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A noble life: Luis de Mendonça Furtado and the quest for fama in baroque Portugal and her empire

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In the long history of the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*, men such as Vasco da Gama and Afonso de Albuquerque, to name but a few, were able to achieve fame and glory in the service of the Crown. In the historiography, however, it is much more common to find such cases for the 16th century when the *Estado* was first established and solidified than during the 17th century as the empire suffered the ravages of the 60 year Spanish “captivity” and the attacks of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC). The count of Linhares, in part because of his deeds, in part because he was one of few Viceroyes whose diaries have survived has received a good deal of notice.¹ Nevertheless, the general tendency to ignore individuals who admirably served in the *Estado* during the 17th century,

¹ For example, cf. Anthony R. Disney, “The Viceroy as Entrepreneur: The Count of Linhares at Goa in the 1630’s,” in R. Ptak and D. Rothermund (eds.) *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400-1750* (Stuggart, 1991) pp. 427-44 and the manuscript sources cited therein.

a period of intense competition from European and Asiatic competitors, is unfortunate. I have previously argued that the post-1668 period in Portugal witnessed an important campaign to rehabilitate what remained of *India portuguesa*. Beginning with the coup of late 1667 that installed Prince Regent Pedro and his supporters in power, every effort was made to reform the abuses which had helped undermine the *Estado's* former glory.² No individual played a greater role both before and during this crucial campaign than Luis de Mendonça Furtado e Albuquerque, the first count of Lavradio, a name that deserves recognition as a great figure in the history of European overseas expansion during the last half of the 17th century.

By 1640, and the “revolution” against the Philip IV, the luster of the Viceroyalty in Goa had been dulled. By 1656, and the death of João IV, it had been definitively tarnished. The *Estado* had suffered losses in Indonesia, at Hurmuz (1622), Melaka (1641), and Maskat (1650). The VOC had also begun an attack on Ceylon, had periodically blockaded Goa, and would soon extend the war to the Malabar coast. Nevertheless, as Virginia Rau and Anthony Disney have demonstrated “the viceroyalty of Goa [remained] one of the most lucrative patronage appointments in the gift of the Portuguese Crown.”³ The great service nobility of the seventeenth century that initially served the Habsburgs in Asia, like Linhares, and ultimately served the Braganzas, like Lavradio, sought to obtain “two of the career objectives most commonly pursued” by their class.⁴ The first was, in some sense, communal: to preserve and advance the interest of one’s noble *casa* or house, and family. The second objective was more

² Cf. Glenn J. Ames, “The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677: Priorities and Strategies in Europe and the East,” *Revista Portuguesa de Historia* XXII (1987) pp. 31-46; “The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise and the Quest for Stability in Portugal’s Asian Empire, *The Journal of European Economic History* XX (1991) pp. 7-27; “The Goa *Rendas* and the Case for Indigenous Dominance in the Economy of Portuguese Monsoon Asia, 1600-1700,” in *Fra Spazio e Tempo: Studi in Onore di Luigi De Rosa*, edited by Ilaria Zilli (Naples, 1995) 1:1-12; and “Spices and Sulphur: Some New Evidence on the Quest for Economic Stabilization in Portuguese Monsoon Asia, 1668-1682,” *The Journal of European Economic History* XXIV (1995) pp.465-87.

³ Cf. Anthony R. Disney, “The Viceroy as Entrepreneur,” pp. 427-44; and Virginia Rau, *Fortunas ultramarinas e a nobreza portuguesa no século XVII* (Coimbra, 1961).

⁴According to Disney in “The Viceroy as Entrepreneur” p. 428.

individualistic: to advance one's *ovmfama* and *reputação* by performing notable deeds in the service of the Crown. For a nobleman, the most acceptable means of adding to one's reputation related to *fama do valor* má *fama do cabedal*. A Viceroy found ample opportunities to achieve both during an appointment in Goa. Fighting against the armies of the king of Bijapur, the Mughal emperor, and Shivaji or the fleets of the Omani Arabs provided ample "fields" for glory and *fama do valor*. The plethora of entrepreneurial opportunities found in Asia offered opportunity for *fama do cabedal*.⁵

The provincial nobility of Portugal, including Mendonça Furtado's family, had done much to place João IV upon the throne in 1640. These nobles had subsequently followed their new king to Lisbon in the hopes of lucrative positions at home and in the *imperio*. Luis's father, Pedro de Mendonça, continuing at least a four generation tradition, had been *alcaide-mor* of Mourão. He had also achieved the position of *commendador* of Santiago de Cacém and Vila Franca, and *senhor* of Seregeira. Pedro de Mendonça had been one of the "principal acclaimers" of D. João IV. As the count of Ericeira noted, he had pushed for the break with Madrid, attending the 12 October meeting at the house of D. Antão de Almada, with Francisco de Melo and others this bold move was discussed. Pedro de Mendonça had then been chosen to travel to Vila Viçosa to report on this meeting and to convince the reluctant duke to accept the throne.⁶ After the "revolution" in December 1640, he had become *guarda-mor* for the new king. He thereafter sought suitable positions for his sons, including lucrative overseas postings of the type that could be obtained serving in the *Estado da Índia*. The background of the men who held the position of Viceroy from c. 1660-1682 reveals a pattern of accession for the sons of these provincial nobles who had supported the Braganza revolution. As these noble families became integrated into the reformed court or administrative nobility under João IV and his immediate successors their male offspring would, as in the case of Luis de Mendonça Furtado, frequently rise to the ranks of the *titulares* following a similar pattern.

⁵For details, cf. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur" pp. 429-44.

⁶ Cf. Ericeira, *História de Portugal Restaurado* (4 vols., Porto, 1946) 1:107-09.

They would win their knightly spurs of honor in combat against the Spanish in the Alentejo and then usually receive an appointment at court, an initial posting in the *imperio*, or a grant of income from the Crown as a reward. A commandery in the Order of Christ or one of the other religious orders would usually follow as would the inheritance of the *casa* and its various titles, the most usual being the post of *alcaide-mor*, and eventual appointment to the Councils of War or State of the king. At that point, given sufficient *reputação*, ties to the Crown, and influence at court, the appointment to Viceroy would eventually follow bringing with it entrance into the ranks of the *titulares*. The break with Spain thereby facilitated the rise to power of a group of hitherto relatively minor provincial families who, by their aggressive service to the Crown, came to dominate the administrative structure of the Braganza state and in doing so helped to establish and solidify it.⁷

Luis de Mendonça Furtado was the eldest child of Pedro's second marriage to D. Antonia de Mendonça, a *dama* of D. Luisa de Gusmão. He had begun his career in the mid-1640's fighting for four years and nine months in the war in the Alentejo, first as a soldier and then as an infantry captain. He had performed these duties with "reputation" and "distinction" and received the commandery of São Pedro de Pinhel of the Order of Christ for his services.⁸ Luis had first traveled to the *Estado* in 1651, as *capitão-mor* of the ships *San Thome*, *S. Antonio de Maragão*, and *Nossa Senhora do Socorro*. This fleet made a swift voyage to

⁷For details on the family and personal background on the Governors and Viceroys of this period, cf. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [ANTT] *Chancelarias Reais* for João IV, Afonso VI and Pedro II; José F. Ferreira Martins, *Os Vice-Reis da índia, 1505-1917* (Lisbon 1935); Felgueiras Gayo, *Nobiliário de Famílias de Portugal* (28 vols. Braga, 1939-41); D. Antonio Caetano de Sousa, *História Genealógica da Casa Real Portuguesa*; Afonso Eduardo Martins Zuquete, *Nobreza de Portugal* (Lisbon, 3 vols., 1960-61); Anselmo Braamcamp Freire, *Brasões da Sala de Sintra* (Coimbra, 3 vols., 1921-30); and HAG Codex 650 "Catálogo dos Vice-Reis e Governadores da índia, 1604-1837."

