

EUROBAROMETER SPRING 2004

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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30 YEARS OF EUROBAROMETER



JOINT FULL REPORT OF EUROBAROMETER 61 AND CC EUROBAROMETER 2004.1

This survey was requested and coordinated by the Directorate General Press and Communication.

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The interpretations and opinions contained in it are solely those of the authors.

Preface – 30 years of Eurobarometer

The first Eurobarometer was published in July 1974.

Only the most imaginative utopist would have foreseen that 30 years later, the original Community of Six Member States would have enlarged to 25 members, of which some came from the former "Communist bloc", that the internal market would be completed, that a common currency would be in circulation, that citizens would elect their European representatives by universal suffrage, that a Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union would be nominated and that a proposal for a Constitution would be adopted by the Head of the States and governments.....


Eurobarometer has continually adapted to all the developments involved in building Europe. The themes it considers have evolved as time went on: the international situation, globalisation, sustainable development, immigration or services of general interest are only some of the subjects which have been covered in the last period.

Moreover, the bi-annual "standard" survey by face to face interviews has been complemented by new instruments: special face to face Eurobarometers, Flash Eurobarometer usually carried out by telephone, quality studies.

Despite the long period of time covered, the principles that govern Eurobarometer have remained unchanged: the scientific rigour which complements the deontological principles, the comparative approach which permits evolution over a period of time to be followed and allows the analysis of similarities and differences between countries and socio-demographic groups: We also apply the principle of transparency, as always, because all results are published and thus can contribute to public debate.

Eurobarometer 61 is the last to have been carried out before the enlargement of the Union to include ten new Member States. For this reason, the reader will find below two separate reports. But it seems pertinent to us to suggest that from now on there should be synthesis and common annexes. By the next edition, in autumn 2004, we will publish a fully integrated report covering the enlarged Union.

May we take the opportunity to thank the "founding father" of the Eurobarometer, Mr. Jacques-René Rabier, as well as the millions of citizens who have accepted the sacrifice of their time in order to aid the Eurobarometer research teams and who have helped make this instrument an irreplaceable means of understanding European public opinion.



Jorge de Oliveira e Sousa
Director General

Notes for the reader

The Standard Eurobarometer and the Candidate Countries' Eurobarometer interviewed 28,340 citizens in 28 European countries that are either members of or candidates to join the European Union in waves EB61 and CCEB 2004.1 respectively. All interviews were carried out face-to-face with respondents and were conducted in February and March 2004.

As the fieldwork for both surveys was carried out concurrently using identical questions, an overall description of the state of public opinion in the existing and in the new member countries of the European Union, as well as in the countries that remain candidates after the May 2004 enlargement can be drawn up.

This comparison of the most topical indicators reveals that the enlargement had a greater emotional effect on the citizens of the new member countries in comparison with the fifteen existing members.

When the fieldwork was completed in March, it was seen, particularly in the new member states, that scepticism appeared to have grown at the dawn of the enlargement and that positive expectations and enthusiasm had given way to disillusionment.

Abbreviations:

- The EU28 figure covers all Member States, as well as the candidate countries that have not yet joined the European Union
- The EU25 figure gives the weighted average for the EU of 25 Member States (in being since 1 May 2004).
- EU15 refers to the Member States of the European Union before 1 May 2004: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK).
- NMS stands for the New Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus (CY), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK) and Slovenia (SI).
- The CC group comprises candidate countries that have not yet joined the EU: Bulgaria (BG), Romania (RO) and Turkey (TR).

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COMMON INTRODUCTION

COMMON INTRODUCTION

Between 20 February and 28 March 2004, 28,340 people across 28 European countries, comprising the then 15 European Union Member States (EU15), the 10 New Member States (NMS) and the 3 candidate countries (CC3 - Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) seeking European Union membership participated in face-to-face surveys covering various aspects of the European Union and its activities

In this report - the first one to embrace what, since 1 May 2004, is an enlarged European Union comprising twenty-five Member States (EU25) - the prime focus will be to examine the views held by people in this expanded bloc in which nearly 455 million people now live and, where appropriate, to highlight the similarities and differences that exist between the views of those in the original EU15 and those in the countries that have recently come on board - the NMS.

The report reviews people's attitudes and feelings on subjects as varied as their expectations for the coming year, globalisation, their trust in various types of institutions, their levels of knowledge about the EU, a common foreign and security policy and a European constitution, as well as their views regarding democracy and various aspects relating to the European Parliament elections which were to be held three months or so after the poll - in June 2004.

The EU25 sample – a socio-demographic portrait

The EU25 sample comprises the 15 European Union Member States (EU15) and the ten countries which became Member States of the European Union on 1 May 2004 - the NMS.

When the two samples are broken down it may be seen that there are minimal differences by **gender**, with men comprising 47% of the NMS sample and 48% of the EU15 sample.

Age groups

More young people in the New Member States

The composition of the population in the NMS differs somewhat from that in the EU15. While one-third of the EU15 population is aged 55 or more, this is the case for only 28% of the NMS population.

At the other end of the age range, there is a difference of four percentage points between the proportion of 15-24 year olds in the NMS (19%) and the EU15 (15%).

However the differences between the two samples are only found at the extremes of the age spectrum. In the middle two age bands (25-39 and 40-54), the composition of the EU15 and NMS samples was virtually identical.

Table: Breakdown of sample by age (in %)

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+
EU15	15	27	25	33
NMS	19	25	27	28

Educational attainment

People in the new member states spend a longer time at school.

More than a quarter (26%) of the EU15 sample had left school at age 15 or before; the equivalent NMS figure was eight percentage points less at 18%. A larger proportion of the NMS sample (47%) than in the EU15 (42%) had completed their education when aged between 16 and 19.

There is a two-percentage point difference between the share of the EU15 sample (23%) that had studied until age 20 or beyond and the figure in the NMS (21%).

On the other hand, there is a two-percentage point difference in the opposite direction between respondents still studying in the NMS (12%) and in the EU15 (10%).

Table: Breakdown of sample by years spent in fulltime education (in %)

	Up to age 15	16-19	20+	Still studying	No answer
EU15	26	42	23	10	NA
NMS	18	47	21	12	2

Occupation

Divergent occupational profiles.

By occupation, as can be seen in the table below, there were similar shares of the NMS and EU15 samples who were **self-employed** (8% in each group) and **managers** (8% in the NMS, 9% in the EU15).

There was also only a two-percentage point difference between those falling in the **other white-collar worker** category: 11% in the EU15 and 9% in the NMS. 13% of the NMS sample was composed of **students** compared with 10% in the EU15.

This is, however, where the similarities end.

The share of the **unemployed** in the NMS (11%) was almost double the 6% in the EU15 sample.

There was a considerably higher share of **retired** people in the NMS sample (29%) than in the EU15 (23%).

Manual workers accounted for 22% of the EU15 sample but only 17% of the NMS sample. The share of **house persons** in the EU15 sample at 11% was more than double that in the NMS (5%).

Table: Breakdown of sample by occupation (in %)

	EU15	NMS
Self-employed	8	8
Manager	9	8
Other white-collar	11	9
Manual worker	22	17
House person	11	5
Unemployed	6	11
Retired	23	29
Student	10	13

Political orientation

Differing political outlooks.

In terms of political orientation, we see from the table below that there were more respondents who claimed to be of the political centre in the NMS countries (47%) than in the EU15 (40%). There were higher proportions of those on the right in the NMS (31%) and those on the left in the EU15 (36%).

Over the years, a gradual migration towards the centre and the right in those NMS countries that were formerly Communist has been observed. This fact is borne out when the results of the June 2004 elections to the European Parliament are examined: it is currently estimated that a majority of the New Member States' representatives will join the EPP-ED political group and Eurosceptic parties made important gains in Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovenia.

Table: Breakdown of sample by political orientation (in %)

	Left	Centre	Right
EU15	36	40	25
NMS	22	47	31

Place of residence

Existing member states are more urbanised.

The EU15 sample was noticeably more urbanised than its NMS counterpart. In the NMS sample, an equal proportion (38%) lived in a rural area or village as in small or middle-sized towns and just under a quarter (24%) lived in large towns.

Only 30% of the EU15 sample lived in a rural area or village and a further 43% lived in small or middle-sized towns. The remaining 27% lived in large towns.

Table: Breakdown of the sample by place of residence (in %)

	Rural area or village	Small or middle-sized town	Large town
EU15	30	43	27
NMS	38	38	24

Income levels

Contrasting income levels.


A substantial one in three (33%) of the EU15 sample did not say in which of four income categories they would place themselves – a common feature over the years in this group of countries. This figure falls to just half this proportion (16%) in the NMS where people would appear to be less reticent about disclosing information relating to their income.

In both samples, 32% were in the two upper income groups but 45% of the NMS were in the two lower income groups in contrast to just 36% of the EU15 sample.

Table: Breakdown of sample by income level (in %) ¹

	--	-	+	++	Don't know/No answer
EU15	18	18	15	17	33
NMS	25	20	17	15	16

European Union citizens' expectations for the next year



¹ Levels of income are denoted by the symbols --(lowest), - (lower than average), + (higher than average) and ++ (highest)

Universal gloom regarding the economic situation.

The state of the **economic situation in their country** was the aspect of life about which greatest gloom was expressed by EU25 citizens (44%) whether they lived in the EU15 or the NMS. However, those in the EU15 countries (43%) were somewhat less pessimistic than in autumn 2003 (-3) whereas their NMS counterparts' concern actually grew by four percentage points from 48% in autumn 2003 to 52% in spring 2004.

Pessimism concerning countries' employment prospects.

Negative feelings regarding the **employment situation in their country** grew throughout the EU25 with 48% believing it would get worse – up one percentage point from last autumn. The averages of those believing the situation would deteriorate were identical for the two sub-groups of countries.

On the other hand, EU25 citizens' expectations were considerably less pessimistic in terms of aspects relating to their private situation such as their household's financial situation and their personal job situation, but there are marked differences between the views of citizens in the EU15 and those of people in the accession countries whose outlook is consistently less optimistic.

Rays of hope on the personal job front.

Almost six out of ten EU25 citizens (58%) believe their **personal job situation** will remain the same over the next year. More EU15 citizens (60%) tended to hold this view than citizens in the accession countries (52%). The latter group also tended to be more pessimistic (18%) than their EU15 counterparts (10%), together making up an EU25 average of 12%. Figures for those with a more pessimistic outlook regarding this issue rose slightly (+1) in the EU25 since autumn 2003 but, in fact, fell by three points in the NMS.

Prospects for household finances less rosy in new member states

A majority (52%) of EU25 citizens expect the **financial situation of their household** to remain the same over the next year. Those living in the EU15 countries are more likely (54%, +1) to opt for this response than those living in the accession countries (41%, +2). Nevertheless, this latter figure of 41% still slightly outweighs that of those who believe that the situation is going to deteriorate (39%), a figure that has risen by four percentage points since autumn 2003.

A majority believes their personal situation has improved over the last five years.

Looking back at their **personal situation five years ago**, two-thirds (66%) of EU25 citizens believe that their present personal situation is either an improvement or has remained the same as it was. 69% in the EU15 hold this opinion, whereas just 54% in the NMS do. In fact, 44% of citizens in the accession countries believe that their situation has actually gone downhill – a three-percentage point increase on autumn 2003.

Overall optimism regarding personal situation five years hence.

Looking **five years ahead**, 75% of EU25 citizens expect their personal situation to have either improved or remained the same. EU15 citizens (78%) are considerably more likely to make this assessment than citizens in the candidate countries (63%).

23% in the NMS group compared with 16% in the EU15 expected that their situation would get worse over the next five years. 14% of those polled in the NMS did not express an opinion in contrast to just 6% in the EU15.

Globalisation

Citizens in the existing member countries tend to have more definite views about globalisation.

Globalisation – the general opening-up of all economies, which leads to the creation of a worldwide market– has become a frequently discussed issue in recent years. European citizens were presented with a series of ten statements about aspects of globalisation and asked whether or not they agreed with them. Some related to advantages and others to the disadvantages of globalisation.

In both the EU15 and NMS, high numbers of respondents did not express an opinion in relation to these statements. In the NMS, at no point, did the 'don't know' reading fall below 30% and was often closer to 40%. In the EU15, these figures were lower, although with one exception (**globalisation leads to power being concentrated in large companies at the expense of others**), with the 'don't know' factor never below 20%..

64% in the EU15 in contrast to 55% in the NMS felt that **globalisation leads to power being concentrated in large companies, at the expense of others**.

Almost six out of ten (59%) of EU15 citizens agreed that **globalisation increases the variety of products for sale in their countries**- a figure seven percentage points higher than NMS respondents (52%).

That **globalisation represents a threat to employment in their country** was a view subscribed to by 57% of EU15 respondents but only 39% in the NMS. This is a possible factor contributing to the pessimistic views regarding countries' employment prospects mentioned in the previous section.

57% of EU15 citizens agreed that **globalisation makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products sold in their country**, a substantially higher figure than that recorded by NMS respondents (42%).

NMS and EU15 respondents recorded similar results (NMS 41%, EU15 43%) and agreed with the statement that **globalisation cuts the prices of products and services through increased competition**.

44% of those polled in the EU15 agreed that **globalisation represents a good opportunity for their country's companies**. However, in the NMS, those disagreeing (37%) greatly out-numbered those agreeing (27%) with it.

In the NMS, 33% and, in the EU15, 39% agreed that **globalisation leads to a duller and more uniform world**.

In both the NMS and the EU15, more disagreed (NMS: 35%, EU15: 40%) than agreed (NMS: 31%, EU15: 39%) with the statement that **overall, globalisation is a good thing for their country**; However the related statement that **overall, globalisation is a good thing for me** was met with opposition by a majority of those citizens who actually expressed an opinion in both the EU15 (45%) and NMS (38%) groups.

Keeping the effects of globalisation under control

EU is most trusted organisation to keep effects of globalisation under control.

EU25 citizens were presented with a list of institutions and groups within society and asked which of these they trusted to get the effects of globalisation under control and respondents could give more than one answer.

Interestingly, the **European Union** came out as the organisation most trusted to keep globalisation under control with a rating of 27% in both the NMS and the EU15.

In second place, European citizens (EU15: 26%, NMS: 24%) trusted **consumer rights associations** in accomplishing this task, although many viewed **citizens themselves** to be of similar importance (EU15: 24%, NMS: 25%).

National governments were trusted to keep globalisation under control by a greater proportion of the EU15 poll (19%) than that of the NMS (13%), although NMS respondents placed more trust **in green/environmental/ ecological groups** with 22% in contrast to their EU15 counterparts' 16% figure.

17% of EU15 and 15% of NMS respondents had confidence in the **World Trade Organisation** to keep globalisation under control, although NMS respondents, in fact, had greater faith in the **United Nations** performing this function, with a figure of 18% compared with the EU15's 13%.

NMS respondents also had slightly more trust in the **anti-globalisation movements** keeping globalisation under control with 15% compared with the EU15's figure of 13%

10% of the NMS trusted **NGOs** in contrast to 13% of the EU15 poll.

NMS respondents also had slightly more trust in the **US government** keeping globalisation under control with 5% compared with the EU15's figure of 3%, trusting the US government the least of all institutions.

Second least trusted of all to keep globalisation under control were **multinational companies**. This low level of trust was seen throughout the EU25 with figures of 7% in the NMS and just 5% in the EU15.

9% of respondents in the EU15 and 8% in the NMS said that **they trusted no one** to do this.

General image of the European Union

Positive image predominates throughout the Union.

Respondents were asked a broad question as to the image they held of the European Union. The responses varied from very positive and fairly positive to very negative and fairly negative and, in this report, those responses are bundled under general headings of 'positive' or 'negative'.

Those people whose feelings fell in the middle ground were 'neutral'.

Overall, there is a strong similarity of opinion between EU15 and NMS respondents in that 32% of both groups had a neutral image of the European Union.

When it comes to more pronounced views, virtually twice as many respondents had a positive image of the EU than those who held the contrary view.

42% of those polled across the EU25 had a positive image of the EU although figures were higher in the EU15 (44%) than in the NMS (40%).

Making up the 21% of EU25 citizens holding a negative view were 21% of EU15 citizens and 22% of respondents from the NMS states – figures approximately half that of those holding a positive view.

When asked whether they thought their country's membership of the EU was a good, a bad or neither a good nor a bad thing, 48% of EU15 respondents said they felt it was a good thing, and a further 29% took a neutral position in saying that it was neither good nor bad. In the NMS, on the other hand, which at the time of the poll had not actually experienced EU membership, respondents were less forthright in their views: 43% of the NMS poll said that they thought membership would be a good thing and one-third (33%) said they believed it would be neither good nor bad.

The NMS figures for respondents saying that membership was a good thing fell by a significant nine percentage points between autumn 2003 and spring 2004, with the negative and neutral camps benefiting equally (+4 percentage points each).

Although the EU15 average of those believing membership to be a good thing for their country did not move between autumn 2003 and spring 2004, there was a slight change in that the neutral position lost 2 percentage points in favour of those feeling it was a bad thing.

Similarly, when those polled in the EU15 were asked if, on balance, they felt their country had benefited from membership, 47% answered positively, with 18% not expressing an opinion.

In the NMS, where EU membership had still to be experienced, 52% expressed the opinion that their country would benefit – a five-percentage point drop since autumn 2003. A similar proportion of the poll (18%) did not express an opinion.

What does the EU mean to you?

The European Union: an area of common values.

Moving from the broad question of image of the European Union, respondents were then asked to be more specific and to select a number of characteristics that they believed identified the European Union.

Across the EU25, the **freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union** was the most significant characteristic of the EU and was cited by 53% of the EU25 poll. Making up this number were 51% of the EU15 and virtually two-thirds (62%) of the NMS polls – an indicator of how important this aspect of the Union is to citizens of the ten new member states.

45% of NMS citizens and half (50%) of those polled in EU15 states said that the European Union and the **euro** were synonymous.

Peace was also an aspect identified with the European Union and was cited by 37% of NMS and 31% of EU15 citizens to make up a 32% EU25 average.

The belief that the European Union meant **cultural diversity** received virtually identical levels of support across the EU15 (28%) and the NMS (30%) in making up the EU25 average of 29%.

The corollary of this, expressed as a **loss of our cultural identity**, was a characteristic of the European Union cited by just 14% of EU25 citizens (EU15: 14%, NMS: 12%).

The belief that the European Union was an engine of **economic prosperity** was a view implicit in the choice of 30% of NMS citizens but only 19% of those polled in the EU15 – these figures aggregating to give an EU25 figure of 21%.

While just 17% of NMS citizens believed that the European Union was **a waste of money** compared with more than a quarter (26%) of EU15 respondents, this broad attitude is potentially contradicted by the fact that while just 22% of EU15 citizens cite **bureaucracy** as a by-product of the European Union, this figure rises to 27% amongst NMS citizens.


Only 16% of NMS citizens believed that the European Union did not have enough **control at external frontiers** compared with nearly a quarter (23%) of EU15 citizens.

Trust in institutions


High levels of trust in the army and radio.

Respondents were then asked whether they trusted various institutions. These ranged from media (television, press, radio) to 'authority' (army, police), to government, the European Union and the United Nations. The percentages of EU25 citizens who trusted these bodies are shown below.

Trust in institutions (EU25)



Trust in institutions (EU15)



Trust in institutions (NMS)




Figure NMS : charitable or voluntary org : tend not to trust 30% instead of 29%
In many respects, EU15 and NMS respondents share opinions in common.

- Each trusts the **army** and the **radio** very highly (both are within the top three of their respective rankings).
- The last five positions (from eleventh to fifteenth place) are also shared, although in different order, with both groups placing **political parties** at the very bottom of the league – at 16% in the EU15 case and at 7% in the NMS case.
- Both groups of countries rate the **European Union** in ninth place (EU15: 42%, NMS: 40%) - well below the **United Nations** (EU15: 49%, NMS: 50%) but higher than **national parliaments** (EU15: 35%, NMS: 16%) and **national governments** (EU15: 30%, NMS: 17%).

There is a significant disparity in the levels of trust that those polled in the NMS placed in their country's **legal system** (a mere 27%) compared with 48% of EU15 respondents.

It is worth noting, however, that there are also important differences between EU15 and NMS respondents in terms of their levels of trust in the **police** – a figure of only 42% in the NMS places them in eighth place compared with 65% in the EU15 countries, where they were first in the overall ranking.


Respondents in the NMS also tended to place slightly more trust in **television**, the **press** and **religious institutions** than their EU15 counterparts.

Awareness of, perceived role of and trust in EU institutions

Awareness

High levels of awareness of all the main EU institutions.

Awareness of EU institutions and bodies (Top 5)



When polled as to whether they had heard of the various EU institutions, 91% of respondents across the EU25 replied that they had heard of the **European Parliament**. NMS respondents' levels of awareness were four percentage points lower (88%) than their EU15 counterparts (92%).

Awareness levels of the **European Commission** were universally high at 80% in the EU15 and 79% in the NMS.

At EU25 level, awareness of the **European Central Bank** (72%) was slightly higher than of the **European Court of Justice** (71%). As might be expected, awareness of the ECB was considerably lower in the NMS countries (none of which are, as yet, members of the euro-zone), at 59% as opposed to 74% in the EU15. The disparities between the two sets of countries' figures relating to awareness of the Court of Justice were similar.

Almost two in three EU25 citizens (64%) were aware of the **Council of Ministers**, with higher levels of awareness in the EU15 (65%) compared with the NMS (60%).


For the most part, therefore, levels of awareness of the various EU institutions and bodies were higher in EU15 than in the NMS countries with the one exception of the case of the **European Ombudsman** where there was a difference of nineteen percentage points between the awareness of NMS respondents (54%) and of EU15 respondents (34%) resulting in an EU25 average of 37%.

Since the last poll, in autumn 2003, there have not been any significant changes in EU15 figures. There were changes in all the NMS figures, the most important of which were in relation to awareness of the Court of Justice (+6) and of the European Commission (+4).

Importance of the role of European Union institutions and bodies

Recognition of the Council's role relatively low compared to that of other EU bodies.

Perceived role of EU institutions and bodies (Top 5)



When asked about the **importance of the role** played by various European bodies, a similar pattern to the responses to the awareness question emerges.

80% of the poll across the EU25 believed the **European Parliament** plays an important role in the life of the European Union. There was a three-percentage point difference between the NMS (78%) and EU15 (81%) figures.

73% of the EU15 and 71% of the NMS sample saw the **European Commission** as playing an important role.

As in the awareness question, the EU25 averages for those citing the importance of the role played by the **European Central Bank** and the **European Court of Justice** were again close. Within the EU25 average of 68% giving importance to the **ECB** were 71% of EU15 but only 56% of NMS respondents.

69% of EU15 respondents believed the **European Court of Justice** to be carrying out an important role in contrast to just 56% of those polled in the NMS, making up an overall EU25 average of 67%.


62% of EU25 citizens considered the role of the **Council of Ministers** to be important with a six-percentage point difference between EU15 (63%) and NMS (57%) respondents. In comparison with the autumn 2003 poll, perceptions of the importance of all of the EU bodies listed rose throughout the EU15 and the NMS countries.

Noteworthy is the fact that NMS respondents' perceptions of the importance of the **European Commission** and the **European Court of Justice** rose by eight and eight percentage points respectively.

Trust

Levels of trust in EU institutions considerably higher than levels of trust in national parliaments and governments.

Trust in EU institutions and bodies (Top 6)



Of all the EU institutions, the highest level of trust of EU25 citizens is placed in the **European Parliament** at 54%. There is a one-percentage point difference between the NMS (53%) and the EU15 (54%) figures.

Next most trusted was the **European Court of Justice** with an overall EU25 average of 51%. There was an eight-percentage point difference between the levels of trust in the NMS group (44%) and the EU15 (52%).

Levels of trust in the **Commission** reached 48% across the EU25 and EU15 and NMS figures were identical in this case.

Trust in the **European Central Bank** reached 44% across the EU25, with higher levels being observed in the EU15 (46%) than in the NMS (36%).

Interestingly, trust in the **European Ombudsman** is nine percentage points higher in the NMS countries (38%) than in the EU15 (29%). These average figures, in turn, yielded an EU15 average of 30%.

No major changes in levels of trust were noted between the autumn 2003 and spring 2004 polls other than a three-percentage point increase throughout the EU25 in levels of trust in the **European Court of Justice**.

It will be seen that the levels of trust in the majority of European institutions cited above (the exception being the **European Ombudsman**) are higher than in the case of national parliaments (EU15: 35%, NMS: 16%) and governments (EU15: 30%, NMS: 17%) mentioned earlier.

It is interesting to look at the levels of those not trusting the EU institutions in the EU15 countries. Almost a quarter (24%) of those polled did not trust the Ombudsman or Court of Justice, 29% did not trust the Parliament and the Commission, and 31% did not trust the Council of Ministers.


It is also worth noting that there were exceptionally high 'don't know' scores recorded in the responses to this question throughout the EU25, and, in the case of all the institutions except the Ombudsman (EU15: 47%, NMS: 50%), these were substantially higher in the NMS than in the EU15. Examples include an EU25 'don't know' average of 20% regarding the European Parliament (EU15: 17%, NMS: 33%), an EU25 figure of 25% (EU15: 23%, NMS: 38%) in relation to the **European Commission** and an EU25 figure of 32% (EU15: 29%, NMS, 47%) in regard to the **European Council of Ministers**.

These high 'don't know' results in the NMS, as well as the lower numbers of respondents in the NMS saying they did not trust the EU institutions, may be explained by their lack of exposure to them at the time of the survey.

It would appear, therefore, that the more experience a respondent has of the EU institutions, the less they trust them.

Impact of institutions on EU citizens

Although national institutions have a greater impact, a substantial majority of EU25 citizens see the EU as having some or great impact on their lives.



When EU citizens were asked how much they are affected by the activities, decisions, etc. of various institutions, there appears to be an important majority overall who believe that their **national government** (EU15: 88%, NMS: 79%) and the **lower house of their national parliament** (EU15: 81%, NMS: 77%) tended to have *some or great* effect.

Fewer believed that the **EU as a whole** or the **European Parliament in particular** had the same impact.

While 73% of EU15 citizens felt that the **EU as a whole** had a *great or some* effect, only 62% of NMS counterparts shared this view.

When views on the **European Parliament's** impact were solicited, roughly the same number in the EU15 (16%) as in the NMS (15%) said it had *great* effect, with a further 47% in the EU15 and 33% in the NMS saying it had *some* effect. In fact, 37% of the NMS sample said they felt the European Parliament had *no* effect (EU15: 24%) and 15% of the NMS sample gave *no opinion* (EU15: 13%).

Across the EU25, 47% of the poll either totally agreed or tended to agree that the European Parliament has more power than the lower house of parliament in their country. In fact, this bundled average hides the disparity between the NMS figure of 62% and the lower EU15 figure of 44%.

Knowledge of the European Union and sources of information, media interest and presentation

Overall levels of knowledge are low – but they are higher in the NMS.

When the level of knowledge about the European Union held by its citizens is assessed by means of a series of 'true or false' questions, it can be seen that, in certain cases, the degree of knowledge on this subject among citizens in the NMS is higher than that of those living in the EU15.

- When asked about the characteristics of the European flag, 87% of NMS citizens compared with 81% of citizens in the EU15 correctly confirmed that it is blue with yellow stars on it. However, it should be noted that an identical 67% in both groups incorrectly believed that there was a star for each country on the flag.
- NMS (47%) were also more likely than EU15 (25%) respondents to confirm that the EU has its own anthem and more EU15 (49%) than NMS (41%) citizens incorrectly believed that the headquarters of the EU are in Strasbourg.
- The percentage of NMS citizens incorrectly believing that the EU consisted of 12 Member States at 45% was marginally lower than in the EU15, where it was 47%.
- There was an identical degree of awareness in both groups of countries, at 50%, of the true statement that EU citizens directly elect Members of the European Parliament.
- However, only 40% of those polled in the NMS recognised the false statement that the EU was created after World War I in contrast to 55% in the EU15.
- Similarly, fewer respondents in the NMS (37%) than in the EU15 (48%) realised that the statement that citizens directly elected the President of the EU was also false.

Preferred sources of information

Europeans use the same sources of information about the EU.

Having looked at the level of knowledge that EU25 citizens have on matters European, the survey then analyses the sources people use when looking for information about the European Union.

It emerges that EU15 and NMS citizens have broadly similar habits and preferences in this area.

Approximately one in ten of citizens (10% in the NMS and 11% in the EU15) said that they **never looked for such information or were not interested in it.**

Across the EU25, **television** is by far the preferred information source on EU-related matters, with 79% of respondents in the NMS and 73% of respondents in the EU15 sharing this opinion.

Second most popular source among Europeans was **daily newspapers** with 54% in the EU15 and 51% in the NMS citing these as a source of information about the EU.

In third place was **radio**, but with a substantially higher percentage in the NMS (51%) than in the EU15 (35%).

Discussions with relatives, friends and colleagues came next, but, as in the case of radio, these were mentioned more frequently by respondents in the NMS (35%) than by their EU15 (25%) counterparts.

Other newspapers and magazines were also an important source mentioned by 31% of NMS but only 23% of EU15 respondents.

Interestingly, 'new technology' was more used as an information source in the countries that joined the Union on 1 May 2004 than in the EU15. The **Internet** was used by 18% of NMS respondents compared with 16% in the EU15. **National media coverage and their presentation of the European Union**

Differing perceptions as to how the media present the EU.

Across the EU25, a substantial number of citizens agreed that their national media either talks **about the right amount** or **too little** about the EU.

In the EU15, 42% believed that they talk **too little** about the EU and this feeling is shared by 37% of NMS respondents.

A further 43% of those polled in EU15 countries believed that the media talks **about the right amount** about the EU, a figure that is same in the NMS.

While, on average, only 8% of EU25 citizens believed the media talked **too much** about the EU, this figure masks a substantial variation between a figure of 7% in the EU15 and 13% in the NMS.

When citizens were asked about the light in which the media presented the EU, there were striking differences observed between the results from the EU15 and NMS samples.

46% of NMS citizens polled felt that the EU is presented **too positively** in their national media, whereas only half this percentage (23%) held this view in the EU15.

A further 36% of NMS and 41% of EU15 respondents felt that coverage of the EU by their national media was **objective**.

While 'don't know' figures on this issue were 23% in the EU15, they reached only 13% in the NMS.

The future of the European Union

This next section of the report looks at citizens' views on the way the Union's institutions work and then assesses their attitude on the further development of certain common European policies. This is important as it shows the ways in which citizens believe the European Union should develop and their attitude to broad decisions and actions being taken at European Union rather than member state level.

Common foreign and security policy

A high degree of convergence of views in the EU25.

What is striking about the results of this part of the survey is the fact that there is such a marked similarity between the NMS and EU15 responses. There were few significant changes in the figures compared with the last Eurobarometer survey in autumn 2003 so only noteworthy changes are highlighted.

- 82% of those polled in the EU15 and 83% in the NMS believed that when an international crisis occurs, European Union Member States should agree on a **common position**.
- Eight out of ten EU citizens (EU15: 79%, NMS: 80%) agreed that the European Union should guarantee **human rights** in each member state, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some member states. There was a six-percentage point rise in the numbers of NMS respondents holding this view and a three-point increase in the EU15 since the last survey.
- Three-quarters or more of EU citizens (EU15: 77%, NMS: 75%) agreed that European Union foreign policy should be **independent of United States foreign policy**. There was a four-percentage point increase in these figures in the EU15 since autumn 2003, but a fall of one point in the NMS.
- 76% of EU15, and a slightly lower share of NMS respondents (67%) felt that the European Union should work to **guarantee human rights around the world**, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some other countries.
- Seven out of ten of those polled across the EU25 (EU15: 70%, NMS: 72%) agreed that the European Union should have a **rapid military reaction force** that could be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs.
- 71% in the EU15 and 68% in the NMS thought that the European Union should have a **common immigration policy** towards people from outside the European Union.
- Almost identical numbers (EU15: 70%, NMS: 68%) believed that the European Union should have a **common asylum policy** towards asylum seekers.
- More than six out of ten Europeans (EU15: 66%, NMS: 62%) agreed that the European Union should have its **own seat in the United Nations Security Council**. There was +1 percentage pointin the EU15 figures since autumn 2003, but in the NMS, they fell by four percentage points.
- There was also strong support (EU15: 64%, NMS: 61%) for the EU to have its **own Foreign Minister** who can be the spokesperson for a common European Union position.
- 48% of NMS and 50% of EU15 respondents believed that **member states that have opted for neutrality should have a say** in European Union foreign policy.

European defence policy

More than four in ten Europeans believe the EU should take defence-related decisions.

When EU25 citizens were asked whether decisions concerning European defence policy should be taken by national governments, by NATO or by the European Union, a majority opted for the European Union. There was, however, a six-percentage point gap between the EU15 result (46%) and that of the NMS (40%).

Between autumn 2003 and spring 2004, there was a three-percentage point fall in the numbers of people in the NMS believing that the EU should take defence-related decisions. In the EU15, there was no change.

The NMS (27%, +4 - autumn 2003) countries, on the other hand, gave greater support than their EU15 counterparts (25%, +1 - autumn 2003) to the idea that national governments should take such decisions. In fact, this increased support for national governments taking such decisions in the NMS almost exactly mirrors the fall in support for EU involvement in this area. It should be recalled that the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia are part of the Iraq coalition.

NMS countries were also somewhat more favourable towards NATO (EU15: 13%, NMS: 18%) being the decision-maker in these situations. Eight of the NMS (the exceptions are Malta and Cyprus) have become NATO members in the recent past - a fact that may explain their greater enthusiasm for this option.

The share of the poll not expressing an opinion on this matter was 15% in both NMS and EU15 countries.

Term of the Presidency of the European Council

Support for the extension of the term of the Council Presidency.

A majority of European citizens, when surveyed as to whether the six-month term of the presidency of the European Council should be retained or extended, favoured the latter solution.

45% of NMS and 50% of EU15 citizens supported the idea that the term of the presidency should be **extended** because the current six-month term is too short to achieve significant results. These figures saw a two-percentage point increase in the NMS and a one-point increase in the EU15 relative to the autumn 2003 survey.

However around one-third in the EU15 (32%) and a slightly higher number in the NMS (35%) felt that the current six-month term should be **retained** so that each member state has the chance to hold the presidency on a regular basis. In the EU15, there was a five-percentage point increase in the number of respondents selecting this option, whereas, in the NMS, the numbers actually fell by two percentage points.

Right of veto

Smaller member states champion the retention of the right of veto.

Under current European Union rules, each member state has the right of veto in certain policy areas.

More than half of the poll in the NMS countries (54%) was in favour of the right of veto being **retained** in order to preserve essential national interests. This contrasts with a figure of 44% - ten percentage points lower - in the EU15 group and reflects the fact that, with the exception of Poland, the NMS states are small countries.

More than one in five in both the EU15 (24%) and NMS (21%) believed it should be **limited** to a very few essential areas.

Only 9% in the NMS and 12% in the EU15 felt it should **be given up** for all decisions in order to make the European Union more efficient.

Majority voting within the Council of Ministers

Divergent views between existing and new member states regarding Council voting procedures.

54% of respondents in the NMS and 43% in the EU15 favoured each Member State having one vote in the Council, regardless of its population size.


On the other hand, around one in three citizens (EU15: 34%, NMS: 31%) felt that the number of votes per Member State should be proportional to its population size.

Issues facing our country

Broad agreement on some issues but wide differences on others.

The survey then asks respondents to nominate the two issues facing their country that they viewed as being most important.

Issues facing our country



When EU25 respondents were asked to identify these issues, it is interesting to note that EU15 and NMS respondents have almost identical rankings for the first five issues.

However, when the actual percentages are scrutinised, it is observed that levels of concern about **unemployment** and the **economic situation** are significantly higher in the NMS than the EU15 countries.

Crime, rising prices/inflation and the state of the **healthcare system** are also cited frequently by those surveyed in both the EU15 and NMS but then it can be seen that whereas EU15 citizens see **immigration** and **terrorism** as being major issues, NMS citizens are more concerned by **pensions** and **taxation**.

Relatively low percentages (less than 5%) of EU15 and NMS polls cite **housing, protecting the environment, public transport** or **defence/foreign affairs** as being one of the two most important issues facing their country.

For the most part, between autumn 2003 and spring 2004, there were no changes in Europeans' perceptions of the issues facing their countries exceeding three percentage points in either direction. The two exceptions to this were in the NMS countries in relation to **crime** (-6) and **inflation/rising prices** (+4).

Perceptions of the role of the European Union in dealing with issues facing our country

New Member States generally view the Union's role in a more favourable light.


When EU25 citizens were presented with the same list of issues and asked what kind of role they thought the European Union played (positive, negative or neither positive nor negative), there are again a number of points in common but, equally, some large divergences between the views held in the EU15 and NMS.

- In the case of all the questions, the levels of 'don't knows' were higher in the NMS countries than the EU15. This is perhaps to be expected in view of the fact that the former group of countries has had less familiarity with the operation of the European Union.
- The NMS countries generally tended to view the Union's role more positively than the EU15, except in the case of **rising prices/inflation**. In fact, 50% of respondents in each group of countries considered that it played a negative role in this instance.


EU15 and NMS respondents shared similar views regarding the EU's role concerning the following four issues:

- **Fighting terrorism** was cited by 54% in the NMS and 53% in the EU15. Between autumn 2003 and spring 2004, there was a twenty-two-percentage point increase in the number of people in the NMS holding this view compared with a four-point increase in the EU15.
- Its role in relation to **foreign affairs** was also seen to be positive by 50% of NMS citizens and 49% of EU15 citizens.
- Both groups saw the EU as playing a negative role in regard to rising **prices/inflation**. Support for this view rose by three percentage points in the NMS and by one percentage point in the EU15 since autumn 2003.
- A similar negative view was taken with respect to the EU's role in **taxation** (EU15 : 40% and NMS: 39%). Since the previous survey, the number of those holding this view increased by four percentage points in the NMS and +1 percentage point in EU15 countries.


Perceptions of the role of the EU in dealing with issues facing our country (EU25)



Perceptions of the role of the EU in dealing with issues facing our country (EU15)



Perceptions of the role of the EU in dealing with issues facing our country (NMS)



On the other hand, in comparison with the EU15, the NMS saw the EU's role regarding the three issues of **protecting the environment**, **defence** and **fighting crime** much more positively.

At 60%, the NMS accorded 18 percentage points more to the EU's perceived positive role in **protecting the environment** than the EU15 (42%) did. In comparison with autumn 2003, support for this view rose by six percentage points, in comparison with just three in the EU15.

Whereas 55% of those polled in the NMS cited the EU as having a positive role in relation to **defence**, only 48% felt this way in the EU15.

Regarding the **fight against crime**, there was an 11-point difference between the NMS (50%) and the EU15 (29%). Support for this rose by 18-percentage points over the last six months in the NMS but by only three points in the EU15.

The EU15 and NMS samples were also divided in their views as to the role played by the EU in **fighting unemployment**. Broadly similar numbers in the EU15 (30%) and the NMS (28%) held a neutral view on the EU's role here, but more in the EU15 (40%, +3 points since EB60) saw it as playing a negative role than in the NMS (24%, -6 points since EB60).

On the issue of **immigration**, a quarter (EU15: 24%, NMS: 25%) saw the EU's role as positive. On the other hand, 40% in the EU15 saw it as negative – a view held by only 27% of NMS respondents. Views on the EU's role in this are virtually unchanged since EB60.

While EU15 respondents were equally divided (pos: 34%, neg :35%) as to the EU's role being positive or negative regarding the **economic situation**, 42% of their NMS counterparts saw its role as being positive and only 22% negative. The numbers believing the EU's role to be positive rose by two percentage points in the EU15 but fell by four in the NMS.

Europeans (EU15: 49%, NMS: 42%) tended to take a neutral stance regarding the EU's role with respect to **housing**. 23% of EU15 and 20% of NMS respondents saw the EU's role in this regard as negative. The negative figures rose slightly by three points in the NMS over the six-month period since the last survey and by one point in the EU15.

Neutral views also tended to predominate in the case of the EU's role in **public transport** (EU15: 51%, NMS: 43%), **pensions** (EU15: 42%, NMS: 38%); **health care systems** (EU15: 41%, NMS: 36%) and **education systems** (EU15: 41%, NMS: 31%).

Democracy in the European Union and member countries

Falling levels of satisfaction among New Member States' citizens with how democracy works in their countries.

43% of EU25 citizens are either **fairly satisfied** or **very satisfied** with the way democracy works in the European Union. The EU15 (43%) and NMS (44%) figures are almost identical, but it is worth noting that the 'don't know' score in the NMS was 30% - considerably higher than the 18% recorded in the EU15.

Compared with the data collected in autumn 2003, the ranks of those who were **not at all satisfied** (+1) and **not very satisfied** (+5) swell in the NMS countries to 27%. There was a corresponding fall (-6) in those not expressing an opinion over the six-month interval between the two surveys, which still remains relatively high at 30%.

When citizens were surveyed as to their satisfaction with the way democracy works in their own country, across the EU25, 50% expressed satisfaction (either **fairly** or **very satisfied**). There was, however, a considerable disparity between the constituent EU15 figure of 54% and that in the NMS - where it was just 24%.

