguered Portuguese

⁽¹⁹⁾ Surveys of the *Estado* include: F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* (2 vols., London, 1894); R.S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497-1550*, (London, 1899); Bailey Diffie and George Winius, *Foundations of Portuguese Empire, 1415-1550* (Minneapolis, 1977); V.J.V. Godinho, *Os* (4 vols., Lisbon, 1981-83); C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (New York, 1969); and M.N. Pearson, *The Portuguese in India* (Cambridge, 1988). For the various estimates on the level of spice imports, cf. F.C. Lane "The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Its Revival in the Sixteenth Century", in *History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane* (Baltimore, 1966); V.M. Godinho, *L'Economie de l'empire portugais au XV.^e et XVI.^e siècles* (Paris, 1969) pp. 674-704; C.H.H. Wake "The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700", *The Journal of European Economic History* (1979); Bal Krishna, *Commercial Relations Between India and England, 1601-1757* (London, 1924) pp. 45ff.; and Niels Steensgaard "The Return Cargoes of the *Carreira* in the 16th and Early 17th Century", in T.R. de Souza ed., *Indo-Portuguese History: Old Issues, New Questions* (New Delhi, 1985) pp. 13-31.

⁽²⁰⁾ On the seventeenth century struggle among the European powers established in Asia, among others, cf. Holden Furber, *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800* (Minneapolis, 1976) pp. 31-89.

may have still believed that God was on their side, they were no doubt convinced that he indeed worked in mysterious ways.

The potential for an anti-Dutch Asian alliance with Lisbon, therefore seemed distinctly promising, as the VOC had succeeded in depriving the *Estado* of a sizable share of its Asian wealth as its territorial holdings. Authoritative, not to mention impassioned, voices in Lisbon and Goa were calling for revenge throughout the 1660's, and swift revenge was precisely what Colbert was willing to offer the Portuguese Crown in the spring of 1669, as Louis XIV's armies continued to grow, the royal treasury continued to fill, and the grand royal fleet destined for Asian waters began to assemble. The ducal house of Braganza, headed by the capable João IV (1640-56) had ended the habsburg "captivity" with the revolution of December 1640. This act, in conjunction with the Catalan revolt of that same year exposed the feebleness of Spanish Absolutism, ensured the failure of Olivares strategem, and signalled impending defeat at the hands of France. For much of the next thirty years, the Portuguese had been forced to acquiesce in the role of a convenient diplomatic and geo-political counter-weight to Spain in the final stages of the long Franco-Habsburg struggle. João IV, his widow Dona Luisa de Guzman (Regent until 1661), their son Afonso VI, as well as his dominating minister the count of Castelo-Melhor, all sought, in one fashion or another, to arrange a solid league with France as the surest means to ensure success in the war for independence that raged from 1640-1668, and thus obtain a formal recognition by Madrid and the rest of Europe of the nascent Portuguese state (21).

(21) For details on events in Lisbon from 1640-1668, among others, cf. H.V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge, 1967) pp. 173-94; A. H. Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* (2 vols. New York, 1972), I: 322-33; C.R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686* (London, 1952) pp.333-56; and Carl A. Hanson, *Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal, 1668-1703* (Minneapolis, 1981), pp.5-17.

These negotiations had been far from facile. For Portugal, the military situation was desperate for much of this period: a continental struggle centered in the Alentejo raged on against successive Spanish invasion forces, while the war in the "imperio" with the Dutch continued in Brazil, Africa, and throughout the Indian Ocean. João IV and his successors were determined to arrange French support to facilitate the successful completion of this daunting martial challenge. On the other hand, Mazarin was largely content to use the Portuguese card in order to leverage a better deal with Madrid. He continually refused to consider a league unless the Portuguese invaded Spain, a demand that first João and then his widow found nearly impossible to meet without first obtaining meaningful support from France. During the mid-1650's, the negotiations had revolved around a league cemented by the possible marriage of Louis XIV to the Infanta, Catherine of Braganza. Mazarin had broached such talk with the 1655 mission of the chevalier de Jant to Lisbon. The dowry of the young princess would include a good deal of cash, the cession of the north African city of Tangier, and perhaps even one of the fortress of the *Estado*. In the end, of course, Mazarin and his young king resolved on the peace with Spain formalized at the Treaty of the Pyrenees of November 1659. Dom João da Costa upon his arrival in Paris early that year learned, much to lus chagrin, the true French estimation of the alliance with Portugal: Louis would not marry the Infanta and embrace a league with the house of Braganza, but rather wed the Spanish Infanta, Maria Theresa, and at long last conclude peace with the Hasburgs. A secret article of the pact required France to break off relations with Portugal, so that "the affairs of Portugal shall be placed in the state they were previous to the revolution" (22).