⁸ Cf., for example, ANTT *Registro geral de mercês-ordens militares* [RGM/OM] Book 4 fo. 11, Book 5 fos. 22v., 134; Book 6 fos. 91-91v. This commandery was located in the diocese of Viseu and appraised at 281\$666 in 1594, making it one of the more lucrative in the the Order of Christ. The author would like to thank Professor Francis Dutra of the University of California-Santa Barbara for his kind assistance in matters relating to the Order of Christ and Mendonça Furtado.

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and from Goa in that year and 1652. In 1653, he had repeated this impressive feat in an epoch of general maritime disasters for the *Estado* by departing from Lisbon on 26 March with the ships *Sacramento da Trindade* and *S. Jozeph* and reaching Goa on the 2nd October of that year. In 1657, Mendonça Furtado had returned to the *Estado* aboard the fleet carrying the *conde* of Vila Pouca, with the title of Admiral of the Indian Seas. Between January and March 1658, he had commanded the Portuguese fleet with great *elan* that unsuccessfully tried to break a Dutch blockade of the Mandovi and relieve Jaffna, the remaining *Estado* outpost on Ceylon. These failures were not the fault of Mendonça Furtado, who acted with great courage and leadership. Rather, they resulted from crucial lapses on the part of other *fidalgo* commanders who had hesitated in the heat of battle. As the Jesuit Queiroz tells us, Mendonça Furtado had the most impressive physique of all the Portuguese in India at that time. Throughout these naval encounters with the Dutch fleet under Adriaen Roothaas: “Great was the valour and wisdom [with] which the Portuguese Admiral acted.. infusing courage into all by his presence.”⁹

On land, Mendonça Furtado’s *ama do valor* had also grown. In 1658, the king of Bijapur in league with the VOC had invaded Salcete with some 400 cavalry and 4000 infantry troops under the general Abdula Aquimo, capturing some 49 *aldeas* in the process. This force had advanced as far as Margão, while a Dutch fleet cruised off Murmugão awaiting word of a convenient time to disembark. The only Portuguese force then in Salcete was some 250 men in Rachol under the command of Gaspar Carneiro Girão. In Goa, this news prompted the dispatching of Mendonça Furtado as general along with some troops to meet the challenge. In a battle fought near the village of Arli, the Portuguese inflicted a decisive defeat upon Abdula Aquimo’s army and obliged

⁹For background on Mendonça Furtado’s family and early career, cf. Gayo, *Nobiliário de Famílias de Portugal* XX (Braga, 1939) pp. 53-56; Caetano de Sousa *História Genealógica* XI (Coimbra, 1953) pp. 260-61; Martins Zuquete *Nobreza de Portugal* II (Lisbon, 1960) p. 678; Braamcamp Freire *Brasões da Sala de Sintra* II (Coimbra, c. 1923) pp. 366-67; Historical Archive of Goa [HAG] Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Boxer A *Índia Portuguesa* pp. 43-44, 59-61; and Queiroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, trans. by S.G. Perera (Colombo, 1930) p. 990.

this force to retreat from Salcete and back across the Ghats. According to Queiroz, the most notable feat of *valor* performed on that day was accomplished by Mendonça Furtado. As the armies deployed for battle, “one of his [Abula Aquimo’s] higher officers who was considered the most valiant among them, took manifest pains to get a view of him [Mendonça Furtado].” The Portuguese general had “sallied out of the ranks to meet him with only the dress sword which he had at his side and a round target, which they had given him in Rachol by way of a shield, because the buckles were not large enough for his arms.” Thus armed on foot, Mendonça Furtado had then engaged the mounted Muslim officer, “and when the Moor galloped at him at full speed, he got behind the hind quarters of the horse and with his left he made the Moor’s horse stumble and from one side ran him through to the top of the opposite shoulder, the Moor dropping dead, a feat characteristic of his strength and daring.”¹⁰

In an age and society that greatly valued such deeds, news of this impressive feat and the welcomed expulsion of Abdula Aquimo’s army had soon reached Lisbon. The Queen Regent D. Luisa de Gusmão wrote a personal letter of thanks to her general. Moreover, in June 1661, when the letters nominating the Fourth Governing Council of the *Estado da India* reached Goa, they revealed that the members of Council were to be D. Pedro de Lencastre, D. Manoel Mascarenhas and not surprisingly, Luis de Mendonça Furtado e Albuquerque.*¹¹ Unfortunately, Mendonça Furtado’s initial foray into governing the *Estado* with Lencastre from June 1661 until December 1662 was an anemic reflection of his military feats of glory. The origin of many of these problems related to a blood

¹⁰Cf. Fernão de Queiroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, trans. by S.G. Perera, (Colombo, 1930) pp. 1000-1002. For additional details on the 1658 campaign in Salcete, cf. Boxer, *A India Portuguesa*, p. 60 and the sources cited therein.

¹¹Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9; Martins *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 149-50; and Biblioteca Pública de Évora [BPE] Codex CXV/1-21 fo. 91v. Lencastre had begun his service to João IV “in the year of his happy acclamation in the province of the Alentejo.” There, he had held the offices of Captain of the Infantry, Captain of Cavalry, *Commissario* and *Mestre de Campo* until 1657. In that year he first traveled to India as *capitão-mor* of the *Naus* under Mendonça’s charge that conducted his uncle, the count of Vila Pouca, to Goa as Viceroy. D. Manoel Mascarenhas was then *Capitão* of Mozambique and had accordingly declined the honor. The most experienced member of the Council was Mendonça Furtado and great things were expected of his stewardship.