In comparison with autumn 2003, the NMS countries saw a seven percentage point increase in respondents stating that they were either **not at all satisfied** (+6) or **not very satisfied** (+1) with how democracy works in their country.

European Parliament elections

European elections considered important, yet a low turnout was expected.

The June 2004 European Parliament elections were the first in the enlarged European Union of twenty-five countries.

Notwithstanding their view that national institutions have a greater impact on their lives than European ones, two-thirds of EU25 citizens (67%) agree or tend to agree that European elections are really important. This figure is 74% in the NMS and 66% in the EU15.

In spite of so many seeing the elections as really important, only 44% of citizens in the NMS stated that they were likely to participate in the EP elections in contrast to 51% in the EU15, and 32% said they would definitely cast their vote in contrast to a figure of 35% in the EU15. [In fact, there was an overall turnout rate of 45.5% in the EU25 with marked variations between Member States. Turnout figures ranged from as low as 17% in Slovakia and 20% in Poland through 37% in Sweden – the lowest in the EU15 – to 82% in Malta, 90% in Luxembourg and 91% in Belgium.]

There is little doubt that these low turnout levels reflect the low levels of knowledge and interest in matters European described earlier.

Furthermore, it would appear that few, if any, factors would have succeeded in inciting more citizens to vote in European Parliament elections.

Examined from the perspective of EU15 and NMS averages (and therefore not looking at country-to-country variations within those averages), it is observed that there is a high degree of opposition to all of the hypothetical possibilities offered to respondents (e.g. polling stations in supermarkets, voting at the work place, free public transport on election day and voting via the Internet).

Reasons for deciding for whom to vote

Differing behaviour of citizens in deciding for whom they vote




Figure opinion about the national issues NMS 45% instead of 46%

When respondents were asked their likely reasons for deciding for whom they should vote, considerable differences were observed between the EU15 and in the NMS.

41% of the EU25 poll cited the **policies of the candidate** as their prime reason. This was a lot more important in the NMS (52%) than in the EU15 (39%).

Next most quoted reason was a respondent's **opinion about national issues**. Again, those polled in the NMS (45%) had a higher score than those in the EU15 (38%), making up an EU25 average of 39%.

A respondent's **opinion regarding European issues** was cited in third place with 35% in the EU15, in contrast to 31% in the NMS
22% across the EU25 responded that the **party of the candidate** was the most important reason, with an identical figure in the EU15 but a slightly higher one in the NMS (25%).

Lastly, the **personality of the candidate** was seen as important by 45% of those polled in the NMS, but only 17% in the EU15.

Awareness of Members of the European Parliament and contact with them

Higher levels of awareness of MEPs in new member countries.

36% of EU25 respondents claimed they had not seen or heard anything about, nor had any contact with, a Member of the European Parliament since the last

European elections. 38% of the EU15 poll gave this response in contrast to just 29% in the NMS – countries where exposure to MEPs is only relatively recent.

For all the possible positive answers to this question concerning contacts with MEPs, NMS respondents consistently recorded higher scores than their EU15 counterparts. Respondents could give more than one answer.


Across the EU25, 46% of respondents said they had **seen MEPs on television** (NMS: 55%, EU15: 44% - an eleven point difference).

32% of EU15 respondents had **read about MEPs in newspapers and magazines** in contrast to 35% in the NMS.

More than a quarter of the poll in the NMS (26%) had **heard MEPs on the radio**, but only 15% of the EU15 poll claimed to have done so.

When asked about their interest in seeing or hearing more about MEPs in the future, there were, again, consistently higher levels of enthusiasm amongst NMS than EU15 respondents.

Most favoured media for obtaining news on MEPs were **television** (EU15: 43%, NMS: 54%), **newspapers and magazines** (EU15: 32%, NMS: 39%) and **radio** (EU15: 16%, NMS: 29%).





Standard Eurobarometer



European
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REPORT

I. The context


1. Globalisation

For a number of years now, the impact of globalisation on the economic and social development of our countries has become of serious concern .

In order to have a clearer picture of EU15 citizens' opinions on this subject, respondents were asked to give their opinion on ten statements about the effects of globalisation. Then they were asked which institutions they trusted most to control the effects of globalisation.

1.1. Europeans' views on the effects of globalisation

A lukewarm perception of globalisation



Almost two-thirds of citizens (64%) think that **globalisation leads to power being concentrated in large companies, at the expense of other types of companies**. This opinion is shared by the majority of citizens in each of the fifteen Member States with results that range from 77% in France to 52% in Portugal and in the United Kingdom. In these last two countries a third of respondents did not express an opinion.

Almost six persons out of ten (59%) felt that **globalisation increases the variety of products for sale in their country**. This is a fall of nine points in comparison with a similar survey undertaken in Spring 2001¹. This statement gets greatest approval in the Nordic countries: Sweden (82%), Finland (76%) and Denmark (75%). This view is shared by less than half the Spanish poll (46%). In addition, 31% of Spaniards were unable to or did not wish to express an opinion about this statement.

¹ Special Eurobarometer 152, wave 55.1, *Europeans, Globalisation and Liberalisation*, fieldwork: April-May 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_152_fr.pdf

57% of respondents considered that **globalisation makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products sold in their country**. 78% of Swedes held this opinion. At the other end of the spectrum, only one-third of the Spanish poll shared this view. This may explain the particularly high number of Spaniards who have no opinion on this issue (36%).

As will be seen later on, the problem of employment remains at the heart of the concerns of those polled, and 57% of citizens consider that **globalisation represents a threat to employment in their country**. This view is particularly widespread in France (73%), in Finland (71%), and in Germany and Luxembourg (70%). As is the case for the other statements, a correlation between the numbers who responded 'tend to agree' and those who responded 'don't know' may be observed: the lower the number of people tending to agree with the statement, the higher the number of those responding 'don't know'.

It should be noted that students are much less likely than the average European to believe that globalisation represents a threat to employment in their country (50% in contrast to the EU average of 57%).

55% of citizens think that **globalisation increases global environmental problems**. This statement receives the support of 71% of French, 65% of Luxembourgers and 64% of Austrians. The Spaniards are proportionally the least likely to share this opinion and the most likely to be unable to or unwilling to give a response.

A majority of those polled in the fifteen Member States think that **globalisation represents a good opportunity for their country's companies** (45%), that it **cuts the prices of products and services through increased competition** (44%), but on the other hand, it also **leads to a duller and more uniform world** (39%, in comparison to only 31% in the survey conducted in 2001). In Sweden the first two statements receive the most support (70% each), while it is in France (44%) and Belgium (54%) that the highest numbers of respondents not agreeing with these two statements are observed. The French (62%) are also the most likely to take the view that globalisation leads to a duller and more uniform world

Public opinion is split down the middle when people are asked whether **globalisation is a good thing for their country**: 40% tend to agree and 39% tend to disagree. Levels of approval are particularly high in Northern Europe (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands). On the other hand, an absolute majority of French and Greeks tend to disagree. Overall, in the Union, young people and the most educated are more inclined to view globalisation as a positive phenomenon for their country.

The idea that **globalisation is a good thing for themselves** meets with approval from 29% of citizens, whereas 45% tend to disagree (60% in France) and 26% do not express an opinion. (EU28Tables Q.36)


1.2. Who can control the effects of globalisation ?

The European Union and consumer rights associations are the most trusted.

The European Union (27%) would appear to be the actor that respondents most trust to control the effects of globalisation. It is followed closely by local actors namely **consumer rights associations** (26%) and **citizens themselves** (23%). National governments are only ranked in fourth place and are cited by only one-fifth of the poll (19%).

The actors which citizens trust the least are trades unions (9%), political parties (7%), multinational companies (5%) and the United States' government (3%).

Around one citizen in ten gave the spontaneous response that they did not trust anyone to control the effects of globalisation.



The Dutch are proportionally least likely to place their trust in the Union (43%), followed by the Swedes (40%), the Greeks and the Finns (37% each). It is not surprising to see that the British are the least likely to say they trust the European Union to accomplish this task (16%).

Consumer rights associations are trusted by 41% of Italians and 34% of French compared with 14% of Portuguese and 15% of Spaniards, Luxembourgers and Finns. Almost one-third of the French poll place most trust in citizens themselves (31%). This is also the case of 30% of Finns and 28% of Greeks and Belgians in contrast to just 15% of Portuguese.

The number of citizens who trust their national government to control the effects of globalisation reaches 34% in Greece but is only 14% in Italy and 15% in Germany.

The highest number of people giving the spontaneous response that they do not trust anyone is recorded in France (14%), whereas the lowest number (2%) are found in the Netherlands.

Over the last three years, the number of citizens citing the European Union (-8 points) and national governments (-6) has fallen appreciably whereas it has shown a marked increase for consumer rights associations (+6). (EU28Tables Q.37)²

² Readers who are interested may also refer to a Eurobarometer Flash survey carried out by telephone and completely devoted to globalisation: Eurobarometer Flash 151b, *Globalisation*, fieldwork: October 2003, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/FL151bGlobalisationREPORT.pdf


2. Pessimism regarding the coming year

This chapter looks at citizens' expectations for the next twelve months³ and their situation compared with five years previously, as well as their expectations for the next five years.

2.1. Citizens' expectations for the next twelve months


Quite a stable situation

As was the case last autumn, pessimism regarding the twelve months to come is more marked for views with respect to the country as a whole than it is regarding people's own lives.




The confidence indicator with respect to **life in general** continues to fall. 15% of citizens (+3 points in six months) think that the next twelve months will be less good as far as their life in general is concerned. One citizen in two does not expect any change and 32% (-1) expect a more positive outcome.

³ This series of questions is only normally asked in the Eurobarometer wave carried out at the end of the year. It was exceptionally included in the survey carried out at the beginning of the year to enable a six-monthly comparison to be undertaken for the first time.




The Portuguese are the most pessimistic about what the next twelve months will bring (35%, +9). Next come the Germans (26%, +5). The Swedes (47%, +6), the Greeks (42%, +7) and the Finns (42%, +6) are the most likely to think that their life in general will improve over the next twelve months. (EU28Tables Q.4.1)


Citizens are particularly gloomy with regard to their country's **economic situation**, although somewhat less so than six months ago (43%, -3). In comparison with autumn 2003, respondents are a little bit more likely to believe that their country's economic situation is going to improve (18%, +2), and there are also higher numbers of those who expect the situation to remain the same (34%, +3).




The proportion of those who are afraid that their country's economic situation is going to get worse has diminished noticeably in Greece (23%, -33) and in Ireland (26%, -14). The figures for the Greeks, who are the most optimistic concerning their country's economic climate, register the greatest change for the six-month period (34%, +18). The Belgians (+2), the Germans (unchanged) and the Italians (-2) are the least optimistic (13% each).




Expectations regarding their **country's employment situation** continue to worsen. In spring 2004, almost one citizen in two thinks that the situation will worsen over the next twelve months (48%, +1). Such low levels of expectations have not been recorded since autumn 1996. Portugal is the country where this is felt the most, and it is also where pessimism has grown the most over the last six months (68%, +10). Negative opinions are much less widespread in Greece (28%, -27) and in Ireland (31%, -10).




The proportion of people for whom the next twelve months will not bring any change to the jobs market has strengthened by one point (30%), whereas the share of the optimists has dropped one point (15%). Overall, the Greeks are the most positive (30%, +15) and Germans and Austrians the least (8% and 9% respectively).




As in autumn 2003, pessimistic outlooks do not appear to have so much effect on people's views of their personal situations. Attitudes are, in fact, more positive concerning **personal job situation**. Six out of ten of those polled do not expect any change over the next twelve months (60%, unchanged) and 21% remain optimistic (unchanged). Nevertheless, the number of pessimists has risen slightly in comparison with the last survey (10%, +1).




The Portuguese are the most likely to expect their **personal job situation** to get worse (21%, +6), followed by the Germans (18%, +4). On the other hand, 28% of the Irish and Spanish see things more positively (+3 and +1 respectively). The most marked changes are seen in Greek (27%, +4), Luxembourg (21%, +4) and Finnish opinion (20%, +4)



With regard to the **household's financial situation**, 54% of those surveyed expect things to remain the same (+1), 22% expect an improvement (-1) and 21% expect a worsening of the situation (+1).



The greatest rise in the number of pessimists is observed in Portugal (33%, +7) and the Germans are the most likely to be pessimistic (36%, +2). Once again, the growth in positive opinions is greatest in Greece (34%, +11) while the Germans are the least likely to share this optimism (11%, unchanged). Two-thirds of Finns think that the situation will remain the same over the next twelve months.



It has been seen that the Greeks and the Irish are more optimistic than in autumn 2003, whatever the situation under consideration. It could be that the Greeks expect that the Olympic Games, organised in Athens in summer 2004, will have a positive impact on the financial and employment situation both for themselves personally and for the country as a whole. The recent elections in Greece⁴, which saw a clear majority vote in favour of the conservative party, following promises of effective measures to boost the economy (including reduced corporation taxes and administrative reforms) may also have played a role. (EU28Tables Q.4.2, Q.4.4, Q.4.5, Q.4.3)

As was the case last autumn, it can be seen that the younger the respondent and the later their fulltime education was completed, the greater the likelihood was that they would be optimistic. Older respondents and those who had received less education tended more towards pessimism, or to think that no change would occur in the various spheres of their lives.⁵

The attitudinal analysis shows that, as in the past, people who considered that their country's membership of the European Union to be a good thing tended more often to be optimistic in their outlook and those who saw their country's membership of the EU as a bad thing tended to be pessimistic.


⁴ The Greek elections took place on 7 March 2004, while the fieldwork was being done for this survey.

⁵ In the rest of this report, demographic analysis will only be undertaken when important divergences from the norm are observed. Readers who are interested in demographic data can download the set of demographic tables from the Eurobarometer Website http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm

2.2. How the situation has evolved over the last five years

Very mixed opinions

36% of EU15 citizens believe that their situation now compared with that five years ago has remained the same (-9 in comparison with spring 2002), 33% believe it has improved (-3) and 30% believe it has worsened (+12). It could be said therefore that even if opinions are very split, the overall tendency of Europeans is much more pessimistic than two years ago.



Ireland is the country where the greatest number of citizens thinks that their situation has improved (53%, -1), followed by Denmark (48%, +1) and Finland (47%, +6). In comparison with spring 2002, the Greek figures demonstrate the largest positive change (41%, +8) and the Portuguese the least positive (25%, -10).


Portugal and Germany are the countries where the greatest sense of deterioration is observed (44%), but also those where the changes are the most marked compared with the previous measure (+22 points in negative views). (EU28Tables Q.5)

As might be expected, the attitudinal analyses show that people who consider their country's membership of the EU to be a good thing are considerably more inclined to think that their current situation has improved in comparison with five years ago (41%, -1) than people who see their country's EU membership as a bad thing (22%, -5). Within this latter group, 45% believe their situation has worsened (+15), compared with 23% of those who consider their country's EU membership to be a good thing (+10). This development would indeed tend to confirm the current gloom.

2.3. Expectations for the next five years

A certain degree of optimism

The expectations of those surveyed for the next five years show that four citizens in ten believe that their situation will improve (39%, -1). The same number thinks it will remain more or less the same (39%, -2) and 16% feel it is going to get worse (+5).



In Greece, Spain, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Portugal, one person in two thinks that his personal situation is going to improve. The number of optimists showed the greatest rate of growth (51%, +13) in Greece. In Portugal 49% of those who have particularly negative views on their current situation in each of the areas already mentioned take a positive stance with regard to the future (+5).

About one-third of Germans think that their situation is going to worsen (31%, +15). There has also been substantial growth in pessimism in the Netherlands (17%, +9). However, only 4% of the Spanish share this negative vision of their situation in five years' time (-2).

The largest number of respondents (53%) believing that their situation was going to remain more or less the same as today are in Austria, followed by the Danes (50%, unchanged) and the Luxembourgers (50%, +1). (EU28Tables Q.6)


Again it should be noted that people who see their country's EU membership to be a good thing are considerably more likely to believe that their situation is going to improve (46%, -1) than are people who see their country's EU membership to be a bad thing (31%, +4).

3. Main issues faced by countries


This part of the report seeks to highlight the main problems currently faced by our countries.

Unemployment remains the number 1 problem

Respondents were presented with a list of issues and asked to indicate the two most important ones faced by their countries. The top of the ranking remains unchanged with the same four issues featuring as in late 2003. Unemployment is still well above the other issues (44%, +2 points). It is followed by crime (26%, -2), the economic situation (25%, -2) and rising prices/inflation (18%, -1).



Immigration shows an increase of two points and is now in fifth position (16%). Terrorism (+3) and the healthcare system (-1) have both become major issues for 15% of citizens.



Three-quarters of Greeks consider unemployment is one of the two main issues currently faced by their country. This problem is also cited by two-thirds of Portuguese (66%), Finns and Germans (64% each) and by more than one citizen in two in France (58%), Denmark (56%), Belgium (54%) and Luxembourg (52%). In each of these countries, except Belgium (-1), unemployment is the problem most frequently cited. The British (13%), followed by the Irish (17%) have the lowest numbers of respondents believing that it is one of the two main problems their countries face.

Crime is one of the two main issues cited by almost one Dutch respondent in two (47%, -5).

The economic situation is one of the two main issues cited by four Dutch out of ten, while 45% of Italians mention rising prices/inflation.


The increase by seven points in the Spaniards' ranking of terrorism (58%) as one of the two main issues faced by their country should be noted.

It should also be noted that immigration and terrorism are becoming of greater concern to the British (with 41%, +9 and 25%, +8 respectively). (EU28Tables Q.27)

4. Low levels of trust in political institutions

A slight improvement in trust in the media

In comparison with autumn 2003, increases of one point in the case of trust in radio (63%) and of two points in trust in the press (46%) have been observed in the Fifteen Member States. The level of trust in television remains unchanged (54%). Radio retains the trust of the greatest number of citizens, followed by television and then the press.



As was the case six months ago, trust in the various media varies among the different countries of the Union. Four out of five Finns trust the radio. Next are the Swedes (76%) and the Irish (75%). On the other hand, only 55% of Italians share this view and 39% of Greeks do not trust this medium.

Three-quarters of the Irish (74%) trust television. The trust level also reaches 72% in Finland and 67% in the Netherlands. It should be mentioned that 54% of Italians do not trust the television in contrast to the 37% who do. The French are very split on the subject since as many of them trust as do not trust television (48% each).

The written press only has the trust of more than half of those polled in eight of the fifteen Member States. The highest level of trust is seen in Spain (61%), while barely one Briton in five trusts the written press. The bad reputation of a segment of the British press might explain this low level of public trust.


Trust in the different types of media has risen slightly overall. Trust in the radio has seen an increase of three points in Finland (80%), in Sweden (76%), in Germany (63%) and in Luxembourg (62%). It is, moreover, falling in five countries and saw its most important fall in Austria (59%, -7). Trust in television has fallen in five countries, including Denmark (65%, -5) and Austria (60%, -7), but is on the increase in seven others, such as Spain (52%, +6). It has remained the same in Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Trust in the written press has increased in eleven of the fifteen Member States, including Finland and Sweden (+4 each), has decreased in three countries (Denmark, Ireland and Greece), and has remained unchanged in Germany. (EU28Tables Q.7.1)

Stability of trust levels in national and international institutions

Levels of trust in national and international institutions, which dropped in spring and autumn 2003, would appear to have stabilised.

The United Nations remains as always the political institution in which citizens of the fifteen Member States trust the most (49%, +1). Trust in the European Union remains completely stable (41%, unchanged), as well as in national parliaments (35%, unchanged), while trust in political parties has gained a point (16%). More than three-quarters of respondents still do not trust political parties (76%). More than six respondents out of ten do not trust their national government (61%) and more than one citizen in two do not trust their national parliament (54%). The European Union elicits as much distrust (42%, unchanged) as trust.



Trust in the United Nations varies considerably from country to country. In the United Kingdom, it has a trust level of 45% (-6), whereas it has gained ground in Finland (68%, +6). The Swedes (76%) have the highest level of trust in the UN in the EU15, whereas the Greeks are the most sceptical (40%).

Although it is not obvious from the EU15 average of those tending to trust the Union, there are significant variations between countries: trust levels are falling in Austria (31%, -5), while they are rising in Finland (40%, +7), in France (42%, +5) and in Belgium (49%, +4). The British are still the nationality that has least trust in the European Union (19%), in contrast to the Greeks (68%).

Trust levels in national parliaments have also seen important shifts. The Greeks (63%, +9), the Irish (40%, +6) and the Finns (58%, +6) now show greater trust in their national parliament while the trend has moved in the opposite direction in Portugal (37%, -9) and in Denmark (63%, -5). Once again, the British show the least trust (25%). At the other end of the spectrum, 63% of Greeks and Danes place their trust in their national parliament.


As far as trust in national governments is concerned, confidence levels in the Danish (44%, -9), Portuguese (34%, -5) and British (19%, -5) governments have fallen, whereas trust levels in the Finnish (59%, +10), Greek (55%, +8)⁶, and Irish (39%, +8) governments are moving up. Levels of trust range from 19% in the United Kingdom to 61% in Luxembourg.

⁶ Note: The Greek government changed in March 2004.

Although political parties remain the institutions least trusted by the EU population, all the same, they have gained one point. This development is mainly due to the situation in Greece (28%, +8), Luxembourg (31%, +5) and Spain (27%, +4). The UK sample places least trust in political parties (10%) whereas the Danes are the most trusting (32%). (EU28Tables Q.7.5)

Trust in other institutions remains for the most part stable

Levels of trust in charitable or voluntary organisations (+2), the police, justice/the national legal system and the trades unions (each +1) are rising, while those in the army and religious institutions have fallen by one point. The greatest fall was recorded in trust levels in relation to large companies (-3).



The police are therefore still the institution in which the population has most trust (65%). This level of trust saw an increase in seven of the fifteen Member States, particularly in Greece (72%, +5) and in Italy (71%, +5). Its trust level remains unchanged in France and Belgium (55% and 52% respectively) and is falling in six other countries including the United Kingdom (55%, -5) and Denmark (86%, -4). Almost nine out of ten Finns trust their police (88%), whereas only 52% of Belgians trust the police.

Trust in the army has fallen by one point (63%), with the largest decrease in Denmark and the United Kingdom (67%, -5 each). However, levels of trust in the army have risen sharply in Italy (73%, +8).

EU15 citizens' trust in charitable and voluntary associations has increased (61%, +2). This is most marked in Portugal (68%, +7), France (68%, +6), Belgium (64%, +6) and Denmark (63%, +6).

Justice/the legal system inspires very slightly greater trust than six months ago (48%, +1). Trust levels have risen in Spain (47%, +6), Italy (46%, +5) and in Greece (73%, +5), whereas they have fallen the most in Portugal (36%, -11) and in the United Kingdom (37%, -6). Belgians (30%) have the least trust in their country's justice system and Danes have the most (76%).

The level of trust in large companies is falling in seven countries with decreases of up to eight points in the Netherlands (30%) and seven points in Italy (24%). Highest levels of trust in companies are seen in Belgium (37%, +7) and Sweden (26%, +5). (EU28Tables Q.7.10)

II. The European Union and its citizens

1. The need for information

This chapter assesses, from a number of different angles, the level of citizens' knowledge about the operation of the European Union and the resulting need for information. The first aspect examined is self-perception of knowledge about the European Union. The second issue looked at the need for courses in schools about how the European institutions work. European citizens were asked about their knowledge about how the Union's budget is spent, and were given a quiz to evaluate the level of their knowledge in reality. The chapter goes on to include an analysis of people's awareness of the European institutions and how they feel the EU is presented in the media. The chapter finishes by examining the sources used by citizens when they are looking for information about the EU.

1.1. Self-perceived levels of knowledge about the European Union

Levels of self-perceived knowledge are rising

What we call the self-perception of knowledge about the European Union provides a good indicator of general attitudes towards the European Union. Analyses show that, on average, the more the people who are polled think they know about the European Union, the more they are likely to support it. Therefore, the levels of people's knowledge about the European Union may help to explain the relatively widespread indifference to the Union.

The question is formulated as follows:


'How much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?' Respondents were asked to rank themselves on a scale of 1 to 10. The higher the figure they choose, the more they think they know about the EU.

In spring 2004, 29% of those polled consider that they have relatively good levels of knowledge about the European Union and selected figures between 6 and 10 on the scale they were given. This represents a rise of two points compared with the results in autumn 2003.

Self-perception of knowledge about European affairs (in %, EU15)				
	Spring 2004	Autumn 2003	Spring 2003	Spring 2002
Scale	%	%	%	%
1 (Knows nothing at all)	6	7	10	10
2	11	11	12	11
3	16	18	17	15
4	17	17	15	15
5	20	19	18	19
6	14	13	12	12
7	9	8	8	9
8	5	4	5	5
9	1	1	1	1
10 (Knows a lot)	1	1	1	1
Don't know	2	2	2	1
Average result	4.48	4.36	4.25	4.35

The average result of perceived knowledge of European affairs is currently 4.48, a rise of 0.12 since last autumn.

Levels of perceived knowledge vary considerably from one Member State to another.



As in the previous survey, the highest level of self-perceived knowledge is recorded in Austria (5.08) and the lowest in Portugal (3.95).

Almost four Dutch people out of ten (38%) think they have a relatively high level of knowledge about the European Union (i.e. a score of 6 or higher on the scale). They are followed closely by the Austrians (37%), Germans (36%) and Greeks (35%). In Germany, there is a striking difference observed between the level of knowledge that people in the old Länder believe they have and the level of knowledge that people in the new Länder believe they have (38% and 29% respectively). Only one-fifth of the Portuguese population thinks it has a relatively high level of knowledge. This level registered an increase of five points since last autumn.

It can also be seen that the number of people placing themselves between 6 and 10 on the self-evaluation scale has only dropped in Sweden (-6), Austria (-3) and Finland (-1). It has remained constant in two countries and has risen in ten of the fifteen Member States. This can be seen most especially in the countries where the lowest levels were recorded in the past: the United Kingdom (+6), Portugal, Spain and Ireland (+5 each). (EU28Tables Q.16)

The relationship between self-perception of knowledge about the EU and two of the standard indices of support for the European Union is represented in the two tables that follow.

Relationship between support for EU membership and self-perceived knowledge about the EU			
Country's membership of the EU is...	Self-perceived EU knowledge⁷		
	Low	Average	High
	%	%	%
A good thing	36	53	61
Neither good nor bad	18	16	18
A bad thing	35	27	20
Don't know	12	3	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>101</i>	<i>99</i>	<i>100</i>

Relationship between image of the EU and self-perceived knowledge about the EU			
Image of the EU is...	Self-perceived EU knowledge⁸		
	Low	Average	High
	%	%	%
Positive	31	48	59
Neutral	38	30	19
Negative	22	20	21
Don't know	9	2	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>

⁷ Respondents are classified as having a low knowledge level if they placed themselves on points 1-3 of the self-perceived knowledge scale. Average= points 4-7; high: point 8-10.

⁸ The classification is identical to that of the table above.

The table that follows presents the average results recorded for various socio-demographic groups in the EU15. Not surprisingly, people who influence opinion, managers and people who had spent the longest time in fulltime education, were the most likely to give themselves a high score in terms of their self-perceived level of knowledge. At the very bottom of the table may be found the people who have the lowest results on the Opinion Leadership Index⁹.


Average results on the scale of self-perceived levels of knowledge for various groups at EU15 level	
Group	Result
Opinion Leadership Index: ++	5.85
Managers	5.43
Educated full-time up to age 20+	5.23
Opinion Leadership Index: +	4.92
Men	4.92
Self-employed	4.89
Students	4.67
White-collar workers	4.62
Aged 40-54	4.61
Aged 25-39	4.51
EU15 average	4.48
Aged 15-24	4.41
Aged 55+	4.39
Retired	4.38
Educated fulltime until aged 16-19	4.37
Manual workers	4.31
Unemployed	4.29
Opinion Leadership Index: -	4.28
Women	4.07
Educated to age 15 or younger	3.93
House persons	3.70
Opinion Leadership Index: --	3.38

⁹ See annex C4 for a definition of the analysis variables.

On the eve of enlargement, almost a third of citizens feel well informed

In the context of levels of self-perceived knowledge and two months before 1 May 2004, the date on which ten new member countries were to join the European Union, citizens were asked how well informed they felt about enlargement.

29% said they felt very well informed or well informed about the enlargement of the European Union. This represents an increase of five points compared with Spring 2003. This sentiment is increasing in eleven of the fifteen Member States and it is particularly noticeable in Italy (+10), Ireland and the United Kingdom (both +9), as well as in the Netherlands and Sweden (both +8). The situation remained unchanged in Austria, but saw a small drop in three countries: Denmark (-6), Finland (-5) and Luxembourg (-4).



In spite of this improvement, the feeling of not being very well informed or not at all informed is shared by at least one person in two in twelve of the fifteen Member States. In Luxembourg, although the number of people feeling badly informed does not reach the 50% mark, this feeling is held by the majority. At the same time, in Austria, there are just as many respondents feeling well informed as there are feeling badly informed. However, in Finland, more than one citizen in two feels well informed. (EU28Tables Q.17)


As was the case a year ago, in Spring 2003, it can be seen that people who feel they are well or very well informed tend most often to be men, managers, self-employed or white-collar workers and this feeling is all the more marked when the later respondents' fulltime education finishes.

Attitudinal analysis shows that respondents who consider their country's EU membership to be a good thing are a bit more likely to feel they are well or very well informed (37%, +5) than those who consider their country's EU membership to be a bad thing (27%, +7) or neither a good nor a bad thing (23%, +5). It should be noted that, compared with the previous time these data were collected, the figures have increased for each one of these categories.


1.2. Learning about the EU at school

A clear majority of citizens in favour of European civics classes

More than four citizens out of five (82%) say they are in favour of teaching school children about the way the EU institutions work, which represents an increase of one percentage point since last autumn.



This proposition has always met with particularly high levels of support, reaching its highest levels of all (87%) in Autumn 1997 and Autumn 1998. As has been mentioned in the past, it is possible that, in view of the low level of knowledge about the EU among those polled, respondents are conscious of the gaps in their own knowledge and would not like their children to be in the same situation.



Levels of support exceed 90% in three countries: Sweden (94%, +5), Finland (92%, +1) and the Netherlands (90%, +4). The British (72%) and Spaniards (73%) are, relatively speaking, the least likely to give their support to this proposition.


The proportion of people who support the idea of teaching school children about the way the European Union institutions work is growing in nine out fifteen Member States. The proportion remains unchanged in four countries and is falling in Austria (77%, -3) and Spain (73%, -2). (EU28Tables Q.29)

1.3. EU spending


A serious lack of knowledge in this area

This question was already asked in Autumn 2001. As the possible answers presented to respondents have been changed, no comparison can be made with the previous set of results.

Nevertheless, the responses still show that citizens have a serious lack of knowledge, as well as a number of unfounded ideas on the subject.



A fifth of EU15 respondents claim that they do not know what most of the EU's budget is spent on, with the number of those responding 'don't know' ranging from 29% in the United Kingdom to just 3% in Finland and Sweden.



A quarter of respondents (24%) think, incorrectly, that the greatest part of the Union's budget is spent on administrative, personnel and buildings costs, when in reality this expenditure only represents 5%¹⁰ of total budget expenditure. 36% of Swedes and Finns share this incorrect belief in contrast to only 13% of Greeks.

14% of citizens believe that the main part of the budget is spent on foreign policy and aid to countries outside the European Union, when, in reality, these expenditures only amount to 5% of the budget. The proportion of those polled holding this opinion reaches 22% in Belgium but only 4% in Sweden and Ireland.

Barely 14% of citizens are aware that the main part of the European Union's budget is spent on agriculture, and, for the most part, on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Danes are the best informed on this subject (43%) and the Spanish, followed by the Portuguese (6% and 7% respectively) the least. In the Union's 2004 budget, agriculture will receive a share of 42%.

One citizen in ten (11%) believes that the greater part of the EU's budget is spent on employment and social affairs, and a similar 10% believe that it is spent on regional aid. Much of EU regional aid is spent on aspects linked to promoting job creation and on social affairs. In total, the share in the budget of money spent in the form of regional aid and on employment and social affairs represents 37% of the European Union's budget. One Irish respondent in five believes that the main part of the budget is spent on employment and regional aid.

5% of citizens believe that the greater part of the budget is spent on scientific research, including 9% of Spaniards. In fact, the European Union spends 4% of its budget on scientific research. (EU28Tables Q.35)

Opinions appear to be little influenced by socio-demographic variables, particularly if opinions that the EU budget is mainly spent on administrative matters are examined. Men, managers, the retired and people who had studied fulltime until age 20 or beyond appear to be slightly more aware than average about agriculture's share of the EU budget.

Most of the people who have a bad image of the EU are likely to believe that the major part of the EU's budget is spent on administrative expenses than people who had a good image of the EU (34% and 20% respectively).


¹⁰ The percentages that are cited are for the total European Union budget for 2004.

1.4. Statements about the European Union

Large gaps in knowledge about the European Union

A quiz was presented to those surveyed in order to measure their knowledge on the European Union. Ten statements, listed in the chart below, were read out to respondents and they were asked to say which were true and which were false.

The chart below shows the percentage of respondents who gave the correct answers.



The question to which respondents were most likely to give a correct answer is 'the European flag is blue with yellow stars', since more than four persons out of five (81%) were able to say that this was true. More than nine persons out of ten gave the correct answer in Sweden, Luxembourg (91% each) and in Finland (90%). The citizens with the least number of correct answers to this question are the British (60%). Barely 5% of citizens gave an incorrect answer but 14% were unable to give an answer.

More than one European in two (55%) knows that it is false that 'the European Community was created just after World War I, in the early 1920s'. Only 13% replied that this was true. The highest numbers of those saying this statement was false were in Sweden and Denmark (79% each), while the lowest figures were recorded in Greece (41%), followed by Spain (42%). More than a third of those polled gave a 'don't know' response.

It is interesting to note that, polled only a short time before the June 2004 European elections, one respondent in two gave the correct answer that 'the Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the European Union', but for a fifth of the population (21%), this was not the case, with figures as high as 42% being recorded in Sweden and 35% in Austria. The Greeks (74%) had the highest number of respondents giving the correct answer.

Another interesting point is the fact that less than one person in two (48%) answered that 'the President of the European Commission **is not** directly elected by the citizens of the European Union'. This piece of information is a known fact for more than 50% of the population in nine of the fifteen Member States, including Denmark (79%) and Sweden (78%). On the other hand, a quarter of Portuguese (27%), Irish and Spanish (26% each) citizens think that the President is directly elected by citizens. The rate of 'don't know' responses reaches 35%.

One-third of Europeans (34%) knows that 'each year, there is a Europe Day in all of the countries of the European Union', 24% are unaware of this and 42% do not express an opinion on this statement. The level of knowledge ranges from 70% in Finland to 14% in the United Kingdom.

It is a matter of concern to see that only one-third of citizens reply that it is false that the 'European Union currently consists of twelve Member States', while 47% believe this is true and 20% are unable to give an answer. In seven Member States out of fifteen, a majority of the population considered that this statement was false, including Luxembourg (63%) and France (52%). In the other eight countries, the majority had the impression that the EU consists of twelve Members, including the Netherlands (56%), Ireland and Germany (55%). Perhaps this may have arisen from confusion between the twelve countries participating in the euro-zone and the fifteen Member States (which increased to twenty-five on 1 May 2004).

A quarter of citizens incorrectly believe that 'the next elections to the European Parliament will take place in June 2006' and only 29% do not agree.

Only a quarter of citizens correctly answer that 'the European Union has its own anthem', while 36% believe that this is not the case.

One-fifth of the population answer that the statement according to which 'the headquarters of the European Commission are in Strasbourg' is false, whereas almost half make the mistake of believing this is true. It should be noted that although the European Commission's headquarters are in Brussels, 57% of Belgians say they agree with the statement that they are in Strasbourg. 61% of French believe this statement to be true (a possible confusion with the headquarters of the European Parliament, which is in Strasbourg).


Lastly, lastly, 13% of the poll know that 'on the European flag, there **is not** one star for each member country'. 67% failed to give a correct answer to this question. (EU28Tables Q.24)

1.5. Awareness of the European institutions

Awareness has risen very slightly

92% of EU15 citizens had already heard of the European Parliament, 80% had heard of the European Commission, 74% the European Central Bank, 73% the European Court of Justice, 65% the EU Council of Ministers and 51% the European Court of Auditors. On the other hand, awareness of the EU's Economic and Social Committee, the European Ombudsman and the Committee of the Regions is still low (37%, 34% and 29% respectively).

In comparison with autumn 2003, levels of awareness have all risen by one point, and even by two points in the case of the Economic and Social Committee. However, there are, two exceptions: awareness of the European Commission and the European Ombudsman have fallen by one point.




The Danes (98%), followed by the Luxembourgers, Finns and Swedes (97% each) are the citizens who have most frequently heard of the **European Parliament**, while the British (85%) were those who had heard of it least. Awareness of the **European Commission** ranges from 95% in Luxembourg and Finland to 72% in Germany. The **European Central Bank** is best known in Sweden (91%) and least known in the United Kingdom (57%). Danes and Swedes (93% each) are the most likely to have heard of the **European Court of Justice**, while the Italians (58%) are the least likely. Awareness of the **Council of Ministers of the EU** is 92% in Sweden but only 41% in the UK. The **European Court of Auditors** is best known in Austria (78%) and least known in the United Kingdom (18%). More than one respondent in two had heard of the **Economic and Social Committee of the EU** in Luxembourg (59%), Austria (52%), in Greece and Portugal (51% each), compared to only just one Dutch person in five. Almost four out of five Finns had heard of the **European Ombudsman** (79%)¹¹, whereas this was the case for only 21% of Germans. The **Committee of the Regions** is known by 51% of Portuguese and 50% of Austrian, but by only 12% of Dutch and 15% of British respondents. (EU28Tables Q.21)

¹¹ The high level of awareness of the European Ombudsman in this country is explained probably by the fact that the former Ombudsman, Jacob Soderman, is Finnish. Since 1 April 2003, the European Ombudsman is P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, who is Greek.

1.6. Perceptions regarding the coverage of the EU in the media

The media talk too little about the European Union


This opinion is shared by 42% of citizens polled (+5 points in comparison with autumn 2003). Exactly the same proportion think that media coverage of the EU is about the right amount (-2), while barely 8% believe that media coverage is excessive (-3).



69% of Finnish citizens (+6) feel that coverage of EU affairs in the media is about the right amount. Only 31% (-4) of British respondents share this opinion. In all Member States, the proportion of citizens who believe that the media do not give enough coverage to European affairs is greater than the proportion of citizens who think they give it too much coverage. The figures for those believing that the media do not give the EU enough coverage have grown since last autumn, with the exception of Portugal (38%, -3) and Finland (25%, unchanged). These higher figures are observed in the Netherlands (53%, +2), Italy (50%, +2) and in Greece (46%, +4). (EU28Tables Q.19)

Presentation is generally viewed to be objective

Four Europeans out of ten (41%, unchanged) believe that the media in their country present the European Union objectively. 23% (unchanged) think that it is presented too positively and 13% (+1) too negatively.



The Finns, Belgians and Danes (57% each) are the most likely to agree that the media present the EU objectively. Only one-third of Italians share this opinion.


A third of Finns and Spaniards (34% each) think that their countries' media present the EU in too favourable a light. This opinion is shared by only 10% of Portuguese and 11% of Britons. On the other hand, 27% of the UK respondents consider that their media present the EU too negatively.

The proportion of those polled whose response to this question was 'don't know' ranged from 4% in Finland to 31% in Ireland (EU15 average: 23%). (EU28 Tables Q.20)

1.7. Sources of information used by citizens

Television, an increasingly used source of information

For many years, EU15 citizens have been polled regarding the sources they use when they are looking for information about the EU. The traditional media are the sources most likely to be used by the public and their use would appear to have grown since the last Eurobarometer survey: television (73%, +7 points in comparison with autumn 2003), daily newspapers (54%, +8) and radio (35%, +4)¹².



A quarter of respondents (+4) get their information from discussions with family, friends or colleagues and 23% (+3) read information on this subject in other newspapers and magazines. 16% of Europeans (unchanged) use the Internet as a source of information. One citizen in ten uses books, brochures or leaflets. Other sources of information listed are used by 3% or less of citizens polled.

11% of citizens (-6) claim that they never look for information about the EU or that they are not interested in such information. (EU28Tables Q.18)

¹² Respondents were shown a card listing 15 sources and were asked to name all those they use when they look for information about the European Union. They could also mention other sources, say that they never look for information about the EU (not interested), or say that they don't know.


2. Views on the European Union remain positive

This part of the survey looks at the main attitudes and perceptions regarding the European Union held by citizens of the fifteen Member States: do they think that their country's membership of the Union is a good thing? Has their country benefited from membership? What image do they have of the EU? What does the EU mean to them? What is their perception of it?


2.1. Support for membership of the Union

Membership of the Union is 'a good thing' - views on this are stable

Support of EU15 citizens for their country's membership of the European Union (48%) remains constant, whereas neutral responses ('neither a good nor a bad thing') have fallen very slightly (29%, -2). Opposition, which is still quite low, has increased by two points to reach 17%, a record level already reached in 1981 and in 1996.