Despite the rather stinging rebuke of the Peace of the Pyrenees, Queen Regent Luisa and her noble advisors had little choice but to continue the

(22) Cf. Edgar Prestage, *The Diplomatic Relations of Port France, England, and Holland from 1640-1668* (Watford, 1925), especially pp. 30-61.

quest for a French alliance: the exigencies of the military situation at home and abroad necessitated it. At last freed from the onerous demands of the longstanding war with France, Philip IV had concentrated his efforts on once again uniting Iberia under a single crown. The king's son Don Juan José in fact commanded the invasion force of 1662 and 1663, numbering over 18,000 men, that captured Borba and, in the greatest victory of the war for Spanish, the second city of the Portuguese realm, Évora. This stunning victory, a reverse which ignited riots in the streets of Lisbon and rumours that the Spanish were approaching Setúbal, was destined to be shortlived. The wily Mazarin had authorized sub rosa assistance for Portugal to ease the pain of the 1659 pact, and Da Costahad raised some 600 men in France under the Anglo-German count of Schomberg, who accompanied the Portuguese envoy back to the Alentejo and set about completely reforming the Portuguese army with a good deal of success. Schomberg's efforts were a notable factor in Portuguese victories that followed: Ameixial (1663), the re-taking of Évora (1663), and Montes Claros (1665). By late 1665, Philip IV was dead and his wife's regency for their sickly infant son was marred by a power struggle with Don Juan de Austria. In these circumstances, the Queen regent announced her willingness to recognize Afonso as king of Portugal. The continental struggle had been won ⁽²³⁾.

In the meantime, Dona Luisa de Guzman had done her utmost to arrange assistance for Portugal in her overseas struggle with the Dutch. While Mazarin and the young Louis had shunned the offer of Catherine of Braganza's hand and her sizable dowry, Charles II, constantly in need of ready money, proved to be a more interested suitor. In June of 1661, Francisco de Melo, later the marquis de Sande, concluded the famed league and marriage treaty with the English Crown. On paper, the alliance was a classic quid pro quo: Charles would receive a dowry of 2 million

⁽²³⁾Among others, *ci.Bcixer, Salvador de Sá*, pp.339-56; Livermorepp. 185-94; and Oliveira Marques, *Portugal*, pp. 332-33.

cruzados, the cession of Tangier and Bombay, and the right for English merchants to trade in Portuguese colonies, in return the English promised to defend Portugal and her colonies from the deprivations of the Spanish and Dutch "as if it were England itself" (24). Catherine sailed from Lisbon to Falmouth in April 1662 to begin her travails as the wife of the plandering Charles and the "barren" queen of England. While Charles indeed dispatched some land forces to the Alentejo that helped to arrest the offensive of Don Juan José, in particular at Ameixial, the English quite simply refused to honor the clauses in the treaty which called for them to protect Portuguese colonies against attacks by the Dutch. This became painfully clear in late 1662. An English fleet under the earl of Marlborough, which was transporting the new Portuguese Viceroy Antonio de Mello de Castro to Goa to facilitate the transference of Bombay, declined to engage the Dutch fleet then on the Malabar coast under Rijkloff Van Goens that was in the process of capturing Cochin, Cannanore, and Cranganore, the last Portuguese strongholds on that pepper rich coast. Mello de Castro, no doubt urged on by the leading citizens of Goa, in turn over Bombay. Since the English had failed to live up to their end of the bargain, the Viceroy argued, why should he honor the provisions of the pact? The imbroglio that ensued over the transference of Bombay lasted over two years and has still not been definitively researched. Only a stern warning from Afonso VI and his Overseas Council, in the end, convinced the Mello de Castro to turn the island over to the English in 1665 (25).

²⁴) For apublished version of the treaty, cf. George Forrest, *the Letters, Despatches, and other State Papers Preserved in the Boml>ay Secretariat, Home Series* (2 vols., Bombay. 1887) 11:362-81.