feud that had developed between the new Governor and Bartolomeu de Vasconcelos in Goa after the former's return from the 1658 campaign in Salcete. Vasconcelos had thereupon charged Mendonça Furtado with various excesses during that campaign, including needlessly attacking local strongholds and segments of the indigenous populace of Salcete for allegedly being in league with the king of Bijapur, as well as the more inflammatory charge of summarily executing 11 men in Coculim.¹² To avoid an open breach in the capital, Mendonça Furtado had been sent to the fortress of Mormugão with the title of general. Upon his return to Goa in June 1661 as Governor, however the simmering feud between he and Vasconcelos had erupted into street fights between their partisans. Meanwhile, the pressing plethora of problems confronting the Viceroyalty, most notably the continuing aggressions of the VOC and the fleet of Rijckloff Van Goens on the west coast of India, were largely ignored. Instead the Governors, the leading *fidalgos* resident in the capital and their retainers all concentrated on settling petty personal grudges with each other. As F. Ferreria Martins aptly noted on this Council and the government of Lencastre and Mendonça Furtado: it was "always in discord, being sterile in [its] administrative action when precisely the opposite was indispensable." The streets of Goa were "turned into a theater with scenes of anarchy, that brought about its complete ruin. Nobles and Clerics hired thugs to harass their enemies and the Governors did nothing to stop them." During the governmental chaos of this eighteen month period, Van Goens captured Cranganor on the Malabar coast and then turned his attention to expelling the Portuguese from the rich coastal city of Cochin in the fall of 1662.¹³

Antonio de Mello de Castro's arrival at Bombay in September 1662 was badly timed with respect to meeting this threat from the Dutch. He did not formally assume power in Goa until December and that delay exacerbated problems in sending relief for Cochin. As a result, one of the first letters Mello de Castro received was from Ignacio Sarmiento de Carvalho, the captain of

¹²Cf. Martins Zuquete, *Nobreza de Portugal* 11:678.

¹³Cf. Ferreira Martins, *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 149-50.

Cochin, informing him of the loss of that rich fortress to Van Goens! In the months that followed, Mello de Castro and Mendonça Furtado sent letters to the Crown seeking to blame the other for this final debacle in the war against the Dutch. Mendonça Furtado had thereafter returned to the *Reino* from Chaul aboard the *caravella Nossa Senhora de Nazareth* in January 1663. Not much is known of his activities for the next few years, except that he gradually became integrated into that clique of young nobles in Lisbon that increasingly came to favor the removal of Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor and the accession of Pedro to power. Mendonça Furtado urged the coup against Afonso that played out in the fall of 1667 and was one of the strongest supporters of Pedro during these months. The fact that he had already garnered an impressive cache of wealth from his years of service in Asia, as well as his willingness to offer contrary advice to the new Prince Regent when necessary, was clearly reflected by his offer in the aftermath of the coup to repay D. Maria Françoise's dowry within the space of three days provided Pedro forego marrying her. It was much to the Prince Regent's credit that he did not hold this emotional difference of opinion against Mendonça Furtado, who subsequently served on both the Council of State and of War. In those forums, Pedro continued to seek out his views until appointing him as Viceroy in March 1670.¹⁴ Following what was becoming a common practice, the Prince Regent also bestowed the title of 1st count of Lavradio upon Mendonça Furtado by Letters-Patent of 10 March, thus completing the rise of another of the provincial noble families that had supported the Revolution of 1640 to the ranks of the *titulares*.

In making this selection, Pedro and Cadaval were anxious to appoint a new Viceroy who was not only one of their own but one who would once and for all alter the decades of decline in the eastern possessions. The Prince Regent and his key advisors had already resolved upon a fundamental shift in Crown policy regarding the tri-partite empire, and were committed to initiating a series of reforms in the *Estado* which would allow it to regain a semblance of its former

¹⁴On Mendonça Furtado's return to the *Reino* and activities there from 1664-1670, cf. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* pp. 352 *ff.*

glory and economic benefit to the Crown and *Reino*.¹⁵ Just as importantly, unlike his parents and brother, Pedro was willing to allocate significant levels of monetary and material support for this daunting project. News of the previous Viceroy João Nunes da Cunha's death had reached Lisbon in November 1669.¹⁶ The search for a suitable replacement had thereafter taken in a flurry of activity regarding the approaching Dutch War of 1672 and Colbert's attempt to lure Pedro into this conflict, especially in Asia against the VOC. In early 1670, the Prince Regent made two wise decisions regarding his quest to rehabilitate the *Estado*: he definitively rejected the often repeated offers of an Asian alliance against the Dutch proffered to him by Louis XIV's ambassador, the marquis de Saint-Romain; and in Letters-Patent of 9 March 1670 he had formally selected Mendonça Furtado as the 31st Viceroy of the *Estado*. Together these choices would have a profound impact on the subsequent history of Portuguese Asia.

Throughout the spring of 1670, the sizable royal fleet that would carry Lavradio to the Indies gathered in the Tagus While garnering the post of Viceroy remained a potentially lucrative prize for the rising service nobility, the inherent difficulties in successfully carrying out the functions of that office had increased exponentially since the days of D. Sebastião. Not only would the new Viceroy have to contend with the continuing military threat of indigenous powers from Monomotapa to Macau, but the English, and especially the Dutch had demonstrated their bellicose intentions towards the *Estado*. Economically, the necessity of competing in a complex of trading networks across the Indian Ocean and, to a degree, inland against well-entrenched, well-financed, and well-connected indigenous merchants had also been complicated with the arrival of the joint-stock companies of the Dutch, English, and most recently the French, founded by Colbert in 1664. The Portuguese were increasingly forced to compete with these rivals merely for a share of the European segment of the overall trade both on the Cape route to Europe and in the "country" inter-Asiatic trade. Religiously, the monopoly of spreading the faith in Asia under the *Padroado*

¹⁵Cf. Ames, "The *Carreira da índia*, 1668-1682" pp. 25-27.

¹⁶Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 7, Governors to Pedro, 8/1/1669; and BPE Codex CXV/1-21 fo. 93v.' and Ames, "The *Carreira da índia*, 1668-1682" pp. 19-22 and the manuscript sources cited therein.

real had also been challenged by the formation of the *Propaganda Fide* (1622) in Rome and the arrival of the Protestant Dutch and English who were generally more willing to forego religious considerations as opposed to the work of the *religiosos* and Goa Inquisition in the quest for profit.¹⁷

On 10 April, Mendonça Furtado and his five ship *frota* had departed. This late departure forced the new Viceroy to “invernar” in Mozambique, and the fleet did not reach Goa until late May 1671, whereupon he took possession of the office at Reis Magos, at the mouth of the Mandovi.¹⁸ The two triennial terms that Mendonça Furtado served as Viceroy marked one of the most crucial periods in the history of the *Estado*. Pedro’s first Viceroy had the experience, strength, force of will, as well as the *fama do cabedal* and *valor* to confront the challenges and entrenched interests that typically frustrate any campaign to reform an inefficient bureaucratic system. Mendonça Furtado, like most *reinados*, had always returned to Portugal after his terms of office and had extensive connections at court. Unlike many of his predecessors, however, he had also spent considerable time living in Goa and could certainly appreciate the inherent weaknesses of the imperial edifice as well as any *casado*. Before his departure from Lisbon, Mendonça Furtado had been approached by Louis XIV’s ambassador regarding the possibility of joint actions in the Asian trade against the much despised Dutch Company. Despite his willingness to discuss the soundest strategy for the French to pursue in their impending campaign against the VOC, Lavradio predictably demurred on the question of Portuguese support for any overt actions against Batavia’s interests.¹⁹ Pedro and his new

¹⁷Volumes 28A-43 cover the years 1660-1679, cf. HAG Codices 37-50.