Luxembourgers (75%), followed by the Greeks and the Irish (71% each) are the nations where respondents are most positive about their country's membership of the EU, while the British (29%) and Austrians (30%) are the least enthusiastic. A third of Swedes see their country's membership as 'a bad thing'. The Austrians (36%), French and Germans (35% each) are most likely to view their country's membership as 'neither a good nor a bad thing'.



In nine out of fifteen Member States, more than one in two citizens hold a positive opinion regarding their country's EU membership, and, in all the others, positive opinions still outweigh negative ones. There is one exception: the UK, where opinion is very split (29% for each of the three possibilities). In France and Italy, the lowest number of positive opinions on membership are recorded since the Eurobarometer's creation.


In Greece, support for membership has grown the most since the last survey (71%, +9). In Finland, it has also strengthened (46%, +7), almost reaching the same level as the EU15 average. Support has fallen in Austria (30%, -5). Austria is also the country in which the proportion of people expressing a negative opinion has increased most (29%, +9). (EU28Tables Q.8)

People who have a positive image of the Union 85% (+1) are more likely to consider their country's EU membership is a good thing in contrast to just 8% (+1) of those who have a bad image and 28% (unchanged) of those who have a neutral image. 56% (-1) of respondents with a neutral image of the EU consider their country's EU membership is neither a good nor a bad thing. This is also the case of 27% (-3) of those who have a negative image. 60% (+2) of the latter believe that their country's EU membership is a bad thing.


2.2. Benefit of European Union membership

Almost one in two citizens polled think that EU membership has benefited their country

Support for this opinion, at 47%, has risen by one point compared with autumn 2003. This figure, although below the 50% mark, is nevertheless considerably higher than the percentage of those believing that their country has not benefited from EU membership (35%, +1).



As was the case last autumn, more than 50% of citizens in eight Member States believe that their country has benefited from membership of the European Union. This view is held by a majority in four further countries: Italy (49%), France and Finland (46% each), and Germany (39%). A majority of Swedes (59%), Austrians and British (47% each) believe that their countries have not benefited from EU membership.





In Greece (82%) and in Ireland (80%), citizens are the most conscious of the benefits their countries have drawn from EU membership. Conversely, the Swedes (27%) and British (30%) are the least conscious of such benefits.

Greatest increases in figures were observed in Greece (82%, +7) and in Finland (46%, +6), whereas the largest fall was seen in Sweden (59%, +9).



The rate of 'don't know' responses remained stable overall in the EU15 (18%, -1), although it rose by four points in Belgium (16%). (EU28Tables Q.9)

Citizens (80%, +3) who view their country's membership as a good thing consider that it has been beneficial, in contrast to 24% (unchanged) who think it is neither a good nor a bad thing and 8% (-1) of those who think it is a bad thing. People who believe their country's membership of the EU is neither a good nor a bad thing, still predominantly hold the view that their country has not benefited from its membership of the Union (47%, unchanged).



BELGIUM





DENMARK





GERMANY





GREECE





SPAIN





FRANCE





IRELAND





ITALY





LUXEMBOURG





THE NETHERLANDS





AUSTRIA





PORTUGAL





FINLAND



SWEDEN




UNITED KINGDOM




2.3. The image of the European Union

Image a little less positive than in the past

The responses to this question, which was asked for the first time in Spring 2000, provide an indication of citizens' feelings about the European Union's image.



Only 43% (-1) of citizens state that they have a very or fairly positive image of the European Union, whereas the number of those with a fairly or very negative image (21%) has grown by two points. Numbers holding a positive opinion are falling in eleven countries including the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria (-5 each). The figures have risen, all the same, by seven points in Greece and by five points in Belgium. In eight of the fifteen Member States, this feeling is held by a majority. Greece has become, with Ireland (65% each), the country where very or fairly positive feelings are most widespread.



The Dutch (42%), Germans, Finns (41% each) and the Danes (40%) are the most likely to have a neutral image of the Union, while the Swedes (42%), British (37%) and the Austrians (32%) are the most likely to have a very or fairly negative image. (EU28Tables Q.10)

2.4. The meaning of the European Union


It primarily represents the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union

For the fourth time, respondents were asked what the European Union means to them personally. A new response option was added to those provided previously: democracy.

In comparison with autumn 2003, the figures for both positive and negative associations grew in parallel. The five associations cited most frequently by citizens were all positive ones.

For more than half of the people polled, the European Union represents, on the one hand, freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU (51%, +2) and, on the other, the euro (50%, +2). For around one-third of respondents, it represents peace (31%, -1), while only 28% associate it with having a stronger say in the world (+1) and cultural diversity (unchanged). Democracy is associated with the Union for 22% of those polled. Less than one European in five associates the Union with economic prosperity (19%, +1) and barely one in ten associates it with social protection (11%, unchanged).

On the other hand, more than a quarter of citizens think that the EU represents a waste of money (26%, +2), not enough control at external frontiers (23%, unchanged) and bureaucracy (22%, unchanged). 19% associate it with more crime (+3) and unemployment (+4), and 14% with a loss of their cultural identity (-1).



The table on the page that follows shows that of the first three things that the EU means to people in each of the Member States, **freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union** was one of the top three options selected in all of the fifteen countries. It is the first choice in six of them, second in seven and third in two.

In all the countries that had adopted the single currency, the **euro** is one of the two aspects that signify the European Union. The single currency arrives on top in nine countries and in second position in three other countries. Outside the euro-zone, this association is less frequently cited, but is, nevertheless, ranked in fourth place in Denmark and the United Kingdom, and ninth in Sweden.

Peace is one of the three things that people associate with the EU in five Member States. As in the past, **economic prosperity** is an aspect that people are likely to associate with the EU in those countries that have greatly benefited from European integration, such as in Ireland and Spain. It has now fallen back into fourth place in Portugal.


For the Dutch, Italians and Portuguese, the European Union represents **a stronger voice in the world**. **Cultural diversity** is always one of the top three options selected by France and it always has the highest percentage of respondents choosing this option.

It is not only in countries with a certain eurosceptic tradition that negative associations are cited. The Belgians and Austrians place **more crime** in third place and the Portuguese **unemployment**. The identification of the European Union with **bureaucracy** is always more frequent in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the UK. An appreciable number of Swedes, Austrians and British consider the EU to be **a waste of money**. The British always record the highest figures for those who associate the Union with **a loss of their cultural identity**. (EU28Tables Q.11)

Ranking of the three most frequently cited replies as to what the EU means personally to EU citizens (in % by Member State)			
Belgium			
The euro	67		
Freedom of movement	44		
More crime	28		
Denmark			
Freedom of movement	54		
Bureaucracy	46		
Peace	40		
Germany			
The euro	58		
Freedom of movement	51		
Peace	44		
Greece			
The euro	49		
Peace	44		
Freedom of movement	42		
Spain			
Freedom of movement	51		
The euro	50		
Economic prosperity	32		
France			
The euro	59		
Freedom of movement	52		
Cultural diversity	38		
Ireland			
The euro	50		
Freedom of movement	45		
Economic prosperity	32		
Italy			
Freedom of movement	60		
The euro	48		
Stronger voice in the world	29		
Peace	29		
		Luxembourg	
		The euro	61
		Freedom of movement	57
		Peace	43
		The Netherlands	
		The euro	56
		Freedom of movement	54
		Stronger voice in the world	37
		Austria	
		The euro	53
		Waste of money	42
		Freedom of movement	38
		More crime	38
		Portugal	
		The euro	46
		Freedom of movement	35
		Stronger voice in the world	21
		Unemployment	21
		Finland	
		Freedom of movement	69
		The euro	65
		Bureaucracy	44
		Sweden	
		Freedom of movement	64
		Waste of money	54
		Bureaucracy	51
		United Kingdom	
		Freedom of movement	45
		Waste of money	31
		Bureaucracy	29
		Loss of cultural identity	29

2.5. Perception of the EU

Citizens of the fifteen Member States were asked for their opinions on nine statements concerning their perceptions of the EU.



Seven respondents out of ten believe that **the biggest countries have the most power in the European Union**. The Finns (93%), followed by the Swedes (92%), the Danes (89%) and the Dutch (88%) have the highest proportions of citizens tending to agree with this statement in contrast to just 64% of the British.

63% of citizens tend to agree that **their country's voice counts in the EU**. The figures range from 78% in France to just 42% in Austria.

In the twelve countries where this question was asked¹³, one citizen in two believes that **their country is more influential in the European Union than it was ten years ago**. Three-quarters of Greeks tend to hold this view in contrast to barely one-third of Dutch.

43% of respondents share the view that **their country will become more influential in the EU in the future**. Greeks (68%) and Spaniards (60%) are by far the most likely to believe this and the Dutch (23%) the least likely. This view is held by a majority in seven of the fifteen Member States.

Four citizens in ten think **they understand how the European Union works** and the same proportion feels **they are safer because their country is a member of the European Union**. It is in Greece (58%) that the feeling of understanding how the EU works is the strongest, while, in the UK, the figure is the lowest at 34%. The Greeks (76%) are also the most likely to feel safer because their country is a member of the EU. They are followed by the Spaniards (63%), whereas the Dutch with 23% are the least likely to share this opinion.

¹³ This question was not asked in Austria, Finland or Sweden.

39% of Europeans feel they are **more stable economically because their country is a member of the EU**. A similar number believe the contrary. This positive opinion is only held by a majority in five Member States out of fifteen but the figures are high: Greece (65%), Ireland (63%), Spain (61%), Luxembourg (58%) and Denmark (56%). On the other hand, seven Swedes out of ten think precisely the opposite.

37% of citizens feel a sense of **greater political stability because their country is a member of the European Union** in contrast to 49% who do not share this viewpoint. The Greeks (64%) are those who associate greater political stability and membership of the EU the most, in contrast to the British who are at the other end of the scale with just 27% with this opinion.

Three citizens in ten tend to agree that **their voice counts in the EU**, whereas 55% of those polled think the contrary. 47% of Danes think their voice counts whereas only 14% of the British share this belief. (EU28Tables Q.12)


3. The main policies of the European Union

This chapter looks at the euro and the role of the EU in the main European policies.

3.1. Support for the euro

Support for the common currency has stagnated in the countries outside the euro-zone


In comparison with last autumn, support for monetary union with a single currency, the euro (60%, +1), rose very slightly. On the other hand, within the euro-zone a fall of one point was recorded (66%).




Levels of support are still the highest in Luxembourg (88%), Ireland and Belgium (83% each). The largest increases in levels of support were observed in Luxembourg (+5), Ireland and Spain (+4 points each). On the other hand, in Germany and the Netherlands there was a rise in the number of citizens who are against the euro (+5).

Opposition to the euro, although still high, is falling in Sweden and the UK

Denmark is still the only country outside the euro-zone where one person in two supports the common currency (50% in favour, 44% against).




Levels of support for the euro are rising in Sweden and the UK, although they are still the only two countries falling below the 50% mark. Support for the euro has increased by 4 points in Sweden (45%) and by three points in the United Kingdom (26%). In these two countries, opponents of the common currency are still in the majority, representing 51% of the population (-3) in Sweden and a higher figure, 61%, in the United Kingdom. (EU28Tables Q.29).



3.2. The role of the EU in different areas

The EU's performance is credible in the fight against terrorism but not in the fight against inflation

For the second time, citizens were asked if, in respect of various fields, they think the EU plays a positive or negative role, or neither one nor the other.



The area in which the EU is seen to play the most positive role is, without any doubt, **fighting terrorism**. More than one citizen in two is plainly convinced (53%, +4 in comparison with autumn 2003). Directly hit by the atrocities of terrorism in March, Spain (62%) recorded the highest figures of those feeling that the EU plays a positive role in the fight against terrorism. This view is also held by 59% of Danes and Dutch, but by only 40% of Portuguese. This view is held by a majority in the fifteen Member States and exceeds the 50% mark in nine of them.

The EU's role in **foreign affairs** is seen as positive by 49% (+3) of respondents. This opinion attracts the support of 59% of Greeks, Irish and Luxembourgers. It is held by a majority in fourteen Member States and exceeds the 50% mark in eight of them. A majority of Austrians hold the view that the EU's role in foreign affairs is neither positive nor negative.

48% (+4) of citizens consider that the Union plays a positive role in the area of **defence**, including 57% of Luxembourgers and Germans. Only a quarter of Austrians share this view but 47% of them see the EU's role in this area as neither positive nor negative. This is also the opinion of 38% of Swedes.

More than two people in five (42%, +3) believe the EU plays a positive role in **protecting the environment**, while one in five has a negative opinion. Positive attitudes prevail in thirteen of the fifteen Member States, reaching figures of 56% in Finland and 54% in Ireland. The two exceptions are Austria and Denmark where 37% of those polled think that the EU's role is a negative one in this area.

39% of Europeans consider the EU plays a positive role in **fighting crime**¹⁴. The Spaniards (57%) are by far the nation that gives greatest support to this view, in contrast to the British who, at the other end of the scale, have a figure of 24%.

The proportion of people who see the EU's role in the **economic situation** as positive is equal to the proportion who see it as negative (34% each). The Irish (57%) are the most positive in regard to this role of the EU, whereas 42% of the French see it as negative.

Negative attitudes are most prevalent in the following fields: rising prices/inflation (50%, +1), immigration (40%, unchanged), fighting unemployment¹⁵ (40%, +4) and taxation (39%, unchanged). On the other hand, a majority of citizens see the role of the EU as neither positive nor negative in respect of public transport (51%, +5), housing (49%, +3), pensions (42%, +2), the education system (41%, +1) and the healthcare system (41%, unchanged) (EU28Tables Q.28).

¹⁴ Note: crime is considered by 26% of those polled to be one of the two most important problems faced by our countries. See Part I, Chapter 3

¹⁵ Unemployment is, for 44% of those polled, one of the two most important problems faced by our countries. See Part I, Chapter 3.


4. Attitudes regarding the institutions

This part of the report provides an analysis of citizens' attitudes towards the European institutions based on the following parameters: satisfaction with how democracy works in the EU and in its constituent Member States, the awareness of and importance of the Irish Presidency in Ireland, the importance of and trust in various EU institutions and bodies and, lastly, the European elections.


4.1. Satisfaction with democracy

Satisfaction with respect to democracy in the European Union is stable

Since autumn 2003, there has been a slight increase in the number of citizens (43%, +1) saying they are very or fairly satisfied with how democracy works in the European Union. Two persons in five say they are not very or not at all satisfied with how it works (40%, +1).




The proportion of people who feel very or fairly satisfied with how democracy works in the European Union is rising in eight of the fifteen Member States, decreasing in five others and remains unchanged in Italy (45%) and in Germany (39%). The highest increases were seen in the figures for Belgium (+9), Greece (+7) and Finland (+5), whereas there was a fall of five points in Austria and four points in both Ireland and the Netherlands.



Levels of satisfaction with how democracy works in the EU rise above the 50% mark in six countries and, in a further three countries, a relative majority is satisfied with this. The Luxembourgers (62%), Irish and Greeks (61% each) have the largest proportions of respondents holding this opinion. The British, as usual, record the lowest figure (32%). In Finland and Sweden (53% each) and in the Netherlands (51%), more than one citizen in two claims to be not very or not at all satisfied with how democracy works. (EU28Tables Q.39b)

Citizens' levels of satisfaction with how democracy works in their own countries are also stable. As in autumn 2003, the level of satisfaction is 54% and the number of those who are not very or not at all satisfied remains unchanged (43%).



However, this apparent stability conceals some relatively important changes at national level. It can be seen that levels of satisfaction are rising in nine out of fifteen Member States, falling in four and are unchanged in the United Kingdom (58%) and France (55%). Largest increases were observed in Greece (+10), Luxembourg (+6), Finland and the Netherlands (+5 each). The proportion of people who were not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with how democracy works in their country rose by four points in Spain¹⁶.

¹⁶ As mentioned in Part I, this survey was carried out between 22 February and 18 March 2004, a period that covered the 11 March terrorist attacks in Madrid and the Spanish national elections on 14 March.

The highest level of satisfaction was observed in Denmark (91%), followed by Luxembourg (80%), Finland (77%), Sweden (74%) and Ireland (70%). The Portuguese and Italians are, by a long way, the countries with the highest numbers of respondents who were not very or not at all satisfied with how democracy works in their countries (67% and 62% respectively). (EU28Tables Q.39a)


4.2. Awareness and importance of the EU Presidency

Almost four out of five Irish citizens had read or heard something about the Irish Presidency

Since 1986, the Eurobarometer has surveyed the awareness and importance of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in the country that is hosting the Presidency at the time of the survey. Ireland held the Presidency for the first six months of 2004.

77% of the Irish had read something in the newspapers or heard something on the radio or television on this subject and 82% of respondents, whether or not they had heard anything about the Presidency, believed it was important that their country presided over the Council of Ministers at that time.


The levels of awareness and importance are higher than was the case during the previous Irish Presidency in 1996 (+ 6 points and +1 point respectively).



4.3. Importance and trust in the European institutions

Perceived importance of their role is growing


It would appear that there are more citizens of the fifteen Member States than six months ago who are aware of the importance of the role played by various European bodies in the life of the European Union. The ranking of the institutions in terms of perceived importance is the same as in Autumn 2003. On the other hand, all the percentages are rising. Currently, 81% (+3) believe that the European Parliament plays an important role. After the Parliament comes the European Commission (73%, +3), the European Central Bank (71%, +5), the European Court of Justice (69%, +4), the Council of Ministers (63%, +5) and the European Court of Auditors (54%, +4).



At a country level, it is seen that the Dutch (90%), Swedes (88%) and Irish (87%) are the most likely to think that the **European Parliament** plays an important role, whereas the British are the least likely (73%). In the Netherlands (83%), Ireland, Finland, Luxembourg and in Belgium (82% each) the importance of the role of the **European Commission** is most frequently cited. The Swedes (86%), Dutch (84%) and Finns (81%) have the highest number of respondents who feel that the **European Central Bank** has an important role. Once again, the British have the lowest number of respondents who feel the role of these institutions is important (61% and 55% respectively). (EU28Tables Q.22)

Slightly higher levels of trust


The European Parliament is always the institution in which those polled place greatest trust. The level of trust remains unchanged since last autumn, but the levels of trust in the eight other institutions and bodies have all seen increases - ranging from three points for the **European Union Court of Justice** and the **Economic and Social Committee of the EU** and one point for the **European Commission**. The European Parliament (54%) and the European Court of Justice (52%) are, nevertheless, the only two institutions in which more than one citizen in two places their trust. The other institutions presented are still trusted by a relative majority. The rates of 'don't know' responses although still very high, are falling and are now all below the 50% mark.



It can be seen that the number of people who do not trust the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers has risen by two points. (EU28Tables Q.23)


European Parliament and European Commission: Austrian and British trust levels lagging behind

The European Parliament is the only institution in which trust levels have stayed unchanged. Seven Greeks out of ten trust it, as do more than two-thirds of Italians (68%) and Luxembourgers (67%). This is also the case for three citizens out of five in Ireland, Belgium (64% each), Spain (62%) and Finland (61%) and more than one citizen in two in six other countries. In Austria, the trust level falls below the 50% mark and the United Kingdom is the only country where a majority do not trust the European Parliament.



At country level, the EU15 average conceals some variations. Since autumn 2003, trust in the European Parliament has increased in nine countries, including Belgium (+6), fallen in four and remained the same in Spain (62%) and Denmark (55%). The largest fall in levels of trust was seen in Austria (-7).

Trust in the European Commission varies from one country to another ranging from 66% in Luxembourg to 26% in the United Kingdom. Trust levels in the Commission are rising in nine out of the fifteen Member States, with increases of eight points recorded on Belgium and Finland. They are falling in three countries: Germany (-1), Spain(-2) and Austria (-5), and remain unchanged in Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.



The proportion of people tending not to trust the European Commission has risen by seven points in Austria and six points in Germany. Austria and the United Kingdom are the two countries where the majority of the poll tends not to trust the Commission. 35% of the British did not express an opinion.

5. The European elections

The questions covered by this part of the report were asked a few months before the European elections. At the time of publication of this report, the results of the elections are known and the particularly high abstention rates are still the subject of analysis¹⁷. There follows a relatively brief presentation of the way the impact of the Parliament's decisions is felt by citizens, their general attitudes regarding this institution, their intention to vote in the June election, as measured last February-March, as well as the issues they would like to see featured in the electoral campaign.

5.1. Effects of the activities and decisions of the EP

The action of the European Parliament has a limited impact


16% of citizens think that the activities and decisions of the European Parliament have an important impact on people like themselves. 47% feel these have some impact and 24% believe they have no effect at all. The table that follows compares citizens' perceptions of the impact of the activities and decisions of the European Parliament with perceptions of the impact of some other institutions.

Respondents generally think that the activities and decisions taken by their national institutions, in particular their national governments, are more likely to have an impact on people like themselves.

	European Parliament	European Union	National parliament	Regional or local government	National government
	%	%	%	%	%
Great effect	16	22	39	42	49
Some effect	47	51	42	40	39
No effect	24	19	14	12	10
Don't know	13	9	5	6	3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>101</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>101</i>

The Greeks, with 26%, are the nationality with the highest number of respondents who consider that the activities and decisions of the European Parliament have a great effect on them. This opinion is also shared by 23% of Spaniards and Dutch. The Danes and Swedes are the most likely to believe that the EP's activities and decisions have some effect (57% and 54% respectively). More than a third of French (35%) think it has no effect, followed by 34% of Belgians and Finns. (EU28Tables Q.45.1 to Q.45.5)


¹⁷ Note: the average participation rate in the Europe of 25 was 46%, with even lower figures in the ten countries that joined the Union on 1 May 2004 (26%) than in the fifteen others (49%).



5.2. Opinions of the European Parliament

Two-thirds of those polled believe the European elections are really important

Although EU15 citizens believe that decisions taken by their national institutions have a greater effect on their daily lives than those of the European institutions, this does not mean that they do not recognise the importance of the European elections. 66% tend to agree or totally agree that the European Parliament elections are very important. This figure ranges from 86% in Greece to 52% in the United Kingdom.




44% of the poll thinks the European Parliament has more power than their national Parliament. This statement meets with greatest approval in Greece (69%) and least in France (34%). This opinion is held by a majority in thirteen of the fifteen Member States.

More than one-third of citizens (37%) consider that Members of the European Parliament are good at protecting their interests, with 56% in Luxembourg, 55% in Greece and 54% in Ireland sharing this view, but only 22% in Sweden. In the EU15 overall, 44% disagree with this point of view.. (EU28Tables Q.46.1 to Q.46.3)

5.3. Awareness of Members of the European Parliament and contact with them

With a few months to go to the elections, visibility of Members of the European Parliament has improved


Only 38% of EU15 citizens claim that they have neither seen nor heard anything about, nor had any contact with a Member of the European Parliament since the last European elections. This represents a fall of six points in comparison with the figure recorded six months previously. On the other hand, all the channels of communication by which citizens were able to hear, read, see or receive something saw their levels increase. Of the main ones, it should be noted that 44% of those polled had seen Members of the European Parliament on the television (+6), 32% had read something on the subject of Members of the European Parliament in newspapers or magazines (+5) and 15% had heard them speak on the radio (+3).



The proportion of those polled who claimed not to have had any contact with a Member of the European Parliament since the last elections differs considerably from one country to another. It ranges from 53% in the United Kingdom to 13% in Denmark. (EU28Tables Q.43).

A desire for more personal contact with Members of the European Parliament

All the channels of communication proposed in the survey meet with increased levels of interest. Television still remains citizens' preferred means of communication (+1), followed by newspaper and magazines (+2) and then radio (+1). Two forms of contact, in particular, have seen their figures increase: MEPs' newsletters and brochures (13%, +4) and public meetings (11%, +3).




31% of citizens (-2) answered that they would not be interested to see or hear anything more regarding Members of the European Parliament. (EU28Tables Q.44)

5.4. Participation in the elections

A very slight increase in the probability of people voting in the June 2004 elections

In February-March 2004, citizens were asked about the likelihood they would be casting a vote were the European elections to be held the next day. They could choose a point on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that they would definitely not vote and 10 that they would definitely vote. The remaining numbers indicate something in between these two positions. The average voting intention can be determined using this scale. The same question was also asked to determine the likelihood of respondents voting in national elections.



Although it certainly could in no way be said to constitute a forecast for participation in the 10-13 June elections, it can be noted that in February-March, the average probability of respondents voting in the forthcoming European elections was 6.87.

The Greeks were the most inclined to participate (8.87) in contrast to the British (5.51) at the other end of the scale. (EU28Tables Q.41)

The same question was asked in relation to national elections. It is not surprising that citizens are more likely to participate in national than in European elections. In fact, the probability of participating in national elections is on average 7.41. This is lower than last autumn (-0.23). (EU28Tables Q.40)


The table that follows shows, that the probability of going to vote in the European Parliament elections depends heavily on what citizens think they know about the European Union. The more that citizens think they know about the EU, the more often they say that they are likely to go to vote in the European elections.

Likelihood of people voting in EP elections as a function of perceived levels of knowledge (in %, for EU15)			
	Low level of knowledge	Average level of knowledge	High level of knowledge
Average result	5.69	7.35	8.38

5.5. Reasons for deciding for whom to vote

Policies play a more important role than political parties in voting decisions

Among those who said they would definitely go to vote in the European Parliament elections, 39% claimed that the policies of the candidate would have most influence on their decision to vote. Respondents' opinions about national issues was in second position (38%), followed by their opinions about European issues (35%). The party to which a candidate belongs was only in fourth place in determining voting decisions (22%) followed by the candidate's personality (17%).




Rates of response varied from country to country. The policies of the candidate are important for 53% of French but for only 23% of Austrians and Portuguese. National questions are of interest particularly to the Swedes (47%), but much less so to the Belgians (26%). European questions are crucial for 48% Swedes in contrast to just 14% of Portuguese.

The party to which a candidate belongs is an important influence for 31% of Finns, but only for 14% of British. The personality of the candidate, which is in fifth position, is essential for 44% of Finns and 29% of Austrians, but for barely 8% of the British. (EU28Tables Q.42)

5.6. Issues in the forthcoming European elections

When citizens are asked on which issues the European election campaign should focus, they could choose from a list of 13 possible propositions. Employment was selected by 59% and equal numbers chose crime and immigration (45% each). These issues reflect the concerns of citizens already mentioned earlier in this report. The reform of the EU's institutions and enlargement (13% each) and the activities of the European Parliament (12%) were the issues of least interest to citizens.

It can be seen that employment as an issue for the election campaign has recorded an increase of five points between autumn 2003 and spring 2004. Other issues cited more frequently this spring are rights as an EU citizen (+7), issues specific to our country (+6) and education and agriculture (+3 each). On the other hand, interest in crime has fallen by four points.




There are important differences between countries. The British (62%) are a lot more concerned than the average about immigration, followed by the Spaniards (53%). The French are much more interested in employment (78%) than immigration (34%). The Portuguese and the Finns are the least concerned about immigration (22% each), the Dutch are more interested in crime (63%) whereas the Spaniards (29%) are the least interested in crime.

Among the other ten issues proposed, the Swedes (54%) favoured national issues and the environment (57%). The Danes (43%) are the most interested in rights of European Union citizens. The Dutch want a debate on education (44%) while the Greeks (50%) think that agriculture should be a key issue. (EU28Tables Q.47)

The simultaneous organisation of other elections as an electoral mobilisation factor

For 45% of those polled, the most important incentive to vote would be to organise local, regional or national elections on the same day as the European elections¹⁸. None of the possible answers proposed to respondents received the support of a majority and many thought that they would not serve as an incentive for them to go to vote. It should be noted that for 37% of respondents, the existence of regional lists of candidates¹⁹ is an incentive and for almost one-third of citizens, the possibility of voting via the Internet or vote at the workplace is also an incentive. For a quarter of respondents, free public transport on the day of the elections would encourage them to go to vote.



The Greeks (61%), have most citizens who consider the holding of other elections on the same day as the European elections could encourage them to go to vote. The Danes (15%) are the least likely to share this opinion. The existence of regional lists of candidates is seen by a majority of Greeks and Germans (51% and 44% respectively) as an incentive to go to vote. The holding of European elections on the same day in all the Union obtains a relative majority in Greece (58%) in Italy (55%), in Spain (52%), in Germany (49%), in Ireland and in Finland (45% each). 56% of Greeks would be encouraged to go to vote if public transport were free on election day. Almost two Irish respondents in five believe that the possibility of voting at their workplace or the supermarket would be an incentive. 25% of them think that having more time to put their names on the Electoral Register would be an incentive. (EU28Tables Q.48)

¹⁸ The elections of 13 June showed that this was indeed an important incentive. Another important incentive would appear simply to make voting compulsory.

¹⁹ This proposition was not offered to respondents in Belgium, Italy, Ireland or the United Kingdom.

III. What future for the European Union?

1. New institutions?


In this chapter, the opinions of citizens of the fifteen Member States on the future operation of the European Union and on the future European Constitution are analysed. It should be noted that the data presented below were collected in February-March 2004, before the adoption on 18 June 2004 by the European Council of the draft Constitutional Treaty²⁰.

1.1. Support for a Constitution

Citizens support the draft European Constitution

As the question concerning support for the principle of a European Constitution was modified, no attempt will be made to compare results with those from previous surveys.

Almost two-thirds of citizens polled (63%) said they were in favour of a European Constitution, 17% are against it and a fifth of those surveyed did not express an opinion on this question.



The draft European Constitution is supported by a majority of public opinion in fourteen of the fifteen Member States. The highest levels of support were observed in Italy (78%), Luxembourg (75%), Belgium (72%), Spain and the Netherlands (70% each). Although well below the 50% level, a relative majority of UK citizens (42%) support the principle of a Constitution in contrast to 24% who oppose it.

²⁰ http://europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm. The text will have to be ratified by the Member States before it can enter into force.

Only one country stands out from the other Member States: Denmark, where only 37% of respondents support the principle of a Constitution, whereas 41% are against it. The next highest percentages of opponents were recorded in Finland (35%) and Sweden (31%).

There was a relatively high rate of 'don't know' responses in the United Kingdom (34%), Ireland (29%) and Portugal (27%). (EU28Tables Q.29)

As might be expected, many more people who think their country's EU membership is a good thing give their support to the draft Constitution than those who think that membership is a bad thing (79% and 40% respectively).

The following table shows that people who think they know a lot about the European Union are much more likely to have an opinion than people who think they know only a little. The levels of support and, to a lesser extent, opposition are higher among this first group than the second.


Support for a European Constitution as a function of perceived levels of knowledge about the EU (in %)			
	Low level of knowledge	Medium level of knowledge	High level of knowledge
% For	50	70	77
% Against	17	16	18
% Don't know	33	14	6
% Total	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>101</i>

1.2. The number of Commissioners

For a large majority of citizens, the European Commission should be composed of Commissioners coming from each of the Member States.

For the second time, EU15 citizens were asked whether they were in favour or not of the proposal that the European Commission should consist of Commissioners coming from each of the Member States.

Support for this proposal is slightly below that obtained in autumn 2003 (69%, -3). The proportion of opponents, although still low (11%), rose by one point, while one-fifth of the population of the fifteen Member States did not express an opinion (+2).




The Swedes (87%), Finns (85%) and Danes (84%) are the EU15 citizens most in favour of this proposal, whereas the British were the least in favour (51%). The highest number of opponents is recorded in the United Kingdom (17%). (EU28Tables Q.29)

1.3. Different speeds of integration

Mixed feelings about a two-speed Europe

In this survey, a new question was introduced. Respondents were asked to decide whether they were for or against European integration taking place faster in one group of countries than in the other countries.

The responses were quite mixed. 31% of citizens said they were in favour of this suggestion, 41% were against it and 28% were unable to or were unwilling to express their opinion.



One Greek in two (52%) supports this idea. Next in line are the Austrians (42%) and the Spanish (41%) in contrast to, at the other end of the scale, the British (17%). Levels of opposition exceed 50% in three countries: Finland (63%), Sweden (56%) and Denmark (50%). The numbers giving 'don't know' as their answer ranged from 39% in the United Kingdom to 14% in Sweden. (EU28Tables Q.29)

It can be seen that the people who think their country's EU membership is a good thing are very torn between support for and opposition to the suggestion (41% and 38% respectively). However, those who think their country's EU membership is a bad thing are clearly against this proposal (54% oppose it compared with 20% who support it). (EU28Tables Q.29)


The table that follows shows how people who think they know a lot about the European Union are much more likely to have an opinion than people who think they only know a little. The levels of support and opposition are both higher among the former group than the latter.

Support for a higher speed of European integration in one group of countries than in the other countries as a function of perceived levels of knowledge about the EU (in %)			
	Low level of knowledge	Medium level of knowledge	High level of knowledge
% For	24	35	44
% Against	38	43	46
% Don't know	39	23	11
% Total	101	101	101

1.4. The term of the Presidency of the European Council

One citizen in two favours the extension of the period of the Presidency of the Council

Fifty percent of people polled (+1 point) consider that the current term of the Presidency of the Council is not sufficient to obtain significant results and should, as a consequence, be extended beyond six months. This was, in fact, the preferred option in ten of the fifteen Member States. In Ireland, Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and Greece, however, respondents believed that the current term of the Presidency gives each Member State the opportunity to preside over the Union on a regular basis. Support for this view increased by 5 points and reached 32% overall in the EU15. Almost a fifth of the population did not express an opinion on this question (18%, -6).



The Dutch and the French are proportionally more likely to believe that the current period of the Presidency of the Council is not sufficient to achieve significant results and should therefore be extended beyond six months (58% each). This opinion is only shared by 32% of Irish and 36% of Austrians. Support for this proposal grew most strongly in Finland (53%, +9).

Support for the option whereby the current period of the Presidency offers each Member State the opportunity to preside over the Union on a regular basis grew by 18 points in Ireland (48%), 11 points in Spain (37%) and 8 points in Luxembourg (45%).


It is interesting to note that in Greece, Denmark and Luxembourg, opinions are very split and that a single point separates the levels of support for the two options. (EU28Tables Q.32)

1.5. The right of veto

Almost two-thirds of citizens want to keep the right of veto at least in certain fields

Support for keeping Member States' right of veto in its current form reaches 45% (+4).

The levels of support for this proposal have risen in fourteen out of the fifteen Member States. Largest increases are recorded in Ireland (+12), Portugal (+11), Spain and Luxembourg (+10 points each). The only country where this opinion was less favourable than in the previous survey was France (-2). Levels of support for keeping the right of veto in its current form are highest in Greece (70%), Austria and Luxembourg (64% each) and lowest in Belgium (35%) and Italy (36%).



The proposition to keep the right of veto for only a very limited number of essential areas receives the support of 24% of respondents (+2). The French (30%), Germans (29%) and Danes (28%) are proportionally more likely to hold this opinion, whereas the Greeks (11%) are the least likely to agree.

Giving up the veto for all decisions in order to make the EU more efficient only has the support of 12% of those polled (-1), of whom 18% were Belgians and 17% Italians.

A fifth of the survey was unable or unwilling to give their opinion on this subject, which represents a fall of 4 points in comparison with last autumn. The highest number of 'don't know' responses was recorded in Spain (31%). (EU28Tables Q.33)


The analysis of socio-demographic data indicates that people who stay at home (non-working men and women) recorded a higher than average number of 'don't know' responses.

1.6. Voting rules in the Council of Ministers

Each Member State should have one vote whatever the size of its population

For the first time, citizens were able to give their opinion regarding the new voting rules within the Council of Ministers of the Union. They were asked whether they thought that each Member State should have one vote irrespective of the size of its population or whether the number of votes per Member State should be proportional to the size of its population.

43% of the poll supports the first idea. The Finns (76%), followed by the Danes (72%) and the Swedes (68%), are the most in favour. In general, the lowest levels of support for this are in those countries where there are the largest populations: Germany (32%), France, United Kingdom (41% each) and Spain (42%).



The second proposal has the support of more than one-third of citizens. The highest levels of support are seen in Germany (53%) and in France (35%), and the lowest in Denmark (16%).

7% of those polled gave the spontaneous response that another solution would need to be found. 10% of the Dutch were of this opinion in contrast to barely 3% in Finland.

A quarter of Britons did not express an opinion on the subject (compared with an EU15 average of 16%). (EU28Tables Q.34)²¹

²¹ Readers who are interested should refer to the Eurobarometer Flash series of surveys carried out by telephone on the work of the Convention and on the draft Constitution:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm


2. The development of a common foreign and security policy

The development of a common foreign and security policy remains at the heart of the debate on the future of the Union. We will therefore analyse - using support for this policy - the level of decision-making that people want as well as their opinions on various other related matters.


2.1. Support for the CFSP

A large majority of citizens agree with the principle of a common foreign and security policy


Support for a common foreign policy gained a point in comparison with last autumn (65%). The number of respondent opposing this principle remains unchanged (22%).




The Greeks (78%), Italians and Luxembourgers (77% each) are the strongest supporters of a common foreign policy. The Swedes with 49% are just below the level of 50% in terms of their support for this policy. The UK is the only country where favourable and unfavourable opinions are equally balanced (39% for each camp). Levels of support have risen in nine Member States out of fifteen, with the highest increases observed in Ireland (+5) and the UK (+4). They are falling in six others, including Denmark (-6). (EU28Tables Q.29)



Support for a common defence policy has risen by two points (72%), whereas opposition to it has lost some ground (16%, -3).




Approval of the principle of a common defence policy has strengthened in ten countries and has grown substantially in Ireland (+7), Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, France, Finland and Sweden (+6 points each). On the other hand, support is dwindling in Austria (-7) and in Belgium (-3), while approval levels in Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal have remained constant. (EU28Tables Q.29)



2.2. Level of decision-making on European defence policy

Decisions on the European defence policy should be taken by the European Union

Citizens feel that the European Union is better placed to take decisions regarding European defence policy (46%, +1) than national governments on an individual basis (25%, +1), or NATO (14%, -1).



Support for the principle that the European Union should take such decisions has risen in seven out of fifteen Member States, with the largest increases observed in Finland (+7), Belgium and in Sweden (+5 points each). On the other hand, it has fallen in six countries, including Greece (-10). The situation remains unchanged in Germany (44%) and in Ireland (34%).


A relative majority of the Irish, the Austrians (39% each), the Danes and the British (33% each) are in favour of such decisions being taken by their respective national governments.

The country with most respondents believing that such decisions should be taken by NATO is Denmark (29%). (EU28Tables Q.31)

2.3. Opinions on the CFSP

Measures are largely supported by public opinion

Across the EU15, levels of support for the various measures that fall within the CFSP and the ESDP have risen and have returned to the levels recorded in spring 2003.



The need for the European Union Member States to agree on a **common position when an international crisis occurs** is the measure that gets the greatest support of the poll (81%, unchanged). Highest levels of support were seen in Luxembourg (89%) and in Italy (87%) and the lowest were in Portugal (72%), the United Kingdom and Austria (73% each).

Between 70% and 80% of citizens give their approval to the EU having a **rapid military reaction force** (70%, +1), the principle of a **common asylum** (70%, -1) and **immigration policy** (71%, unchanged), to the principle of an **EU foreign policy independent of United States' foreign policy** (77%, +4), to the **EU working to guarantee Human Rights around the world** (76%, +2) and to the **EU guaranteeing Human Rights in each Member State** (79%, +3).

Between 60% and 70% of respondents agree that the **EU should have its own Foreign Minister** (64%, +1) and the **EU having its own seat on the United Nations Security Council** (65%, +1)

One citizen in ten believes that **Member States which have opted for neutrality should have a say in European Union foreign policy** (50%, +3). A majority are opposed to this idea in Denmark (57%) and the Netherlands (46%). (EU28Tables Q.30)

3. What speed for European integration?


This last chapter seeks to understand the pace at which citizens would like to see European integration progress, their hopes and fears with respect to further integration and the political processes they would like to see set in place.

3.1. Speed

The pace of European integration is slower than EU citizens would like

Since 1986, Eurobarometer has measured public opinion about the perceived and desired speed of European integration²².


On a scale of 1 to 7, the average speed at which respondents think the European Union is integrating is 4.08. This figure is higher than that recorded in autumn 2003 (+0.23). The average speed at which those polled would like to see the European Union progress has risen very slightly to 4.75 as opposed to 4.73 in autumn 2003.



²² The question asked is the following:
 a. In your opinion, what is the current speed of building Europe?
 Please look at these figures (SHOW CARD WITH SCALE). No. 1 is standing still, No. 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds to your opinion of the current speed of building Europe.
 b. And which corresponds best to the speed you would like? (SHOW SAME CARD)

European integration is felt to be developing most rapidly in Ireland (4.91), Luxembourg (4.56) and Denmark (4.55). On the other hand, its progress is seen to be slowest in Portugal (3.42) and in Italy (3.63). (EU28Tables Q.13a)

As in autumn 2003, it is the Greeks who would like the speed of European integration to be faster (6.09), followed by the Portuguese (5.82) and the Italians (5.51). Although there are very slight increases, the lowest figures for desired speeds are still seen in the United Kingdom (3.97), Denmark (4.03) and Sweden (4.05).