²⁵) The letter from Afonso and the Overseas Council to Mello de Castro was dated 8/U/1664 and can be found in the Historical Archive of Goa (I I AG)././vrvav *das monções do Reino* (MR) 29, fo. 13. Although a large quantity of documents on this dispute can be found in the HAG, the *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino* (AHII), the IOL, and the Public Record Office (PRO). London, no detailed analysis on the transference of Bombay has yet been compiled. The issue has been touched on in 77i *English Factories in India, 1661-1664*, edited by William Foster (Oxford, 1923) pp. 123-44,332-41 *Factories*

As early as 1662 Turenne had proposed that French influence be assured in Lisbon by marrying both Afonso and his younger brother Pedro to French princesses. After all, a renewed campaign against the Spanish Habsburgs remained a likely possibility. Louis XIV had not only sanctioned the match between Charles II and Catherine, but actually encouraged it. In 1663, the English king and his bride returned the favor by consenting to Sande's trip to Paris to negotiate the twin marriages to the royal brothers, talks that were much to the liking to Castelo-Melhor a traditional supporter of reviving a league with Paris. Afonso was betrothed to Marie-Françoise-Isabelle of Savoy, with the marriage contract being signed at Paris in February 1666. The ambitious Pedro, an implacable foe of Castelo-Melhor, refused the match made for him, declaring he would not marry, a declaration he would soon retract in a spectacular, albeit scandalous, manner. Afonso VI was one of the more tragic figures in Portuguese history. The second son of João IV and Luisa de Guzman, his eldest brother Teodósio had died in 1653 at the age of nineteen. A childhood affliction had resulted in the partial paralysis of Afonso's right arm and leg as well as slightly affecting his power of concentration. The king had nonetheless learned to read and write. His passions, however, were riding, coursing bulls, and frequenting dog and cock fights. Marie-Françoise and her Jesuit confessor, F. de Villes, arrived in Lisbon in August 1666 for the formal marriage ceremony, intent on extending French influence at court. Afonso was less than enthralled with the festivities. Bored with the ceremony, he left early to dine alone in bed. The young king was also unable to consummate the marriage. His ambitious new queen, disappointed in the royal bed, swiftly succeeded in gaining admission to the Council of State meetings, in having Schomberg named commander-in-chief, in challenging the powers

in *India, 1665-1667*, edited by William Foster (Oxford, 1925) pp. 37-75, 180-200, 287-313; S.A. Khan, "Anglo-Portuguese Negotiations Relating to Bombay, 1660-1677", *Journal of Indian History*, Series No.3(1922)pp.419-570; and J.G. da Cunha, *77te Origin of Bombay* (Bombay, 1900), pp. 239-79.

of Castelo-Melhor, and in beginning a torrid love affair with the king's brother Pedro ⁽²⁶⁾.

Louis XIV's agents in Lisbon were less successful in preventing the much desired peace between Portugal and Spain. The marquis de Saint-Romain was dispatched to Lisbon in 1666 to undermine these negotiations that would deprive France of the traditional Portuguese card in a renewed war with the Habsburgs. In March of 1667, an offensive and defensive league between France and Portugal was at last signed, in part to persuade Castelo-Melhor to abandon his talks with Madrid, in part to lay the groundwork for Louis foray into the Spanish Netherlands. The clever Castelo-Melhor, perhaps not realizing the precariousness of his situation in light of the cabal forming against him led by the queen, the Infante, and the powerful duke of Cadaval, was not content with this diplomatic triumph. Although the treaty was ideally to be kept secret until such time as Louis was ready to invade Flanders, he sought to dangle the French alliance to force Madrid to terms, a strategy which in fact succeeded. Before Castelo-Melhor could enjoy the fruits of these talks, however, the complicated manoeuvrings involved ensured his downfall. At the urging of the queen and the French faction at court, Afonso dismissed the count in September 1667. This step proved fatal for the unfortunate Afonso, as he was now isolated and deprived of the advice and support of the skillful Castelo-Melhor. In a palace coup of late 1667, Pedro and his supporters made short work of the reign. By March of 1668, Afonso had been deposed and imprisoned, Pedro ruled with the title of Prince-Regent bestowed on him by a grateful Cortes, a scandalous suit of nullity had been pursued and an annulment of the royal marriage obtained, Pedro and Marie-Françoise had promptly married. While it appeared that French influence had scaled new heights at this volatile Iberian court, Louis and Colbert would soon discover that Pedro was not easily dominated by his

⁽²⁶⁾ On the Marriage of Marie-Françoise to Afonso VI and the new Queen's initial moves at court, among others, cf. Prestage, *Diplomatic Relations*, pp. 84-88, 166-69; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 352-59; and Livermore, *New History*, pp. 192-94.

wife. The Prince Regent refused to continue the war with Spain as specified by the secret treaty of March 1667 with France, and in February of the following year he sanctioned the treaty with Spain signed at the convent of St. Eloi (27).