¹⁸For details on Mendonça Furtado’s assumption of his new titles and his voyage to Goa, cf. BPE Codex CXV/1-21 fos. 93-93v.; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Martins *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 157-58; ANTT *Registro de Mercês: Ordens Militares* Book 12 fo. 453 and Book 14 fo. 9v.; Martins Zuquete, *Nobreza de Portugal* 11:678; *Assentos* IV:217-23; and HAG MR 36 fo. 405, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 14/X/1671.

¹⁹Saint-Romain’s summaries of these conversations and other information relating to the proposed Franco-Portuguese alliance can be found in AAE CC fos. 97-100v., ‘Extrait des Lettres de M. Saint-Romain,’ 22/XII/1669-12/V/1670; fos. 103-05, Saint-Romain to Colbert, 30/XII/1669; fos. 110-13V., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 22/1/1670; and fos. 119-20, Saint-Romain to Colbert [in cipher], 4/II/1670.

Viceroy, after all, had already decided to reject these overtures as “diplomatically” as possible and to instead to enact a series of reforms while their European rivals were busy warring against one another at home and overseas in Louis XIV’s War of 1672.

Lavradio focused his energies around four main priorities: to reestablish an adequate military presence in the *Estado*; to resuscitate the flagging economic fortunes of the eastern empire; to reestablish effective Crown control over the outlying areas of the *Estado*; and to address the plethora of administrative and religious abuses that had done much to undermine the reputation and position of the Portuguese throughout Asia. First, a serious effort was made to rehabilitate Portuguese arms. After receiving a plethora of complaints on the lack of manpower to garrison the fortresses and serve in the fleets, the *Conselho Ultramarino* had first considered the matter in December 1669. In the past, as many as 5000 Portuguese had served in these functions, now that number had been reduced to perhaps 500. In the councilor’s view, the principal cause of this evil was not that the Crown had failed to send out sufficient numbers of men but that certain factors which confronted them upon their arrival in Goa. For example, a sufficient number of officers were not present to form them into companies, instill order, and provide some form of monetary support given the dearth of a reliable pay system. The quality of the men sent over as soldiers had also contributed to the problem of desertion: it was common to impress relatively young boys and to send convicts or *degrades* as fodder for the forts and fleets. The *Reis Vizinhos* and the religious orders had demonstrated great facility in attracting such men to their service; the former through the lure of reasonably lucrative pay, the latter with promises of a relatively comfortable lifestyle.²⁰

The Council made several important recommendations. First, the *Principe* should send as many men and ships as possible in Mendonça Furtado’s fleet to begin the rehabilitation. Second, the Crown should encourage all officers with experience in the recently ended Restoration war and all qualified nobles to enlist for service in the *Estado* by offering royal *mercês* at home and a level of

²⁰AHU DAI Box 28, Document 87, Consulta of Overseas Council, 9/XII1669, fos. 1-3.

fixed salaries in Asia. Third, the Prince Regent should form a permanent royal *Terço* of some 800 men and officers to form the new basis of military power in the State of India, a force that could be utilized to meet extraordinary threats confronting the Viceroy. This *Terço* should be comprised only of well-qualified and experienced officers and soldiers. Neither *rapazes* nor *degredados* would be allowed to serve, “since these two types are not of any real use,” and had traditionally deserted in droves upon arrival in Goa. The Council admitted that the normal revenues of the *Estado* were not sufficient to bear the cost of this new *Terço*. It is significant, and indicative of the renascent interest in Lisbon of reviving the fortunes of the Asian empire, that the *Conselho* recommended that these new expenditures should be met with the share of the money the *Estado* had been assessed for the peace with the United Provinces, nominally 130,000 *cruzados* a year. In his marginal notations to this *consulta*, and in later letters, Pedro made it clear that his firm conviction “*de acudir a India*” had prompted him to accept this plan.²¹ Despite problems relating to shortfalls in the actual yield of the *donativo*, this new royal *Terço* was in fact formed by Mendonça Furtado after his arrival in Goa with the experienced officer corps from the *Reino* and the rest of the empire that the *Conselho* had envisioned.²² Militarily, the new Viceroy also ensured prompt dispatching of the yearly fleets to the Straits of Hurmuz and south along the Malabar coast in search of contraband shipping.

Mendonça Furtado also helped to stabilize the economic life of the *Estado*, particularly the *Carreira da India*. The nadir for the *Carreira* had occurred from 1640-1663 during the war with Spain and the United Provinces when many vessels were lost.²³ Between 1658 and 1663 an average of one ship a year arrived

²¹Cf. AHU DAI Box 28, Document 87, and HAG/MR 36 fo 56, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 6/11/1670; MR/37 fo. 75, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 10/III/1672.

²²On the initial steps in the formation of the *Terço*, cf. Mendonça Furtado to Pedro: MR/36 fo. 36, 3/X/1671; MR/36 fo. 393, 6/X/1671; 37 fo. 76, 13/IX/1672; and Pedro to Mendonça Furtado: MR/36 fo. 35, 20/III/1670; and 38B fo. 310, 26/IX/1672.

²³For details on these generally dismal years, cf. Boxer *A india Portuguesa em meados do século XVII* pp. 39-49. Among others, the *Atalaia e Sacramento* went down off southeast Africa, a fierce storm sank scores of vessels in the Mandovi, two *naos* were lost in 1647, and the richly laden *São Lourenço* went down in 1649. Of the five ships that left Lisbon in the 1650 of the Viceroy Count of Aveiras, none reached India that year.

in Goa, while not even that number made the return voyage successfully. In only slightly exaggerated terms, the Queen-Regent Dona Luisa told the French ambassador in 1659 that no news had been received from India in three years. Perhaps the final debacle took place in 1662, when Antonio de Mello de Castro was forced to sail to Goa as Viceroy in an English fleet.²⁴ Thanks largely to the efforts of Pedro and Mendonça Furtado, it appears that there were 31 sailings from Lisbon to Goa for the years 1668-1681. Of that number, 30 made the voyage successfully, with an average voyage time of 8 months. During those same years, there were 28 sailings from Goa to Lisbon, with 23 ships completing the return voyage, again in an average time of 8 months. The days when the *Carreira* was virtually moribund and contact between Lisbon and Goa was interrupted for years at a time were over, and a regular seaborne trade between the metropolis and India was definitively re-established. Swift successful passages from Lisbon to Goa became the rule after 1674, with 14 consecutive vessels making the passage in approximately 6 months. This is a record that even the more “advanced” proto-capitalist companies of the Dutch and English and Colbert’s *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* were doubt hard-pressed to equal.²⁵

The reasons for this startling turnaround are not hard to find. As C.R. Boxer pointed out long ago, the key for successful sailings on the Cape route was prompt departures from Lisbon and Goa, leaving the Tagus between late February and early April and departing Goa in January.²⁶ We have a plethora of royal decrees from 1668, especially during Mendonça Furtado’s tenure, exhorting prompt departures and forbidding harmful stopovers in Brazil and Africa. Moreover, offending captains were punished and the number of late departures

²⁴Ibid. pp. 22, 39-49.