In many EU15 countries, with the exception of Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, the United Kingdom and Austria, respondents have the impression that European integration is not taking place as rapidly as they would like. The countries where this gap is perceived as largest are Portugal, Greece and Italy. (EU28Tables Q.13b)

3.2. Expectations regarding the European Union

A majority of EU15 citizens want the EU to play a more important role in five years' time

More than two citizens in five think that, in five years' time, the EU will play a more important role in daily life (42%, -3 points in comparison with autumn 2002), 39% believe it will play the same role (+1) and 9% that it will play a less important role (+2).




Greeks (66%) are proportionally more likely to believe that in five years' time the EU will play a more important role in their daily lives. They are followed by the Portuguese (53%) and Italians (51%). This opinion is only held by a majority in five countries and is losing ground in twelve out of fifteen Member States. The greatest falls are seen in Sweden (-10), Italy (-9) and Ireland (-8).

In the other countries, the majority believes that, in five years' time, the Union will play the same role in people's daily lives. This view is most frequently held by Finns (58%), and least frequently by Germans (40%).

It is increasing in eight countries, including Finland and Sweden (+7 each), but is falling in seven others. The country in which it has lost the most ground is Luxembourg (-10). In this case, opinion has veered towards those who believe the EU will play a less important role (+8). (EU28Tables Q.14a)

When the role that citizens would like the EU to play in their daily lives in five years' time is examined, it can be seen that 44% of those polled want it to play a more important role (-3), 30% the same role (-2) and 15% a less important role (+4).



The Greeks (73%), Portuguese (67%) and Italians (63%) are the most likely to want the EU to play a more important role in their daily lives in five years' time. This is a view held by a majority in seven countries, but its support has fallen significantly in eleven Member States, including Italy (-9), Ireland and Austria (-8 points each).


A majority in seven other Member States shares the desire that the EU should play the same role in people's lives in five years' time. The proportion of people holding this view is highest in Finland (51%). Wide variations in the prevalence of this opinion between this survey and the previous one are seen in Belgium (+8) and in Germany (-8).

The number of people wanting the EU to play a less important role in their daily lives in five years' time, although only held by a minority in the EU15, has grown in twelve out of fifteen Member States, including Austria (+12), the United Kingdom and Luxembourg (+10 points each). In the United Kingdom, this is an opinion held by a relative majority of citizens polled (31%). In Luxembourg, although there was a large increase in the number of people wanting it to play a less important role, opinions remains split in equal parts between those who want the EU to play a more important role and those who want it to play the same role (40% each). (EU28Tables Q.14b)

3.3. Fears

The relocation of jobs to other countries is the main fear expressed by EU15 citizens

Some people may have fears in relation to the Europe that is being created by the European Union. Before identifying these fears and measuring the extent to which they prevail, a list of things which some people say they are afraid of was presented to respondents and their opinion was sought for each of them.



More than seven respondents out of ten currently fear the **transfer of jobs to other member countries which have lower production costs**. This fear was most often observed among Finns (87%) and French (83%) and least frequently among Spaniards (53%).

Almost two-thirds of respondents (64%) are currently afraid that **their country will have to pay more and more to the European Union** but also that there is **an increase in drug trafficking and international organised crime**. The Finns (78%) and Swedes (75%) are those who most fear that their countries will have to pay an increasing amount to the EU. The Swedes (81%) and the Finns (80%) are also most afraid of an increase in drug trafficking and international organised crime. In these two cases, the Spaniards are, once again, the nation that appears least concerned about these fears (with figures of 46% and 48% respectively).

In Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the three countries outside the euro-zone, on average, 64% of respondents fear the **end of their national currency**. This fear is particularly strong in the UK (68%). In Denmark, the proportion of those surveyed who say they fear the end of their national currency is the same as those who do not fear it (48% each). The number of Swedes who are afraid of this is less than those who are not afraid (43% and 52% respectively).

Three citizens in five (61%) are currently afraid of **more difficulties for their country's farmers**. The proportion of people sharing this opinion ranges from 80% in Portugal and Finland to 43% in Spain.

The loss of social benefits is currently a fear expressed by 53% of respondents. It is cited by 70% of Germans but by only 38% of Italians.


More than one citizen in two (51%) expresses a fear of **an economic crisis**, ranging from 72% of citizens in Portugal to 28% of citizens in Denmark.

A majority of citizens are not currently afraid of **a loss of power for smaller member states** (48%), **the loss of national identity and culture** (52%) or their **language being used less and less** (57%). (EU28Tables Q.15)

3.4. Enlargement


With the approach of 1 May 2004, support for enlargement is fading

When the largest enlargement in the European Union's history was looming on the horizon, a relative majority of EU15 citizens claimed that they supported it: 42% favoured the membership of the ten new countries, while 39% opposed it.



The question asked in this Eurobarometer was modified²³ in order to take account of the imminent accession of ten new countries to the Union on 1 May 2004. Comparisons with previous accession questions should therefore be treated with caution.


²³ The question asked in previous Eurobarometer polls was:
'Please tell me whether you are for or against it: the enlargement of the European Union to include new countries.'
The new formulation used in Eurobarometer 61 is:
'Please tell me whether you are for or against it: the enlargement of the European Union to include ten new countries this May.'



The Greeks (66%) and Irish (60%) have the highest number of respondents in favour of this enlargement, whereas the Germans (28%) and the British (31%) are the least enthusiastic.

In the United Kingdom, almost three respondents out of ten (29%) did not express an opinion on the matter. (EU28Tables Q.29)

In reply to the question as to whether EU15 citizens are for or against **further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years**, a majority oppose the idea. In fact, 43% of respondents are against further enlargement, 37% support it and 20% express no opinion in its regard.



Those opposed to further enlargement are in the majority in nine out of the fifteen member States. German (60%), followed by the Austrian (59%) and Finnish (55%) citizens are the most opposed to further enlargement in future years. Spaniards are the least opposed to it (17%).

A majority supports this idea in six other countries with the numbers of those in favour of it ranging from 60% in Greece to 45% in Ireland.

It can be seen that three Britons in ten do not express an opinion on this question and that this is also the case for a quarter of the Spanish, Italian and Irish polls (compared with an EU15 average of 20%). (EU28Tables Q.29)

As might be expected, people who consider their country's membership of the EU to be a good thing are more favourable to the further enlargement of the Union than those who think it is a bad thing (52% and 17% respectively).

3.5. Towards a European identity

A majority of citizens see themselves, in the near future, as European to some degree or another

This question was asked in two different ways. The first half of people surveyed in the fifteen Member States answered the existing standard question:


'In the near future, do you see yourself as...?

- (NATIONALITY) only
- (NATIONALITY) and European
- European and (NATIONALITY)
- European only»

The second half of the poll was asked the same question - except without the possibility of being able to give the 'European and (NATIONALITY)' response.

The first question allows a comparison to be made with the results from Eurobarometer 60, while the second does not.

With regard to those respondents who answered the normal standard question, there were 56% (-1) who saw themselves, in the near future, as European to some degree or another. More specifically, 4% of them feel European only (+1), 6% feel European firstly and then citizens of their own country secondly (-1) and 46% (-1) feel first citizens of their own country and then European.




In spring 2002, the number of those feeling they were European to some degree or another was greater than the number identifying exclusively with a nationality in twelve out of fifteen Member States. In autumn 2002, this was only the case in eleven countries and in spring and autumn 2003, in ten countries. In spring 2004, this feeling now only prevails in nine Member States and its frequency is decreasing in nine countries out of fifteen. Greatest decreases in these figures are seen in Sweden (-10) and Austria (-6). On the other hand it is rising in six countries. The highest increases are seen in France (+6) and Portugal (+5). Its level remains more or less the same in Germany (60%), Ireland (49%) and the United Kingdom (35%). In the United Kingdom (62%), Finland (60%), Sweden (57%), Greece (55%) and Austria (50%), the prevailing feeling is one of being a citizen of one's own country only. In Ireland, the proportion of people who feel citizens of their own country only and the proportion of those who feel European to some degree or another is identical (49% each). (EU28Tables Q.38)

The feeling of being European is more likely to be felt by men, managers, students, white-collar workers and the self-employed. The longer respondents have spent in fulltime education and the younger they are, the more likely they are to feel European to some degree or another.

Not surprisingly, of those people who consider their country's EU membership to be a good thing, 73% (-3) feel European to some degree or another. This is only the case of 28% of people who consider their country's EU membership to be a bad thing (+1).

If these results are compared with those arising from the second formulation of the question presented in this survey, it can be seen that 56% (=) of citizens feel European to some degree or another and 42% feel they are citizens of their own country only (+1).





EUROBAROMETER 2004.1

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

Fieldwork: February - March 2004

Publication: July 2004

FULL REPORT

This survey was requested and coordinated by the Directorate General Press and Communication

This document does not represent the point of view of the European Commission.
The interpretations and opinions contained in it are solely those of the authors.

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I. Life in the candidate countries

In this chapter, we will take a closer look at some particular aspects of life in the accessing and candidate countries. First we will focus on overall satisfaction levels among the citizens — how people feel about their present personal situation compared to five years ago, and how they think their situation will evolve over the next five years. Later in this chapter we will examine trust in political and social institutions in these countries, and what they consider to be the most important issues facing their nations.


1. Life satisfaction

The life satisfaction question is a summary measure in the Eurobarometer series of how people feel about things related to their lives. This indicator of subjective well-being is regularly asked in the 15 EU member states, as well as the 10 new member states and the three candidate countries.

Life satisfaction compared with five years ago

FIGURE 1a shows that the past dynamics of self-perceived life satisfaction, or quality of life, of the new EU member countries were not favourable. Twenty-four percent of the new member states' citizens feel that their present situation has improved compared to five years ago, 30% feel it has stayed about the same, and the small majority of respondents (44%) feel it has gotten worse.

Driven by the increasing Turkish overall satisfaction levels, a relatively large fraction (40%) of the CC societies thought the quality of their lives had improved over the past five years. One-third of citizens (33%) say their situation stayed same, and only 27% of them claim that their life got worse in the last five years.



One-third of previous members' citizens (33%) claim that their situation improved, a few more people (36%) feel their situation has not changed, and 30% of respondents' situations got worse in the last five years – this shows a much more favourable trend compared to the new member states' results.

Obviously, there are large differences among the populations of the 10 accession and three candidate countries. While most of them report stable or improving conditions over the past five years, Bulgarians have been experiencing deteriorating conditions in dramatic proportions, and perceptions in Poland and Slovakia are at best mixed in this respect.

The Turks and Cypriots are most likely (49% and 46%, respectively) to feel that their present situation has improved. In Malta and Estonia nearly four in 10 (39% and 37% respectively), and in Slovenia (32%), Latvia (29%), the Czech Republic, Romania (both 26%), Hungary (25%) and Lithuania (24%) more than or nearly one-fourth feel their situation has improved during the past five years. The countries well below average are Poland (21%), Slovakia (20%) and Bulgaria (with only 12%).

In Malta the number who note improvement in their situation has increased most of all (7 percentage points), and in Lithuania this proportion has decreased (2 percentage points) the most since autumn 2003.

The Slovenians are the most likely to feel that their situation is the same as it was five years ago (43%), followed by Lithuanians (40%). People in Bulgaria and Slovakia are the most likely (54% and 53%) to say that their situation has become worse during the past five years. The percentages for Polish (49%), Hungarians (46%) and Romanians (44%) are right behind those for Bulgarians and Slovaks. The Turks (16%) are the least likely to think that their situation has deteriorated over the past half decade, which matches the largest decrease in negative judgment of situation over the past five years (-8%) since autumn 2003. At the other end of the scale is Hungary, where 8% more people say their present situation has gotten worse in the last five years than did in autumn 2003. (EU28 TABLES Q.5)

The demographic breakdowns show that students (54%) and young people (49%) are the most likely to feel that their present situation has improved compared with five years ago. The data indicate that the older cohorts are most likely to feel their present situation has gotten worse. Interestingly, those who are about to finish their careers are more likely to report worsening conditions than are their juniors (40-54 years: 45%; for those 55 years and older: 46%; versus 15-24 year olds: 19%, and 25-39 year olds: 29%). Retired people complain of worsening conditions most of all (53%).

Finally, attitudinal analyses show that people who see their country's membership in the EU as a good thing are significantly more likely to feel that their present situation, compared to five years ago, has improved (40%) than are those who regard their country's membership as a bad thing (22%). Among the latter group, 49% feel their present situation has gotten worse, compared to only 28% of people who view their country's membership in the EU as a good thing.¹


¹ All demo tables are available in the CCEB Annex on the EUROBARPMETER website http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm

Life satisfaction over the next five years

A third (33%) in the new EU member countries, and more than half (52%) in the three candidate states, forecast that their personal situations will improve in the next five years. A little more than two citizens of new member states out of 10 (23%) feel things will get worse (and 8% of CC countries). Thirty percent in the NMS zone and 31% in candidate countries feel their personal situation will stay about the same.

These data suggest that people in the candidate region generally feel more positive about the development of their personal situations over the next five years.

The differences concerning hope for the next five years are particularly significant between the two parts of Europe. The percentage of citizens who believe their situation will improve or will stay the same are higher (both 39%) in the previous member states than in new EU member countries. Fewer old (16%) than new member states' citizens expect their situation to deteriorate over the next five years.



Now, the country that has the highest hopes for the next five years – Turkey — is also the one that most believed things improved over the last five years.


We find that the Turks are the most likely to feel their situation will improve (55%), and Slovenians are the most likely to feel they will stay about the same (40%). People in Slovakia are the most likely to feel their situation will get worse (28%). More than two out of 10 in Latvia (22%) and about one in six respondents in the Czech Republic (18%), Lithuania (17%) and Estonia (16%) did not know what to expect in the near future. (EU28TABLES Q.6)

The proportion of those who believe their life satisfaction will improve has increased in Malta, Slovakia and Turkey in the highest degree (each 4 percentage points) and has decreased in Cyprus (9 percentage points), Poland and Lithuania (both 6 percentage points) in the highest proportion.

In Turkey and Cyprus the deteriorating personal outlook has changed the most of all, although in an opposite direction (- 8 and +9 percentage points respectively).

The demographic analyses show that pessimism is primarily found among elderly people in these countries. The age group with the worst expectations for the next five years are the retired and oldest ones (27 and 24% pessimistic). Students (69%) and young people (between 15 and 24 years, 61%) are most likely to be optimistic.

Again we find that people who regard their country's future membership in the EU as a good thing are significantly more likely to feel that their situation will improve (56%) than are people who regard their country's membership as a bad thing (23%).



The people's judgment concerning past personal situations in new EU member countries has been fairly gloomy for years, and since 2002 has cautiously, but continually, worsened (FIGURE 1c). Namely, in autumn 2001 and 2002, 28% of people said their circumstances had improved; now in spring 2004 this proportion is 24%.

Since 2001, citizens have been expecting less and less improvement in the next five years. In 2001, more than a third of people expected improvement (38%), and now 33% of citizens do, while the proportion of pessimistic citizens is slowly but surely increasing.

Dynamics of change in subjective well-being

Satisfaction is always relative. The perceptions of the past and expectations regarding the future together determine to what extent people think they have a chance to improve their quality of life. In the paragraphs below, we will profile certain patterns we found in each country in this respect.

In the NMS zone we find that a little negative change over this one-decade period is perceived by a bit fewer than a three out of 10 (28%), more than one out of 10 (13%) report no change, and 31% expected — or experienced — negative change. (Twenty-seven percent reported mixed directionality in the past and future change of their subjective well-being.)

Forty-five percent of the candidate countries hope for improvement in their life and almost one-third of this proportion (15%) expect deterioration. Only 21% of respondents suggest theirs will be a stable life.

Table 1. Subjective well-being, perceptions of change over time				
in %, by country				
	IMPROVING ¹	STABLE ²	DETERIO-RATING ³	NET DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF IMPROVEMENT AND DETERIORATION
NMS	28	13	31	(- 3)
MALTA	48	10	23	(+ 25)
CYPRUS	41	11	25	(+ 15)
SLOVENIA	40	24	23	(+ 17)
ESTONIA	37	15	25	(+ 12)
LATVIA	33	13	25	(+ 8)
LITHUANIA	32	17	23	(+ 9)
HUNGARY	30	10	31	(- 2)
SLOVAKIA	26	9	39	(- 12)
CZECH REP.	26	16	32	(- 6)
POLAND	26	13	32	(- 6)
CC	45	21	15	(+ 20)
TURKEY	51	27	8	(+ 42)
ROMANIA	37	10	24	(+13)
BULGARIA	26	12	34	(- 8)

In most countries (8 out of 13), the net balance of the consistent directionalities of change points to the positive direction as far as subjective well-being is concerned.

The highest level of positive change can be observed in Turkey, Malta and Slovenia (+42, +25 and +17, respectively), which are among the top-ranked countries in subjective well-being in this region. Among the other countries we found clearly positive tendencies, most notably in Cyprus (+15 percentage points), Romania (+13 percentage points) and Estonia (+12). Lithuania and Latvia also have a positive balance of improvement and decline (+9, +8 percentage points, respectively).

In the rest of the countries, deterioration marginally outweighs improvement. In Slovakia 12 percentage points more people expect deteriorating rather than improving circumstances in their lives. The situation is the same but the negative overweight is less in Hungary (-2 percentage points), the Czech Republic and Poland (both -6), and Bulgaria (-8).

¹ Those who believe their satisfaction levels were not higher five years ago than they are today, and expect positive change in the future; and those who experienced improvement in the past five years and do not expect deterioration in the near future.

² Those who did not experience change in the recent past, and expect none in the future either.

³ Those who believe that their satisfaction levels were better five years ago than today, and who do not expect positive change in the future; combined with those who experienced stability over the past five years but expect deterioration in the near future.


2. Short-term expectations

While mid-term outlooks are relatively stable and rather optimistic in most countries, at the dawn of their EU membership, citizens in the accessing countries feel extraordinarily pessimistic about their personal lives in the immediate future. Three months ahead of the accession, more people expected deterioration than anticipated positive change in their personal condition. In fact, the levels of pessimism have reached historic highs, and optimism has never been so rare a commodity in the course of the five years of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.

Respondents were asked about their expectations for the year to come. Among the new EU member countries, 22% believe their life in general will be better in the next 12 months, and 31% feel it will be worse. In the CC countries 43% of respondents think their life in general will be better in the next 12 months and 15% feel it will be worse.

In the previous member states 32% expect a better life in the next 12 months, and only 15% await a worse life in general. Of those expecting stability, 50% in the member states and 42% in the new member countries do not forecast any change for the upcoming year. In spring 2004 there were twice as many people in the NMS zone than in the previous member states being generally pessimistic about their coming year.

New member countries' citizens are still highly concerned about their national economies: 52% think that their economy will perform worse in the next 12 months and only 15% hope for a better economic situation in the coming year. In the EU 15 zone only 18% expect a better future in their country's economic situation, but 43% of the people are pessimistic. The candidate region's citizens believe the opposite -- the proportion of optimists is more than double (39%) and there are fewer than half as many pessimists (21%) than in the accession region.



In the new member states 15% expect that the financial situation of their household will be better in the next 12 months, whereas 39% expect it to be worse. In the previous member states the citizens look forward similarly, only 22% of them are confident in a better future, just as many inhabitants (21%) expect a worsening year, and more than half (54%) expect an unchanged situation. Meanwhile, in the candidate region, 37% expect improvement and 17% foresee deterioration.

Regarding employment opportunities in their country, 48% in the new member states expect that there will be fewer employment opportunities, and only 15% of these citizens believe opportunities will get better in their country. Among previous European Union members the situation is the same: fewer than two out of 10 hope for improvement (15%) and many more respondents expect that the employment situation will be worse (48%) in their country. Citizens of candidate countries feel relatively secure at their present workplace: among the candidate countries 34% expect a better employment situation in their country and 23% are afraid that the situation will be worse.

Expectations for changes in personal employment are more negative in new member countries than in previous member countries; 12% of accession countries' respondents expect a better and 18% a worse situation for the next year. Previous member states, however, have nearly half as many pessimists (10%), and nearly double the optimists (21%). (In the candidate countries 31% of people are optimistic and 11% pessimistic.)

As *TABLE 2* shows, in past years we have observed continuous decreases in immediate future positive expectations in every investigated domain of life on the NMS level.

The accession countries' optimism in the various tested domains changed dramatically. Compared to their past predictions for the next 12 months, citizens in the 10 new members report a gloomier personal outlook. Now 31% of all teenagers and adults in the new EU member countries expect their life to change for the worse in next year, which is significantly more than the 26% expressing pessimism last autumn.

When looking at short-term expectations, in the NMS zone we see that the proportion of people with expectations of an improved future has decreased since 2002 in nearly every category. There is no direct decrease in the amount of people who expect better employment situations in their country. The number of people who expect worse for the next year in their country has increased in all the mentioned categories since 2002. (*ANNEX TABLES Q.4.1, Q.4.2, Q.4.3, Q.4.4, Q.4.5*).

	Will be better			Will be worse		
	2002 AUTUMN	2003 AUTUMN	2004 SPRING	2002 AUTUMN	2003 AUTUMN	2004 SPRING
Life in general	30	27	22	19	26	31
Economic conditions in (COUNTRY)	18	18	15	38	48	52
Financial situation of household	20	19	15	26	35	39
Employment situation in (COUNTRY)	13	17	15	44	46	48
Personal job situation	15	16	12	16	21	18

In the following paragraphs we present the results for each domain.

Life in general


Overall, among the new EU member countries, the outlook is the gloomiest in Slovakia (41% think that their personal situation will deteriorate in the course of the next 12 months) and the brightest in Slovenia (with only 15% expecting negative, and 29% awaiting positive change). There is more optimism to be found in the CC zone as a whole than in either the previous or new member countries (see *EU28TABLES Q.4.1.*) – primarily due to a very positive climate in Turkey.

Country results show that, across the board, people in Turkey, Romania and Cyprus (49%, 35% and 32% respectively) are most likely to believe that the next 12 months in general will be better. People in Slovakia (41%), Poland (36%) and Latvia (30%) are most likely to feel that their life in general will get worse in the next 12 months. The largest proportions of those expecting no change for 2004 are in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Slovenia (each 51%). (*FIGURE 2b*)

In new members countries, we have seen a decrease in the number of optimists (-5), and an increase in pessimists and those who expect an unchanged life in general (+5, and +3 respectively). In candidate countries the number of optimists has increased (+1), and pessimism has decreased (-4) since autumn 2003.

People in Slovakia (+4), the Czech Republic, Malta and Turkey (each +3), and Bulgaria (+1) are now more likely to believe the next year will be better than the previous year. However, there are several countries where the mood is clearly more depressed. In Latvia, people are now more likely to be pessimistic, because the proportion of worse general life expectation increased 15 percentage points. The same situation is found in Cyprus (+8), Poland, Malta (both +7) and Estonia (+6%), where the ratio of pessimists increased extensively.

In other countries the proportion expecting no change for 2004 increased, such as in Hungary (+12), Lithuania (+11), Cyprus (+6), Romania (+4), Poland (+3), Slovenia and Turkey (both +2), and Bulgaria (+1). In the other five countries the proportion of people believing that generally life will be the same as it was in the year of European accession has decreased. The largest decrease was seen in the Malta (-8). (*EU28TABLES Q.4.1*)




Demographic analyses show that students (51%) and young people (48%) expect an improving life situation, while the retired (34%) and older generation (40-54 years and 55+ years) are the most pessimistic (both 30%) of all.

Economic situation in the country

The same question was used to measure people's expectations for their country's economy in the next 12 months to come. We see clear dismay for developments in respondent's home country's economic situation. Continuing the trends of last year, citizens are overtly pessimistic about how they characterise their country-level economic outlook, with about half expecting the situation to further decline.

The proportion of respondents who feel that the economic situation in their country will be better in 2004 ranges from only 10% (in the Czech Republic) to 47% (in Turkey). Fifty-nine percent of Polish and 53% of Cypriots are most likely to think that the economic situation in their country will get worse in the next 12 months. The smallest proportions of those expecting a worse economic situation are found in Turkey and Lithuania (16% and 24% respectively). The largest proportions of those who expect no change in the economic situation for 2004 are in Bulgaria (42%) and Slovenia (38%), while the smallest percentages expecting no change are found in Malta (16%), Poland (19%) and Cyprus (21%). (FIGURE 2c) (EU28 TABLES Q.4.2)



Regarding the economic situation, the proportion of optimists in new member states overall has decreased since autumn 2003 (-3) and pessimism has increased (+4). Comparing the current results with those from one year ago, a series of countries show a higher level of economic confidence for the coming year. Among those we find Slovakia, where many more people are optimistic (+6 percentage points), and pessimism has decreased even more sharply (-13). Similar patterns prevail in Turkey (+6, -10), Malta (+4, +2), the Czech Republic (-1, -3) and Lithuania (+1, 0).

In Romania optimism and pessimism has changed in a similar way (-3, -3).

Reverse tendencies — shrinking optimism and growing pessimism — were found in Latvia (-9, +18), Cyprus (-8, +8), Slovenia (-7, +5), Hungary (-5, +6), Poland (-3, +7), Estonia (-3, 0) and Bulgaria (-1, +6).

Demographic analyses show the self-employed (41%) hope the economic situation will improve in their country most of all, while those who finished their education between the ages of 16 and 20 (46%), the retired (44%), the unemployed and other white collars (both 43%) are likeliest to think that the situation will be worse in the next months.


Financial situation of the household

The survey also measured what people expect to happen to their household's financial situation in the year to come. In the new member states 15% believe their household's financial situation will improve, and 39% believe it will get worse.

On a personal level, the primary expectation is stability. Yet, general pessimism related to the national economic situation affects personal outlooks as well. The Visegrad countries (Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) report the gloomiest personal financial outlook for the coming year. Yet again, Lithuania is relatively the most optimistic, with results very close to the EU 15 region.

Turkish citizens are most likely to think that their household's financial situation will improve in the next 12 months (41%). We found relatively high levels of optimism regarding household finances in Romania (32%) and Lithuania (23%). The lowest levels of optimism were found in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (both 12%) and Poland and Hungary (both 14%).

Levels of pessimism were relatively high in Slovakia (48%), Poland (43%) and Hungary (38%). Slovenian and Bulgarian respondents are the most likely to expect their financial situation to remain the same next year (57% and 51% respectively). (EU28TABLES Q.4.3)



Comparing the current results with those from a year ago, only in five countries has the survey found a higher level of optimism regarding household finances: Slovakia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta.

In Cyprus we see a sharp decline in optimism (-7) paired with a comparable increase in the proportion of those expecting financial decline (+6). The pattern is similar in Poland (better: -6, worse: +9), Latvia (-4, +13) and Estonia (-5, +6). In Hungary an increased expectation of financial stability (+7) was measured along with a rather significant decrease in optimism (-6). In Slovakia, a similar change was felt in the opposite direction: a marked decrease in pessimism (-11) went parallel to a similar increase in the proportion of those predicting stability (+11). Finally, in Malta (where people are generally the least likely, in all issues, to believe that things will remain the same) both the proportion of optimists and pessimists has increased (+4 both) at the expense of those who think their situation will not change (-10).

Demographic analyses show similar proportions of expected improvement for household financial life and economic conditions in general among the self employed (38%), students (37%) and young people (36%). The retired (41%) are the most pessimistic of all in these aspects.


Employment situation in the country

Regarding employment, citizens in the accession states have traditionally been very pessimistic. The most recent changes in opinion – although they are unfavourable as pessimism grows and optimism shrinks throughout the NMS zone – were not as significant as those regarding domestic economy and labour market predictions.

People in Turkey (42%), Malta (28%) and Lithuania (26%) are the most relatively optimistic regarding labour market changes for the next 12 months. Hungary (15%), Poland (14%) and the Czech Republic (9%) are under the new EU member countries' average (15%) in this aspect.

People in Poland (58%), Cyprus (50%) and the Czech Republic (41%) are overwhelmingly pessimistic; they believe the employment situation will become worse in the next term.

The Bulgarians and Latvians (38% both) and Lithuanians (36%) expect an unchanged employment situation more than anyone else. (EU28TABLES Q.4.4)



Comparing the forecast for the next 12 months with last year's 12-month forecast indicates the countries that are typically optimistic or pessimistic.

The average mood in the new EU member countries has been increasingly pessimistic (optimism: -2, pessimism: +2). The most striking changes were found Slovakia, where citizens move away from the extreme pessimism from last year (will be better: +10, will be worse: -7), and Poland, where change moves in the opposite direction. In Poland the proportion of those expecting employment in their own country to be worse in the next 12 months increased (+6), at the expense of those who expect it to be better (-4).


Optimist countries are Turkey (optimism: +8, pessimism: -12) and still Estonia (+2, -4). The opposite is true in Cyprus (-3, +5), Bulgaria (+1, +7) and Slovenia (-3, +3) -- the pessimistic mood has enlarged significantly.

The most optimistic demographic group is the self-employed (37%). The most pessimistic people are those who finished their education between the ages of 16 and 20 (44%) and the 40-54 year olds who will work in the European Union during their last years before retiring (43%).

Personal job situation

When asked about their expectations regarding personal job situations, most citizens of the new EU member countries (52%) expect no significant change for the next 12 months, and the general mood is rather neutral.

Expectations vary considerably from country to country. People in Turkey are the most likely (38%) to feel that their personal job situation will get better in the next 12 months, followed by people in Cyprus and Lithuania (both 18%), Estonia (17%), Slovenia (15%), Bulgaria (14%), Latvia, Poland and Slovakia (each 13%). People in Lithuania (23%), Hungary (21%) and Cyprus (20%) are the most likely to feel that their personal job situation will get worse. In nearly all countries, the prevailing attitude is that things will stay the same, but lots of people can't predict the future in this aspect (new EU member countries: 18%). The largest numbers of hesitant respondents are found in Malta (66%), Romania (40%) and the Czech Republic (32%). (EU28TABLES Q.4.5)



Comparing the current results with those from autumn 2003, a series of countries show a higher level of hope regarding their personal job situations for the next term. Among these we find Slovakia, where more people are optimistic (+3), and pessimism has decreased too (-4), and in Turkey (-1, -8). Similar patterns dominate in Estonia (will be better: 0, will be worse: -2), and Romania (+2, 0).

Reverse tendencies are to be found in the other countries — shrinking or no optimism at all and growing pessimism — were found in Latvia (will be better: -4, will be worse: +1), Hungary (-5, -2) and Malta (-4, -1).

The most optimistic demographic group is the self-employed (36%), and the most pessimistic people are the unemployed (25%).

3. Socio-political climate

Beyond immediate experiences about own life and personally relevant economic perspectives, the general mood regarding social and political institutions is important as well to better understand the changes in EU-related attitudes. In this chapter we will first look at the confidence in socio-political institutions, then we take a look on the issues that concern the citizens the most. Finally, we will examine the role citizens attribute to the EU in resolving each of these issues.

3.1 Trust in institutions


Trust in political institutions

Next we look at the public's trust in three political institutions: the countries' national governments, their national parliaments and political parties.

The Eurobarometer shows that the new EU member countries' average trust level of these three political institutes is 13% -- mainly determined by the extraordinarily low trust levels Eurobarometer found in Poland. Countries in the CC zone have a much higher level of trust (44%) in national governments and national parliaments than that found in the 10 new EU member countries.

COUNTRY	%	COUNTRY	%
CYPRUS	60	LITHUANIA	20
TURKEY	55	LATVIA	19
CC	44	CZECH REP.	18
MALTA	43	SLOVAKIA	15
ESTONIA	32	NMS	13
ROMANIA	27	BULGARIA	13
HUNGARY	24	POLAND	6
SLOVENIA	23		

Citizens of Cyprus have the most trust in political institutions (60%), followed by Turks (55%) and the Maltese (43%). The most generally sceptical countries are the aforementioned Poland, with Bulgaria and Slovakia. Slovakian political institutions are only trusted by 15% of Slovaks, and only 13% of Bulgarians trust their political institutions. Polish, at the time of the survey with a stepping-down government, are the least trusting with 6%.



The most trusted political institution in the new member states and candidate countries (17%, 58% respectively) is the national government, followed by the national parliament (16% and 56%). The least trusted are political parties (7% and 17% respectively). Confidence in the major institutions of the political system reached historic lows in the new EU member countries -- trust in political parties has shrunk to a single-digit level.

The EU 15 zone trusts their national parliament most (35%). The next most trusted political institution is their national government (30%). Citizens in these countries as well trusted political parties least (16%).

The level of confidence in the three political institutions is the highest in candidate countries, and lowest in new member states where trust levels are about half of what Eurobarometer found in the EU 15 countries.


Considering each political institution in each country, the Maltese and the Cypriots trust their political parties above all (33%, 31% respectively), and Polish (3%) and Bulgarians (6%) trust them least of all. (FIGURE 3.1b)

In Cyprus, reliable government and parliament and the stable economic situation brought about high trust for the government and the parliament (75%, 74%, respectively); now Cyprus ranks among the most trusting of political leadership. Turks are second in the line. Turks' level of trust was equal to Cyprus' in spring 2003; in autumn 2003 the trust index had fallen 6-10 points, but now trust in government and parliament are the same as they were in spring 2003 (now both 72%). Polish are the most suspicious of national government (7%) and parliament (8%). Polish' total lack of confidence in their government, political establishment, and other public institutions is undoubtedly due to the corruption scandals erupting in their government (and leading party). (EU28 TABLES Q.7.5)

Demographically, we can see the house persons and those who left school at 15 have the most trust in political parties (20%, 19% respectively). Other white-collar workers trust political parties least of all (5%).

House persons and those who left school at 15 trust the government most of all (64% and 59%). More educated respondents, those who left school between 16-19 years of age, managers and other white collars trust the government least of all (each 26%).

The people who trust parliament in the highest degree are house-persons (62%), those who left school before they were 15 (57%). The proportion of distrust towards parliament is the greatest among those who left school after 20 years (71%) and managers (72%).




In spring 2004, only 7% of people in the new EU member countries tended to trust in political parties (this rate was 11% in autumn 2003). In the candidate region this proportion is 17% (it was 16% in autumn 2003). The trend analyses show an increase in trust of **political parties** since autumn 2003 in Cyprus, Malta (both +4), Turkey (+3) and Estonia (+1). Trust of political parties decreased in Poland (-5), Slovakia (-4), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia (each -3), Hungary (-2) and Lithuania (-1). (EU28TABLES Q.7.5)

There has been a significant change in how much people trust their **governments**. Individual country results show that in Turkey (+9) and Cyprus (+4) citizens trust their government more than they did five months ago, while trust has decreased significantly in Latvia (-18), Bulgaria (-9), Poland and Hungary (both -7), Slovenia (-6), the Czech Republic and Estonia (both -5).

We see a similar picture when we focus on national **parliaments**. Turkey (+6) and Malta (+3) are the most likely to have increased their trust in their legislative bodies. Trust in national parliament decreased in Latvia (-10), Hungary (-7), Slovenia (-6) and Poland (-5).

Trust in national government and in the national parliament has fallen dramatically in Latvia, where there was a government crisis and a change in power during the fieldwork.




Focusing on the acceding countries only, we see an enormous erosion of confidence in national political institutions over the past years. Among the least trusted institutions, national governments and parliaments suffered a huge drop in confidence in the 10 new EU member countries. Since autumn 2002, level of trust in governments and national parliaments fell 17 points (to 17%) and 14 points (to 16%), respectively. In a sense, this change is very significant: currently not only trade unions (which have traditionally suffered from a serious trust-deficit in the post-communist countries of the region, and were among the least trusted social institutions in the past decade), but even big companies attain higher levels of trust than the national government and parliament of the new member countries.

Trust in the media

Eurobarometer also measured levels of trust in the printed press and in electronic media. Trust in the media is similar in the new member countries and the previous members of the European Union. Radio is the most trusted source of information in the new EU member countries — 60% of respondents say they tend to trust radio (EU 15: 63%); 57% say they tend to trust the television (EU 15: 54%) and 49% say they tend to trust the printed press (EU 15: 46%).

Candidate countries show less trust than the NMS zone as a whole in these media: 56% of people trust television, 50% trusts the radio and 40% trusts the written press.



The country-by-country analyses show that the greatest trust in eight countries is for television, second is the radio, and last is the press. In the other five countries, radio is the most trusted media and television is the second.

Trust levels for the **press** are highest in the Czech Republic (59%), Romania and Slovakia (both 57%). They are lowest in Turkey (34%) and Hungary (27%), which show very little confidence in all three media. Confidence in **radio** is highest in Estonia (75%), Slovakia (71%) and Romania (69%) and lowest in Hungary (42%) and Turkey (43%). Trust levels for **television** are highest in Estonia (75%), followed by Romania (73%) and Bulgaria (70%), and lowest in Hungary (44%) and Turkey (48%). (EU28TABLES Q.7.1-3)

Trust in media has significantly decreased in the NMS zone since autumn 2003: trust in the press is down 4 percentage points, trust in radio is down 6 percentage points, trust in television is down 7 percentage points.

The greatest, most strikingly negative changes in trust in media were found in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. Trust in the press decreased in Lithuania -17 points, in Latvia -10 points and in Hungary -6 points. Trust in radio shows the same diminishment in Lithuania (-14), Hungary (-11) and Latvia (-7), but the greatest drop in trust is reserved for confidence in television (Lithuania: -16 points, Hungary: -14 points, and Latvia: -13). (EU28TABLES Q.7.1-3)

Trust in other institutions

Next we look at trust in the following institutions:


- Justice
- The police
- The army
- Religious institutions
- Trade unions
- Big companies
- The European Union
- The United Nations
- Charitable or voluntary organizations

The next graph shows that new EU member countries' citizens are most likely to trust the army (58%), charitable or voluntary organizations (51%), the United Nations (50%) and religious institutions (45%). There is a greater proportion of those who do not trust in the other institutions than those who do.

People living in the NMS zone have, generally, significantly less confidence in these social institutions than previous European citizens do. New EU member countries trust, only a little bit more than previous member states, the United Nations and religious institutions. In the EU 15 zone citizens trust each of the other institutions rather more than new member states do.

A wider gap (at least 5 percentage points) can be observed in trust of the police (NMS: 42%, EU 15: 65%), justice (NMS: 27%, EU 15: 48%), trade unions (NMS: 22%, EU 15: 36%) and charitable or voluntary organizations (NMS: 51%, EU 15: 61%) and army (NMS: 58%, EU 15: 63%). (EU28TABLES Q.7.5, Q.7.10)

Nearly two-thirds of the respondents in new EU member countries do not trust the legal system of their own country (62%), and at least half of the respondents do not trust big companies (56%) and trade unions (52%).



The most trusted of all institutions in the candidate countries are the army (81%), religious institutions (67%), police (59%), the European Union (56%) and justice (54%). The trade unions have the least credibility (24%).

TABLE 3.1b shows the three institutions that are most widely trusted in each accession and candidate country.

Table 3.1b Top three most widely trusted institutions (% by country)

Bulgaria		Malta	
The European Union	66	Charitable or voluntary organizations	87
The army	58	The religious institutions	74
The United Nations	55	The army	73
Cyprus		Poland	
The army	83	The army	63
Justice / the [COUNTRY] legal system	66	Charitable or voluntary organizations	55
The religious institutions	65	The religious institutions	51
Czech Republic		Romania	
The United Nations	49	The religious institutions	84
The army	48	The army	77
Charitable or voluntary organizations	45	The European Union	72
Estonia		Slovakia	
The army	64	The army	63
The United Nations	50	Charitable or voluntary organizations	52
Charitable or voluntary organizations	48	The European Union	47
Hungary		Slovenia	
The United Nations	55	The European Union	47
The European Union	54	The United Nations	46
The police	54	The army	43
Latvia		Turkey	
The army	47	The army	86
The United Nations	44	The police	69
The religious institutions	44	Justice / the [COUNTRY] legal system	68
Lithuania			
The army	54		
The European Union	50		
The religious institutions	46		

The **army** tops the list in seven of the 13 the new EU member and candidate countries, comes in second place in three countries, and is in the third place in two countries. Hungary is the only country where the army is not included in the top three. The **European Union** as well as the **United Nations** are ranked among the top three in 6 of 13 countries. The **European Union** top the list in Slovenia and Bulgaria, the **United Nations** in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Both are in second or third place in four other countries. **Charitable organizations** are in first place in one country, and are placed

second or third in another four. **Religious institutions** are found in the top three in six states (in Romania it is first). The **police** and **justice** are among the three most trusted institutions in two countries. None of the other institutions make it to one of the top three slots. (see also *EU28TABLES Q.7.10*)

Eurobarometer included the United Nations and the European Union in the list of national institutions. Here we take a look at how trust in these two organizations compares to national institutions and to each other.

As *TABLE 3.1c* shows below, the United Nations is more trusted than the European Union on the NMS level (third and sixth most trusted institutions, respectively), the European Union is more trusted than the United Nations on the CC level (fourth and seventh one, respectively).

A group of the new EU member countries expressed higher trust levels towards the United Nations than towards the European Union. Confidence in the EU has slipped down one place on the rank of institutions since autumn 2003. (*EU28TABLES Q.7.5*)

In seven of the 13 countries, the European Union attains more trust than the United Nations. In Bulgaria and Slovenia the EU is the most trusted among the 9 listed institutions.