In the spring of 1669, Colbert was undoubtedly hoping that the new Prince Regent would prove more accommodating towards an alliance with France in the Indian Ocean directed at the much hated Dutch than he had proven willing to honor the continental pact directed against Spain. This hope too proved in vain. Pedro, Cadaval, and the rest of the Portuguese ruling hierarchy ushered into power by the palace coup of late 1667 would reveal that they were preeminently determined to protect and resuscitate what remained of the once glorious *Estado da India*, while seeking to rehabilitate the continental prestige of Portugal. Therefore, Colbert and his agents would be forced to grovel for the generous concessions in the outre-mer that Mazarin had been humbly offered by Dona Luisa and her advisors a decade earlier, concessions that had been belatedly accepted by Charles II and the merchants of London. On one level, this dramatic volte-face demonstrates the changing priorities of French Crown that were ushered in by Colbert's rise to ministerial prominence in the mid-1660's. Mazarin, like Louis and the LeTelliers, was exceedingly traditional in his conception of power and wealth, like them he had little or no interest in overseas trade or possessions, as the dismal state of the French marine in 1661 eloquently demonstrates. Such priorities were of course a seminal part of Colbert's theories on political economy. Unfortunately the offers of the 1650's from Lisbon were no longer available. Why? For one thing, the Portuguese were not nearly as desperate in 1669 as they had been in 1659: peace had been achieved (at a price) with both Spain on the

(27) For the deposition of Afonso and the assumption of Pedro to power, among others, cf. Oliveira Marques, *Portugal*, 1:332-33; Livermore, *New* 194-97; and Boxer, *Salvador de Sá*, pp. 358-74. The 1668 treaty ending the Restoration struggle can be found in J.F. Borges de Castro, *Collecção dos tratados, convenções, contratos, e actos publicos celebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente* (8 vols. Lisbon, 1856-58) 1:357-409.

continent and with the United Provinces in the outre-mer. Pedro had already begun to turn his attention to stabilizing the realm at home and reviving what remained of the empire abroad. The Prince Regent, as he styled himself, and his advisors had little interest in jeopardizing this important work in renewed warfare with either Spain or the United Provinces, the logical end of any renewed Franco-Portuguese alliance. This was the state of affairs in Lisbon, as Colbert and Saint-Romain began their quest for an Asian alliance in the spring of 1669 ⁽²⁸⁾.

On 16 March, Colbert completed and dispatched formal instructions on the negotiations to his ambassador in the Portuguese capital. He began by reminding Saint-Romain of the "pains" that Louis XIV had taken to form the East India Company, "of the great sums of money" that he had given it from the royal treasury, and would continue to give it, until the Directors then in Asia had established a solid trade and overcome the difficulties that awaited "at the outset all enterprises of this nature". Colbert reminded the ambassador that of the four European nations trading in Asia: France, England, the United Provinces, and Portugal, the Portuguese had the longest experience and for many years had dominated the commerce and "all the islands of Asia, and established diverse places and considerable posts on the coasts of Africa, Persia, the Indies, China, and Japan", nothing "that this great power had been notably diminished after the Dutch had introduced their commerce in these same countries, and at present find themselves reduced only to the places of Goa, Diu, and several other less considerable ones on the Coromandel coast". In terms that anticipated the thrust of Saint-Romain's arguments to the Portuguese Crown, Colbert contrasted the great wealth of the Dutch, whose annual fleets "transported] merchandise to the value of 10-12 million livres," and their military power, with "more than 150 ships in the Indies... land armies of 10,000 to 12,000 men, and at sea 40 to 50 warships" with the

⁽²⁸⁾ Cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Estado da India, 1663-1677: Priorities and Strategies in Europe and the East", *Revista Portuguesa de Historia*, XXII (1987), pp. 36-38; and on Pedro's internal reforms, Hanson, *Baroque Portugal*, pp. 141-259.