²⁵ For details on this maritime rehabilitation cf. Ames, “The *Carreira da India*,” and “Spices and Sulphur: Some Evidence on the Quest for Economic Stabilization in Portuguese Monsoon Asia, 1668-1682,” *The Journal of European Economic History* 24 (1995) pp. 465-87. The French, for example, sent 56 ships (both Company and royal) made the passage to *les Indes Orientales*. Of this number only 26 or 37.4% made it back to France. Cf. Paul Kaepelin, *La Compagnie des Indes Orientales et François Martin* (Paris, 1908) pp. 653-55.

²⁶Cf. Boxer, “The *Carreira da india*, 1650-1750,” pp. 36-37; and *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 206-07.

and *invemos* dropped. The Crown and Viceroyalty were also diligent about ensuring prompt departures.²⁷ By the mid-17th century, the Portuguese had also begun to integrate the shipbuilding advances of Dutch and English into the construction of their own *naos*. This promising trend had been continued by Pedro after 1668. As a result, the unwieldy 1200 ton carracks of late 16th and early 17th centuries, the monsters which had fueled the stories of the *Historico Tragico-Ultramarino*, were abandoned. In their place sleeker, more seaworthy galleons were built in the royal dockyards of Lisbon, Porto, and Goa.²⁸ The Portuguese therefore made serious efforts to revive and stabilize their seaborne trade between Lisbon and Goa during the late 17th century. A fundamental precondition for any such revival was the re-establishment of regular seaborne interchange between the métropole and Goa and this was definitively achieved during the crucial decade of the 1670's under Mendonça Furtado.

The attempt to reestablish effective control over the outlying fortresses of the *Estado*, settlements that had largely fended for themselves during the crisis years of c. 1640-1668, was another priority of Lavradio. Macau, “so distant from this kingdom, and also from this State of India. . .and so surrounded by enemies,” was indeed in dire straits.²⁹ The cost of the struggle with Spain and the Dutch meant that Macau was forced to fend for itself with virtually no support from Lisbon or Goa. In fact, “the city only managed to save itself with a great loan from the king of Siam [at this time] that permitted it to pay the exorbitant sums demanded by the Mandarin Chinese.”³⁰ It appears that not a

²⁷For details on the Crown's attempt to enforce such orders and ensure prompt departures, cf. HAG MR/34 fos. 213-13v., Pedro to S. Vicente, 29/III/1669; fo. 214, Governors to Pedro, 26/1/1670; MR/35 fo. 1, Governors to Pedro, 13/1/1669; MR/36 fo. 309, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 1/IV/1671; MR/37 fo. 22, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 2/III/1672; fo. 23, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 12/IX/1672; fos. 24-25, Instructions for Ships Returning to *Reino*, 2/11/1672(7); fos. 236-36v., Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 2/1/1673; fos. 239-39v., Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 14/1/1673; MR/38A fo. 144, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 28/XI/1672; MR/38B fo. 463, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 26/1/1674; fo. 474, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 13/III/1673; MR/39 fo. 86, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 20/III/1674; MR/40 fo. 141, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 26/III/1675; and MR/42 fo. 84, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 22/III/1677.

²⁸Cf. Boxer “Admiral João Pereira Corte-Real and the Construction of Portuguese East-Indiamen in the Early Seventeenth Century.”

²⁹HAG MR/28A fo. 140, Queen Regent to Mello de Castro, 7/IV/1662.

³⁰Cf. Boxer, *A india Portuguesa* p. 68; and “Macao as a Religious and Commercial Entrepot in

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single royal ship reached the Mandovi from Macau nor departed for that fortresses between 1660-1666. The captaincy of the fort of Sao Paulo in the City of the Name of God of China remained vacant for a brief time, royal power was virtually non-existent, and the *casado* population had fallen to perhaps 1000 or so by 1669, half of what it had been in 1635.³¹ As early as April 1662, the Queen Regent had written to Antonio de Mello de Castro ordering him to keep communication open with Macau by “whatever means” possible, and some efforts were made to reestablish a viable Crown presence in Macau and the Lesser Sunda Islands during the remainder of the 1660’s.³² Yet, the Viceroyalty of Mendonça Furtado witnessed a more concerted effort to entrench royal power in those regions.

In February 1670, the Prince Regent lamented “the miserable state and great problems,” in Macau and ordered assistance for that place and Timor.³³ In May 1671, Mendonça Furtado sent two frigates to China loaded with muskets, gunpowder, other munitions, as well as a new Captain-general, Jorges Borges da Silva.³⁴ Mendonça Furtado also agreed that it was vital to conserve Timor: “There is no doubt Senhor that it will be of great importance to conserve these islands as much for the benefit that Your Majesty’s vassals can gain commercially, principally the city of Machao.” The Viceroy’s long experience, however, tempered his enthusiasm: “There are so many problems with the officials and subjects in those parts, as much by the captains and representative of Your Majesty, as by the Dominicans.. the distance is great, and manpower small”.³⁵ By early 1672, the Viceroy had formulated a policy to definitively rehabilitate the influence of the Crown in China and the Lesser Sunda Islands. First, he would reestablish the traditional voyages from China to Manila and Indonesia undertaken at Crown expense, “that have been extinct for many years.”³⁶ A

the 16th and 17th centuries,” *Acta Asiatica* XXVI (1974) pp. 64-90.

³¹Cf. Sousa, *Survival* p. 32.

³² HAG MR/28A fo. 140, Queen Regent to Mello de Castro, 7/IV/1662.

³³HAG MR/36, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, fo. 44, 6/II/1670; and fo. 268, 20/III/1671.

³⁴HAG ACF/12 fo. 70, *Assento* of Treasury Council, 5/V/1671 ; and HAG Codex 1258, *Livro de Homenagens* (3) fo. 32.

³⁵HAG MR/36 fos. 269-69v., Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 8/X/1671.

³⁶HAG MR/37 fos. 123-23v., Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 20/VIII/1672.

new Captain of the voyages to Timor had been named: João Antunes Portugal, who sailed to Macau aboard the *Nossa Senhora da Guia* in May 1672. Portugal's ship carried munitions, naval riggings, and other supplies for the outpost. The *caravella Bom Jesus da Trindade* was also outfitted for the voyage to China.³⁷ To exploit the provisions of the recent treaty with Spain and further bolster Crown trade in the region, Mendonça Furtado appointed Antonio Mesquita Pimentel as Captain-general of the royal voyages between Macau and Manila. To ensure "good administration" over these voyages, Mendonça Furtado had appointed a 5-man *Junta* to oversee them.³⁸ Despite persistent problems, regular voyages were indeed reestablished between Goa, Macau, and the Lesser Sundras during the 1670's. Ships including the *Santo Antonio e Almas Benditas*, *Nossa Senhora do Mar e Almas Benditas*, and *Santa Clara, Madre de Deus* all made the voyage³⁹.