	2004 spring		2003 autumn	
	rank of EU	rank of UN	rank of EU	rank of UN
NMS	6	3	5	3
CC	4	7	4	6
BULGARIA	1	3	1	3
CYPRUS	6	7	4	7
CZECH REPUBLIC	4	1	3	1
ESTONIA	6	2	6	4
HUNGARY	3	1	2	1
LATVIA	5	2	4	2
LITHUANIA	2	5	2	4
MALTA	6	5	7	5
POLAND	6	4	7	3
ROMANIA	3	4	3	4
SLOVAKIA	3	4	2	5
SLOVENIA	1	2	1	3
TURKEY	6	7	5	8

Neither of these countries has turned round their confidence level in these two organizations since last autumn.

The most marked difference we have found is in Estonia, where the United Nations is the second most trusted among all institutions, while the European Union comes in only sixth. People in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta and Poland all put more trust in the UN than citizens in the EU 15 zone. Consequently, the UN is more trusted in the 10 new member countries than in the previous countries of the European Union.


3.2 Problems facing the nations

Next we look at important issues currently facing European nations. Our respondents were asked to choose, from the following list, the two issues they consider to be the most pressing for their country today:

- Crime
- Public transportation
- Economic situation
- Rising prices/inflation
- Taxation
- Unemployment
- Terrorism
- Defence/Foreign affairs
- Housing
- Immigration
- Health care system
- The educational system
- Pensions
- Protecting the environment

The next graph shows that citizens in the new EU member countries are most likely to mention unemployment (61%), followed by the economic situation (35%) and health care system (25%), as the most important problem facing their nation. The new member countries' citizens are significantly less likely than EU 15 citizens to see terrorism (NMS: 2%; EU 15: 15%) and immigration (NMS: 2%; EU, 16%) as significant problems. On the other hand, the new member states have more, significantly more, problems with unemployment (NMS, 61%; EU 15, 44%), the economic situation (NMS, 35%; EU, 25%) and the health care system (NMS, 25%; EU, 15%) than do the previous member states.

The new members' residents aren't likely to consider terrorism (2%), protecting the environment (2%), immigration (2%), public transportation (1%), or defence and foreign affairs (under 1%) to be significant problems.



In candidate countries the two most important problems facing nations are the same: unemployment (60%) and the economic situation (46%). The third most pressing problem is inflation (22%), and the health care system is only the fifth most important, with 13% naming it a top concern.

Table 3.2 Top three most important problems facing nations
(%, by country)

Bulgaria		Malta	
Unemployment	57	Unemployment	57
Crime	46	Economic situation	42
Economic situation	42	Rising prices/INFLATION	24
Cyprus		Poland	
Crime	51	Unemployment	72
Rising prices/inflation	41	Economic situation	36
Economic situation	27	Health care system	29
Czech Republic		Romania	
Unemployment	49	Economic situation	39
Crime	31	Rising prices/inflation	37
Economic situation	26	Unemployment	30
Estonia		Slovakia	
Unemployment	41	Unemployment	60
Rising prices/inflation	38	Economic situation	39
Crime	36	Health care system	25
Hungary		Slovenia	
Economic situation	44	Unemployment	54
Unemployment	42	Economic situation	32
Health care system	30	Crime	23
Latvia		Turkey	
Unemployment	42	Unemployment	72
Rising prices/inflation	38	Economic situation	49
Economic situation	33	Rising prices/inflation	19
Lithuania			
Unemployment	52		
Crime	35		
Economic situation	27		

TABLE 3.2 shows the three most important problems facing each accession and candidate country. **Unemployment** tops the list in 10 of the 13 countries, and comes in second and third in one country. Cyprus is the only country in which unemployment is not included in the top three. The **economic situation** makes the top three in 12 candidate countries; only in Estonia is it not in the top three. The economic situation tops the list in two of the 13 candidate countries (Hungary and Romania), comes in

second place in five countries, and third place in another five. **Crime** is in the top three in six of the 13 countries, and crime is seen as the most significant problem in Cyprus.

Also among the top three were **rising prices/inflation** (in six countries) and **health care system** (in three countries). None of the other problems has made the list of top three significant state problems. (see also EU28TABLES Q.27)

We can see the top five problems by country as well: Polish and Turks are worried about **unemployment** most of all (both 72%), and Cypriots fear this problem the least of all (14%).


More than any other country, Turkey (49%) and Hungary (44%) are anxious about the second most important problem in 13 countries, the **economic situation**. The Estonians are concerned about the economic situation least of all (24%).

Inflation is the greatest problem in Cyprus (41%), but only 8% in Bulgaria believe that it is one of the most important problems facing their country.

Cypriots are more worried about **crime** (51%) than anyone else, but it is least important in Turkey (9%).

The condition of the **health care** system is giving most cause for alarm in Hungary (30%), but it's the least burning question in Cyprus (7%).

Looking at changes over time, we see that citizens increasingly feel that addressing economic concerns should be that top priorities in their county; that inflation, unemployment, the economic situation require attention, The other domain where people in the new member states are increasingly concerned is the health care infrastructure that in most countries produces very poor outcomes compared to the EU 15 region.



In the new member states the problem of crime has decreased by 6 percentage points. The economic situation, health care system and unemployment have increased 3 percentage points. Rising prices and inflation increased 4 points as well since autumn 2003. (EU28TABLES Q.27)


3.3 The perceived role the European Union plays in major policy domains

We asked whether they think the European Union tends to play a positive or a negative role in each of these areas:

- *Fighting crime*
- *Public transportation*
- *Economic situation*
- *Rising prices / inflation*
- *Taxation*
- *Fighting unemployment*
- *Fighting terrorism*
- *Defence*
- *Foreign affairs*
- *Housing*
- *Immigration*
- *Health care system*
- *The educational system*
- *Pensions*
- *Protecting the environment*

As FIGURE 3.3 shows below, the new EU member countries' citizens declare that the EU plays a positive role, first, in protection of the environment (60%), second, in defence (55%), and third, in fighting terrorism (54%). Neither of these issues are among the most important ones, as discussed in the previous subchapter.

At the same time, in new member states people think the role of the EU in inflation is more negative than positive (50% vs. 17%), taxation (39% vs. 17%), immigration (27% vs. 25%) and pensions (23% vs. 21%). In all other areas people are inclined to attribute a more positive than negative role to the EU.



It is interesting that in previous member countries, the EU's role is considered most positive in fighting terrorism (53%), foreign affairs (49%) and defence (48%). In these countries people reckon the role of the EU is more negative than positive in inflation, taxation, immigration and pensions, but also in the health care system (29% vs. 19%), fighting unemployment (40% vs. 21%) and housing (24% vs. 12%).

The candidate countries believe that in all areas the positive role of the EU is greater than the negative role. The people in the candidate region think the European Union has the most positive role in the economic situation (61%) and in protecting the environment (55%). They believe the EU has the most negative role in inflation (16%).

Malta is the most confident (79%) about assigning a positive role to the EU in **protecting the environment**. Lithuania shares this view in the smallest degree (42%). Latvians (15%) are most likely to consider the EU's role in protecting the environment to be negative, and Bulgarians (3%) are the least likely to assign the EU a negative role in this respect. (EU28TABLES Q.28)

Romanians are the most likely (65%), and Turks the least likely (40%), to believe that the EU plays a positive role in **defence**. Overall in this regard, the Maltese (13%) assign the most negative role to the EU, while Bulgarians and Romanians are the least likely (both 3%) to assign the EU a negative role in defence.

The new EU member countries are third most likely to say that the EU plays a positive role in **fighting terrorism**. Bulgarians support this opinion the most (71%), and Turkey and Latvia support it the least (44%). Cyprus attaches the most negative role for the EU in fighting terrorism (31%), and Bulgaria is the most unlikely to assign a negative role in this respect (3%).

The new member countries are more negative than positive about the EU's role in **inflation**. Turkey (50%) and new members Slovenia (36%) are likeliest to say the EU has a positive role in inflation and rising prices, and Latvia (9%) and the Czech Republic (13%) are least. The Estonians and Cypriots (71% and 69% respectively) have the most negative things to say about the EU's role in inflation, but Turkey (13%) and new member Slovenia (30%) are least likely to insist it plays a negative role.

Turkey and new members Hungary and Malta are the likeliest to say the EU's role in **taxation** is positive (38% and 28% respectively). Estonians are least likely to consider the EU's role positive (11%). At the same time Cypriots are the most likely (63%) and Romania only slightly (14%) believes the EU plays a negative role in taxation.

The ratio of positive opinions of the EU's role in **pensions** is highest in Turkey (59%) and Cyprus (45%), but it's mostly Slovakia (32%) and Slovenia (30%) thinking the opposite.

Respondents in Malta and Romania (both 41%) have the most positive opinion of the EU's role in **immigration**. Cyprus and Estonia (49% and 47% respectively) are likeliest to think the EU plays a negative role.

The European Union's perceived role in fighting crime and fighting terrorism has changed significantly since autumn 2003 in the new EU member countries. The positive view regarding fighting crime has increased 18 percentage points, and the negative view regarding fighting crime has decreased 13 points. The same positive change can be seen in fighting terrorism (positive: +22 points, negative: -14 points). (EU28TABLES Q.28)

Positive change, but less of it, can be seen in protecting the environment (positive: +6 points, negative: -1 points), in fighting unemployment (positive: +1 points, negative: -6 points) and in public transport (positive: +1 points, negative: -3 points).

Rather more negative change has been in the EU's role in the health care system, where opinions of a positive role have decreased (8 points, and a negative role has increased 4 points), in pensions (positive -6, negative +2), in housing (positive -5 points, negative +3 points), in the economic situation (positive -4 points, negative +2 points), in the educational system (positive -4 points, negative +1 points) and in taxation (positive-3 points, negative +4) since last autumn.

II. The European Union and its citizens


4. Information about the European Union

In this chapter we will study the information citizens possess about the European Union and we will investigate their preferred sources of such information. As a new feature in this wave, we will take a look on how citizens judge the role of their national media in covering the European Union and news related to it.

4.1 Knowledge of the European Union

Factual knowledge

Much like we found in autumn 2003, the citizens of the new EU member countries, and particularly of the candidate countries, are increasingly but still surprisingly poorly informed about some very basic facts of the European Union. The most widely known trivia-fact is what the European flag looks like; 87% of the new member countries citizens and 58% of the CC countries can recognize it. It is an interesting development that such trivia knowledge is now sometimes higher in the new EU member countries than in the EU 15 zone, the flag is an example: in the previous member states fewer citizens (81%) think that the EU flag is blue with yellow stars.



As some questions we used in the current wave about basic EU-related facts were reformulated, there are only five statements that could be compared to the data we measured in autumn 2003.

Knowledge of two of five common facts about the EU has increased since autumn 2003 and knowledge of two others decreased. The European Parliamentary elections are coming soon, so it is no surprise that more citizens from new EU member countries (50%, +9% points) know that *the*

members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the European Union, than did in autumn 2003. Furthermore, more citizens from new EU member countries (40%, +8) know correctly that *the European Community was not created after World War One, in the early 1920's*.

Turning our attention to the statements for which we measured a slight decrease since Autumn 2003, fewer citizens from new EU member countries (37%, -3) disagree that *the President of the European Union is elected directly by the EU citizens*, and fewer (47%, -1) confirm that *the European Union has its own anthem*. As we already noted before, in the new EU member countries the number who can describe the European flag (87%) hasn't changed since the last wave, but in the CC countries more citizens say the flag is blue with yellow stars (58%, +4), than could in autumn 2003. (EU28TABLES Q.24)

For the first time we asked about Europe Day -- 40% of the new member countries' citizens know correctly that the holiday exists in all the EU countries (9 May), but fewer in previous member countries knew it (34%), and even fewer in the CC countries (24%).

Only 35% in the new EU member countries consider the statement that the European Union consists of 12 member states to be false. This rate is very similar to that found in previous member states (33%), but much higher than in the CC countries, where only one in five citizens (11%) say this statement is false.

New EU member countries give the correct answer to the European headquarters question most frequently (34%), compared to the previous European Union countries (22%) and the CC countries (11%).


Given the close date of the upcoming EP elections, it is quite surprising that the proportion of the correct answers to the statement that "the next elections to the European Parliament will take place in June 2006", is very low. A quarter (24%) in the new EU member countries' citizens correctly say this statement is false – a markedly higher rate than that found in CC zone (9%) – but somewhat even lower than the very unfavourable result from EU 15 countries (29%).

The lowest number of correct answers came in response to the question about the stars on the European Union flag – namely, that there is a star for each member country. Only 16% and 7%, respectively, of the respondents from NMS and CC countries were able to identify the following statement as false, as did only 13% from the previous member states. (FIGURE 4.1a)

In six of the 10 questions, citizens of the new EU member countries could give correct answers in higher rates than the citizens of the EU 15 countries, and in the case of one question the proportions of correct answers were identical to proportion in the two groups of countries. In the case of three questions the citizens of the previous EU member countries provided the correct answers in higher proportions: the EU was *not* created at the end of the 1920s, the EU citizens *do not* directly elect the EU President, and the next European Parliament elections will *not* take place in 2006. Citizens of the three candidate countries were able to give the correct answers in all questions in smaller proportions than the citizens of the other two groups of countries.


As FIGURE 4.1b shows below, the new EU member countries' population, on average, gives 4.09 (4.74 in autumn 2003⁴) correct answers to the 10 statements, but in the CC countries 2.06 is the mean of correct answers (2.83 in Autumn 2003). The Maltese (4.76), Polish (4.40) and Slovenians (4.38) give the most correct answers, and the Turkish (1.96), Romanians (2.19) and Bulgarians (2.44) give the fewest ones.

⁴ As the question items were not identical, one should be careful to evaluate such direct comparisons



Thirty-four percent of Turks (29% in autumn 2003), 20% of Romanians (no change from Autumn 2003) and 15% of Bulgarians (12% in autumn 2003) cannot give a correct answer to any statement of 10. Meanwhile 3% in Poland, Slovenia and Malta could not provide at least a single correct answer on the factual questions regarding the European Union (4%, 5%, and 0%, respectively, were the figures from the respective countries in autumn 2003).

Comparing the average scores of correct answers for the five common statements asked in both autumn 2003 and spring 2004, we should emphasize all scores are higher now than they were half year ago, except in Turkey. The highest increases are in Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia (0.47, 0.42, and 0.39 average points, respectively), and the lowest are in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic, in that order: 0.01; 0.02; 0.09 and 0.09. (FIGURE 4.1c)



Perceived level of knowledge

A standard feature of the Eurobarometer is a question that asks respondents how much they feel they know about the European Union. The comparative results presented in the table below show that a quarter (25%) of the accession country citizens feel they know “quite a lot” to “a great deal” (i.e., those choosing the numbers 6 through 10 on the scale) about the European Union. This is highly stable compared to autumn 2003 (26%). The perceived knowledge of the previous member states is higher than that of the NMS, where 30% of the citizens mention they have quite a lot to a great deal information on the European Union.

	NMS Autumn 2001	NMS Autumn 2002	NMS Spring 2003	NMS Autumn 2003	NMS Spring 2004	EU 15 (EB61)
Scale	%	%	%	%	%	%
1 (knows nothing at all)	8	7	5	5	6	6
2	14	13	10	11	12	11
3	18	18	15	16	17	16
4	16	16	15	16	16	17
5	22	20	21	22	22	20
6	8	9	12	12	11	14
7	6	7	9	7	8	9
8	4	5	6	4	4	5
9	1	2	2	2	1	1
10 (knows a great deal)	1	1	2	1	1	1
Don' know / No answer	2	1	3	2	2	2
Average	4.15	4.28	4.69	4.52	4.36	4.48


The responses show that 39% of Slovenians feel they know “quite a lot” to “a great deal” (i.e., score 6 and higher on the scale) about the European Union (38% in autumn 2003, +1 percentage point increase), 37% of the Maltese feel the same (39% in autumn 2003, -2), as do 29% of the Cypriots (37% in autumn 2003, -8). The same countries are in the first three places in the order of high knowledge of the European Union in spring 2004 as were autumn 2003. But different countries now make up the bottom three: Turkey (13%, -10), Bulgaria (18%, -2) and Hungary (18%, +1). Each of these countries had the lowest numbers of people answering that they know “quite a lot” to “great deal” about the European Union in spring 2004⁵. (EU28TABLES Q.16)

	2004 Spring	2003 Autumn	Difference		2004 Spring	2003 Autumn	Difference
SLOVENIA	39	38	1	ESTONIA	22	19	3
MALTA	37	39	-2	ROMANIA	20	20	-1
CYPRUS	29	37	-8	LITHUANIA	20	22	-2
LATVIA	27	28	-1	HUNGARY	18	17	1
POLAND	27	30	-3	BULGARIA	18	20	-2
NMS	25	27	-2	CC	15	22	-7
CZECH REP.	23	23	0	TURKEY	13	23	-10
SLOVAKIA	23	30	-7				

⁵ In spring 2003 the Hungarians (17%), the Estonians (18%) and the Romanians (20%) answered thus in the lowest numbers.

This difference in citizens' perceived levels of EU-related knowledge is also reflected in the averages we measured on the 10-point scale, all of which fell below the midpoint (see TABLE 4.1a). People in the new EU member countries scored at about 4.36, which is lower than we measured in October-November of 2003 (4.52), and also lower than their EU 15 fellows — who also evaluate their knowledge as slightly below the midpoint (4.48). The score we found in new EU member countries in spring 2004 (4.36) is the same as that found in previous European Union countries in autumn 2003 (4.36).

The following graph depicts the average scores for each of the 10 new EU member countries, the three candidate countries and the EU 15 average. It shows that self-perceived knowledge levels vary from one country to the next, and indeed, the acceding countries' citizens assume they have a higher level of information than those in the three countries not included in the current enlargement (4.36 average score and 3.51 average score, respectively). (FIGURE 4.1d)



Comparing data from spring 2004 to autumn 2003, it should be noted that there is a slight increase only in Lithuania (+0.16 points); in all other the new EU member and candidate countries the level of perceived knowledge measured by average scores decreased. The knowledge of Turks and Cypriots decreased the most, by -0.51 and -0.41 average scores, respectively. In new EU member countries we measured a -0.16 point decrease, and a -0.37 decrease in the CC countries. But self-reported knowledge in the previous member countries is higher (+0.12 point) than it was in the previous wave.

The following table shows the average self-perceived EU knowledge scores for various socio-demographic groups in the candidate region. Just like in spring and autumn 2003, we find that managers and people who score high on the Opinion Leadership Index⁶ rate themselves the highest on the knowledge scale. At the bottom of the table we find the house persons, those with very low opinion leadership index scores, and those who left school at 15 or younger. Men consider themselves to be better informed than women do. (TABLE 4.1c)

⁶ See Appendix C4 for a definition of the constructed variables shown in the table

Table 4.1c Average scores on perceived knowledge scale for various groups in the new EU member and candidate countries

Group	Score
Managers	5.35
Education: 20+ years	5.01
Opinion leadership index ++ high	5.01
Other white collars	4.63
NMS	4.36
Education: Still studying	4.34
Opinion leadership index +	4.34
Education: 16-19 years	4.29
Male	4.26
EU support: a good thing	4.11
Age: 25-39 years	4.10
Self-employed	4.02
Age: 15-24 years	4.01
Unemployed	4.01
Age: 40-54 years	3.98
Manual workers	3.97
EU support: a bad thing	3.91
Opinion leadership index -	3.82
EU support: neither good nor bad	3.79
Retired	3.69
Female	3.56
CC	3.51
Age: 55+ years	3.49
Education: Up to 15 years	2.97
Opinion leadership index -- low	2.95
House Persons	2.92

4.2 Preferred sources of information on the European Union

We asked the respondents of the accession and the candidate countries to select from a list of 15 which sources they prefer when looking for information about the European Union policies and institutions.

Citizens were provided with the below sources to select from:

- *Meetings*
- *Discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues*
- *Daily newspapers*
- *Other newspapers, magazines*
- *Television*
- *Radio*
- *The Internet*
- *Books, brochures, information leaflets*
- *CD-Rom*
- *European Union information offices, Euro-info Centres, Euro-info Points, Euro-libraries, etc.*
- *National or regional government information offices*
- *Trade unions or professional associations*
- *Other organisations (consumer organisations, etc.)*
- *A member of the European Parliament*
- *Other politicians*

And we also registered their spontaneous responses about: using other sources, refusal to look for such information, and complete disinterest.

Based on the previous research findings it is not surprising that the largest proportion of the people in the new member states (79%), candidate countries (77%) or the EU 15 zone (73%) dominantly prefers television as a source of information about anything, including the .


While the citizens of the new members get information from daily newspapers and the radio in the second and third greatest number (51% for both), significantly lower proportions of the candidate countries selected the same sources second and third (42% and 28%, respectively). Among the EU 15 citizens daily newspapers and the radio have priority over other sources, as well – dailies are mentioned by a mere 3 percentage points more citizens than in the NMS countries (54%), while the radio was named by significantly fewer (35%).

The citizens of the new EU member countries collect information about the policies and institutions of the European Union in discussions with relatives, friends, and colleagues in a higher proportion (35%) than either the candidate (23%) or the previous member countries' citizens (25%). Thirty one percent of new EU member countries population use other newspapers, magazines to collect information, while the candidate countries', as well as the previous member countries' citizens do so in lower proportions (21%, and 23%, respectively).

The citizens of the NMS and the EU 15 zone use the Internet, and books, brochures, information leaflets in similar proportions. Eighteen percent of the new members and 16% of the EU 15 countries mentioned the Internet. Fifteen percent of the new members and fewer than 10% of the EU 15 countries citizens mentioned books, brochures and information leaflets. Among the new EU member countries, the Estonians, Slovenians and Czechs (25%, 24%, and 22%) use the Internet in the highest proportions, while the Hungarians and the Lithuanians (both 14%), and the Cypriots (15%) use it in the smallest proportions. The population of the candidate countries mentioned both the Internet (9%) and books, brochures; information leaflets (6%) as sources of information in smaller proportions even than the EU 15 average.

Meetings were a preferred source of information about the EU by a mere 6% of both the accession and the candidate countries' population, while even fewer mentioned this source among the previous member countries (3%).

All the other options were preferred by fewer than 3% in the new member, candidate or previous member countries. Every tenth person (10%) in the new EU member countries mentioned spontaneously that they do not ever look for information about the policies and institutions of the European Union, and 1-2 percentage points more responded similarly in the candidate (12%) and the EU 15 countries (11%). (FIGURE 4.2)



We examined the sources preferred by the population in a country-by-country breakdown.

Much like the total average of the countries, all 13 new EU member and candidate country citizens mentioned most often that they collect information about European Union policies and institutions from the television. Hungarians (82%) are likeliest to say they get information from television among those who prefer that medium, while Cypriots and Maltese the least (both 69%).

As the second preferred source, radio was mentioned as a vehicle to receive information about the European Union in nine out of the 13 countries; while in all other countries the daily newspapers option was more popular (thus in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey).

In eight out of the 13 countries, citizens mentioned in the third largest proportion that they collect their information by reading the daily newspapers – this source of information is mentioned in the third largest proportion by the Bulgarians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Maltese, Polish, Romanians and Slovaks, while the Czechs, Hungarians and Slovenians receive their information from the radio. Only the Cypriots and the Turkish mentioned in the third place that they collect news about the European Union policies and institutions from discussions with relatives, friends, and colleagues.

For more detailed data see also *EU28TABLES Q.18*.

Table 4.2. Preferred sources for receiving information on EU
(% of mentions, by country)

Bulgaria		Malta	
TELEVISION	74	TELEVISION	69
RADIO	43	RADIO	45
DAILY NEWSPAPERS	41	DAILY NEWSPAPERS	38
Cyprus		Poland	
TELEVISION	69	TELEVISION	80
RADIO	38	RADIO	52
DISCUSSIONS WITH RELATIVES, FRIENDS	34	DAILY NEWSPAPERS	49
Czech Republic		Romania	
TELEVISION	77	TELEVISION	74
DAILY NEWSPAPERS	61	RADIO	46
RADIO	47	DAILY NEWSPAPERS	32
Estonia		Slovakia	
TELEVISION	73	TELEVISION	81
RADIO	56	RADIO	56
DAILY NEWSPAPERS	42	DAILY NEWSPAPERS	52
Hungary		Slovenia	
TELEVISION	82	TELEVISION	80
DAILY NEWSPAPERS	49	DAILY NEWSPAPERS	63
RADIO	49	RADIO	55
Latvia		Turkey	
TELEVISION	75	TELEVISION	79
RADIO	50	DAILY NEWSPAPERS	46
DAILY NEWSPAPERS	48	DISCUSSIONS WITH RELATIVES, FRIENDS	20
Lithuania			
TELEVISION	73		
RADIO	46		
DAILY NEWSPAPERS	44		


4.3 The European Union in the national media

A new block of questions asked citizens about how much, in their opinion, the national media talk about the European Union – too much, about the right amount, or too little. We also asked the respondents to tell us whether the mass media presents the European Union objectively, too positively, or too negatively.

The largest proportion (43%) of the new member countries' population said the national media talks about the European Union about the right amount, and the second largest proportion said the national media provides too little information about the Union (37%). A bare 13% said they get too much information about the Union from their national media.

No significant differences are found among the population of the three candidate countries: 26% say the media talks about the European Union too much, 29% say the media presents about the right amount of information, and 28% say their national media gives too little EU news.

The opinion of the new member countries comes closer to the opinion of the previous member countries than that of the candidate countries. In the EU 15 countries respondents feel, in a significantly higher proportion, they receive just the right amount or too little information about the European Union (42% both responses). A mere 8% of the citizens said that the media talks too much about the Union. (FIGURE 4.3a)



With the exception of three, every country said they get the right amount of news from their national media; Slovaks believe this in the highest proportion (58%), followed by Slovenians (52%), Hungarians (51%) and Estonians (51%).

When looking only at those who said they get too little news from their national media, the highest such proportion of people are in Poland (44%), followed by Cyprus (43%) and Latvia (37%), Bulgaria (20%), Slovenia (20%) and, last, Malta (19%).

On average citizens did not very often say that the national media provides too much information about the EU, but we found significant differences between the countries: while in Turkey 29% and in

Malta 26% of the population believe this type of coverage to be too much, in Hungary a mere 9% of the citizens share this view. (FIGURE 4.3a and EU28TABLES Q.19)

Those who think EU membership is a good thing mentioned in higher numbers than the total population that the national media provides the necessary amount of information about the European Union (39%), and significantly in lower numbers as the total population that it provides too little (31%) or too much (20%).


On the other hand, EU-opponents say in a significantly smaller proportion (26%) than the total population that the national media gives the right amount of Union news, and a significantly higher proportion than the total population that this coverage is too small (36%) or too much (29%). And finally, 37% of the respondents to whom membership is neither bad nor good, find the information about the Union provided by the national media to be too little -- and this rate is significantly higher as we find in total population. Comparing to proportions again to that ones from total population, among the citizens neutral to EU membership significantly fewer say the national media gives too much of coverage (18%) -- but the proportion of those who consider just the right amount of coverage doesn't differ significantly of the total population (36%). (TABLE 4.3a)

Table 4.3a Cross-tabulation of EU presence in the national media and support for EU membership				
	Membership of the EU			<i>Total</i>
	good thing	bad thing	neither good nor bad	
Too much	20	29	18	21
About the right amount	39	26	36	36
Too little	31	36	37	33

In another question, we asked if national media presented EU news in an objective, too positive or too negative manner. Almost half, 46%, of the new members' population said that this image was too positive, while in the opinion of 36% it was objective. A bare 5% of the population say the news casts the EU in a too negative light.

The ratio of the "too positive" opinions in the new member countries is higher than that in the candidate countries (35%), and is far above that of the previous member countries (23%). On the other hand, the proportion of citizens believing the image about the European Union to be "too negative" is higher both in the CC (7%) and the EU 15 countries (13%) than in the new member countries (5%).

Approximately the same proportions of the population in the CC (35%) as in the new member countries (36%) said that the image of the European Union in the national media is objective, while among the previous member countries this is the majority opinion (41%). (FIGURE 4.3b)



When looking at the answers country by country, we find the following differences:

Polish (52%) and Estonians (49%) are likeliest to say their national media's coverage of the EU is too positive, while Romanians (20%), Bulgarians (29%) and Cypriots (29%) are least likely to share this opinion. At the other end of the scale, we find the Turkish (9%) and Maltese (7%) are likeliest to consider their EU news too negative, while scarcely 2% each of Bulgarians and Slovaks share this view.

Cypriots, Romanians and Slovenians believe the image presented by the media about the European Union to be objective – they share this opinion in the largest proportions (46% all), while barely 29% of the Turkish citizens agree.

(FIGURE 4.3b)

Significantly higher proportions of those who believe Union membership is a good thing called media information objective (40%) and significantly fewer of them said it is too positive (38%), comparing to figures from total population. Only 6% of those who believe Union membership is a good consider the information too negative (6%) and this figure doesn't differ from that of we find in total population.

On the other hand, significantly fewer citizens on the anti-EU-membership side believe this information to be objective (21%), and significantly more of them think it is too positive (57%) or too negative (9%), comparing to proportions from total population.

Among those respondents who regard accession as neither good nor bad said in a significantly higher proportion than in the total population that the image of the European Union created in the media is too positive (44%). The number of respondents selecting the rest of the answer options does not significantly differ from the rates of citizens from the new EU member and candidate countries in average. (TABLE 4.3b)

Table 4.3b Cross-tabulation of perceived adjudication of the EU in the national media and support for EU membership

	Membership of the EU			<i>Total</i>
	good thing	bad thing	neither good nor bad	
Too positively	20	29	18	21
Objectively	39	26	36	36
Too negatively	31	36	37	33

According to the demographics, managers and students are likeliest to find media representation of the EU objective (41% and 40%, respectively). White collars and those who quit schooling at 20 mentioned, again, in the highest proportion that the national media presents a too positive image of the Union (50% and 47%, respectively), while the self-employed and unemployed say the media presents a too negative image (9% and 8%, respectively). For more detailed data see *EU28TABLES Q.20*.


4.4 “I understand how the European Union works”

When asked, “I understand how the European Union works”, an average 47% in the new member countries agree, and this proportion exceeds not only that of the CC countries (31%), but even that measured in the EU 15 countries (41%).

The proportion in the new EU member countries of those sharing the view that they do not adequately understand how the EU works is lower (35%) than those saying they do understand it. The situation is the reverse in the candidate countries and the previous EU member countries: in these groups of countries the majority esteem themselves to be not acquainted enough with how the Union works, and in these countries the proportion of those not adequately cognizant of how the Union works is higher (38% and 44%, respectively) than in the new EU member countries. (FIGURE 4.4)

When looking at the proportion of citizens understanding how the Union works at the country level, we find significant differences. In the highest proportions –above the NMS average – the Polish (58%), Slovenians (52%) and Cypriots (49%) mentioned that they do understand the operation of the European Union, while in the smallest proportions the citizens of two candidate countries, Bulgaria (27%), Turkey (29%) and the Czech Republic (29%) share this opinion. The proportion of those who agreed that they understand how the Union works is lower in these three countries than the CC average, and also in Lithuania (30%). (EU28TABLES Q.12)

The low proportions of agreement are not necessarily signs of lack of information; they may indicate simply higher levels of a need for information.



Analysing the difference between the proportions of those understanding and not understanding the ways the EU works, we find that only in three countries do the subjectively well-informed outnumber the subjectively ill-informed: the biggest difference was measured in Poland (+33), a somewhat more moderate difference in Slovenia (+17), and finally an even more modest difference in Cyprus (+5). In the rest of the new EU member and candidate countries the majority doubt they understand how the EU works: the difference is the largest in Bulgaria (-21) and the Czech Republic (-20), and can also be regarded as high in Hungary (-14), Latvia (-13), Slovakia (-12) and Estonia (-12). (TABLE 4.4a)

	Difference between those who agree and disagree
POLAND	33
SLOVENIA	17
NMS	12
CYPRUS	5
MALTA	-2
ROMANIA	-3
EU 15	-3
CC	-7
TURKEY	-7
LITHUANIA	-9
ESTONIA	-12
SLOVAKIA	-12
LATVIA	-13
HUNGARY	-14
CZECH REP.	-20
BULGARIA	-21

Looking at the demographics, the most likely to claim knowing how the EU works are managers (62%), and those who stopped their education after the age of 20 (58%). Those who left school young (24%), house persons (25%) and respondents above the age of 55 (29%) are least likely to say they understand the way the Union operates.

On the other hand, manual workers (43%), the retired (41%) and those who left school at the age of 15 (40%) most mentioned that they do not understand how the EU works, and managers (24%) and those who were in school until the age of 20 (26%) share this view in the smallest numbers.

Naturally, the proportion of those understanding how the EU works is higher among those who regard EU accession a good thing (46%), and lower among those who think it is a bad thing (29%). The reverse is also true: in larger proportions citizens who believe EU accession to be a bad thing say they do not understand the operation of the EU, compared to those regarding it a good thing (50% vs. 31%). (TABLE 4.4b)

	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree
EU membership is a good thing	46	31
EU membership is neither good nor bad	32	45
EU membership is a bad thing	29	50

5. European identity

The Eurobarometer analyses whether or not the new EU member and candidate countries' citizens would see themselves in the near future as their nationality only, or European to some extent.

The 2004 Spring Eurobarometer recorded a dramatic change in identities across Europe. If there were any expectations whether the "re-unification" of Europe would enhance attachment to the values and identity of the continent as a whole, they were – at least in the short term – wrong. In 8 of the 10 new EU member states, the proportion of those who only identify themselves with their national identity increased by at least 4 percentage points. In the newly joined member countries, on average, the increase in national identity amounts to 11 points. Citizens might have learnt from the recent debates on future budgets and majority rules that the Union is not so much a family of the nations of Europe, but rather a group of countries competing for resources, jobs and other gains.

Exclusive attachment to national identity has increased by at least 10 percentage points in Poland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia since last autumn.

There are no big differences in either the new EU or candidate countries between the number of citizens who consider themselves as their nationality only and those who call themselves European to some extent (3 and 4 percentage points, respectively). The only difference is that while slightly more citizens from new EU member countries (51%) would see themselves as European in the near future than only their nationality (47%), the opposite is true in candidate countries: slightly fewer consider themselves European only (47%) than their nationality only (52%).

The figures from new EU member countries are closer to the previous European Union member countries than they are to the candidate countries: while 56% of the previous members see themselves in the near future as European to some extent, 41% mentioned they see themselves as their nationality only.

As we said, since autumn 2003, in both the new EU member and candidate countries, there is a decrease in the number of citizens who might consider themselves in the near future European to some extent, and an increase in the number who see themselves as their nationality only. In spring 2004, the number of those who will consider themselves their nationality only is 12 percentage points higher in NMS countries, and 10 percentage points higher in the CC countries than in autumn 2003. The number who would see themselves as European to some extent is 7 percentage points lower in both NMS and CC countries, compared to autumn 2003. Meanwhile the citizens of EU 15 didn't change their opinion between the two last waves. (TABLE 5a)


	NMS autumn 2003	NMS spring 2004	NMS autumn 2003	CC spring 2004	EU 15 (EB60.1)	EU 15 (EB61)
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Nationality only	36	48	41	51	40	41
European to some extent	58	51	54	47	57	56

We see a remarkable change from autumn 2003 in the individual countries' data. While half a year ago, only in Hungary we saw a higher proportion of those who will consider themselves to be Hungarian versus European to some extent in the near future (3 percentage points), in spring 2004 there are four countries where more citizens would consider themselves to be their nationality rather than European to some extent (Hungary: 22, Turkey: 14, Lithuania: 10 and the Czech Republic: 3 percentage points difference).

Other than Malta, in every country measured there was an increase between autumn 2003 and spring 2004 in those who would see themselves as nationality only.

The greatest increases from autumn 2003 in the number of those who would consider themselves their nationality only are in Poland (+13). The second highest increase is in Cyprus and Turkey (+12 both), the third is in Lithuania and Slovenia (+11 both) and the fourth highest increase is in the Czech Republic and Hungary (+10 both). There is a 9 percentage point increase in the number of those who see themselves as their nationality only in Slovakia and Estonia, +7 in Romania, +6 in Latvia and +3 in Bulgaria. The only decrease was in Malta, with -3 percentage points.

On the other hand, only in Malta and Bulgaria do more citizens in spring 2004 than in autumn 2003 say they would see themselves as European to some extent in the near future (+6, and +3 percentage points, respectively). In all other countries fewer citizens agree: in Cyprus there is an 10 percentage point decrease, as well as in Turkey (-10), (-9) in Poland, in Hungary and in Slovenia, (-6) in Slovakia, (-5) in Estonia and in the Czech Republic, (-4) in Romania and Lithuania, and finally (-2) in Latvia. (FIGURE 5 and EU28TABLES Q.38)



Fifty-six percent of EU 15 citizens associate their identity to some extent with being European. Still, there are five countries among the previous member states in which national attachment exclusively determines the identity of the majority of the people: UK, Finland, Greece, Spain and Austria.

Considering the attitudes of the country's membership to the European Union, the analysis shows that 60% (69% in autumn 2003) of people who regard their country's membership to the European Union as a good thing feel European to some extent (compared to 27% of those who told us their country's membership will be a bad thing -- 24% was this figure in autumn 2003). In a mirror image, we find that 71% (69% in autumn 2003) of people who regard their country's membership as a bad thing identify with their own nationality alone (compared to 39% of those who told us their country's membership will be a good thing -- 27% in autumn 2003). We note that among those who can't decide if EU membership is a good or bad thing, a higher number would consider themselves as their nationality only in the near future (58% vs. 40%)⁷. (TABLE 5 b)

Table 5b Support of the EU membership and European identity			
%, CC 13			
FEELS...	THE COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE ...		
	A good thing	a bad thing	neither good nor bad
[NATIONALITY] only	39	71	58
European to some extent	60	27	40

The demographic analyses at the new EU member and candidate countries' level show that as we measured in autumn 2003, managers (68%), students (64%) and those who left school at 20 or older (64%) are most likely to feel European to some extent -- and persons older than 55 (62%), the retired (61%), house persons (61%) and people who left school before the age of 15 (60%) are most likely to identify with their own nationality alone. Men are more likely to see themselves in the near future as European to some extent and women are likelier to identify with their nationality only.

⁷ The association between the two variables is statistically significant at 0.000 level.

6. Membership of the European Union

6.1 Support for European Union membership

In this subchapter, we look at developments in some of the standard indicators of support for the European Union in each of the new EU member and candidate countries⁸.


Membership: a “good thing” or a “bad thing”?

The general mood in the new EU member countries regarding the European Union membership has changed significantly. It is the first time in this enlargement process that the new EU member countries are less supportive of their EU membership than the previous member states (43% think it will be a good thing versus 48% average in the previous member countries).

Since the record of support level measured at the spring of 2003 (coinciding with a number of referendum polls, with campaigns popularising the European Union and motivating citizens to attend referenda about membership) we see a sharp decline in the proportion of those who believe that membership to the EU would/will be a “good thing” (-15 percentage points since one year ago). In most countries EU membership lost the support of the absolute majority. The only exceptions are Lithuania and Malta.

This significantly decreased *support* does not mean huge outright *opposition* to membership. The proportion of opponents remains limited at 16%, although is increasing.

Currently 43% consider their country's future membership to the European Union as a “good thing” (compared to 52% in autumn 2003). This rate is much lower than what we find in the CC countries, where 70% of the population say EU membership is a good thing, and lower still than the percentage in the EU 15 countries (48%). (EU28TABLES Q.8)



⁸ We note that the question about support for EU membership is slightly modified since the last wave: while in autumn 2003 the question wording was “Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union **would be**...<a good thing/a bad thing/neither good, nor bad>?”, in spring 2004 the Eurobarometer asked the question in new member states, “Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union **will be**<a good thing/a bad thing/neither good, nor bad>?” In the three candidate countries the question wording remained unchanged.

The proportion of people in the NMS region who regard their country's coming membership as a bad thing increased again a little bit: 16%, versus 12% in autumn 2003. The number of those who say EU membership is bad thing is 7% in the CC countries, but 17% in the EU 15 zone.


Also, the percentage of undecided responses increased from 29% in autumn 2003 to 33% in spring 2004. The percentage of undecided citizens is lower in both CC and EU 15 countries (15% and 29%, respectively).

FIGURE 6.1a shows that only in five of 13 the new EU member and candidate countries at least half of the respondents consider their country's coming or future membership to be a good thing. Those who are most likely to feel this way are those not included in the 2004 round of enlargement: Turkish (71%; in autumn 2003 this figure was 67%), Romanians (70%; 81% in autumn 2003) and Bulgarians (65%; 73% in autumn 2003), followed in fourth and fifth place by Lithuanians (52%) and the Maltese (50%).

The lowest levels of support were recorded in Estonia (31%), Latvia (33%) and Slovenia (40%) – just a little bit different from autumn 2003 when Estonians, Czechs and the Latvians were least likely to say EU membership is good (38%, 44% and 46%, respectively).