poverty and weakness of the *Estado*, which had "neither warships or troops". According to Colbert, this "prodigious difference" between the powers and the insatiable desire on the part of the Dutch to augment their position and entirely exclude the Portuguese from the trade, necessitated a "powerful and effective remedy": to form a commercial and military "société" with a nation with similar interests not only to combat the nefarious designs of the V.O.C. but also "to take back from them a part of the places that they have usurped by force". In Colbert's view "only die French" were capable of procuring this great advantage for the Portuguese. Saint-Romain was there fore instructed to turn the 1667 treaty into a full-fledged commercial union in Asia based on reciprocal trading rights and, following the advice of Caron, the granting of at least one fortified in the *Estado* to the French ⁽²⁹⁾.

Saint-Romain presented the French case to Pedro in April 1669 and continued talks well into the new year. In the course of his negotiations, he logically attempted to exploit the influence of the French faction at court, most visably in the form of Marie-Françoise, as well as the religious affinity of the two Crowns. Following Colbert's advice, he also sought to utilize the thirst for revenge against the Dutch that was virtually endemic in Lisbon at the time, and to stress the admittedly poor performance of the English as allies and saviors for the tottering *Estado* in the years following the marriage treaty between Charles II and Catherine of Braganza. The French offer was made at a crucial stage in the history of Portuguese Asia. One of the more pressing questions confronting Pedro and his clique following the ouster of Afonso was how to arrest, and if possible reverse, the alarming seventeenth century decline of the *Estado*. Should the Crown, as in 1661, embrace a foreign alliance as the basis for such a turnaround, or should peaceful internal reforms be adopted? As Saint-Romain pursued his negotiations, Pedro was in the process of resolving this Asian dilemma, a resolution that was no doubt accelerated

⁽²⁹⁾ Given in Colbert, *Lettres*, IF, 456-59.

by the aggressive demands in Colbert's instructions. In late 1669, the decision was made to appoint a new Viceroy for the Asian possessions, a decision that apparently offered some initial evidence on how the Prinee Regent would resolve this dilemma. Luís de Mendonça e Albuquerque was the nominee. The royal fleet charged with carrying him to Goa began to prepare in the Tagus in early 1670. While Saint-Romain was evidently convinced that a grand design was afoot in Lisbon regarding the *Estado*, it was not clear whether this "restorador de Ceilão", as Mendonça Furtado was styled, would achieve this laudable end by violent or peaceful means. Beginning in January 1670 the French ambassador therefore held a series of meetings with the new Viceroy in an attempt to discover to this vital question, while hopefully generating support for the proposed alliance.

Mendonça Furtado came from an aristocratic family that had gained much by the 1640 revolution. His father, Pedro de Mendonça, was one of the principal supporters of João IV in December of that year and shared in the largesse of his grateful monarch. In typical fashion, the young Luis had begun his career in the war against the Spanish in the Alentejo. He had then launched a notable career in *the Estado*. Mendonça Furtado had served as *capitão-mor* of the ships of the *Carreira da Índia* on successful voyages between Lisbon and Goa in 1651-1652 and 1653, commanded the armada that on three occasions in 1658 attempted to break the Dutch blockade of Goa and relieve Jaffnam, the last Portuguese outpost in Ceylon, finally serving as co-Governor-general of the *Estado* in 1661-1662. In Asia, Mendonça Furtado forged a reputation for military prowess, financial acumen, and a strong dislike of the Dutch. He possessed one of the most impressive physiques of all the Portuguese in Asia and his successful individual combat against a mounted Bijapuri cavalry commander near Margão in 1658 had become legend. Wise investments in private trade had also made him rich. He returned to the Reino in 1663 and gracefully integrated himself in the faction around Pedro that would soon overthrow Afonso. Mendonça Furtado had tried to dissuade Pedro from marrying Marie Françoise, even offering to repay her dowry long since spent, an

act which created a temporary rift between the two that was formally healed by his appointment as Viceroy with the title count of Lavradio ⁽³⁰⁾.