Mendonça Furtado also established a *Junta do Comércio* for the Rios de Cuama or Zambezi River basin area, part of a general campaign to bolster the Portuguese presence in southeast Africa that Antonio Alvares Pereira and others had requested.⁴⁰ Interestingly enough, it was in part the work of Colbert's new *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* that prompted the Prince Regent to take a more active interest in developing Mozambique and the *Rios*.⁴¹ Colbert's well funded *Compagnie* centered its early activities on nearby Madagascar, sending out fleets in 1665-1666 comprising some 18 ships, 2500 people, at a cost of 2,760,000 *livres*!⁴² As early as March 1666, Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor had ordered S. Vicente to take extraordinary care in reinforcing

³⁷ Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 123-23v. And various *assentos* of the Treasury Council found in HAG Codex 110, *Assentos do Conselho da Fazenda* [ACF/12] fo 121,123,5/IV/1672; fo. 123v., 19/IV/1672; fo. 128v., 27/IV/1672; fo. 129, 27/IV/1672; fo. 129v., 27/IV/1672; and fo. 130, 27/IV/1672.

³⁸ Outlined in HAG MR/37 fos. 123-23v.

³⁹ Cf. HAG ACF/12 fo. 260, *Assento* of Treasury Council, 14/IV/1674; and ACF/13 fo. 179v., *Assento* of Treasury Council, 28/IV/1678.

⁴⁰ Cf. His 16 September 1661 letter in HAG MR/28A fos. 150-50v.

⁴¹ Cf. HAG MR/24 fo. 338, Lima to Viceroy, 17/VIII/1654; *consulta* of Overseas Council at AHU Codex 211, fos. 326v.-27v., 29/1/1657; cited in Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600-1700*, p. 134.

⁴² Cf. Glenn J. Ames, *Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade* pp. 7, 12-

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Mozambique given the increasing threat that the French Company posed.⁴³ Beginning in 1669, Pedro began a concerted effort to address the lingering problems with Mozambique. A May 1669 *consulta* of the Overseas Council called for major reforms, noting that the problems in Mozambique and the *Rios* along with “new conquest that the French are making on the island of São Lourenço, together constitute a very important matter, and embody prejudicial consequences to the conservation of the *Estado da India*”⁴⁴ Pedro informed Mendonça Furtado of an impending shift in Crown policy in a letter of March 1671, including a decision to send an infantry company of 100 men, munitions, and arms to assist the fortress of Mozambique in the coming monsoon. More importantly, beginning with the next Captain, the contract of a trading monopoly would be taken away from that position, and instead the commerce of Mozambique and the *Rios* would be free to all Portuguese subjects on payment of custom duties. These duties, it was assumed, would compensate for the loss of monies yielded from farming out the captaincy. The Viceroy and Treasury Council would be charged with establishing the *alfândega* in Mozambique. Pedro, however, indicated that he would await Mendonça Furtado’s advice before taking a final resolution on the issue.⁴⁵

Mendonça Furtado’s long experience in Asia convinced him that the Crown was considering an ill-advised course of action. In October 1671, he argued that while the monopoly contract with the Captain may not have been good for the vassals of the Crown, experience demonstrated that opening the *Rios* to free trade would be even less be useful. The Viceroy maintained that such a radical shift in policy would unleash potentially dangerous economic forces, with consequences not easily remedied. Moreover, the influx of textiles and other goods into the *Rios* would deflate prices and reduce the yields of any *alfândega*, whose receipts could thus not be expected to cover the revenue lost by abandoning the contract.⁴⁶ Mendonça Furtado offered a less sweeping scheme

⁴³ Cf. HAG MR/33 fo. 91, Afonso to S. Vicente, 30/III/1666.

⁴⁴ Cf. AHU DAI/28 Document 94, *consulta* of Overseas Council with supporting documents and reports from de Lima, Sylveira, and Barreto, dated 14/V/1669 and revised 17/X/1669.

⁴⁵ Cf. HAG MR/36 fo. 264, Prince Regent to Mendonça Furtado, 21/III/1671.

⁴⁶ Cf. HAG MR/36 fos. 265-66, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, II/X/1671.

based on an *estanque* or Crown authorized monopoly run for the benefit of the *Fazenda*. This entity would control the level of goods imported and exported from the region, thus ensuring stable prices and returns; some products might even be opened to private traders with customs duties paid at an *alfandega* at Mozambique. Mendonça Furtado proffered that since the economic potential of the region was so great, with 100,000-200,000 *cruzados* being made by men without much capital, the Crown might expect to make a handsome return from such a system.⁴⁷

In March 1672, before receiving these letters, Pedro resolved to abolish the monopoly contract system for the Captain of Mozambique and Sofala and to instead substitute *comercio livre* for Mozambique and the *Rios de Cuama*.⁴⁸ The following day a formal *alvará* was issued by Pedro that henceforth established free trade for all of his vassals resident in Portugal, the Atlantic islands, Brazil, and other conquests giving them the right to send vessels to trade on the African coast between the Cape of Good Hope and Guardafui in all goods, including pepper, cloves, cinnamon, and slaves without impediment, provided customs duties were paid. This new system would ideally commence in March 1673 and one of the prime reasons for undertaking it was to facilitate the settling of the *Rios* with Portuguese subjects. That same day, the Overseas Council approved a list of 24 skilled stonemasons, blacksmiths, locksmiths, and carpenters that were to be sent to Mozambique aboard the *Nossa Senhora de Nazareth e Santo Antonio* to assist with the work of improving the fortifications there.⁴⁹ By September, Mendonça Furtado's letters criticizing this plan had reached Lisbon and been debated by the Overseas Council which recommended a compromise position. While the Crown had taken its original decision in order to save the *Rios* by populating them, the Viceroy evidently

⁴⁷ Cf. HAG MR/36 fos. 265-66; and MR/36 fo. 401, Mendonça Furtado to Prince Regent, 13/X/1671.

⁴⁸ Cf. AHU Codex 208, fo. 349, Prince Regent to Mendonça Furtado, 7/III/1672; HAG MR/37 fo. 192 Prince Regent to Mendonça Furtado, 8/III/1672 [same as Codex 208 fo. 349]; and MR/37 fo. 10, Prince Regent to Mendonça Furtado, 8/III/1672.

⁴⁹ Cf. AHU DAM/3 Document 6, decree on free trade for Mozambique and Rios de Cuama, 9/III/1672; and AHU DAI/29 Document 29, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 9/III/1672.