Opposition to European Union membership ranges from 3% in Romania to 22% in Latvia, and similarly to the latest results of the Standard Eurobarometer, there is no country in the accession and candidate zone in which those who would regard EU membership as a bad thing outnumber those who see it as a good thing: the smallest difference between the number of those who say the EU membership is good vs. bad thing is 10 percentage points, and we see it in Estonia.



There are only three countries (Slovenia, Latvia and Estonia) where the number of those who consider the EU membership neither good nor bad thing outnumber those who say it is a good thing (with 4, 5 and 8 percentage point difference, respectively). (FIGURE 6.1a)



To spring 2003 one can see a slowly accelerating growth in support for EU membership in the new member countries, and stabilised high support in the whole candidate region. But since spring 2003 the data shows a decreasing tendency: there is a 6 percentage point decrease between spring and autumn 2003, but we found, from autumn 2003 to spring 2004 a 9 percentage point decrease in support among the new EU member countries. One might attribute the spring 2003 peak in support to

the temporary effects of the campaigns that surrounded EU referenda in nine of the 10 acceding countries. (FIGURE 6.1b)

The trend analyses show an increase in support since autumn 2003 only in Turkey (+4), but a decrease in all other the new EU member and candidate countries, with the highest decrease in Cyprus (-17), with significant decreases in Latvia (-13), Slovakia (-12), Hungary (-11), Romania (-11), Slovenia (-10), Poland (-10), Bulgaria (-8) and Estonia (-7). The most modest decreases were in Malta (-5), Lithuania (-3) and the Czech Republic (-3). (See also individual country graphs, FIGURES 6.1c - 6.1o)



Support for European Union membership (Czech Republic) 1999/00-2004




Fig. 6.1e

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country)s membership of the European Union will be...?

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Support for European Union membership (Estonia) 1999/00-2004






Fig. 6.1f

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country)s membership of the European Union will be...?

GALLUP



Support for European Union membership (Lithuania) 1999/00-2004




Fig. 6.1i

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country)s membership of the European Union will be...?

GALLUP

Support for European Union membership (Malta) 1999/00-2004






Fig. 6.1j

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country)s membership of the European Union will be...?

GALLUP



Support for European Union membership (Slovakia) 1999/00-2004




Fig. 6.1m

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country)s membership of the European Union will be...?

GALLUP

Support for European Union membership (Slovenia) 1999/00-2004





Fig. 6.1n

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country)s membership of the European Union will be...?

GALLUP



It appears that men and women have different feelings about a unified Europe. The demographic analysis shows that men are more likely than women to regard their country's future membership as a good thing (64% vs. 51%) than did in the last two waves from 2003. (TABLE 6.1) But differences in attitude move with levels of education. Support for the European Union is lowest among people who left school at 16-19 years old (54%), and the highest among students (65%), followed by those who left school at 15 or younger (59%), and by those who finished their education at the age of 20 or older (58%). Support levels linearly decrease by age, with those aged 15 to 24 being significantly more likely to support their country's membership (65%), followed by those aged 25-39 (63%), 40-54 year olds (57%), and finally by those aged 55 and over (46%). Those from large towns are likeliest (61%) to say EU membership is a good thing, followed by residents of rural areas and villages (57%), and finally by the small and middle-sized town population (55%).

Analyses of the economic activity scale show a gap of 25 percentage points in support levels between the self-employed (70%) and retired people (45%). Among managers 61% consider EU membership a good thing. Those with very high and high scores on the opinion leadership index are more likely to support their country's membership (65% and 63% respectively) than are those with low and very low opinion leadership index scores (55% and 50%). (TABLE 6.1)

Table 6.1 Support of membership (%, on CC-13 level)		
Group	a good thing %	a bad thing %
Self-employed	70	12
Age: 15-24 years	65	10
Opinion leadership index: ++ high	65	14
Education: still studying	65	8
Male	64	11
Opinion leadership index: +	63	11
Age: 25-39 years	63	9
Large town	61	11
Managers	61	10
House Persons	61	8
Education: Up to 15 years	59	11
Manual workers	58	11
Education: 20+ years	58	13
Unemployed	57	11
Rural area or village	57	11
Age: 40-54 years	57	14
Other white collars	56	14
Small or middle sized town	55	13
Opinion leadership index: -	55	11
Education: 16-19 years	54	12
Female	51	12
Opinion leadership index: - - low	50	12
Age: 55+ years	46	14
Retired	45	16


6.2 Perceived benefits of European Union membership

This section will examine the national advantages the new EU member and candidate countries will/would gain with membership in the European Union⁹.

Only slightly more than half of the new EU member countries' citizens expect their country would benefit from membership to the European Union (52%, compared to 57% who expected so in autumn 2003). But three-quarters (75%) in the CC are certain their country would benefit from EU membership.

Almost one-third (30%) in the new member countries do not share this expectation, and this figure is higher than what we found in autumn 2003 (25%). In the CC countries, fewer citizens agree -- only 13% say their country couldn't benefit from the membership.

Consequently, 19% from the new EU member countries and 12% from the candidate countries are unable to formulate a positive or negative opinion on this question. (FIGURE 6.2a)



In all but three countries half or more of all citizens agree that their country will or could benefit from European Union membership, and there is no country in which the number of those who said their country wouldn't or couldn't benefit outnumber those who said the contrary. In Estonia there are only 3 percentage point differences between the two figures indicating a serious pessimism of what benefits the membership can possibly bring to the country.

The highest percentages of optimists are found in the CC zone: 75% of both the Turkish and Romanians, and 74% of the Bulgarians see benefit in a possible future membership (in autumn 2003 these figures were 75% in Turkey, 82% in Romania and 79% in Bulgaria). Among the new EU member countries, the Slovenians (64%), Hungarians and Lithuanians (58% both) hold the same opinion (these rates were 72%, 62%, 63%, respectively, in autumn 2003).


⁹ The question regarding the countries' benefits from EU membership is slightly modified compared to the last wave: while in autumn 2003 the question wording was "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union? <yes, it could / no, it could not>", in spring 2004 the Eurobarometer asked in new member states: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) will get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union? <yes, it will / no, it will not>". In the candidate countries the question wording remained unchanged.

Fewer than half, but a clear majority among Estonians (41%, 45% in autumn 2003) and Czechs (46%, 49% in autumn 2003), agree that their country would benefit from European Union membership.

The proportion of people who say that their country will not get advantages from being a member of the European Union ranges from 9% in Romania to 38% in Estonia, and the proportion of those who lack an opinion ranges from 23% in Czech Republic to 9% in Slovenia. (EU28TABLES Q.9)



Like the trend among those who support membership, there is a significant decrease between spring 2003 and spring 2004 in the new EU member countries among those who think their country will benefit from the membership, but it is worth mentioning that the from between autumn 2003 to spring 2004 is lower (-5 percentage points) than the decrease from spring 2003 to autumn 2003 (-7 percentage points) was.



Also, in the CC countries the number of those citizens who support membership decreased (-2 percentage point) – nonetheless, there is no change in these figures between spring 2003 and spring 2004.





At the individual country level, in all but one country, the number of those who say their country will/could benefit from the membership decreased. The only exception is Turkey, where there is no change in this rate.

The country that drives the decrease is Cyprus (-15), but significant decreases were also noticed in Latvia (-9), Slovakia (-8), Slovenia (-8), Romania (-7) and Poland (-6). Notable decreases turned up in Lithuania (-5), Bulgaria (-5), Hungary (-4), Estonia (-4), Malta (-3) and in the Czech Republic (-3). Similar to autumn 2003's finding, there was no change in Turkey on this issue. (See also FIGURES 6.2c – 6.2o)







Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Lithuania) 1999/00-2004




Fig. 6.2i



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) will get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

GALLUP

Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Malta) 1999/00-2004






Fig. 6.2j





Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) will get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

GALLUP





Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Turkey) 1999/00-2004




Fig. 6.2o

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
Februar-March 2004

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

GALLUP

6.3 Image of the European Union


The following question provides an indication of people's emotive stance towards the European Union:

In general, do you have you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image of the European Union?

On average, 40% of the new EU member countries' citizens have a very or fairly positive image of the European Union, but only 5% of them choose the answer category "very positive" (these figures in autumn 2003 were 46% and 7%). The number of those new member countries' citizens whose image is very or fairly positive of the European Union is much lower than of that found in the CC countries (61%), and lower than the previous member countries, too (43%).

While 32% of the new EU member countries' citizens view the EU in a neutral way, 22% say that the EU conjures up a negative image, of which only 4% feel very negatively (in autumn 2003 these figures were 20% and 5%).

The data from previous member countries is close to the new member countries': 32% of the previous member citizens have a neutral image and 21% have a very and fairly negative image of the European Union. But in the CC region the numbers of the neutral (22%), or negative (10%) are lower to some extent. For more detailed data see *EU28TABLES Q.10*.



As the graph above shows, in four countries the majority have a very or fairly positive image of the European Union: 72% of Romanians, 69% of Bulgarians, 56% of Turks and 51% of Maltese hold this view. On the other hand, the Estonians (27%), the Latvians (37%), the Czechs (39%) and Polish (39%) have the least positive image of the EU.

The Maltese (+3) and Turkish (+2) say, in a slightly higher number than in autumn 2003, that they have a positive image of the European Union, but in all other countries fewer citizens hold this positive view. In Cyprus the number of those who have a very and fairly positive image of EU decreased (with - 13 percentage points), but we detected a significant decrease in Slovakia (-9), Poland (-8) and Latvia

(-7) too. There were moderate decreases in Estonia (-5), Slovenia (-4), Bulgaria (-3), Lithuania (-3), Romania (-3), Hungary (-3) and the Czech Republic (-2).

Considering those who have a somewhat negative image of the European Union, the Czechs lead (27%), followed by the Estonians and the Polish (25% both), and the Romanians, Bulgarians end the list (6% both). The number of citizens with negative opinions of the EU increased from autumn 2003 in Cyprus (+7), Latvia (+4), Poland (+4), Slovakia (+4), Romania (+2), Estonia (+2), Hungary (+1), Lithuania (+1), the Czech Republic (+1) and Bulgaria (+1), decreased in Turkey (-7) and in Malta (-1), and there is no change in Slovenia.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer found the highest proportion of neutral image of the European Union in Estonia (45%), Slovenia (41%) and Slovakia (38%). (EU28TABLES Q.10)

A demographic analysis of the population shows a positive EU image in 63% of those who are still studying, 59% of the self-employed, and 58% of the 15-24 year olds. The least likely to have a positive image of the EU are the retired (43%), 55 or older citizens (44%) and women (46%).

On the other hand, analysing the negative image of the EU by demographic variables, one can see the retired (20%), those who finished their education at 16-19 (19%) and the 40-54 year old citizens (18%) are likeliest to have a negative view of the EU – but the least likely are house persons and students (10% both). Furthermore, as one would expect, most people who support their country's EU membership (77%) have a positive image of the EU. Conversely, 68% of people who regard their country's membership as a bad thing have a negative image. (TABLE 6.3).

Group	very and fairly positive %	very and fairly negative %
EU membership: "a good thing"	77	4
EDU: still studying	63	10
CC	61	10
OCCU: Self-employed	59	17
AGE: 15-24 years	58	13
Male	58	15
AGE: 25-39 years	56	14
OCCU: Managers	56	17
EDU: 20+ years	53	17
OCCU: Manual workers	53	18
large town	52	16
small or middle sized town	52	17
rural area or village	51	15
EDU: up to 15 years	51	15
OCCU: Other white collars	50	18
OCCU: House Persons	51	10
OCCU: Unemployed	50	17
AGE: 40-54 years	49	18
EDU: 16-19 years	49	19
Female	46	17
AGE: 55+ years	44	18
OCCU: Retired	43	20
NMS	40	23
EU membership: "Neither good nor bad"	21	20
EU membership: "A bad thing"	5	68


6.4 Meaning of European Union

We are also interested in what the European Union means to respondents personally. Each respondent was asked to select from 14 possible “meanings” shown to him/her on a card – but was also given the opportunity to mark the spontaneous “other” category in the questionnaire. All but one item were similar to the questions asked in autumn 2003 by Eurobarometer – the new item brought up is “democracy”.

The new member countries’ rankings were slightly different from the CC zone, but similar to that of the EU 15 region. The people from new EU member countries select free movement within the EU first (62%; in autumn 2003: 64%), the Euro second (45%; in autumn 2003:47%) and peace third (37%; in autumn 2003: 43%) as items that the European Union mean to them. These three items are the top three in the previous member countries, too, but with lower percentages: freedom of movement within the EU means the European Union to 51% of the previous member citizens, the Euro for 50% of them, and peace for 31% of them. In the candidate countries, the European Union means, first of all, economic prosperity (55%), followed closely by free movement within the EU (54%), and social protection third (48%).

The European Union means democracy to 31% of the citizens in the new EU member countries (mentioned fourth most often) and to 43% in the candidate countries. Only one in five (22%) previous member citizens “identify” the EU with democracy, putting it in ninth place in the EU 15 zone (see Chapter 8.1 to get more detail about the assessment of the EU democracy). (FIGURE 6.4)

Comparing the autumn 2003 data to the spring 2004 data at the accession country (now NMS) level, we find only two items chosen by more citizens now than half a year ago: bureaucracy (+1) and not enough control at external frontiers (+1). All other concepts/notions mean the European Union to fewer citizens that in autumn 2003. The European Union no more means economic prosperity (-8), peace (-6), protection (-5) and a stronger say in the world (-4) as much as it did, and fewer people mention the unemployment (-3), cultural diversity (-2), the Euro (-2), freedom of movement within the EU (-2), loss of cultural identity, more crime and waste of money (-1 decrease in all these items) as in autumn 2003, as well. (EU28TABLES Q.11)



Looking at the individual countries' figures from *TABLE 3.4a*, we should note that among the meanings of the European Union, *freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU* is mentioned first, second or third in all countries – a feature that is partly limited for the newcomer citizens for the coming years. Moreover, in all but two countries this item is mentioned on the first place (the two exceptions are Slovenia and Turkey, where this item is situated second). Among those countries that most often mentioned freedom of movement within the EU, Cyprus led the group (75%), and Estonia brought up the rear (51%).

The country-by-country analysis shows that *peace* as an attribute of the European Union is mentioned in one of the second or third places in six of 13 candidate countries – the Bulgarians, Cypriots, Hungarians and Romanians mentioned it second most frequently, and Latvians and Polish mentioned it third most frequently.

Table 6.4 Primary meanings of the European Union
(% of mentions, by country)

Bulgaria		Malta	
FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	68	FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	55
PEACE	56	STRONGER SAY IN THE WORLD	45
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY	54	DEMOCRACY	44
Cyprus		Poland	
FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	75	FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	64
PEACE	60	EURO	40
EURO	48	PEACE	33
Czech Republic		Romania	
FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	62	FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	65
EURO	53	PEACE	61
DEMOCRACY	42	ECONOMIC PROSPERITY	57
Estonia		Slovakia	
FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	51	FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	72
EURO	32	EURO	53
BUREAUCRACY	29	ECONOMIC PROSPERITY	51
Hungary		Slovenia	
FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	56	EURO	56
PEACE	45	FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	52
EURO	43	CULTURAL DIVERSITY	39
Latvia		Turkey	
FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	54	ECONOMIC PROSPERITY	55
EURO	41	FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	49
PEACE	36	SOCIAL PROTECTION	49
Lithuania			
FREEDOM TO MOVE WITHIN THE EU	72		
EURO	60		
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY	42		


The European Union means *economic prosperity* in five countries, noted as either first, second or third. In Turkey this is selected most often, by 55%. *Euro* is mentioned in either the second or third place in eight of 13 countries – in Slovenia it's first place with 56%. *Democracy* means European Union for Czechs and for the Maltese, mentioned third in both countries. *Social protection* is in third place only in Turkey, *stronger say in the world* is in second place in one country (Malta), *bureaucracy* is third only in Estonia, and finally *cultural diversity* as a synonym for Europe only merits third place in Slovenia.

6.5 Role expected and desired for the European Union in five years' time

As to the expected role of the European Union: just 3 months before their country's accession almost half (49%; it was 46% in autumn 2003) of the citizens from new EU member countries believe that in five years' time, the European Union will play a more important role in their daily life, 31% believe it will play the same role (in autumn 2003: 33%), and only 7% believe it will play a less important role than it does now (in autumn 2003: 8%).

We should note that there is a small difference between the expectations of the new members (who know they will be members of the Union this May) and the other candidate countries for which accession is a more remote possibility. An optimistic 46% of the CC zone citizens think the EU will play a more important role in their life five years from now, 10% say this role will be less important. There are slightly more citizens from candidate than new EU member countries who assign the same role for the EU in their life in five years' time (33%).

Obviously there are larger differences regarding this question between the new and previous member countries data: there is an 8 percentage point difference between the number of the acceding and the number of EU 15 citizens who think the role of the EU will not change — the new members rather tend to expect increasing influence. (FIGURE 6.5a)



Country-by-country analyses reveal that there are opposite dynamics behind this steady or only slowly increasing regional average. Respondents in eight of the 13 countries expect, in numbers above the new EU member countries' average, the European Union to have a greater role in their lives for the next five years, and among these eight countries are Bulgaria and Romania, too.

The countries in which citizens say the EU will play a more important role in five years' period in above average proportions are: Cyprus (62%), Malta (58%), Bulgaria (56%), Slovakia (52%), Romania (51%), Hungary (50%), Poland (50%) and Estonia (49%). Latvians (48%), the Czechs (48%) and Slovenians (47%) agree in numbers lower than the NMS average, but higher than the CC average.

The Turkish (43%) and Lithuanians (40%) are the last in line to expect the EU to have a more important role in their daily lives five years in the future.

Except in Turkey and Lithuania, more people in all countries say the EU will play a more important role in their daily lives than say the EU will play the same or a less important role. The greatest net differences in this respect are in Cyprus (more important role: 62% versus the percentage saying the same plus the percentage saying a less important role: 27%), in Malta (58% vs. 32%) and in Bulgaria (56% vs. 31%). Only the Turkish and Lithuanians say in a higher than average number that the EU will play a less important or the same role in their lives than a more important one — Turkey: 49% vs. 43%, Lithuania: 51% vs. 40%. (TABLE 6.5a and EU28TABLES Q.14A)

	More important	Less important	Same role	Difference between "more" and "less + same"
CYPRUS	62	11	16	35
MALTA	58	10	22	26
BULGARIA	56	4	27	25
ROMANIA	51	8	25	18
SLOVAKIA	52	9	27	16
POLAND	50	6	31	13
ESTONIA	49	7	31	11
CZECH REP.	48	6	31	11
NMS	49	7	31	11
HUNGARY	50	10	31	9
LATVIA	48	7	35	6
CC	46	10	33	3
SLOVENIA	47	8	37	2
TURKEY	43	12	38	-7
LITHUANIA	40	6	45	-11

The proportion of those who think that the EU will play a less important role in their daily lives in five years is the highest in Turkey where citizens are increasingly sceptical whether the EU is actually willing to include Turkey among its members (12%) as well as in Cyprus (11%), Malta and Hungary (10% both).


The expectation of a greater EU role in daily life increased 3 percentage points in NMS countries, and has decreased 6 percentage points in the CC countries since autumn 2003.

A positive change has been recorded in the majority of countries, with the highest increases in Bulgaria (+9), Hungary (+7) and the Czech Republic (+7), but we have recorded a negative change in the number of people expecting a bigger EU role: Turkey (-7), Romania (-7), Slovenia (-2), Lithuania (-1) and Cyprus (-1). (EU28TABLES Q.14A)

When we look at the role that the new EU member countries citizens **would like** the European Union to play in their daily lives in five years' time, we find that 57% desire a more important role, 23% desire the same role, while 9% desire a less important role. According to the CC members, 56% desire a more important role and 8% would like a reduced EU role, but more in the CC countries want the EU to play the same role (28%). (FIGURE 6.5b)

Most importantly, the desire for the European Union to play a more important role in new EU member countries has increased by 7 percentage points since autumn 2003 – it is notable that in the CC countries this rate decreased by 4 percentage points. The largest positive changes have been in Hungary (+15), Poland (+9) and Malta (+6), we find moderate increase in Slovakia (+3), the Czech Republic (+3), Bulgaria (+1), Estonia (+1) and Lithuania (+1).

On the other side, negative trends have been found in Turkey (-4), Latvia (-2), Romania (-2) and Cyprus (-2). There is no change in this respect in Slovenia. (EU28TABLES Q.14B)



Romanians (73%), Bulgarians (70%) and Cypriots (65%) are the most likely to want a bigger EU impact on their daily lives, and a high number of Hungarians (63%) and Polish (61%) do too. More than half in Malta (58%), Slovakia (57%) and Slovenia (51%) would like the EU to play a more important role in their lives – but Slovenia is the first of those countries in which the percentage of those citizens who say “a more important role” is lower than either the NMS or the CC averages.

More than four in 10 in Turkey (48%), the Czech Republic (46%), Latvia (45%) and Lithuania (45%) want the EU to play a more important role, and Estonians say so least often (35%).

Analysing the differences at the individual country level between the “more important role” answers and the “less important role + same important role” answers, we notice a desperate, more than 50 percentage point difference in Romania (+56) and Bulgaria (+53). In the third candidate country, Turkey, we do not see that level of engagement at all (+3). Most new EU member countries would like to see the Union to play a more important role, it is only Estonia are there fewer people who do not want a more important role for EU in their daily lives compared to current influence (-17), and the two other Baltic states that are content with the current influence (+3). (TABLE 6.6b and EU28TABLES Q.14B)


	More important	Less important	Same role	Difference between more and less or same
ROMANIA	73	4	13	56
BULGARIA	70	4	13	53
CYPRUS	65	10	16	39
HUNGARY	63	9	19	35
POLAND	61	6	21	34
SLOVAKIA	57	9	21	27
NMS	57	9	23	25
MALTA	58	12	23	23
CC	56	8	28	20
SLOVENIA	51	11	31	9
CZECH REP.	46	15	24	7
LATVIA	45	15	27	3
LITHUANIA	45	5	37	3
TURKEY	48	10	36	2
ESTONIA	35	16	36	-17

6.6 Feeling informed about enlargement and the accession process

Enlargement of the European Union

Candidate Countries Eurobarometer finds that the majority of people in the accession and candidate region – just ahead of the historic event – are still very poorly informed about the enlargement process. Nonetheless, at the time of the fieldwork, there were 3-4 months left to go until the enlargement of the European Union in May 2004.

The results show that only 38% in the new EU member countries feel very well or well informed about enlargement process (in autumn 2003: 37%), while 59% feel not very well or not at all informed (in autumn 2003: 60%). There is a more understandable ranking in the CC countries, where only one in five citizens are very well and well informed (21%), but three-quarters are not very well and not at all (76%) informed about the enlargement. And, in line with other findings, fewer of the previous member countries' population (29%) than NMS countries' population mentioned they are very well and well informed about the enlargement of the European Union. Sixty-nine percent mentioned they are not very well and not at all informed -- the figures could suggest that they would have needed even more information than the NMS countries. (FIGURE 6.6a)




The individual country results indicate that only in Slovenia do more than half feel well informed about enlargement (55%). Malta (46%), Cyprus (43%), Lithuania (42%) and Poland (41%) follow; four in 10 citizens feel very well and well informed about the enlargement, as do 40% of the Latvians. In all other countries, fewer than one-third of the respondents feel well informed; this is especially true for Bulgarians, Romanians and Turks, of whom only 25%, 22% and 20%, respectively, feel informed about the enlargement process. (EU28TABLES Q.17)

A demographic analysis shows that, except for managers, a majority of all demographic groups said they feel more uninformed than informed regarding the accession process. There are more informed than uninformed managers (54% vs. 44%), but a very high number of those who left school at 20 or older said they are very well + well informed (48% vs. 51% uninformed). The list of demographic

groups who more often answered “not well” and “not at all informed” than “informed” is led by those who left school at 15 (16% informed vs. 79% uninformed), house persons (19% vs. 74%), the retired (24% vs. 73%) and citizens 55 and older (23% vs. 72%).

Looking at the trend analysis on the accession country level, the number of those who feel they are very well and well informed about the enlargement, as well as the percentage of those who felt the opposite between autumn 2003 and spring 2004, is equalized. But comparing the data from a year ago to spring 2004 shows a slight increase in the number of those with not enough information (+3) and a decrease in the number of those with enough information about the enlargement process (-3). However, on the long term, we cannot say that the perceived information deficit regarding the enlargement would have significantly diminished over the year the preceded the 2004 May enlargement. (FIGURE 6.6b)




Accession process of own country

There are more citizens in all new EU member countries feeling well and very well informed about their own country accession process than feel the same about the general enlargement process – but there are big differences among the countries. In the Czech Republic (+3), Hungary (+4), Poland (+4) and Slovakia (+4) only slightly more citizens said so, but vastly more people would agree in Estonia (+27), Lithuania (+24) and Latvia (+17). (TABLE 6.6)

	COUNTRY's accession	EU enlargement	Net difference
CZECH REP.	35	32	3
HUNGARY	35	31	4
POLAND	45	41	4
SLOVAKIA	37	33	4
NMS	44	38	6
SLOVENIA	62	55	7
MALTA	55	46	9
CYPRUS	58	43	15
LATVIA	56	39	17
LITHUANIA	66	42	24
ESTONIA	59	32	27

But in the face of these positive results, on average, fewer citizens in the new member countries feel very well and well informed than feel uninformed (44% vs. 54%) about their country's enlargement process.



The NMS countries' average is undercut by the Polish, Slovakian, Czech and Hungarians' responses. Fewer of them claimed to be informed, rather than uninformed, about their countries' accession


process (Poland: 45% vs. 52%, Slovakia: 37% vs. 61%, Czech Republic: 35% vs. 61%, Hungary: 35% vs. 65%).

In all other new EU member countries, more citizens said they feel very well and well informed than poorly informed or uninformed about their countries' accession process. Comparing the citizens' opinions, Lithuania is the most informed country (66%), and Slovenia comes in second (62%), followed by Estonia (59%), Cyprus (58%), Latvia (56%) and Malta (55%). (FIGURE 6.6c and EU28 TABLES Q.17B)

Analyzing the data by demographic variables we find the proportion of people who feel well informed about their country's accession ranges from 22% (those who left school at 15) and 33% (the retired as well as house persons), to 63% (managers), 58% (the most educated group) and 54% (students).

Managers (+28), those with more education (+18), students (+9), 25-39 year olds (+5), the self-employed (+5) and males (+1) are more likely to say that they are adequately informed rather than uninformed. The 15-24 year old cohort feel as well informed as uninformed. Among all other demographic groups the number of uninformed citizens outnumbers the very well and well informed, mainly among those with the least education (-49), house persons (-32), the retired (-31), those 55 and older (-27), women (-20) and the unemployed (-21).

The figure below shows the autumn 2001 to spring 2004 new EU member countries' trend concerning the feeling of being informed. The results indicate that the proportions of "well or very well informed" and "poorly or uninformed" people in the accession region, after a small fluctuation, are now at about the same level as in spring 2003. Comparing the figures to the last measures from autumn 2003, slightly fewer citizens feel they are uninformed (-2), and slightly more say they feel very well and well informed about their country's accession process (+3).



6.7. Fears related to the building of Europe

In another set of questions, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer tested the prevalence of several common fears related to the “building of Europe”; the increasing integration of the Union. In order to measure the extent to which the public is concerned about this ongoing process, respondents were asked the following question:

Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you - personally - are currently afraid of it, or not?

The below listed fears were presented to the respondents on a card¹⁰:

- *A loss of power for smaller member states*
- *An increase in drug trafficking and international organized crime*
- *Our language being used less and less*
- *Our country paying more and more to the European Union*
- *The loss of social benefits*
- *The loss of national identity and culture*
- *An economic crisis (N)*
- *The transfer of jobs to other member countries that have lower production costs*
- *More difficulties for [NATIONALITY] farmers*
- *The end of [NATIONAL CURRENCY]*

As the results show, the citizens from new member countries are most likely to fear that the building of Europe will lead to *more difficulties for the farmers* (70%); this item was more prevalent than the fear of *increased drug trafficking and international organized crime* (62%). The third greatest of the NMS’s fears was of their country *paying more to the EU* (57%), followed in the fourth place by the fear of the *transfer of jobs to countries that have lower productivity costs* (54%). We emphasized these four fears because they were mentioned by the previous member countries’ population in equally high rates, but in total opposite ranking order.


The previous members’ citizens are mostly afraid of the transfer of jobs to countries with lower production costs (72%), followed by the rational fear of their country paying more and more to the EU (64%), as well by the increase of drug trafficking and international organized crime (64%). “Building of Europe” spells more difficulties for farmers to 61% of the EU 15 citizens.

Maybe because the accession is further off for the CC countries, the citizens express fears in lower ratios than do people in the NMS or EU 15 zone. There is only one fear mentioned more often in CC than in NMS or EU 15 countries that regards the cultural identity: “*Our language being used less and less*”; 41% in CC, 38% in EU 15 and 28% in new EU member countries agree. The fear of loss of national identity and culture is also higher in candidate countries than in new EU member countries (37% vs. 27%), but the figure from previous member countries exceeds both of these (42%). Less citizens in candidate countries than in the others are currently afraid that an increase in drug trafficking and international organized crime will occur with the enlargement (44%). Forty-two percent of CC citizens are afraid of *the loss of their national currency*, and 38% express their fear that more difficulties for farmers will arise (38%).

The new EU member countries are least likely to be afraid of the loss of their national identity and culture (27%), or that their language will be used less and less (28%). Similarly, the previous member states are least likely to fear reduced usage of their language (38%), loss of national identity and culture (42%), or loss of smaller member states’ power (42%).

¹⁰ The item “The transfer of jobs to other member countries that have lower production costs” wasn’t mentioned in CC-3 countries, and the item “The end of [NATIONAL CURRENCY]” wasn’t asked in EU-15 countries.

Fear of economic crises, as well as the loss of social benefits, is mentioned in the highest numbers by the previous member states (51% and 53%). Meanwhile, in NMS countries, only 43% and 35%, respectively, fear these possibilities, CC countries are even less worried -- 24% and 22%, respectively, agree. (FIGURE 6.7)



As TABLE 6.8a below shows, *increase in drug trafficking and international organized crime* is the most widespread fear in the new EU member and candidate countries: in 12 of 13 countries it is in the top three items, and first place in six countries -- first in Cyprus (81%), and sixth of the six in Bulgaria (42%). Organized international crime is the second greatest fear in Slovakia, and all other countries put drug trafficking and international organized crime third (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovenia). Only in Turkey is it not within the top three.

The enlargement will generate *problems for farmers*; say 10 of 13 countries, mentioned among the top three fears. The Czechs (73%), Hungarians (76%), Polish (72%), Slovaks (67%) and Slovenians (67%) express this fear more than the other countries. There are other three countries where this fear is mentioned second most often (Latvia, Lithuania and Romania), and another two putting it third (Bulgaria and Cyprus).

The Maltese are most likely to be afraid of the *job transfers to countries with lower production costs*, mentioning it with the highest rate (64%). This fear appears in the second and third places among the citizens of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia (second place), as well as of Slovakia (third).

Turks have their own fears. They are most afraid of *their language being used less and less* after enlargement (53%). This fear doesn't appear among the top three mentions in any of the other countries.

The fear that own country *has to pay more and more to the European Union* is mentioned second and third most frequently in six countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania), as well as the *fear of the end of national currency* (Estonia, Malta and Turkey). Only the Cypriots are afraid of the *economic crises*, and only the Turkish fear the *loss of national identity and culture*. (TABLE 6.7a and EU28TABLES Q.15)

Table 6.7a Three most widespread fears connected to the building of Europe, %

Bulgaria		Malta	
Increase in organized crime	42	Transferred jobs	64
Accession expensive	39	End of natl. currency	45
Problems for farmers	34	Increase in organized crime	45
Cyprus		Poland	
Increase in organized crime	81	Problems for farmers	72
Economic Crisis	68	Accession expensive	65
Problems for farmers	61	Increase in organized crime	63
Czech Republic		Romania	
Problems for farmers	73	Increase in organized crime	44
Transferred jobs	63	Problems for farmers	34
Increase in organized crime	61	Accession expensive	33
Estonia		Slovakia	
Increase in organized crime	67	Problems for farmers	67
End of natl. currency	63	Increase in organized crime	63
Accession expensive	57	Transferred jobs	49
Hungary		Slovenia	
Problems for farmers	76	Problems for farmers	67
Transferred jobs	69	Transferred jobs	63
Increase in organized crime	62	Increase in organized crime	58
Latvia		Turkey	
Increase in organized crime	64	Abandoning language	53
Problems for farmers	61	End of natl. currency	49
Accession expensive	52	Loss of natl. identity, culture	49
Lithuania			
Increase in organized crime	57		
Problems for farmers	51		
Accession expensive	46		

Finally, we will take a look at the “average fear level” in each candidate country. As the following table shows, the average percentage of respondents saying they are currently afraid of things related to building Europe is the highest in the Cyprus (56%), Estonia (51%) and the Czech Republic (50%), and is lowest in Romania (23%), Bulgaria (24%) and Turkey (36%) – those countries are further away from enlargement. (TABLE 6.7b)

This ranking is very similar to that found in autumn 2003, when citizens rated 10 similar fears, but the questions were worded slightly differently: in autumn 2003 the most fearful citizens were from the Czech Republic (50%) and Estonia (48%), and the least fearful were from Bulgaria (26%) and Romania (22%).

Table 6.7b Fears regarding the building of Europe
(Average score for ‘% currently afraid’ responses for 10 items, by country)

Country	% average
CYPRUS	56
ESTONIA	51
CZECH REP.	50
SLOVENIA	48
POLAND	48
NMS	47
HUNGARY	46
SLOVAKIA	45
LATVIA	44
MALTA	44
LITHUANIA	39
TURKEY	36
CC	31
BULGARIA	24
ROMANIA	23

Splitting the average fear index from the new EU member and candidate countries by demographic variables, the results show those who left school at 16-19 years old (43%), those from small and middle-sized towns (42%) and the other white collars (42%) are afraid of the items presented to them in the highest numbers, and the house persons (34%), those with the least education (35%) and the large towns’ population (35%) are least likely to feel fears relating to the enlargement. (TABLE 6.7c)


Table 6.7c Fears regarding the building of Europe
(Average score for ‘% currently afraid’ responses for 10 items, by demographic groups)

group	% average
Education: 16-19 years	43
Small or middle sized town	42
Other white collars	42
Age: 40-54 years	41
Manual workers	41
Self-employed	41
Education: 20+ years	40
Unemployed	40
Female	40
Retired	39
Age: 25-39 years	39
Rural area or village	38
Age: 55+ years	38
Managers	38
Male	37
Education: still studying	37
Age: 15-24 years	37
Large town	35
Education: up to 15 years	35
House Persons	34

7. European Union priorities

7.1 Support for key issues

The survey measures public opinion toward a certain number of key EU issues. These issues are clearly strategic questions each of them being essential for the future of the Union therefore it is essential that they maintain a high level of support among the current and future citizens of the Union, too.




The analysis of the items on current strategic matters (that will be analyzed, one by one, in more detail in the subsequent chapters) shows that (see also *EU28TABLES Q.29*):

- 79% of citizens of NMS countries, and 72% of the EU 15 zone are in favour of a **common defence and security policy among the EU member states**. Among the candidate countries, the proportion of those who support it is lower (57%). Support is most widespread in Cyprus (91%), Hungary and Slovakia (both 82%), while opposition is greatest in Malta (18%) and Turkey (16%).
- 68% of new EU member countries' citizens — and 65% in the EU 15 countries — support a **common foreign policy toward other countries**. A bit more than half of the respondents in the candidate region are for it (56%). Support is greatest in Cyprus (81%) and Slovenia (76%). Opposition is greatest in Malta (24%), Estonia and the Czech Republic (both 23%)
- Well ahead of the actual introduction of the common currency in their countries, 60% of the people in the NMS zone (just as in the previous member countries) and 54% in the candidate region are in favour of a **European Monetary Union with one single currency**. The highest support for EMU and the euro registers in Slovenia (82%), while resistance is strongest in Estonia (47%) and in Malta (42%).
- Seven in 10 future EU citizens (71%) are in favour of **the enlargement of the European Union to include 10 new countries in May 2004**; the proportion is 57% among the candidate countries and altogether 42% in the EU 15 countries. The most widespread support is found among Cypriots and Slovaks (both 80%). Opposition is greatest in Estonia (20%) and Malta (17%).

- Six in 10 the new EU member and candidate countries' citizens (60%) are in favour of **further enlargement of the European Union to include other countries in future years**; the proportion is 37% in the EU 15 zone. The highest support is found among Romanians (79%), Bulgarians (75%) and Slovaks (70%). Opposition is greatest in Estonia (25%) and in Hungary (21%).
- Almost three-quarters (74%) of the new EU member countries' citizens think that **the European Commission should be composed of commissioners from each of the member states**. A little smaller proportion, 69%, in the EU 15 countries agree, while a bit more than half of the candidate countries' respondents concur (52%). Country-by-country support ranges from 46% in Turkey to 81% in Estonia.
- Sixty-three percent of new EU member countries and previous member countries and 51% of the candidate citizens are in favour of the **constitution for the European Union**. Levels of support range from 41% in Turkey to 75% in Hungary. The opposition is the strongest in Turkey and in the Czech Republic (both 18%).
- Almost four in 10 candidate citizens and new EU member countries' respondents (both 38%) are in favour of the statement that **the speed of building Europe is faster in one group of countries than in the other countries**. In the EU 15 countries, support for this issue is even lower (31%). The most widespread support is found among Cypriots (53%) and Romanians (49%). Opposition is greatest in Slovenia (45%).
- Seventy-eight percent on the NMS level, 63% in the candidate zone, and 82% in the EU 15 countries are in favour of **teaching schoolchildren about the way the European Union institutions work**. Support levels range from 55% in Turkey to 88% in Cyprus. Opposition is relatively the strongest but still very limited in Slovenia (13%) and in the Czech Republic (12%). On the NMS level, support for this proposition decreased -3 points since autumn 2003. The highest decrease is found in Lithuania and in Poland (-3 percentage points), and the least negative change was -1 percentage point found in both Latvia and in Bulgaria. (EU28TABLES Q.29)

Stable support for the Euro

On average, 60% of respondents from the 10 new EU member countries now favour using the Euro — the European single currency — in their countries. Support is the same in the EU 15 countries, where the Euro is a reality. Comparing current numbers with the data gathered in the autumn of 2003, we can see that at that time 58% of the NMS and 56% in the candidate countries were in favour of replacing their currency with the Euro. This means an increase of 2 percentage points in the entire region and a 2 percentage point decrease in the candidate region. (EU28TABLES Q.29)



Even with this small drop, the Euro is attractive to the majority of citizens across the new EU member countries region. We found the highest support levels (82%) for the Euro in Slovenia (+1 percentage point change from autumn 2003). Opposition is strongest in Estonia (47%), Malta (42%) and Latvia (33%). (There was a -2 percentage point decrease in Malta and +3 percentage point increase in Latvia.)

We detected the biggest increase in support for the common currency in Cyprus and in Lithuania (both +7 percentage points). The most significant decrease in support was recorded in the aforementioned Malta (-2 percentage points). The proportion of opponents has increased the most in Estonia and in Romania (both +5 percentage points).


Socio-demographic analyses pinpoint that managers (73%), highly qualified people with more than 20 years of education, and those who are still studying (70% and 65%, respectively) are most especially likely to favour the common currency.

7.2 Opinions on the European Union

We asked the new EU member and candidate countries' citizens about the economic and political stability of nations and about the influence nations and individuals will have in the future in the European Union. The topics will be examined and analysed in two groups based on the above aspects.

Stability

Among the new EU member countries, opinions related to stability enjoy approximately 50% support. Fifty-one percent of the respondents living in the 10 new EU member countries believe that their situation will be safer **as they become members of the European Union**. According to 50% **accession will bring political stability**, and 49% expect **economic stability**. Respondents in the candidate countries agree in higher proportions that their situation would be safer after their accession (63%), and expect economic rather than political stability from the Union in higher proportions (66% vs. 57%). The EU 15 countries agree with these three aspects in lower proportions than both the candidate and the new EU member countries. They mostly perceive a safer situation, and 2 percentage points more (39%) say that the Union brings economic stability rather than political stability (37%).




After analysing the results country by country, we have the following observations regarding each of the statements (*EU28TABLES Q.12*):

- Seventy-six percent of the Romanian, and 73% of Cypriots, agree that **their situation will be safer because** of their European Union membership. Nine percent in Romania and 22% in Cyprus disagree. Fewer than half of the respondents expect more safety from Union membership in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Estonia (48%, 46% and 38%, respectively). In Estonia (just like in the EU 15 zone) citizens are more likely to disagree than to agree with this proposition.
- As regards expectations about **political stability**, Cypriots hope for political stability from the Union in the largest proportion (70%). With the exception of Slovakia (49%), Estonia (46%)

and the Czech Republic (42%), more than 50% in the rest of the countries agree that accession will bring about political stability.