In his talks with Mendonça Furtado, Saint-Romain received mixed signals. As he informed Colbert and Louis XIV in letters of January and February 1670, the Viceroy evidenced "a great desire to take some action against the Dutch there" especially one aimed at the reduction of Batavia, which was the "only good place that they had there and the basis of their power". Moreover, he "does not believe that one can diminish the commerce of the Dutch in the Indies without waging war on them there". Drawing on decades of fighting the Hollanders Asia, Mendonça Furtado was also willing to furnish Saint-Romain with various strategem for waging a war with the VOC including plan to exploit indigenous assistance, "une simple guerre de Pirates" using small ships designed to ruin their commerce, and the establishment of a strong fortified French settlement near the straits of Malacca, near the center of Dutch power. Nevertheless, he refrained from revealing exact nature of his instructions from Pedro and continually stopped short of embracing the proposed league with France as the soundest means for restoring the *Estado* to its former glory. As the French ambassador discussed the matter with members of the Council of State like Cadaval, the marquis of Fronteira, and the marquis of Tavora and the members of the Overseas Council like Salvador Correia de Sá e Benavides the profound division among Pedro's advisors on the issue became clear ⁽³¹⁾.

Nearly all members of the ruling hierarchy in Lisbon believed that a Franco-Dutch conflict in Europe was inevitable ⁽³²⁾. On this point there was little debate. Rather, the dispute raged around the question of how

^(M) On Mendonça Furtado's background, cf. Boxer, *A Índia Portuguesa em Meados do Século XVII* (Lisbon, 1982), pp. 59-61 ; Salvador de Sá, pp. 374-76; Fernão de Queyroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, translated by S.G. Perera (Colombo, 1930), pp. 987-92 and 1000-02.

⁽³¹⁾ Cf. AAE CC B'644, fos. 119-20, Saint-Romain to Colbert, 4/II/1670; fo. 98v., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 15/IV/1670; and fo. 111, Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 22/1/1670.

^(*) AAE CC B'644, fos. 103-05v., Saint-Romain to Colbert, 30/XII/1669.

best to exploit this impending struggle for the benefit of the realm in general and the *Estado* in particular. The opinions of Pedro's councillors contained in a document titled "Instrucção da Secretaria de Estado e pareceres sobre a liga de França e Inglaterra" offer valuable insights on the divergent views on this question. The pro-French faction at court, championed by Marie-Françoise and Fronteira, argued that such an opportunity could be exploited "to regain a part of the places they had lost in the Indies" (33). In Fronteira's words, Colbert's proposal offered "the most opportune and desired opportunity that the kingdom could have to restore itself to the most important and glorious of all the conquests, which is the Estado da India". In terms that reflected the mixture of dynastic glory, mercantile benefits, and religious zeal that had long characterized the Portuguese presence in Asia, he concluded: "without conquests one cannot have capital, [and] it is without doubt true that in order to have a kingdom one has to have conquests, and in India, Your Majesty pledges himself to the honor of God, the glory of the nation, [and] the interest and remedy of your vassals" (34). The opposing faction led by the duke of Cadaval was not convinced that the proposed league was the best way to rehabilitate the Estado, since external dependence had failed in 1661 with the English and any league with France would also result in renewed war with Spain in Europe as well as the Dutch in Asia. In arguing against an external alliance, Cadaval maintained there was "great doubt of the recovery of India according to the treaty celebrated between Y our Majesty and the king of England [and] if Your Majesty recovers India with the arms of France, that king will want the profit of his expense" (35).

The first official word that Saint-Romain received on the proposed alii anee came as early as August 1669 in a *consulta* of the Overseas Council.

(*) AAE CC B'644 fos. 105-05v.

Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon (BNL), Fundo Geral, Codex 748, fos. 130-65 for the "Instrucção da Secretaria de Estado e pareceres sobre a liga de França e Inglaterra." For Fronteira's views cf. fos. 154-54v.

(35) BNL, Codex 748, fos. 137-38.

After summarizing Colbert's offer, this document merely called for a strict adherence to the provisions of the 1667 treaty but little else. Thus, while Portuguese commanders throughout the *Estado* were instructed to assist French ships in need, it recommended to Pedro that Colbert's Compagnie not be allowed to establish trading factories in the port cities of the *Estado*, nor should Lisbon grant one of her fortresses to the French, as Caron and others had suggested and Saint-Romain requested ⁽³⁶⁾. This news could not have been totally unexpected for the French ambassador, since his dispatches to Colbert throughout the spring and summer of that year suggest that Pedro was being gradually won over by the Cadaval faction with regard to the alliance ⁽³⁷⁾. Colbert was irked by this initial rebuff from Lisbon. Perhaps he had taken the advice of Damião Vieira's to heart on willingness of the Portuguese Crown to embrace his offer "given its current and pressing need". In any event, his impatience at what he believed was an ill-conceived response emerges from his letters to Saint-Romain, in which he constantly chastized Pedro and his advisor for being "blind" to the grim reality of their situation in Asia. "The Portuguese can not see clearly what to me appears perfectly obvious, [that] it is impossible for them to exist in the Indies, and resist the power of the Dutch if they do not align with another European power". Despite his disappointment, Colbert ordered Saint-Romain to continue to press for the league or, failing that, the incorporation of pro-French clauses into the official orders or *regimento* of Mendonça Furtado, as well as permission to establish a French naval magazine on the banks of the Tagus ⁽³⁸⁾.