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believed that his *estanque* plan would also achieve this end. Nevertheless, the Council recommended that this scheme would only be applied to the erstwhile area of the *contracto* in Mozambique and the *Rios*. The rest of the African coast should indeed be subject to the provisions of the free trade *alvara* of the previous March. Mendonça Furtado should be apprised of this decision without delay and he should immediately order it into effect since: “this business is of the utmost importance for the conservation of the *Estado da India* These prompt actions would also allow the Viceroy to select an experienced group of private citizens to form a *Junta* to oversee the activities of the *estanque*.⁵⁰ On 22 September, Pedro forwarded the advice of his Council while informing Mendonça Furtado that he had decided to defer to his Viceroy’s vast experience on such matters, allowing him to do what was best for the interests of the Crown, the *Estado*, royal and private profit, the conservation of Mozambique and the settlement of the *Rios*.⁵¹

In January 1673, this pressing matter was finally resolved. After consultations with the Goa State and Treasury Councils, Mendonça Furtado established a *Tribunal da Junta do Comércio de Moçambique e Rios*. According to the *regimento* of the 23 January, six officials would henceforth direct the trade of Mozambique and the *Rios*: a superintendent, a *castelão*, and *ouvidor*, the *Reitor* of the College of S. Paul, and the Prior of the Convent of S. Domingos, and finally an “homem de negocio e trato de Mossambique,” nominated by the Viceroy. The principal role of the *Junta* was to manage this commerce for the benefit of the *Fazenda Real*: overseeing the procurement, financing and shipping of products in a timely fashion, determining “just” prices, establishing a distribution network throughout the *Rios*, and enforcing the Crown’s monopoly privileges over the trade. *Fazendas de lei* including ivory, gold, gunpowder, and firearms constituted a Crown monopoly, while *fazendas livres* could be imported and exported by private subjects, provided that customs duties of 5% were paid at the *alfandega* established at Mozambique. The superintendent

⁵⁰ Cf. AHU Codex 212 fos. 18-19, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 5/IX/1672. Cf. also AHU Codex 212 fos. 17v.-18, *consulta* of Overseas Council, 6/IX/1672.

⁵¹ Cf. HAG MR/38A fo. 64, Prince Regent to Mendonça Furtado, 22/IX/1672.

was expected to utilize royal functionaries at Cape Correntes, Sena, Quelimane, and Sofala and their hinterlands to obtain trading goods that would eventually be shipped via “cafilas”, along with appropriat *fazendas livres* to Mozambique for eventual shipment to Goa and the major ports of the Province of the North. Conversely, textiles and other goods from India would arrive at Mozambique and thereafter be distributed to the subordinate settlements.⁵² Although great difficulties presented themselves, Mendonça Furtado persevered and by the end of his tenure, the organization was functioning relatively effectively and able to assist the great colonization scheme and military campaign on the Swahili coast undertaken by his successor D. Pedro de Almeida.

A final area where Mendonça Furtado played a seminal role in the late 17th century rehabilitation of the *Estado* related to the overbearing social and economic power of the *religiosos* in the Asian empire.⁵³ As Antonio de Mello de Castro had noted: “Among the great miseries that have existed for many years in this State of India, none is of less weigh than the multitude of *Religiosos* that there are in it, because they are rich, they are making themselves Masters of everything, and those that are poor, sustain themselves with the alms of those that are even poorer than themselves.”⁵⁴ While the complaints of secular officials against the “abuses” of the religious orders in Goa and elsewhere were common and longstanding, the economic implications of such issues took on far greater significance in the face of increased European competition from the Dutch, English, and French Companies. This was especially true with respect to the London East India Company (EIC) which actively pursued a policy of de facto religious freedom in its settlements as opposed most starkly with the activities of the Goa Inquisition. Perhaps the most glaring of the abuses relating to the

⁵² On the formation of the *Junta*, cf. Mendonça Furtado to Pedro: HAG MR/37 fos. 250-50v., 22/1/1673; MR/37 fos. 272-72v., 22/1/1673; MR/37 fos. 273-73v., 24/1/1673; the *regimento* can be found in MR/37 fos. 251-55 titled ‘Regimento para o novo comércio de Moçambique,’ and has been discussed by Oliveira Boleo, “O ‘Regimento para o novo comércio de Moçambique de 1673,’” in *Studia* 3 (1959) pp. 90-109.

⁵³Cf. Ames, “The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677” pp. 38-46 and the manuscript sources cited therein.

⁵⁴Cf. Historical Archive of Goa [HAG] *Livros das monções do Reino* [MR] MR/35 fos. 149-49v., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/1/1666.

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series of anti-Hindu laws enacted in Goa since c. 1560 related to D. Sebastiao's decree on the taking and forcible conversion of Hindu orphans.⁵⁵

Mendonça Furtado's arrival in Goa signaled a notable escalation in the campaign to extend royal authority over the *religiosos*, to curb the most glaring abuses of the Inquisition and the religious orders, and to resolve the inherent trade-off of economic advancement *vis-à-vis* religious zealotry in favor of the former. The increasing sensitivity of the Prince Regent and the duke of Cadaval to the economic consequences of spreading the faith in Asia, was well reflected in a May 1670 *consulta* of the *Conselho Ultramarino*.⁵⁶ This document resurrected the question of dealing with the challenge to Crown's *Padroado* embodied in the continuing actions of the Rome dominated *Propaganda Fide* that "had made, and continues to make the determination to continue [to appoint] foreign subjects as bishops of Asian lands with the title of missionaries, against the law and practice immemorial, that Your Majesty enjoys thanks to the Senhores Kings, his predecessors." It is significant that in addition to voicing the traditional complaint of such actions by the *Propaganda* violating the rights, power, and *gloire* of the kings of Portugal, the Overseas Council also voiced strong concerns over the economic impact of such actions. "Even though the motive of the *Junta* may be to propagate the Faith, and to assist Christianity... it has succeeded in accomplishing something very different. . . [these foreign priests] have applied themselves toward giving advice and news to the Princes of which they are vassals, in order to introduce the commerce of these states to the ruin of that of Your Majesty."

Soon after taking power, Mendonça Furtado was confronted with the most damaging problem relating to the *religiosos*: the taking and forcible conversion of Hindu "orphans." In a letter dated 19 June, the new Viceroy received greetings from 35 of the leading *gentio* merchants of Baçaim (Bassein). These merchants listed problems with the *rendas* and *alfandegas* in the rich "Province of the

⁵⁵Discussed in Ames, "The *Estado da India*, 1663-1677," pp. 33-34, 41-42.

⁵⁶Cf. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino [AHU] *Documentos avulsos relativos à India* [DAI] Box 28, Document 150.

North” due to the “oppression” they were enduring. Foremost among these abuses was the taking of Hindu orphans in violation of “ancient laws of the Kings of Portugal,” which had permitted such actions only when both parents and grandparents were dead. Instead, the *religiosos* in the North and elsewhere had over time come to define “orphan” in an extremely loose fashion when merely the father had died, but child still had a mother, grandparents, and great-grandparents alive. Because of this abuse, many indigenous merchants had fled to the lands of the neighboring kings. As the petitioners pointed out, many of these Hindus and Jains had also gone to the burgeoning English enclave of Bombay, attracted by the beacon of de facto “freedom of religion.” This exodus to Bombay was of “such rigor” that this port, “whose tobacco *renda* in other times was 3000 *pardaos* per year, today yields to the English more than 13,000, and it may soon reach 24,000, after yielding in our time less than 3000, and that port is improving itself every day for merchants, since they are safe from the assaults we suffer.” This letter asked that Mendonça Furtado do his utmost to remedy such abuses by ensuring that the original decrees on this matter were henceforth observed by the *religiosos*.⁵¹

The petition from Bassein made an immediate impact on the Viceroy. In October 1671 he wrote: “I am obliged by the position I hold to tell Your Majesty the truth, and this is that the order of the Count of São Vicente relating to the land holders in the countryside presenting certification to the *Pai dos Christãos* has been extremely damaging to the Service of Your Majesty.” São Vicente’s decrees had caused great damage to the royal *rendas*. Especially harmful was the increased number of “orphans” who had been taken “in violation of the ancient laws of your royal predecessors.” Echoing the language of the petition from Bassein, the new Viceroy pointed out that this practice had forced the indigenous merchants of the *Estado* “live under oppression without Reason,” and forced many of them to emigrate to the lands of the *Reis Vizinhos* and especially to Bombay dramatically increasing the trade of that port and the

⁵¹Cf. HAG MR/36 fos. 259-59v., Hindu Merchants of Baçaim to Mendonça Furtado, 19/VI/1671, Pedro had already addressed this issue in HAG MR/36 fo. 257, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 21/III/1671.