- Citizens of the three candidate countries believe, in the largest proportions, that **following a possible accession to the European Union, their country will become more economically stable** (Romania: 76%; Bulgaria; 71%; Turkey: 62%). Respondents in the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Estonia agree in the smallest proportions (45%, 43% and 43%, respectively). Expectations of economic stability are regarded the least realistic by the EU 15 population; the citizens of these countries disagree in higher proportions that Union membership would provide economic stability for them (47%).



Feeling more stable politically as a member of the EU




Fig. 7.2c

*Source of EU 15 data: Standard Eurobarometer 61 Spring 2004

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1 Februar-March 2004

Question: Please tell me, for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?

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Feeling more stable economically as a member of the EU




Fig. 7.2d

*Source of EU 15 data: Standard Eurobarometer 61 Spring 2004

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1 Februar-March 2004


Question: Please tell me, for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?

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Influence

Among the four examined statements related to **influence**, respondents of the 10 new EU member countries agree in the highest proportions that the biggest countries have the most power in the Union (76%). The candidate countries' population share this view in a significantly lower proportion (63%), while 70% of the EU 15 member countries think it's true. Importantly, in the new EU member countries (most of them small countries compared to the big four or the big six, including Poland and Spain, too), nearly half of the respondents believe that their country will have more influence in the European Union in the future.


Forty-six percent of the new EU member countries' population shares this view, while respondents of the candidate countries agree in a somewhat larger proportion (49%), and citizens of the previous member countries agree with this in the smallest proportion (43%). More believe that the opinion/vote of the nation will count in the European Union (46% among the new EU member countries) than that the opinion/vote of the individual will (27%). The order is the same in the three candidate and the 15 previous member countries; however, in the member countries the difference is bigger: twice as many respondents believe that the opinion of the country counts (63%) as believe that the opinion of the individual does (30%).





Looking at the above statements in country-by-country breakdown we see the followings:

- The **biggest countries have the most power** in the European Union – mostly Cypriots agree with this statement (82%), followed by the Czechs and Estonians (80% and 78%, respectively). Disagreement appears in very small proportions (9-11%) in all of the countries, except for Malta where this proportion is 26%. The proportion of those agreeing is above 70% in all countries, with the exception of Turkey (58%) and Malta (57%). (EU28TABLES Q.12)
- Compared to the previous items, significantly lower proportions are seen in relation with the next statement: the **country will become more influential** in the EU in the future. Somewhat more than half (55%) of Cypriots agree with this statement. The Slovakian, Czech, Estonian and Lithuanian respondents are less hopeful; in these countries the proportion of disagreeing respondents exceeds that of those agreeing.

- In the highest proportions Hungarians (62%) and Cypriots (61%) believe that **the voice of the country will count in the European Union**. The average of the EU 15 countries (63%) surpasses those of all candidate and new EU member countries in this respect. In five countries the majority do not agree with this statement. The largest difference is among the Czech respondents: 27 percentage points more disagree than agree with the statement that the voice of the country will count (26% agree, 53% disagree).
- Only in Malta and Hungary does a relative majority say their personal voice will be more heard in the European Union. Respondents in Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic believe in rather large proportions that their opinion will not count in the European Union (79%, 72%; 70% and 70%, respectively).





My voice will count in the EU




Fig. 7.2i

*Source of EU 15 data: Standard Eurobarometer 61
 Spring 2004

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1
 Februar-March 2004

Question: Please tell me, for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?


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7.3 Opinions on the speed of building Europe

We asked the new EU member and candidate countries respondents about their opinion on the current speed of building Europe, and about the speed they would like to see. We measured the responses on a scale of 1-7. The relative results of the two questions are shown in the figure below.

In the opinion of the 10 new EU member countries, the speed of building Europe is slower than desired. They would prefer a faster integration of Europe by 1.1 average points more (5.34 vs. 4.22). Based on the opinion of the respondents, the difference between the perceived current and the desired speed is larger in the candidate zone. They would prefer a speedier building of Europe (presumably to include their country too) by 1.7 average points. Even in the previous member states the majority is not content with the current pace; the respondents would like to see faster integration. (ANNEX TABLES Q.13A, Q.13B)

As regards the aggregated opinions in the individual countries, respondents of Estonia, Malta and Cyprus feel that the speed of building Europe is faster than they desire. Estonians believe this the most (4.91 vs. 4.02). Slovenians say Europe is being built neither too fast, nor too slow (average point difference is 0.1). In the accession zone, the Polish consider the pace the slowest compared to what they desire (1.7 average point difference between the current and the desired speed).



III. Institutions of the European Union

In this Chapter, before covering the awareness, attributed importance and trust in relation with the most important institutions and bodies of the European Union, we will introduce the reader to the citizens' assessment of the European democracy in contrast with their evaluation of their own national democracies.


8.1 Degree of satisfaction with democracy

Satisfaction with how national democracy works

In the new EU member countries, one-fourth (24%) are very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. While the differences concerning the confidence in political institutions are not particularly significant between the two parts of Europe, levels of satisfaction with national democracy are generally higher (54% satisfied overall) in the previous member states. The candidate countries' satisfaction level (39%) is between that of the previous members and the greatly disillusioned new member states (24%).

Cypriots are the most satisfied with the way democracy works in their country – three-quarters (75%) of the respondents are satisfied. In Malta (56%) and in Turkey (49%) the absolute majority give their country's democracy a positive assessment as well. In all other countries, the absolute majority are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country, notably in Poland (83% unsatisfied), Slovakia, Romania (both 80%), and Bulgaria (75%). The smallest difference can be found in the Czech Republic, though the tendency is toward dissatisfaction (53% are unsatisfied, 43% satisfied). (EU28TABLES Q.39A)

Demographic analyses do not show significant variance across the different social groups. House persons and those who left school are at the age of 15, however, slightly more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (49% and 41%, respectively). Other white collars (37%) and 15-24 year olds (36%) are most likely to feel satisfied, while the unemployed (24%) and the retired (24%) are the groups least satisfied with national democracy.




We have witnessed an increase in the candidate countries in satisfaction with the way democracy works, but citizens in the new member countries report a decrease in satisfaction with their democracies since spring 2003 (satisfied -5 percentage points, unsatisfied +7).

Increase of satisfaction was strong in Turkey (+15), and detectable in the Czech Republic (+3), too. Satisfaction levels regarding national democracy decreased in the highest degree in Poland, Lithuania (both -7) and in Latvia (-5) over the course of the past five-six months.

Satisfaction with how democracy works in the European Union

In the new EU member countries four in 10 people (44%) are very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union. We have to mention that people in the candidate countries as well (49%) as the new member states are more satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union than in their own country. The situation in previous member states is similar to that of the new members, however outright dissatisfaction is more prevalent: levels of satisfaction are 43% satisfied to 40% dissatisfied. In the EU 15 countries the ratio of the satisfied and the dissatisfied are the closest to each other (43% to 40%).

In each of the 13 countries in the survey, those who are satisfied outnumber those who are dissatisfied with EU democracy. Cypriots and Maltese are the most satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union (57% and 54%, respectively). The people in Estonia are the least satisfied with how democracy works in the European Union (satisfied: 35%, dissatisfied: 27%). The least dissatisfied citizens are found in Bulgaria (12% dissatisfied), Romania (16%) and Cyprus (17%). (EU28TABLES Q.39B)




Managers (59%), students (57%) and the most educated people are the most satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union (54%), while those who left school at 15 (40%) and those 55 and older (35%) are least satisfied.

Mixed views on national democracy and how democracy works in the EU

Looking at the new EU member countries, the population is much more satisfied with how democracy works in the European Union than with their national democracy (44% vs. 24% very satisfied or satisfied). Satisfaction with the democracy processes in the EU is also higher in the candidate countries (49% versus 39%). Opposite results can only be found in the EU 15 countries, where respondents are more satisfied with the national democracy than the EU version (54% vs. 43%).

Comparing the assessment of European democracy to the perceived quality of national democracy, we find one single country where citizens are clearly more satisfied with their national democracy and another three where the satisfaction levels regarding national democracy slightly surpassing that regarding the EU democracy. This country is Cyprus, where 75% of the population is satisfied with their national democracy and 57% are more satisfied with the democratic processes of the European Union. The Maltese, the Turks and the Czechs are the further nations where satisfaction with national democratic institutions is similar to satisfaction with the EU variety, but there is a slight positive difference favouring their national democracy.

In all other countries people are more satisfied with how, they think, democracy works in the European Union compared to their national democracy. This attitude is more characteristic of Romania, where we find an enormous 35 percentage point difference favouring EU democracy, 53% are satisfied with how democracy works in European Union, and just 18% have a favourable opinion about Romanian democracy. The Slovaks and Polish are quite disappointed, displaying a 25 (Slovakian) and 30 (Polish) percentage point difference between EU democracy and national democracy.




8.2 The European Union institutions and bodies

Awareness

Generally, EU institutions and bodies are better known in the EU 15 countries than in the ten new EU member countries, but the difference is increasingly smaller, especially in the case of the most widely known institutions. The candidate countries continue to be poorly informed about the most important organisations within the European Union.

First and foremost, the European Parliament is the most well known organization in all the three groups; 88% in NMS countries, 72% in the CC countries, 92% in the EU 15 zone. The second most well known institution is the European Commission (79%, 61% and 80%, respectively). The Council of Ministers, the International Court of Justice and the European Central Bank are also relatively well known in the new EU member countries (60%, 59% and 59%) but less so in the candidate region (45%; 42%, 49%, respectively). In the new member states, The European Court of Auditors dropped to last place on this list with only 23% recalling having heard of this organisation in the new member countries. In the candidate countries the European Ombudsman is the most unknown body of the EU (17%). (EU28TABLES Q.21)



A more detailed look at the country-level results reveals that, in the highest proportion, Slovenians, Slovaks and Czechs (93%, 92% and 90% respectively) are aware of the **European Parliament**. Turks have heard about the EP in the lowest ratio (68%). Managers and respondents who left school when they were 20 or older are somewhat more likely to have heard about the EP (95; 94% respectively) than are those who are still studying (86%), and house persons (59%). Awareness of EP is 1 percentage point up since autumn 2003 on the NMS level, mostly due to the +7 change in awareness in the Czech Republic.

The European Commission is best known in Poland and in Slovenia (both 84%). Bulgarians have heard about it the least, 62%, closely followed by Cypriots with 63%. Demographically, the data shows some difference by gender. The European Commission is better known by males (77%) than females (62%) and also better known to the middle-age generation (73% of the 40-54 year olds). Only 63% of

respondents aged 55 or older mentioned the European Commission. Almost twice as many managers (88%) than house persons (46%) have heard about this institutions.

More than half of the respondents have heard about the next four institutions in the new member countries.

Council of Ministers of the European Union is best known in Slovenia (70%) and in Hungary (66%) and least known in Turkey (43%) and Romania (47%). Demographically, Council of Ministers of the European Union is best known by managers (74%), the least known by house persons (35%), by those who left school at 15 years (37%) and those 55 years or older (44%). Awareness of this institution is 1 percentage point up in the accession zone since the previous wave in autumn 2003, mostly due to the +9 change in awareness in the Czech Republic (*EU28TABLES Q.21*).

Cypriots are very familiar (88%) with the **Court of Justice of the European Communities**, much more so than respondents from Turkey (39%) and the Czech Republic (42%). Managers (75%) and more educated persons (69% among those who finished their studies at 20 or older) are also likely to have heard of the court. At the other end of the scale we found house persons (33%) and the least educated respondents (36%).

Awareness of **The European Central Bank** shows an interesting detail among countries. Respondents in Slovakia and Latvia (both 68%) have heard about this institution in the highest ratio, Turks (45%) and Maltese (47%) show the lowest awareness. Males (60%) surpass females (47%) by 13 percentage points. There is a huge difference between managers (79%) and house persons (35%), as well.

The European Ombudsman is best known by Slovenians (77%), Polish and Cypriots (both 63%). Respondents from Turkey (9%) and Bulgaria (14%) show the least awareness. Managers (62%) and those who left school at the age of 20 or older (54%) are more likely to be familiar with the ombudsman than are house persons (15%) or those who left school at 15 (16%).

One-third of the new EU member countries have heard about the **Social and Economic Committee of the European Union**. Slovaks (43%), Cypriots (40%), Hungarians and Lithuanians (both 39%) claim to recall the institutions in the highest proportions. Bulgarians and Romanians, with only 19% and 24% awareness, are the least likely to have heard about the Social and Economic Committee. Managers (50%) and the most educated respondents (40%) are mainly aware of this body, while house persons (18%) and the oldest generation, those 55+ (23%), have lower awareness of this institution.

As for the **Committee of the Regions** and the **European Court of Auditors**, about one-quarter of the new EU member countries have heard about them (27% and 23% respectively). Both bodies are outstandingly better known among the EU 15 countries than in the currently accessing countries (the difference is 28 percentage points).


There is also a big difference in awareness of the **European Central Bank** and **The Court of Justice** (15 percentage points both in the EU 15).

There is only one European Union institution among the nine that is better known by the currently accessing countries than the EU 15 countries': 54% of the new EU member countries' citizens have heard about the **European Ombudsman**, while this proportion is 20 percentage points lower in the EU 15 countries (34%).

Role of the European Union institutions and bodies

Respondents were asked about the importance of several institutions in the life of the European Union. The attributed importance seems to be closely connected to the awareness of the institutions, as the ranking on *FIGURE 8.2b* below suggests. Most people assign the most importance to the **European Parliament**, primarily among the EU 15 countries (81%), followed by the new EU member countries (78%) and the CC countries (62%). The **European Court of Auditors** dropped to the last place. On average a bit more than one-fourth of the NMS and CC respondents (both 28%), and a bit more than half of the EU 15 countries (54%), think this body plays an important role in the life of the EU.

The **European Commission** is thought to be the second most important, followed by the **Council of Ministers** in the third place. There's a gap between the 10 new EU member countries and the candidate countries (71% and 54% respectively) concerning the importance of the European Commission. The pattern is similar to that of the Council of Ministers, though the gap is narrower (57% and 43%, respectively). Opinions of the **Court of Justice** show an interesting detail as well: 56% of the new EU member countries believe in its importance, while only 42% of the candidate countries and 69% of the EU 15 countries feel the same.



Opinions of the importance of the nine institutions are quite inverted. The EU 15 countries assign higher importance to all the institutions, except one, the European Ombudsman. Forty-eight percent of the NMS countries think that the European Ombudsman plays an important role in the EU, as do only 37% of the EU 15. The European Court of Auditors is thought to be more important in the EU 15 countries than in the new EU member countries (54% versus 28%, 26 percentage points is the difference). The difference is also high regarding the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice (more in the EU 15 countries, by 15 and 13 percentage points respectively, think it's important than in the new EU member countries). (*EU28TABLES Q.22*)

The **European Parliament** is thought to be an important institution mostly by Slovakia (83%), Hungary (81%), Poland and Slovenia (80% both). Turks are the least convinced of its importance (58%). Belief in the importance of this institution has increased by 5 percentage points in the 10 new EU member countries and increased as well in the candidate countries (+3). The biggest increase is in Lithuania (+10) and in Estonia (+9) and the biggest decrease is in Malta (-1). Demographic analyses show that

the highest educated (85%), managers (84%) and males (76%) find the EP to be more important than do house persons (51%) and the least educated respondents (55%) (*ANNEX TABLES Q.22*)

The **European Commission** is seen as the second most important institution in the life of the EU. Poland (76%) and Hungary (74%) lead the region in this opinion. On the other end of the scale are Turkey (51%) and Latvia (56%). The comparison shows that the EC's importance has increased by 8 percentage points in NMS countries and by almost as much in candidate countries (+5). The Czech Republic shows the highest increase (+14), unlike Malta and Latvia where there was no change in belief in the importance of the Commission. Managers (80%) and the highest educated respondents (78%) feel its importance the most, and house persons (43%) and those who finished their studies before the age of 15 (48%) are least likely to think the EC is important.

Council of Ministers of the European Union is most important in Hungary (70%), Cyprus and Slovakia (both 62%) and plays the least important role to Turkey (42%) and Romania (43%). Demographically, **Council of Ministers** seems the most important to managers (66%) and the least important to house persons (33%) and those who left school at 15 (36%). The importance of this institution is up 5 percentage points in NMS countries and candidate countries since spring 2003.

Cypriots (86%) are most likely to feel the **Court of Justice of the European Communities** is important, much more so than respondents from Turkey (40%), the Czech Republic (41%) and Romania (43%). Managers (66%) and higher educated persons (64% among those who finished their studies at 20 or older) are also likely to feel the importance of the court. At the other end of the scale we find house persons (32%) and the least educated respondents (36%). An 8 percentage point increase has been seen in NMS countries, and Court of Justice importance also increased in candidate countries by 7 percentage points.

Importance of **The European Central Bank** shows the following: respondents in Slovakia (66%) feel its importance in the highest number; Turks (40%) and Maltese (42%) in the lowest number. Males (55%) surpass females (44%) by 11 percentage points. There is a huge difference between managers (70%) and house persons (31%) as well. Importance of the Central Bank has increased both in new EU member countries and in candidate countries (+3; +4 percentage points respectively).

The European Ombudsman is the most important to Cypriots (62%), Polish (57%) and Hungarians (56%). Respondents from Bulgaria (13%) believe least in its importance. House persons (20%) and those who left school at the age of 15 (22%) are less likely to be familiar with the Ombudsman than those who left school at 20 years or older (48%) or managers (47%).

The Hungarians (53%) and the Cypriots (48%) feel that **The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union** plays the most important role, more so than do Bulgarians and Slovenians (only 22% each). Managers (43%) and those whole are still studying (42%) are likeliest to find the Economic and Social Committee important, while house person (22%) and the oldest group, those 55+ (26%), are least likely.


Trust

More than five in 10 trust the European Parliament (EP) in NMS countries (53%) and EU 15 countries (54%). Generally, trust in European Union institutions is somewhat higher in the EU 15 zone than in the new member states or the candidate countries. Barely half of the citizens in the latter group trust the EP (48%).

Somewhat less confidence is invested in the European Commission – 48% of the new EU member countries, 42% of the candidate countries and 47% of the EU 15 countries trust it. Forty-four percent of the NMS trust the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Almost the same proportion of the acceding group trusts the European Ombudsman, the Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank (38%, 37% and 36%, respectively). In the candidate countries all three institutions gain less confidence, but the rank order is just the opposite (21%, 33% and 35%, respectively). The Social and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions are less trusted, one in four respondent trusts the Social and Economic Committee in NMS countries, and 22% of the candidate countries trust the

Committee of the Regions. The European Court of Auditors is the least trusted institution in the NMS countries (20%) and the candidate countries as well (22%).

The EU 15 trusts every institution more than do the NMS or CC, expect one: the European Ombudsman is trusted by 38% of the accession countries and only 29% in the EU 15 countries.



Examining the countrywide results for each institution shows us the following:

- The **European Parliament** is trusted most by Romanians (66%, +1 since 2003 autumn) and Hungarians (64%, -2). The least trusting are Latvians and Turks (both 40%, Latvia: -12!). Since autumn 2003 the highest increase in trust in the European Parliament can be seen in Estonia, (+7) and Lithuania (+6). At the same time, some states have experienced EP trust decreases, the most significant being in Latvia (-12 percentage points) and Cyprus (-7 percentage points). Managers (65%) and male respondents (55%) trust the EP more than do females (46%) and house persons (36%) (ANNEX TABLES Q.23).
- Romanians (59%) and Hungarians (58%) trust the **European Commission** more than any other nationality, while Latvians (32%), Turks and Czechs (35% both) trust this body the least. Managers (61%) and those who finished their studies at the age of 20 or older (59%) trust the EC more than do the retired (40%) or house persons (30%). Lithuanian and Slovenian trust in the European Commission has increased in the highest proportion, by 8 points compared to results from autumn 2003. In Estonia trust has increased by 7 percentage points in the last six months. There is also an increase in Romania (+4) and in Turkey (+3). The highest drop has been experienced in Latvia (-11) and in Cyprus (-5).
- The **Court of Justice of the European Communities** is trusted most by Cypriots (76%, an increase of 5 percentage points since autumn 2003). Other countries have much less trust in the Court of Justice: Slovakia (56%), Hungary (53%) and Bulgaria (49%). We can see an increase in trust in Lithuania (+12), Slovenia (+11), Hungary and Romania (both +8), Turkey (+7) and Bulgaria (+6), and a decrease in the Czech Republic (-6) and Latvia (-3).

- Trust in the **European Ombudsman** is measured on a wide continuum. Slovenians (47%), Polish (46%) and Hungarians (44%) trust it the most and Lithuanians (13%), Turks (16%) and the Czechs (19%) trust the least. As the results of autumn 2003 show, trust in this institution has increased by 5 percentage points among CC countries and has not changed in new EU member countries. As for country results, there is an increase in Malta (+11), Turkey (+7), Hungary and Slovenia (both +6). The greatest decrease can be seen in Latvia (-8).

- Trust in **The Council of Ministers** has fallen to fifth place in new EU member countries and fourth place in the CC countries. Hungarians have the most trust (54%), but only 26% of Czechs concur. Trust in this body has decreased by -1 percentage point in NMS countries since the spring 2003 survey, but the CC average has increased by 3 percentage points. When looking at the individual country results, we can say that the greatest drop has been in Cyprus and in Latvia (both -9) followed by Poland (-3). The highest increase of trust is in Lithuania and in Slovenia (both by 6 percentage points).

- The **European Central Bank** is trusted mostly by Bulgarians, 49%, compared to 29% of Turks. Trust in the European Central Bank has decreased by 1 percentage point in NMS countries and has increased by 5 points in candidate countries since the 2003 spring survey.

- Individual country results show that Hungarians are the most trusting of the **Economic and Social Committee of the European Union** (41%), while Czechs are the least (18%).


9. The European Parliament

As we look toward the European Parliament elections, the way candidate countries view the EP, their willingness to vote (and how turnout can be increased), their reasons for participation, and the major issues become more and more important. In this subchapter we go through these topics one by one and see some interesting comparisons between previous and new EU member countries.

9.1 Awareness and attitudes toward the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been the most widely known European institution in the candidate countries for years. In the most recent survey, almost nine out of 10 (88%) of the NMS citizens said that they have heard about it, what is only 4 percentage points lower than that of the previous EU member states (92%). On the NMS level, about one out of 10 respondents had not heard about the EP -- this ratio is 7% in the EU 15. In the three candidate countries only 72% of the respondents said that they have heard about EP, while one-quarters of them had not.

Awareness of the **European Parliament** ranges from 93% in Slovenia to 68% in Turkey. Among the accession states, the most aware are in Slovenia (93%), Slovakia (92%), the Czech Republic (90%), Malta and Poland (both 88%), Estonia and in Hungary (both 87%), whilst relatively few people are aware of the EP in Lithuania (85%), Latvia (82%) or Cyprus (76%). (see more about awareness of European institutions in the previous chapter and *EU28TABLES Q.21*)




Respondents were also asked – among other things – about the importance of several institutions in the life of the European Union. Most people assign the most importance to the **European Parliament**, primarily in the EU 15 countries (81%) followed by the new EU member countries (78%) and the CC countries (62%). The EP plays a more important role now in all regions than six months ago: there has been a 4 percentage point increase in the member countries, a 5 percentage point increase in the NMS, and a 3 percentage point increase in the CC zone.

The **European Parliament** is thought to be an important institution mostly by Slovakia (83%), Hungary (81%), Poland and Slovenia (both 80%), while the highest rate of increase shows in Lithuania with +10 percentage points (from 59% to 69%). Turks are the least convinced of its importance (58%).


The survey has investigated trust levels towards nine of the European Union's institutions and bodies as well. The public in the new EU member countries trusts the **European Parliament** just as much as the citizens in the previous member states do (54% in the EU 15 countries and 53% in the NMS). Besides this, it is noteworthy that twice as many respondents in the previous member states do not trust the EP (29% of them) as in the new EU member and candidate countries (14% both).

Trend analysis shows that the awareness and importance of the EP in the new EU member countries grows unbrokenly, while trust shows some fluctuation over the past four years and is now at the same level as it was one year ago (53%).



9.2 The role of the European Parliament and the National Parliament

Eurobarometer also investigated attitudes toward the European Parliament’s power and influence. Respondents in the new EU member countries clearly think that the European Parliament has more power than their national legislative body (31% totally agree, and 31% tend to agree as well), maybe acknowledging its supra-national, pan-European influence. On the NMS level, only 18% disagree to some extent, while 20% have no opinion on this issue. In comparison, respondents are much more divided about this question in the EU 15 countries; only a slim majority feel that the EP is more powerful than the national parliament. Citizens in the CC are rather hesitant; altogether only 60% of them could answer this question, while 40% of them could not decide. (EU28TABLES Q.46.2)



The prestige of the institution is especially high in Slovenia and Hungary. Besides them, the number of “totally agree” respondents is also very high in Cyprus (50%) and in Romania (44%).

Estonia (22%), Malta (21%) and Slovakia (20%) are least likely to believe the EP has more power than their national governments.

Men rate the power of the EP somewhat higher than women do (57% as opposed to 51%). Overall, more managers and manual workers (both 64%) than the self-employed (48%) and house persons (37%) think the EP has more power than the lower house of the national parliament.

The response rate as well as the rejection rate of this statement grows with education level: 40% agreed and 14% disagreed of those who left school before they were 16 years old, while 59% agreed and 22% disagreed of those who studied until aged 20 or older.


Those who think that the European membership is a good thing are more likely (56%) than not (46%) to say the EP has more power than their own national parliament.

Attitudes regarding the effects of EP and regional institutions on everyday life turn up some interesting data.

On average, most people think that the national parliaments have the greatest impact in the new EU member countries (some or great effect: 79%) and in the previous member states (some or great effect: 88%).

Respondents in the forthcoming member countries think that the activities of the European Union and the EP have great effect on their life in the same proportion as citizens in the previous member states.


Overall, 15% of the new EU member countries' citizens consider EP decisions to have a great impact on their lives, and a further 33% believe EP decisions have some effect. We find the same structure of opinions in each NMS country, with different emphases. The proportion of those who do not attribute any direct effect to the EP is highest in Lithuania (46%), Slovenia (41%), Slovakia and the Czech Republic (both 38%). At the same time, those who believe that the EP has a great effect on their lives are most prominent in Malta (28%), Cyprus (25%), Romania and Hungary (both 21%). (EU28TABLES Q.45.1-Q.45.5)



On the other hand, almost four in 10 citizens in the new EU member countries believe that the decisions and activities of the EP have no affect on their lives at all (37% compared to 24% in the EU 15 countries). The EP is considered to have much less impact on the lives of the citizens in the new EU member countries (just like in the previous member states) than national government, parliament, or local government. The EU in general is considered to have more direct effect than the EP on one's life.

The importance of the EP elections in the new EU member countries

A large majority of citizens in the new EU member countries are convinced that the EP elections are "really important". On an NMS level, 34% agree completely, and a further 40% agree somewhat that elections are "really important". (In the previous member states only 18% agree completely and 44% agree somewhat.) It is interesting that in the accession states only 11% tend to disagree or totally disagree, but the ratio among the previous members is almost twice as high (21%).



Again, Slovenians and Hungarians are most likely to totally agree or tend to agree that the EP elections are really important. Among the new EU member countries, citizens in Estonia and the Czech Republic are relatively less convinced about the importance of the event. (EU28TABLES Q.46.3)

9.3 Channels to get information about a member of the European Parliament

The media, reflecting the forthcoming European Parliament elections, pay more and more attention to this topic, therefore Eurobarometer asked the citizens in the new EU member countries and in the three candidate states where they get information about previous members of the European Parliament. Besides the three basic news media, we listed other channels of information as well, such as the Internet, public meetings and short leaflets.


As there were no MEPs neither in the new member states nor in the candidate countries at the time of the fieldwork; the respondents might answered this question with regard to MEPs in the previous Parliament (from other member states), or they included in their assessment the observers delegated by their own country, too.

Overall, only 29% of respondents in the new EU member countries did not access them nor had no information about a member of the European Parliament (we suspect that many respondents in the new member states considered current observers as MEPs too). Total lack of contact with MEPs applies to 31% in the CC and – interestingly – 38% in the previous EU member countries. (EU28TABLES Q.43)

In the new EU member countries **television** is the most frequently mentioned source of information regarding a member of the European Parliament. The absolute majority of the new EU member countries' citizens received information about MEPs from television (55%), while this proportion is about 10 percentage points lower in the three candidate countries (45%) and previous member states (44%).


Magazines and newspapers come in second in every region. About one-third of the NMS (35%) and previous member states (32%) reported that they read about European parliamentarians. In the candidate countries, 28% of the citizens said that they read about the members of the EP.

The third most frequently mentioned information channel in every region is the radio. About one-quarter (26%) of NMS respondents heard from MEPs on the radio, while this proportion is only 15% on the EU 15 level. In the three candidate countries, about one-fifth (19%) of the citizens said that they get information about MEPs from the radio.




Radio, television and print are rather passive sources – individuals take what they get, regardless of their interest. The **Internet** is one of the more active sources, on the web people have to select what they are interested in and search for it. This is somewhat true for **public meetings** as well. Although very few people choose these active channels of information, it is clear that NMS respondents (9%) are more likely than previous members (5%) to use the Internet to learn more about EP members, even if Internet penetration rates are lower in this zone. The personal contact at a public meeting is most popular among previous member citizens (3%), but some future member states' citizens received information from the members of the EP at public meetings, too.

Eurobarometer also asked how people would prefer to get information about MEP member. We find that the medium people want is usually what they get.



If we look at the differences between the received and the intended sources of information about the EP members by the channels of information, we get the net intentions of each source. (see *FIGURE 9.3c* below)

It is interesting that the highest proportion of difference regards public meetings. It means that most in the new EU member and candidate countries would prefer to see EP members face to face at public meetings (15% and 13%) more often than they do. In the previous member states, 8 percentage points more people said that they would be interested in seeing members of the European Parliament at public meetings than currently do. About the same proportion of people need more contact through leaflets, newsletters or letters from the members of the EP. The deficit of this info source in the new EU member countries overall is 13%, 12% on the CC level, and 9% in the previous member states. (*EU28TABLES Q.44*)




9.4 Participation in EP elections

Ten countries among the candidate states will take part in the next European Parliament elections to be held in June 2004. Eurobarometer asked how likely people in these new EU member countries think they are to participate in this election.

Without any exceptions, the rates of intention to vote have increased in the last six months in all of the new EU member countries. Now, about one-third of the citizens said that they will definitely vote. The highest increase was registered in Malta, where 15 percentage points more people say they will vote.


We can establish that the proportions of willingness to vote are at about the same level in the previous EU member states and in the new EU member countries. In both regions about one-third of the people (NMS: 32% and EU 15: 34%) said that they will definitely vote in the election.

Among the new EU member countries, only the Maltese (58%) can claim an absolute majority who think they would definitely vote in EP elections. Although now 6 percentage points more people say they will definitely vote in the EP election (32%), the proportion who say they will definitely not vote (16%) is also 6 percentage points higher than it was six months earlier.



The most likely to participate are citizens from Malta (58%), as was mentioned above, but Hungary (47%), Cyprus (46%), Slovenia (39%) and Latvia (35%) are also still above the EU 15 and the NMS average. The least likely are in Estonia (21%), although the rate is still higher than it was half year ago. Turnout would remain under the 30% threshold in Lithuania (26%), in the Czech Republic (24%) and in Estonia (21%). (EU28TABLES Q.41)

Trend analysis shows that the willingness to vote in the EP elections, after a small trough of a wave in autumn 2003, is now at about the same level as a year before, while the rate of those who said they will definitely not take part in the election has now reached the highest proportion (16%) since measures began. The result is that today twice as many people think that they definitely would vote as won't.



Demographic results show that males have a higher willingness to take part in EP elections than do females (34% and 31%, respectively). As for age categories, the late middle-aged (40-54 years old) have the most (39%), and the youngest have the least (25%) willingness to take part in elections. Managers also lead, according to the main economic category -- 38% of them expressed willingness to take part in EP elections.

Male	34%	Self-employed	36%
Female	31%	Managers	38%
AGE: 15-24 years	25%	Other white collars	30%
AGE: 25-39 years	32%	Manual workers	34%
AGE: 40-54 years	39%	House persons	33%
AGE: 55+ years	32%	Unemployed	30%
EDU: up to 15 years	28%	Retired	33%
EDU: 16-19 years	32%	EU membership is a good thing	44%
EDU: 20+ years	43%	EU membership is a bad thing	18%
EDU: still studying	25%	EU membership neither good nor bad	27%


Comparison of participation in EP elections and national election

We asked about the likelihood of voting in the national (local parliament) elections. If we compare those answers to intended EP voting rates, it becomes clear, that – with the exception of Malta and Cyprus – the respondents in the new member countries would definitely vote in the EP elections in about the same ratio as in hypothetical national elections – in other words, in this hypothetical level they do not make distinctions between the two. On the NMS level the proportions are exactly the same (32 to 32%), while in the previous EU member states we find an 8 percentage point advantage in favour of the national election.

In Malta there are about 6 percentage points more people, and in Cyprus 13 percentage points more people, who would rather participate in a national election as an EP election.


The only two countries where we find a higher number of people who will definitely vote in the EP election as national elections are Slovenia (39% vs. 38%) and Poland (31% as opposed to 28%). (for more details see *EU28TABLES Q.40*).

In reality, the mobilisation rates on national elections are much higher in the NMS zone, compared to the pathetic turnout rates we have seen on the EP elections this June.



Reasons for participation in EP elections


Regarding the forthcoming EP elections it is very interesting to investigate the reasons why people would vote in their own country – what the main party characteristics are, and which characteristics the voters will appreciate.



One of the main findings is that NMS citizens are much more likely than previous member citizens to vote for personalities. In the new EU member countries, 45% of the respondents said that the most important reason for deciding who to **vote for** is **the person** him or herself, while only 17% of previous

member citizens think so. (In many countries there was no possibility to vote on candidates, but only for closed, non-preferential party lists.) The second most common thing to elicit vote choice is **party preference** (NMS: 25%, EU 15: 22%). **Opinion about the European issues** (NMS: 31%, EU 15: 35%) is about as important in both regions.

The most important reason for people in the new EU member countries to vote is the **policies of the candidate**, which mostly divides between the left and right side of the political palette. More than every second respondent on the NMS level mentioned that this is the most important reason to vote for somebody. In the EU 15, the **policy of the candidate(s)** is the most important instigator, but much less significantly – 39% of the EU 15 citizens mentioned it. (see *EU28TABLES Q.42*)




The **policy of the candidate(s)** is more important to the respondents in Poland and in Hungary (both 56%) than the region on average. On the other hand, Cypriots (26%) and Estonians (29%) are least likely to think that.

By looking the demographic characteristics, the **policy of the candidate(s)** is more often mentioned by men (55%) than women (49%), and more by the younger generations (15 to 39 years old: 55%) than the older ones (aged 40 to 54: 51%, 55 years and above: 47%). Candidate policies were mentioned by 47% of those who left school before they were 16 years old, 50% of those who stopped full-time education between 16 and 19, and 55% of those who studied until age 20 or older.

By economic activity, candidate policies were rather more characteristic of managers and manual workers (both 54%), while only 37% of house persons and 49% of retired people mentioned them.

Analysis by attitude toward EU membership shows that 56% of citizens who think membership is a good thing said the most important driver of their votes is the policy of the candidate(s). Forty-seven percent of those who think EU membership is a bad thing concur.




Forty-five percent of those who will join the Union in May 2004 said **national issues** elicit their votes – the same number named the **personality of the candidate**. Unlike the previous member countries, 38% in the new EU member countries said **national issues**, a number very similar (39%) to those who mentioned the **policy of the candidate(s)**.

On the individual country level, national issues are least compelling for Hungarians (34%) and Slovenes (40%). The **opinion of the candidates about the national issues** is the most important thing in Cyprus (66%), Estonia (55%), Latvia (68%), Lithuania (66%), and Malta (54%).


National issues are more important for men than women (49% to 42%), and more so to the younger age groups (52% among 15-24 year olds and 51% among 25-39 year olds) than the older ones (42% among those 40 to 54, and 38% among those 55 years and older). By economic activity, national issues have the greatest impact among managers (52%), other collar workers (55%) and the self-employed (54%). The retired and the unemployed are much less concerned (both 38%) with national issues when they vote.

The role of the **candidate's personality** is very different in the new EU member countries, but overall it is significantly more important than in the previous member states.

The proportion of those who mentioned the personality of the candidates ranged from 30% in Estonia and Malta to 70% in Slovakia. In the middle are the Czechs (63%), Cypriots (52%) and Lithuanians (46%). The personality of the candidate is rather more motivating for men (47%) than women (43%). Personality is less important to the youngest generation (42% said that it is important for them), than to people aged 55 and over (48%). **Personality** is more important to the self-employed (54%) than those with a middle or high level of education (both 46%).



The **party of the candidate** is the least effective factor on the list, but still mentioned by every four out of 10 people. This was mentioned mostly by the Maltese, it drives every second voter (49%). At the other end of the scale – which represents the countries where the parties have the least impact on voters – we find Estonia with 14% and in Lithuania with 17% of mentions. In Hungary 37% of people, and 30% in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia, said that political parties are an important consideration when voting.



The demographical analysis shows that men are more likely to vote on party lines than are women (28% vs. 22%). Party is more motivating to those who left full-time education at age 15 (30%) than it is

to those who left school between the ages of 16-19 (26%) and those who didn't leave school until they were at least 20 (25%).

The following table gives an overview about the most frequently mentioned reasons. It shows the three most important factors by country.

The **policies of the candidate** – as the main reason to vote for EP candidates – is mentioned among the top three in nine new EU member countries; in first place in Hungary and in Poland (both 56%); in second place in the Czech Republic (51%), Latvia (42%), Malta (52%) and Slovenia (43%); and the third place in Estonia (29%), Lithuania (40%) and Slovakia (45%).

As mentioned above, people in the new EU member countries are more likely than previous member citizens to vote on persons. This is rather more characteristic of Czechs (63%) and Slovaks (70%), who ranked this motivator first. The magic of the personality of the candidates plays an important role in Cyprus (52%), Lithuania (46%), Latvia (42%), Poland (40%), Hungary (36%) and Estonia (30%), as well.

Table 9.4b Top3 ranking the most important reasons for deciding who to vote for
(% of mentions, by country and NMS-10 average)

Cyprus		Lithuania	
Opinion about the national issues	66	Opinion about the national issues	66
The personality of the candidate(s)	52	The personality of the candidate(s)	46
Opinion about the European issues	30	The policies of the candidate(s)	40
Czech Republic		Malta	
The personality of the candidate(s)	63	Opinion about the national issues	54
The policies of the candidate(s)	51	The policies of the candidate(s)	52
Opinion about the national issues	47	The party of the candidate(s)	49
Estonia		Poland	
Opinion about the national issues	55	The policies of the candidate(s)	56
The personality of the candidate(s)	30	Opinion about the national issues	44
The policies of the candidate(s)	29	The personality of the candidate(s)	40
Hungary		Slovakia	
The policies of the candidate(s)	56	The personality of the candidate(s)	70
The party of the candidate(s)	37	Opinion about the national issues	52
The personality of the candidate(s)	36	The policies of the candidate(s)	45
Latvia		Slovenia	
Opinion about the national issues	68	The policies of the candidate(s)	43
The policies of the candidate(s)	42	Opinion about the national issues	40
The personality of the candidate(s)	42	Opinion about the European issues	39

9.5 Main issues of the EP campaign


In general, all but two of the main issues of the EP campaign have lost from their importance in the NMS over the last six months, which is not true on the EU 15 level.

In most new EU member countries citizens expect the EP election campaign to address the problem of unemployment, and agriculture is frequently ranked among the top three desired foci of the EP campaign.

As we presented in Chapter 1.3 (Problems facing the nations), **employment** is the prime issue in the new EU member countries and correspondingly, it is the single most important desired focus of the EP campaign as well. The opinion of the respondents did not changed much in the past six months, though there was a 2 percentage point reduction, but employment was the most mentioned issue last autumn as well. In the previous member states people most frequently mentioned unemployment, with a 5 percentage point increase in the last six months. Nevertheless, more of the NMS than previous member citizens (70% to 59%) think unemployment should be the most important campaign issue.

Eurobarometer found that the European Parliament election campaign, according to the citizens in the new member states, should focus second on **agriculture**: 56% of new member countries' citizens hold this opinion, 5 percentage points than did six months before. In the previous member states, the weight of this issue has also increased (with 3% points), but still in a much smaller ratio -- only one-quarter (24%) mentioned it. We found the greatest difference between EU 15 citizens and new EU member countries' respondents concerning this issue (32 percentage points). (see *EU28TABLES Q.47*)

In third place, almost every second respondent in the NMS (49%) mentioned **country-specific issues**. Last autumn this topic was mentioned by 56% of people, so its importance in the EP elections has decreased 7 percentage points. But in the new member states country-specific issues gained 6 percentage points since the previous survey, putting them at 35%.



The third most important campaign element in the new EU member countries (42%) is their **rights as EU citizens**, while only one-third of previous EU respondents think so. In the past six months, the

magnitude of this issue decreased 6 percentage points in the new member states (from 48% to 42%), but increased 7 points in the previous member countries (from 26% to 33%).