⁽³⁶⁾ The *consulta* of the Overseas Council can be found in AHU, "Documentos avulsos relativos à Índia" (DAI), Caixa 28. Document 71.

⁽³⁷⁾ Saint-Romain's 1669 and 1670 letters to Colbert and Louis XIV can be found in AAE CC B'644, fos. 97-217v.

⁽³⁸⁾ For Colbert's letters to Saint-Romain on these negotiations, cf. BN CCC 204, fos. 131-33, 10/VI/1669; fos. 133v.-34v., 1/VI/1669; fos. 278v.-82, 27/X/1669; fos. 312-13 v., 21/XI/1669; and fos. 330-31, 7/XII/1669. Cf. *administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV*, edited by G.B. Depping (4 vols., Paris, 1850-55) 111:494-95, and Colbert, *Lettres*, IB², 494-95 for a letter of 27/VIII/1670.

For the remainder of 1669 and all of 1670 Saint-Romain continued his talks with the Portuguese hierarchy to little avail. In December 1669, he discussed the matter with Marie-Françoise, who informed him that Schomberg had also raised the issue of granting one of the remaining fortaleza to France, a concession that she believed her husband was unlikely to make ⁽³⁹⁾ *. Although the ambassador tried to hold out hope of an eventual agreement, it became increasingly clear that Pedro had been definitively won over by Cadaval's arguments on the issue. Nevertheless, Saint-Romain informed Colbert that he believed his efforts could help contribute to the naming of Távora as the next viceroy when Mendonça Furtado's three year tenure expired in 1674, an appointment that would bode well for France's ambitions in that region. In the meantime, he argued that the hatred towards the Dutch was such in many areas of the *Estado* that most Portuguese there would offer to assist the French royal fleet then forming "even without orders from tins court" O- This of course remained to be seen, or so Colbert must have thought. The Portuguese made precious few concessions beyond Hie recommendations of the August 1669 consulta of the Overseas Council. Pedro rejected Saint-Romain's call to include pro-French clauses in Mendonça Furtado's formal regimento. He did, however, write letters to Portuguese commanders in Brazil and *Estado* instructing them to favorably receive French ships in their ports. The Prince Regent also acceded to Colbert's demand that a French naval magazine be establish on the Tagus, something that would prove of great utility to the French navy in the ensuing continental struggle. Pedro's request that Mendonça Furtado's fleet be allowed to sail to India in the company of Colbert's grand fleet was rejected in November 1669, as soon as it became clear that the Portuguese would in all likelihood rejected the comprehensive league in Asia that the French were seeking ⁽⁴¹⁾.

⁽³⁹⁾ AAE B' 644, fos. 103-05v., Saint-Romain to Colbert, 30/XII/1669.

O AAE B'644, fo. 142v., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 18/IV/1670.

⁽⁴⁾BN CCC 204, fos. 312-13V., Colbert to Saint-Romain, 21/XI/1669.