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level of the tobacco *renda* there.⁵⁸

The Viceroy warned that unless drastic measures were taken to correct such abuses, the *rendas* generated in the English settlement would soon outstrip those produced in the Province of the North. “If Your Majesty does not order a prompt and appropriate remedy to this great evil, all the *rendas* that Your Majesty possesses there will soon be extinguished, and the trade [and prosperity] of the said *praças* will be reduced to great poverty.”⁵⁹

Nonetheless, as the Viceroy pointed out, any attempt to reform this long-standing abuse was bound to be complicated. His Council of State had determined that the issue should be resolved by the *letrados* in the *Reino* in consultation with the *religiosos* in Goa. Mendonça Furtado had gauged the response of the religious community to reform by asking leading clerics their views on a number of issues including whether a Hindu child who had simply lost his father could in fact be considered an “orphan.” Much to his chagrin, both Francisco de Barcelor, the *commis sario-geral* of the Franciscans and Augusto da Piedade, the *Provincial* of the Augustinians, had indicated that legal and ecclesiastical precedents in Portugal and the *Estado* indeed supported such a stance. The Viceroy had also sought to poll the *Inquisidor-geral* to very little result.⁶⁰ Francisco Delgado e Matos had little interest in responding to such requests from the secular authorities in Goa. “This minister is so absolute in his replies that even the Viceroys of Your Majesty are not treated with the respect that is due to them.”⁶¹ The disturbing fact that very little had changed in this matter was reflected in letter of December of 1674 when Mendonça Furtado, quoting from a report from the captain of Bassein, outlined the continuing exodus of Hindu and Jain merchants from the North “selling their properties and goods,”

⁵⁸Cf. HAG MR/36 fo. 258.

»Cf. HAG MR/37 fos. 137-37v., Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 24/VIII/1672.

⁶⁰For details, cf. Mendonça Furtado to Pedro: HAG MR/38B fos. 406-06v., 21/XI/1673; MR/38B fos. 378-78v., 20/1/1674; and MR/38B fos. 456-57, 20/1/1674, which contains an *assento* of the Goa Council of State on the matter dated 28/XII/1673. P.S.S. Pissurlencar provides useful additional documentation on the discussions on this matter in his *Assentos do Conselho do Estado, 1618-1750* (Bastorá, 5 vols., 1953-57) IV.:229-31 n. 1, and IV.:287-91 n. 1.

⁶¹ HAG MR/38B fos. 378-78v., Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 20/1/1674.

much to the detriment of the royal *rendas*.⁶²

In late 1676, the Prince Regent received a document from the *povo gentio* of Goa that finally convinced him to address this crucial issue. A petition from the “officials, nobles, and others of the Brahmanic Nation assisting in that City and its environs. . .had complained against the *Pai dos Christãos* taking from the possession of their mothers, children orphaned by their father together with the property that his death bestows upon them, in order to oblige them by force to receive the baptism water against formal laws and provisions that defends them.” In the Prince Regent’s words, this matter was of “such importance” that he ordered a formal *Junta* to be held to resolve the matter. This grand meeting would include the opinions of the newly arrived Archbishop Primaz, D. Antonio Brandão, the Inquisitor Francisco Delgado de Matos, the Chancellor Francisco Cabral d’Almeida, Antonio Paes de Sande (recently appointed *Vedor da Fazenda*) with “three or four” other leading citizens, along with the *Pai dos Christãos*, the *Procurador* of the Crown, and significantly the *procurador* of the *povo gentilico* of Goa. This assemblage would examine all the relevant documentation on the matter and seek to resolve the conflict, “by the means that seem most convenient to pacify and quiet the indigenous Hindu population.”⁶³ Meeting in from December 1677-January 1678 under D. Pedro de Almeida, this *Junta* would reaffirm the original wording of the decree of 1559 and thus seek to retain indigenous merchants and capital within the *Estado*.

By October 1677 and the arrival of Almeida, Mendonça Furtado yearned to return to the *Reino* in order to enjoy the fruits of his long labors for the Crown. In December of that year, he departed for Lisbon aboard the *Bom Jesus de Nazareth e Nossa Senhora de Boa Memoria*. Tragically, Mendonça Furtado would never reach the *Reino* or take up his grant of Lavradio. After narrowly surviving a fierce storm off Mozambique, he died off Bahia in mid-1678. Having never married, and given a plethora of problems with his brothers, his vast

⁶²Cf. MR/39 fo. 109, Mendonça Furtado to Pedro, 3/XII/1674.

⁶³Cf. HAG MR/42 fo. 110, Pedro to Mendonça Furtado, 31/III/1677. The petition from the Hindu population of Goa to Pedro can be found in MR/42 fos. 138-38v. A similar petition had been sent to Mendonça Furtado on 21/11/1676, cf. MR/42 fos. 147-48.

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estate went mainly to a niece living in Evora, with a generous bequeath to the Misericórdia of Lisbon to pay for dowries of young women.⁶⁴ Thanks to his work, however, great strides had been made toward placing the *Estado* on a solid footing once again. As Gerald Aungier, the able English President in Bombay, was prompted to write as early as 1674 on Lavradio's attempt to address the traditional banes of bad government and the abuses of the *religiosos* and *fidalgos* for *India Portuguesa*: "the prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much: both in one and in the other."⁶⁵

⁶⁴ On Mendonça Furtado's departure for Lisbon and death, cf. HAG Codex 1171, [ACF/13] fo.142v.; Martins, *Os Vice-Reis* pp. 157-58; HAG Codex 650 fo. 10. It appears that Lavradio bequeathed at least 4000 *cruzados* to provide dowries. Cf. Arquivo Histórico da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa, QH-7 No. 13862 Livro 7 *de Contas Correntes das Testamentarias* [CCT] (1766-70) fo. 60; QH-9 No. 13864 Livro 9 [CCT] (1771) fo. 66; QI-3 Livro 2 *de Legados, Capelas e Dotes* No. 13887-89, Livro B (1768-69) fo. 154, C (1770-72) fo. 146, and D (1772-75) fo. 85.

⁶⁵IOL OC 3929, Aungier to Company Directors, 25/1/1674.