Throughout the course of these discussions, English and Dutch diplomats resident in Lisbon were extremely apprehensive about Saint-Romain's efforts. Francis Parry, the English envoy, informed Arlington in August 1669 that he had broached the topic of the French ambassador's orders regarding the India trade with the Dutch resident and was told that the "States [General] had now Sent him expresse Command to be vigilant in this business, and by all Arts imaginable to hinder its taking effect" (42). France's rivals were especially wary of the close relationship that seemingly existed between Saint-Romain and Marie-Françoise, and made a good deal of the prominent role the French ambassador played at the baptism of the royal couples first child. Dona Isabel Luisa Josefa, in 1669. As Parry advised Arlington in two letters dated November 1670, these early fears were unfounded. In the first he wrote: "There has been a Rumour some time about Towneof a League that is making between the French king and this Crowne ...to make a joint warre on the Hollander in the Indies. But there is a Person living in the french Ambassadors house, and very well acquainted with all his actions, who assures me that nothing is yet concluded". A week later, he was able to inform the Secretary of State: [I] "now have it l'rom a good hand that the French Ambassador, notwithstanding all his persuasions cannot prevaile with these people to engage in any Acts of hostility against the Hollander" (43). Cadaval's eminently logical arguments on the dubious nature of recovering any Asian territory based on the arms of either England and France, the sincere desire of the populace for continued peace at least with Spain, and the simple judgment on the part of the Council of State that the French, despite all of Colbert's efforts were still no match for the Dutch in an open test of strength in Asia evidently decided the issue C44). Instead of embracing

(42) PRO, *State Papers, Foreign, Portugal/SPF*, 89/10, fos. 117-18, Parry to Arlington, 13/VTII/1669.

(43) PRO SPF 89/11, Parry to Arlington: fos.5-5v.,21/XI/1670; and fo.14, 29/XI/1670.

(44) As Mendonça Furtado later informed Pedro in a coded letter: "there is no doubt Majesty that the French do not have the power in India to oppose the Dutch, who are

the admittedly timely and attractive French offer for quick revenge against the Dutch, Pedro and his advisors instead decided to remain as neutral as possible in the threatening conflict, and to utilize any war that might develop among their rivals in the Asia trade to initiate badly needed reforms in the *Estado*. For Portugal, this wise decision and the reforms carried out in Asia during the 1670's yielded impressive results ⁽⁴⁵⁾.

Colbert's enticing proposal thus had the misfortune of reaching a de facto king at a time when he was intent on reforming his once glorious kingdom, a kingdom that had been gravely reduced in power and stature by decades of foreign domination, limited demographic and economic resources, and a global empire to defend against increasingly effective enemies. French policy had helped bring Pedro to power with the full expectation that he would prove sympathetic to the desires of Louis XIV and, by extension, Colbert. The Prince Regent, however, once safely ensconced on the throne proved to be a bitter disappointment to Paris by pursuing policies which he believed were in the best interests of his realm and empire, and not those that would conveniently complement the dynastic or outre-mer priorities of France. His rejection of the projected Asian alliance certainly complicated Colbert's grandiose plans in the *Indes Orientales*. Portuguese assistance in the maritime and mercantile struggle against the VOC would have greatly facilitated the work of the grand royal squadron of 1670 as well as the Compagnie's operations, and placed the French in a very strong position at the outset of the hostilities in Europe and Asia in the spring of 1672. The correspondence between the Dutch Directors in Amsterdam and Governor-General in Batavia reveals great disquiet at the prospect of such a league ⁽⁴⁶⁾. The failure to

extremely powerful." Cf. AHII DAI Caixa 29, Document 171,18/11/1673.

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Cf. Ames, "The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677", pp. 39-46; and "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise and the Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire", *The Journal of European Economic History*, 20, No. 1 (1991), pp. 7-27.

Hcf.IOL OC.3639, *Batavia to Heeren*XVU/12/VII/672; 3661. *Batavia to Heeren* XVII,31/Vn/1672;IOL HT,1/3/94. *Heeren* XVII to *Batavia*: 177,22/V/1670; 179,5/1X/1670; 182,24/XI/1671; 183, 14/V/1672; 185. 30/IX/1672; and 187, 30/IX/1673.

arrange a firm Asian alliance with Portugal also exacerbated the debilitating process whereby Colbert's entire eastern strategy became inexorably linked to the military vagaries of the dynastic campaign in Europe. Had a firm alliance been concluded, it is likely that Louis XIV would have been much more willing to send reinforcements to Asia after April 1672, and continue the high degree of interest he had demonstrated in the project from 1664 to the outbreak of the war. As it was, this diplomatic rebuff deprived the Asian campaign of immediate military connections to the struggle in Europe and ensured that Louis lost interest in the project, especially as the continental setbacks multiplied, the power of Louvois increased at Colbert's expense, and dynastic priorities reasserted themselves to the exclusion of all else. In the end, these events not only thrust Louis's kingdom into "guerre éternelle," for the remainder of the long reign, they also doomed Colbert's promising plans in Asia and retarded French ambitions in that trade well into the following century.

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