Crime is one of the topics that is much less important to the countries that joined the EU in 2004 than to the previous EU member countries (41% to 45%). In fact, the saliency of crime in the elections has fallen in the last six months.

It is also noteworthy that one of the biggest differences of opinion (25 percentage points) between the previous EU and new member citizens is the importance of **immigration**. Every second (20%) new EU member countries citizen mentioned immigration as an important topic in the campaign, while 45% of previous EU citizens agree. Since last autumn, the ratio of those who say EP candidates should be worried about crime decreased 1 percentage point in the NMS and increased in the previous member states.

Education as a campaign element is important for 40% of respondents in the acceding countries, just as it was half a year ago. In the previous EU member countries, 32% now say that the campaign should focus on education, a three-point upsurge since the previous survey.

Previous and new EU citizens are about equally concerned about **protection of the environment** (34% and 31%), **common defence policy** (22% and 24%), and **foreign policy** (20% and 22%) in the EP elections.

To NMS respondents – and the EU 15 citizens – the least important issues in the European Parliament election campaigns are the **enlargement of the EU** (17% mentioned it on the NMS level), the concrete **activities of the EP** (13%), and the **reforms of the EU institutions** (gained 13 points as well). All of these topics have decreased 5 points since autumn 2003.

Looking at the individual countries' data from *TABLE 9.5* in the next page, again we should emphasize that among all the important campaign elements, the question of employment is one of the top three items in all 10 countries. This item is mentioned most often in seven of 10 countries -- in Slovakia (79%), Poland (72%), Malta (71%), the Czech Republic and Slovenia (in both 70%), Latvia (57%) and Estonia (55%). Employment is named second in Hungary (67%), and third in Cyprus (61%) and Lithuania (56%). The question of agriculture was mentioned by more than 50% of citizens in the 10 future member countries, and was in the top three of four of them. Agriculture was mentioned first in Hungary (68%), second in Poland (57%) and Slovenia (47%) and third in Latvia (50%).

Table 9.5 The European Parliament election campaign should mainly focus on ...
(% of mentions, by country and NMS average)


NMS		Lithuania	
employment	70	issues specific to (COUNTRY)	68
agriculture	56	crime	57
issues specific to (COUNTRY)	49	employment	56
Cyprus		Malta	
issues specific to (COUNTRY)	73	employment	71
education	62	issues specific to (COUNTRY)	62
employment	61	environment	62
Czech Republic		Poland	
employment	70	employment	72
rights as a EU citizen	50	agriculture	57
crime	50	issues specific to (COUNTRY)	42
Estonia		Slovakia	
employment	55	employment	79
issues specific to (COUNTRY)	48	rights as a EU citizen	63
crime	36	issues specific to (COUNTRY)	59
Hungary		Slovenia	
agriculture	68	employment	70
employment	67	agriculture	47
issues specific to (COUNTRY)	60	issues specific to (COUNTRY)	44
Latvia			
employment	57		
issues specific to (COUNTRY)	53		
agriculture	50		

How to increase willingness to vote

Low turnouts for EP elections have traditionally harmed the legitimacy of the legislative body of the European Union. Eurobarometer also investigated if there are ways to better mobilise citizens to vote in European Parliament elections. We presented a list of possibilities regarding the elections and the voting itself, such as through the Internet or at the supermarket. We asked if people would be more likely to vote if one of these new services were available, or not.

The analysis shows that none of the listed propositions met with unconditional support among the NMS citizens -- they remain rather sceptical that any of these would enhance the likelihood of their attendance in EP elections. The most affirmed method was only appealing to one-third of the people in the new EU member countries. But, as our numbers reflect, each of the propositions could at least somewhat further mobilise citizens for voting in May 2004.

Comparing recent results to those of last autumn, it is clear that this scepticism did not lessen. We found less increased willingness to vote in every category.



Overall, the most frequently mentioned method of voter encouragement – **if the local election were organised on the same day as the EU election** – was chosen by 34% of the respondents. On the other hand, every second person (53%) said it would not affect their willingness to vote. (see EU28TABLES Q.48)

If we look at these mobilizing factors within an individual country, we find interesting details within the region. Organising **local elections on the same day as EU elections** would increase the number of citizens taking part in EP elections mostly in the Czech Republic (46% confirming higher likelihood of participation in both countries), in Slovakia (42%), and in Lithuania (35%) – compared to the NMS average of 34%. It would have the least effect in Latvia (25%).

The second most frequently mentioned idea, **regional lists of candidates**, would increase interest in voting among 29% of respondents in the future member countries. Among the new EU member countries, we find the highest proportion of people who agree in Malta and Poland (both 40%), but above-NMS average rates in Cyprus (30%). On the other hand, this proposition would have a rather modest effect in Hungary (11%).

Making **public transport free** on Election Day would mobilize 26%, but for 63% it is not a reason to vote. The effect of mobilisation has fallen 7 percentage points since last autumn (from 33% to 26%). The proportion who would not be more likely to vote due to free transportation has increased 9 percentage points (from 54% to 63%). **Free public transportation** would much more likely inspire Lithuanian voters (37%) than any other nationality. The most moderate effect of free public transport was found in Hungary (13%).

If **EP elections took place on the same day throughout the EU** (which will be almost the case in 2004 for the very first time in EU history), fewer than one-quarter (24%) of NMS respondents would be compelled to vote, but it has no effect on the willingness of 61% in the future member countries. Six months ago, 32% thought that this would improve their likelihood of voting and 10% fewer (51% to 61%) said a common election day wouldn't encourage them to vote. Nevertheless, this is an above average (24%) factor in Cyprus (34%) and Malta (31%), while the most negative answers were given by Hungarians (79%), Slovenes, Latvians (both 64%), Slovaks (63%) and Maltese (62%).

The possibility of **voting at one's workplace** would increase the general willingness to vote in EU elections for 23% in the new EU member countries, while it wouldn't be attractive to two-thirds (66%) of the NMS. Compared to survey results from autumn 2003, the current measure shows a 6 percentage point decrease and 9 percentage points increase among those on whom voting at the workplace doesn't have any effect. It is accepted in an above-average rate in Cyprus, Estonia (37% both), Lithuania (33%), Slovakia and in the Czech Republic (both 27%). On the other hand, such a possibility would have the least effect in Hungary, where it would inspire only 17% of citizens, but wouldn't have any effect on the voting habits of 79%.

While six months ago, one-quarter of respondents said that they would be more likely to take part in the EP election **if it were possible to vote on the Internet**. Now this ratio has fallen to one-fifth (20%) and the ratio of those who said that it would not increase their willingness to vote is now six percentage points higher, 69%.

The possibility of **voting over the Internet** is the most attractive for Estonian (34%) and Slovene respondents (32%). But overall we do not see much encouragement from the Internet to vote in Hungary (82% refused) in Malta (77%), in Cyprus (75%) and in Slovakia (72%).

As far as candidate countries are concerned, setting up **voting booths in supermarkets** does not seem to be the best solution for inviting more people to take part in EP elections. The promise of this option decreased in the last six months as well in new EU member countries: the number of those who would be more likely to vote if they could do it in the supermarket has fallen 5 percentage points (15%), while the number of those who would not be more likely to vote has increased by 7 percentage points. In the most recent survey, almost three-quarters (74%) of new EU member countries' citizens said they would be no more likely to vote in supermarkets, while 15% it would make their voting more probable. This option is more popular than the NMS average in Lithuania (32%), Latvia (24%), Estonia (22%) and Cyprus (20%).

The least effective voter motivation strategies in the NMS would be **having citizens from other states' candidates on the ballot**. This option would increase the willingness to vote of only 12%.

On the country level we can see that 15% of Polish and Estonians would be more inclined to take part in EP elections, while Hungarians (4%) and Czechs (7%) are the least inclined to vote via this method.

10. Institutional Reforms

In this chapter we analyse opinions about institutional and organisational issues of the European Union; about the EU budget, about the way the presidency should work in the European Union, how people are thinking about their national right of veto in the EU, and about some other structural issues connected to the institutional reforms proposed by the Constitution draft.

10.1 Budget

In the course of the survey, we asked respondents in which area they thought the European Union spends most of its budget. We listed six areas in the question:

- *Employment and social affairs*
- *Agriculture*
- *Scientific research*
- *Regional aid*
- *Foreign policy and aid to countries outside the European Union*
- *Administrative and personnel costs, buildings*

The new EU member countries suspect personnel costs rival agriculture (19% both) in the EU budget. In the opinion of 13%, employment and social affairs take the biggest cut of the EU budget, and according to 11% foreign policy and aid to countries outside the European Union take the most from the common budget (*EU28TABLES Q.35*)


Nearly one-fourth (24%) of citizens of the previous member countries (incorrectly) say the Union budget is the most burdened by administrative and personnel costs. Fourteen percent each say agriculture and foreign aid are the EU's biggest expenditures.

Among the citizens of the candidate countries, the majority (16%) believe administrative and personnel costs constitute the largest item in the EU budget. The second most frequently mentioned area was foreign affairs and aid to countries outside the European Union (14%), and the third was scientific research (12%).

In the new EU member countries, the Union is very much perceived as a bureaucratic institution. And it is not surprising that people in these countries presuppose significant EU agricultural expenditures -- the majority in the new EU member countries are heavily involved in agriculture, therefore their population is well-exposed to the subsidies, rules and liabilities relating to CAP and their national agricultural industry.

Uncertainty within the candidate countries is significantly higher: one-fifth (20%) of the citizens of the previous member countries, nearly one-fourth (23%) in the new EU member countries and somewhat more than one-third (34%) of the candidate countries population could not answer the question. Among the surveyed 13 countries, the highest proportion of respondents providing an answer to the question was found in Slovenia (87%), and the lowest proportion was in Bulgaria (55%).

Among the surveyed countries, Malta (31%) had the highest proportion saying the EU spends the most on employment and social affairs. The Polish are likeliest (23%) to believe the EU spends the most on agriculture. The Turkish are likeliest to call scientific research (17%) the biggest part of the EU budget, and the highest proportions of those who regard regional aid to take the largest cut are Maltese and Latvians (both 12%). Romanians are likeliest (18%) to believe that the EU allocates the most funding to foreign policy and aid to countries outside the European Union. Among the surveyed countries, Slovenians share the opinion in the highest numbers (33%) that the greatest proportion of the EU budget is consumed by administrative and personnel costs.



Men were more certain than women; one-fourth of them could not answer the question, while one third of women could not. Men are likeliest to think most of the EU budget goes to employment and social affairs (15%), and agricultural subsidies (14%). Among women, employment and social affairs is the most mentioned item (15%), followed by foreign affairs (14%). The proportion of the uncertain is higher among older respondents than among the younger age groups: one-fifth (21%) of the 15-24 year olds said they did not know which area is most supported by the EU, as did two-fifths (40%) of the older cohort. When they do give an answer, the oldest group is likelier to suppose the EU spends the most on agriculture (9% among the youngest, and 15% among the oldest respondents). When looking at employment groups, we find that managers were able to answer the question in the largest proportion (82%), and house persons in the smallest (58%).


10.2 Council presidency

Respondents in all regions are rather more divided as opposed to having a definite opinion about the six-month presidency. In the political sphere there is an extensive acceptance of the idea to abolish the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers. The rotating presidency could be replaced by a more permanent presidency of each individual Council formation.

The NMS respondents also agree that the period of the presidency should be extended – as expressed by 45% of them. In the previous member countries almost every second respondent (49%) thinks that the six-month presidency is too short to achieve significant results and it should be extended. Twenty-seven percent among the EU 15 citizens and 35% of the people in the new member states said that this method should be preserved as it guarantees every member a chance at the presidency. On the NMS level one-fifth of the citizens (20%) could not decide, while in the previous member states this proportion is one-quarter (24%). People in the CC are much more divided, and could answer this question in a lower proportion: one-third (33%) of them support the extension of the six month period of presidency of the Council, and about one-third (32%) of them said that this period should be retained. Thirty-four percent of them could not or would not answer this question.

Among the 10 new EU member countries, and above the NMS average (45%), Hungarians, Latvians (both 48%) and Polish (47%) are likeliest to think that six months is too short and it should be extended, while the least support comes from the Czech (37%) and Estonian (39%) respondents.


On the other hand, Cypriots (47%) and Slovenes (44%) claim in the highest proportions that they do not prefer to change the current method, and think that it should be retained because it gives each member state a chance to hold the Presidency of the European Union on a regular basis. If we look at the difference between people who tend to support the extension of the period of presidency and those who think it should be retained as it was before, we find that people prefer a longer period of presidency in the 13 countries -- Hungary, Latvia and Poland, as mentioned above, but also Lithuania (+12 percentage points), Turkey (+4 points) and Malta (+3 percentage points). The most divided are Slovakian, Slovenian and Bulgarian respondents, where nearly the same proportions of citizens are for and against the six-month presidency. (EU28TABLES Q.32)



The demographical analysis shows that the younger generation (43% of 15-24 year olds and 42% of 25-39 year olds) are more likely to support the extension of the six-month presidency than are the 40-54 year olds (39%) and those aged 55 and over (32%). The highest proportion of those who think six months is too short to achieve significant results are managers (48%) and other white collar workers (47%), while only 34% of the retired and 29% of house persons share this point of view.

There are significant differences as well between those who support European Union membership and those who don't. Forty percent of those who think membership is a good thing support the expansion of the presidency, as do 37% of those who think membership is a bad thing.


Comparing this with earlier results there is a slightly increasing proportion of those who think that the EU presidency should be longer. Meanwhile somewhat lower proportions of respondents think that this period should be retained and the non-response rate is dropping, too.



10.3 The opinions about the right of veto

In discussions of the institutional reforms of the European Union, the question of the right of veto comes up again and again. Overall we can say that people in all regions are rather more of the opinion that the right of veto should be retained as it is in order to preserve essential national interests. It seems that if the “right of veto” is clearly connected with preserving essential national interests in the question wording, people in all parts of Europe are in favour of keeping it. (Previous surveys suggested that citizens are in favour of abolishing the consensual decision making, if they were explained that it would lead to a more efficient operation of the EU.)

In the new EU member countries, more than every second respondent (54%) thinks that the right of veto should be retained, while among the previous member states we find only 41% who share this view. On the NMS level 21%, and in the previous member states 22%, of the people think that the right of veto should be limited to a few essential areas.



Fewer in the newly joined member countries (9%) than in the candidate countries and in the previous member states (both 13%) are willing to give up “the right of veto”. No nation would be in favour of abolishing this final weapon of self-defence. The opinion that the right of veto should be given up entirely in order to make the EU more efficient is more likely shared by Turks (15%), Estonians (12%), Czechs, Latvians and Lithuanians (each 11%).


In the highest proportions, Hungarians (61%), Polish and Cypriots (both 55%) are for preserving this important right. About every other person in Slovenia, Slovakia (both 51%) and in the Czech Republic (50%) agree, while this is a much less important issue for the respondents in Turkey (41%) and Malta (40%).

Limiting the right of veto to very few essential topics is closest to Slovenian opinion (27%), but Estonians, Latvians (both 23%) and Polish (22%) mentioned it above the NMS average (21%). (see EU28TABLES Q.33)

In general, men were able to express any opinion in higher proportions about this topic (81% could answer this question) while 33% of women could not or would not to answer it. Men would like to preserve the right of veto more than women would (51% to 45%). The 25-39 group (51%) are more in favour of the veto than those aged 55 and over (43%).

Managers, other white collar workers (both 54%) and manual workers (52%) are rather on the side of the right of veto, as compared to the self-employed (49%), retired (46%) and house persons (36%).

The people who think membership is a good thing would give up the right to veto for all decisions in order to make the EU more efficient in a higher proportion (14%) than those who think membership is a bad thing (8%) or those who cannot decide whether it is good or bad (9%).




The figure above – which shows the results of the previous surveys – indicates that opinions reflecting the right of veto now stands at about the same level as it did a year ago (after increasing 5 percentage points). In the same period, the proportion who said that it should be given up and those who would like to limit it seems to be consistent as well.

10.4 Structural issues

The voting system

Overall the absolute majority of the respondents (54%) in the new member countries think that every country should have one vote regardless of its population size, while in the previous member states only 43% agree, and one-third (34%) would divide the votes proportional to population. In the new EU member countries, support of this opinion is 3 percentage points lower (31%).

In the previous member states of the EU, and on the CC level as well, it seems that people don't have enough information, or interest, to decide this question. Twenty-two percent in the three candidate countries, and 23% in the EU 15 could not or did not decide. (see EU28TABLES Q.34)



It is in the general interest of every country to claim as much power as is possible. In order to reach it, countries with lower population sizes must have the votes divided equally among the member states. Bigger countries must prevent that possibility to preserve their greater influence in the Union.

The results of the country-by-country analysis shows nothing surprising: in general the smaller countries are rather on the side of dividing the votes regardless of population, while the more populous countries are on the other side. Accordingly, Cypriots (75%) and Slovenes (69%) support in the highest proportions the idea of one country-one vote.

On the other hand, Polish (38%) and Turks (34%) are the most likely to refuse this point of view and would like to divide the votes by population size.


There are two interesting exceptions: Romania – which belongs to the more populous group of countries but has a relatively high number of people (60%) supporting the one country-one vote idea – and on the other hand Malta – where regardless of its smaller population, “only” 54% share this view (just matching the NMS average), while 28% of Maltese prefer the voting method based on population size.

Socio-demographic analysis shows that the more educated respondents are more inclined to say each country should have one vote (56% of those who studied until aged 16-19 choose this solution, as do only 42% of those who stopped full-time education before they were 16). Manual workers (57%),

managers (59%) and other white collars (60%) accept this idea in higher proportions than do the self-employed (46%) and house persons (36%).

A Commissioner for each member state?

In general, people support the way the European Commission is currently shaping up. On average three-quarters (74%) of the respondents from the new member countries are for it, while 6% of them are against this system, and one-fifth of the citizens could not or would not answer this question. In the previous member states, 69% are for having commissioners from each state, and 11% are against it. Only 61% of the respondents in the CC could answer this question.



In the highest proportions, Estonians (81%), Cypriots and Slovenes (both 80%) are for such a combination of the commission, and Slovakian (79%), Latvian (76%) and Czech (75%) respondents agree above the NMS average (74%). The least support – and the lowest response rate as well – comes from the three candidate countries: Romania (67% for, 3% against), Bulgaria (59% for, 2% against), and Turkey (46% for, 13% against). (EU28TABLES Q.29)

On average more men (68%) than women (57%) support the current composition. The middle aged (25-39 year olds: 65%; 40-54 year olds: 66%) prefer the system more than do older people (aged 55 and over: 55%). Managers (80%), other white collars (78%) and manual workers (69%) are likelier to prefer a Commissioner from each state than do the retired (60%) or house persons (39%).

Those who think membership is a good thing are 69% in favour and 5% opposed to the system. Only 47% of those who think EU membership is a bad idea support the current EC composition, but 21% are against it.


The idea of a two-speed Europe

Eurobarometer investigated feelings about the future of building Europe as well. People were asked what they thought about the different speeds of building Europe among the member countries that had been vaguely proposed by prominent European politicians after the failed negotiations about the Constitution in Rome.

This question was never asked before and, as it is a new topic, relatively few people have an evolved opinion about it. The overall response rate in the new EU member countries is 71%. Among those respondents who volunteered to answer, the slight majority support the differentiated integration of a “core Europe” and a more reluctant “periphery”. In general, respondents are divided: on the NMS level 38% are in favour of the idea of a two-speed Europe, while one-third of them (33%) are against. In the previous member countries, there’s a much bigger difference; citizens refuse this proposition in much higher proportions. On average 31% are for while 41% are against this idea. In the CC only 60% could give an answer to this question, 38% are for and 22% are against this idea of a two-speed Europe.

The greatest number of people who accept the differentiated integration process can be found in Cyprus, where more than every second respondent think so (53%), and in Romania where almost every second citizen (49%) support the differentiation of integration. The support rate is higher than the NMS average in Hungary (47%), Malta (41%), and Poland (40%) as well, although in Poland one-third (34%) of the citizens are definitely against this idea. (see EU28TABLES Q.29)

On the other hand the highest level of disagreement was measured among Slovenes (45%), and also more than one-third of the respondents are against it in the Czech Republic (37%), Estonia and in Slovakia (both 36%).



The support of a two-speed Europe is rather characteristic of men (44%) rather than women (32%). More of the 25-39 year olds (43%) than those 55 and over (30%) support staggered growth. More managers (46%), the self-employed, other white collars and manual workers (each group 44%) support this idea than the retired and house persons -- however, 59% of the retired and only 47% of house persons could answer the question at all. Acceptation of the “two-speed Europe” is higher among the better-educated group (studied until aged 20 or above: 47%) and much lower among those who left school before they were 16 years old (31%).


IV. Common foreign and security policy

11.1 Support for a Common Foreign Policy

The majority in the stands for a common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union. More than two-thirds (68%) of the respondents in the newly joined EU member countries are in support while only 16% oppose. About one in six (16%) could not, or would not, answer this question. We find a similar level of support in the previous member states (65%); 6 percentage points more oppose (22% are against this common policy).

Recent developments have resulted in somewhat stronger approval of EU level foreign policy-making in the candidate countries. Since the last survey in autumn 2003, support in the NMS region for common foreign policy has increased by 3 percentage points (from 65% to 68%), while the proportion of those who are opposed has decreased by 2 percentage points on the NMS level.

We find a similar proportion of support (65%) among the previous member states. The EU 15 average stayed about the same as it was a half-year before (changed by only 1% in the positive direction). It is interesting however that there are about as many people in the EU 15 countries who support a common foreign policy as there are in the candidate countries. It is also interesting that – such as it was six months ago – there are more people in the previous member countries who are against such a harmonised foreign policy (22% in members vs. 16% in the new members).



The recent results of the survey shows – as the previous surveys did, too – that Cypriots are the most likely to support a common foreign policy (81%), followed by Slovenians (76%). Practically three-quarters of the Slovaks, Romanians and Bulgarians (74% each) defend EU-level foreign policy. Seven out of 10 among the Polish and Hungarian respondents support a common foreign policy, and these are the countries where we find still a higher number of people supporting a common foreign policy than the average among new members (68%).


At the bottom of the list of support we find Turkey (47%), Malta (50%) and the Czech Republic (57%). The greatest numbers of people expressly opposed can be found in Malta (24%), the Czech Republic and Estonia (23% both). (EU28TABLES Q.29)

A socio-economic analysis shows that men (68%) are more likely to support one common foreign policy than are women (56%), and this proportion has not changed much since the last survey conducted (autumn 2003) when 68% of men and 59% of women were in support. Respondents under the age of 55 support one common foreign policy in a higher proportion than do respondents over 55 (age group 15-24: 61%, 25-39: 63%, 40-54: 65%, and 55+: 56%).

More managers (73%), white collar workers (72%) and manual workers (71%) would vote in support than would the self-employed (58%) and house persons (39%). Additionally, supporting a common foreign policy is much more likely among the more educated demographic group, where 73% of those who left school at age 20 or later are in support and only 48% of those who left school at age 15 hold this same opinion.

Male	68	Self-employed	58
Female	56	Managers	73
AGE: 15-24 years	61	Other white collars	72
AGE: 25-39 years	63	Manual workers	71
AGE: 40-54 years	65	House persons	39
AGE: 55+ years	56	Unemployed	67
EDU: up to 15 years	48	Retired	61
EDU: 16-19 years	69	Rural area or village	57
EDU: 20+ years	73	Small or middle sized town	66
EDU: still studying	66	Large town	63

Trend analysis shows that this support has increased in seven of the 13 candidate states, rather strongly in Lithuania (+5), the Czech Republic (+5), Bulgaria (+4) and Cyprus (+4). Only one country shows a significant drop in support for a common foreign policy, Estonia (-4).



We see the highest positive changes in opinions of EU-level foreign policy in Bulgaria (+8%), but also among Estonians (+6%) and Latvians (+4%). Support fell furthest in Turkey (-13%) -- now fewer than every second respondent is for it, while in autumn 2003 this percentage was 60%.

In Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland enthusiasm for a common European foreign policy has remained unchanged. The rate of support also remains largely stable in Lithuania, Cyprus (both -1 percentage point), the Czech Republic and Romania (both +1).


Table 11.1b
Support for one common foreign policy
by country (%)

Country	2003	2004	Difference
BULGARIA	66	74	+8
ESTONIA	56	62	+6
LATVIA	63	67	+4
NMS	65	68	+3
HUNGARY	68	70	+2
ROMANIA	73	74	+1
EU 15*	64	65	+1
CZECH REP.	56	57	+1
SLOVENIA	76	76	0
SLOVAKIA	74	74	0
POLAND	70	70	0
CYPRUS	82	81	-1
LITHUANIA	62	61	-1
MALTA	52	50	-2
TURKEY	60	47	-13

11.2 Support for a Common Defence and Security Policy


Lately, the role of defence and security policy has been getting more and more important, not only in the previous European member states but in the newly joined members as well. Citizens of the countries that became members of the European Union in May 2004 definitely stand for a common defence and security policy, just as they did in the past.

In general, we can say that the absolute majority of people (79%) in the 10 new EU member countries still stand for a common European Union defence policy, somewhat more strongly than they did during the previous survey in the autumn. Nonetheless, one out of 10 respondents is against a common defence policy, but the number of those who could not or did not want to answer that question has decreased by two percentage points (from 13 to 11 percentage points). This level of support is 3 percentage points higher than it was during the previous survey, and is about on the same level as it was a year before (spring 2003), but it is 5 percentage points lower than it was during summer 2003.



Comparing previous European citizens and new citizens' support of common defence and security policy, it is interesting that more people want EU-level defence in the new EU member countries than in the previous member states. Citizens of the EU-15 countries support the common defence and security policy, but their support is 7 percentage points less (72%) than that in the new member countries. When we consider respondents who are definitely opposed to common defence we see a much higher ratio within the previous members (16%) as compared to the NMS (10%).

If we look at opinions about this country-by-country, we find the most people in support of the common defence and security policy in Cyprus, where the rate of support is now 4 percentage points higher than it was six months earlier. Ninety-one percent support a common defence and security policy, while only 2% of them are opposed.



In Slovakia and in Hungary exactly the same proportions of people are in favour of a common defence policy (82%), and 7% in both countries are against it. About eight out of 10 respondents say that they are in favour of this policy - and just match the new EU member countries' average - in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. The support rate of Slovenians, Czechs (78% both), Latvians and Estonians (each 77%) is still above the EU 15 average (72%). In Lithuania 70% of the citizens say there should be a common security and defence policy on the EU level. Turkey (46%) and Malta (54%) are at the bottom of the list of policy proponents, and top the list of opponents (16% and 18%, respectively). However, notably, in Malta there is an absolute majority in support of a common defence policy, but the rate of opposition (18%) is the highest among the 13 countries. (see EU28TABLES Q.29)

The same percentage in Turkey and the previous member states (16%) are against a common defence and security policy. The level of Turkish opposition has decreased 3 percentage points. Opposition to EU-level defence reached its highest rate, 19%, in the last survey.

Table 11.2a Support for a common defence and security policy by demographic groups

Male	73%	Self-employed	63%
Female	62%	Managers	83%
AGE: 15-24 years	68%	Other white collars	81%
AGE: 25-39 years	69%	Manual workers	75%
AGE: 40-54 years	70%	House persons	43%
AGE: 55+ years	62%	Unemployed	75%
EDU: up to 15 years	51%	Retired	68%
EDU: 16-19 years	78%	Rural area or village	63%
EDU: 20+ years	81%	Small or middle sized town	73%
EDU: still studying	71%	Large town	68%

The socio-economical analysis shows that on average in the candidate region men (73%) are more likely to support a common defence policy than are women (62%). The respondents between 40 and 54 years old are more supportive (70%) than respondents over 55 (62%). Looking the respondents by economic activity, managers (83%) and other white collar workers (81%) like the idea more than do house persons (43%) or the self-employed (63).

A common defence and security policy among the member states finds still higher support among those who think membership is a good thing (now it is 73% -- decreased 8 percentage points compared to the last survey) than among those who think it is neither good nor bad (currently it is 71% -- increased 9 percentage points compared to last autumn), or who think that EU membership is definitely bad (49% -- six months earlier it was 34%).

Country	2003	2004	Difference
POLAND	73	79	+6
BULGARIA	75	79	+4
CYPRUS	87	91	+4
HUNGARY	79	82	+3
NMS	76	79	+3
ROMANIA	76	79	+3
MALTA	51	54	+3
EU 15*	70	72	+3
SLOVENIA	76	78	+2
ESTONIA	76	77	+1
CZECH REP.	79	78	-1
SLOVAKIA	83	82	-1
LATVIA	80	77	-3
LITHUANIA	75	70	-5
TURKEY	58	46	-12


The analysis of trends shows that support of common policy-making in security issues has increased in 10 of the 13 candidate countries, particularly in Poland (+6 percentage points), Bulgaria and Cyprus (both countries +4). The biggest drop in support for a common defence policy has been in Turkey (-12). A common EU level security initiative is now effectively less supported by Latvians and Lithuanians, where approval decreased 3% and 5% respectively.

Citizens support the creation of a European rapid military reaction force

Along with European defence policy, Eurobarometer investigated opinions about the existence and role of a European military force – specifically a rapid military reaction force that could be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs.

Setting up such a European army is a popular idea with more than seven out of 10 new EU member countries' citizens (72% express an affirmative response), although it has slightly decreased 2 percentage points since the last survey in autumn 2003. On the other hand, those who do not agree with this idea increased in the past six months by 2 percentage points and make up 14% on NMS level.

In comparison, average support for the creation of this type of military force among the previous member states and in the 10 new EU member countries converge closer to each other: while six months ago, the difference between the two regions was 5 percentage points (EU 15: 69%, NMS: 74%), now the difference is 2 percentage points (EU 15: 70%, NMS: 72%). At the same time more of those in the previous EU member states than the NMS are expressly opposed (19% vs. 14%).



In the candidate countries significantly fewer respondents than in the NMS region support setting up such a European military force; 63% of the CC agree while 12% disagree with the concept. However, among the three candidate states more people were unable to formulate an opinion (25%) than in the 10 new EU member countries (14%).

Table 11.2c
Support the idea of an “European Army”
 By country (%)

Country	2003	2004	Difference
MALTA	45	56	+11
CYPRUS	87	92	+5
BULGARIA	67	71	+4
ROMANIA	72	75	+3
HUNGARY	69	71	+2
SLOVAKIA	70	72	+2
ESTONIA	69	68	-1
SLOVENIA	77	76	-1
NMS	74	72	-2
CZECH REP.	67	65	-2
POLAND	78	76	-2
LATVIA	74	72	-2
TURKEY	61	57	-4
LITHUANIA	64	56	-8


The idea of the European army is most popular in Cyprus (92%; +5% points compared to the previous survey in autumn 2003), but also highly favoured in Poland (76%; -2% points), Slovenia (76%; -1% point) and Romania (75%; +3% points). Support in these countries is above the NMS average (72%; points). Today, in Slovakia, Latvia (both 72%) support for this idea is rising to the new EU member countries' average. Support is somewhat lower, but still above the EU 15 average (70%), in Bulgaria

and Hungary (both 71%). An EU army receives the least support in Lithuania and in Malta, where citizens tend to agree with the idea the least often, only in 56% in both countries. Six months earlier only 45% of Maltese respondents gave support, and 36% of them were expressly against it – Malta had the highest disagreement rate among the 13 candidate countries. Still today, the largest number of people who are definitely against such an army are in Malta (with 29%, however that is 7 percentage points lower than it was last time). (see EU28TABLES Q.30)

The idea of setting up a European rapid military reaction force is more appealing to men (72% compared to 62% of women), and much less to the oldest generation (55+ age group, 59%) than to younger respondents (15-39 years old: 70%, 40-54 years old: 69%). By economic status we can say that every group of workers (managers: 73%, other white collar and manual workers: 74%) like the idea more than retired respondents (65%), the self employed (66%) or house persons (49%) do. By level of education, it's notable that those who were educated until they were at least 20 (73%) and students (74%) agree that there should be an army more than do those who left school before the age of 16 (56%).

Male	72%	Self-employed	66%
Female	62%	Managers	73%
AGE: 15-24 years	70%	Other white collars	74%
AGE: 25-39 years	70%	Manual workers	74%
AGE: 40-54 years	69%	House persons	49%
AGE: 55+ years	59%	Unemployed	74%
EDU: up to 15 years	56%	Retired	65%
EDU: 16-19 years	74%	Rural area or village	64%
EDU: 20+ years	73%	Small or middle sized town	70%
EDU: still studying	74%	Large town	68%

The attitudinal analysis shows that those who think membership is a good thing are much more likely to support a European rapid military reaction force (74%) than do those who think that membership is a bad thing (51%). Sixty-six percent of the EU-neutral tend to agree with the idea of a European military force as well.




It is noteworthy that support for setting up a common European rapid military reaction force has decreased slowly since last summer, while the proportion who disagree with this opinion seem to be very stable – it is between 12% and 14%.

Support for a European Foreign Minister

In connection with European foreign policy, Eurobarometer also investigated opinions about the existence and role of a European Foreign Minister. In the new EU member countries, the absolute majority (61%) of respondents would still support a spokesperson for a common EU position on foreign affairs.

Support for a European Foreign Minister has not really changed during the past six months (from 63% to 61%) in the new member countries and in the previous member countries alike, still somewhat less than two-thirds in these countries continue to support this idea. In the countries that will join the European Union in May 2004, support has decreased by 2 percentage points. In the previous member states it has increased by 1 percentage point since autumn 2003.

Currently, 61% of the NMS citizens tend to agree that the EU should have its own Foreign Minister, while 16% tend to disagree. Results within the previous member states are similar — 64% agree while 19% disagree. On average 17% of citizens in the member states and 23% in the new member countries either could not or would not answer, instead choosing “do not know”. Respondents in the three candidate states support this idea practically at the same rate as the new members: 60% support a EU foreign minister. Among these countries’ respondents we definitely find fewer people who are against such an idea (only 9%), while almost one-third of them (31%) were unable to decide.




Now Romanians (79%), Cypriots (78%) and Slovenians (73%) are the most supportive of a European Foreign Minister and it is a popular proposition in Latvia (71%) and in Hungary (69%) as well. Malta and Slovakia come in just above the 2004 members' average with 65% tending to agree. Just as it was in the last survey, the least support is to be found in Turkey (53%) – however this proportion is 4 percentage points higher than it was six months before. The highest percentage of “tend to disagree” answers are in the Czech Republic (22%), followed by Estonia (20%). It is worth mentioning that the proportion of “do not know” or “no opinion” responses is very high in Turkey (35%), Bulgaria (31%), Lithuania (29%), Poland and the Czech Republic (both 25%) as well. (EU28TABLES Q.30)

Since autumn 2003 we found the highest increase of support for a European foreign minister in Romania (incredible +19% points), and a smaller increase is found in Bulgaria (+10 points) and Estonia (+8 percentage points). Only in Cyprus (-1 point) and Turkey (-2 percentage points) do we find the idea of a common foreign minister less popular than it was last autumn.

Table 11.2e
Support the European Foreign Minister
 By country (%)

Country	2003	2004	Difference
ROMANIA	60	79	19
BULGARIA	52	62	10
ESTONIA	49	57	8
LITHUANIA	58	62	4
CZECH REP.	50	53	3
MALTA	62	65	3
LATVIA	69	71	2
SLOVAKIA	63	65	2
SLOVENIA	71	73	2
HUNGARY	69	69	0
POLAND	60	60	0
NMS	62	61	-1
CYPRUS	79	78	-1
TURKEY	55	53	-2



The idea of a European Foreign Minister is welcomed most by men (66% tend to agree, as compared to 55% of women), and by younger generations (15-39 year olds: 63%; 40-54 age group: 62%, while those aged 55 years and above: 54%). Manual workers (70%), managers and currently unemployed respondents (both 68%) tend to agree, more than house persons (43%) and retired people (58%) do. The rate of support for this idea is increasing with levels of education. Those who stayed in school until they were 20 (70%) like the notion of a common foreign minister more than do people who left school by the time they were between 16-19 (67%) or those respondents who stopped their full-time education before age 16 (51%).

Male	66%	Self-employed	61%
Female	55%	Managers	68%
AGE: 15-24 years	63%	Other white collars	66%
AGE: 25-39 years	63%	Manual workers	70%
AGE: 40-54 years	62%	House persons	43%
AGE: 55+ years	54%	Unemployed	68%
EDU: up to 15 years	51%	Retired	58%
EDU: 16-19 years	67%	Rural area or village	57%
EDU: 20+ years	70%	Small or middle sized town	64%
EDU: still studying	64%	Large town	62%

The attitudinal analysis shows that those who think membership is a good thing are much more likely to want a European Foreign Minister (68%) than those who think EU membership is a bad thing (45%). However, the increase of support compared to the last survey results is significant, when it was only 31%, in this latter group of people. Fifty-nine percent of those who are neutral on this point tend to agree that there should be a common foreign minister, which is a 9 percentage points increase compared to their level of support in autumn 2003.

11.3 Measures related to Common Foreign and Security Policy

Overall, in the 10 new EU member countries, since autumn 2003 there has been a slight deterioration in support for most of the various elements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP). Only support concerning human rights and the asylum and immigration policy has risen on the NMS level compared to six months ago. In the same period, previous member states' opinions show positive changes regarding the most topics. In general we can establish that the opinions of the respondents in the candidate countries – by recent survey results – are much closer to the previous EU citizens' opinions than to those of the CC.


On the NMS level, from autumn 2003 to spring 2004 the greatest increase was found in agreement with the proposition that the “*EU should guarantee human rights in each member state*” (+6 percentage points). In the previous EU member states the number who agreed with this statement has also grown, but “only” by 3 percentage points. The largest fall in support in the NMS is for the idea that the “*EU should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council*”, which lost 4 percentage points in support in the last six months. Support for a UN seat on the EU 15 level is up 1 percentage point since autumn 2003. As *TABLE 11.3a* below illustrates, most measures related to CFSP had a higher approval in spring compared to autumn. (*EU28TABLES Q.30*)

	EU 15			NMS		
	Autumn 2003	Spring 2004	Diff.	Autumn 2003	Spring 2004	Diff.
The EU should guarantee Human Rights in each member state	76	79	+3	74	80	+6
The EU should work to guarantee Human Rights around the world	74	76	+2	65	67	+2
The EU should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the EU	71	71	0	66	68	+2
The EU should have a common asylum policy towards asylum seekers	71	70	-1	67	68	+1
EU foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy	73	77	+4	76	75	-1
Member states which have opted for neutrality should have a say in EU foreign policy	47	50	+3	49	48	-1
When an international crisis occurs, EU member states should agree a common position	81	81	0	84	83	-1
The EU should have a rapid military reaction force	69	70	+1	74	72	-2
The EU should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common EU position	63	64	+1	63	61	-2
The EU should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council	64	65	+1	66	62	-4

As an overview, two observations about CFSP, which are most widely accepted in general, in all countries of Europe, are especially noteworthy.

First of all, all recent surveys show that more than eight out of 10 respondents (83%) within the new member states agree that EU member states should promote a **common position in times of international crisis**. Despite the fact that this response decreased 1 percentage point since last autumn, still the overwhelming majority in the NMS agreed. A decisive majority in the EU 15 zone agreed as well (81% of them) that international crises call for a common position across the member states. This statement seems to be generally acceptable for the most respondents because in the three candidate countries it is the statement the most citizens (64%) agreed with.

The second most clearly expressed opinion related to EU foreign and defence policy is that the **EU should guarantee human rights in each member state**. After a 6 percentage point rise, the idea receives 80% agreement on the NMS level, with only 9% opposed. It was accepted by about the same proportion of citizens in the previous member countries (79% tend to agree with it) and gained the highest rate of agreement in the candidate countries as well (65%). (see also FIGURE 11.3a and FIGURE 11.3b)




The next most important element, which also received three-quarters (75%) approval on the NMS level, and 77% in the previous EU member countries, is that **European Union foreign policy should be independent of the United States' foreign policy**, while only about one out of 10 respondents oppose this idea in both regions (NMS: 9%, EU 15: 10%). This independency of EU foreign policy is supported by 62% of CC citizens, while 8% disagree with it.

Somewhat fewer than three-quarters (72%) of the respondents in the future member states agreed with the creation of a **"rapid military reaction force"**, or in other words, a European army, which is a 2 percentage point lower rate of support than was measured last autumn. The existence of such a military unit is necessary to 70% of previous EU citizens, while one-fifth (19%) of them definitely disagree with this idea. (We have dealt with this issue in the previous subchapter in more detail.)

Although this is the statement that had less support six months ago (-1 point), still somewhat more than two-thirds of NMS respondents (68%) said that they tend to agree that the EU should have a **common immigration policy** for people from outside the EU, while 13% definitely disagreed. The same proportion of respondents agreed that the EU should have a **common asylum policy** towards asylum seekers. Thirteen percent are on the opposite side. Citizens in the previous member states see these questions nearly the same way: 71% agreed that the EU needs a **common immigration policy** (15% against it) and 70% support the idea that the EU should have a **common asylum policy** towards asylum seekers (15% are against). In the CC countries, 55% support the common

immigration policy, but one-third of the respondents (34%) could not or did not want to answer. The statement that the EU needs a **common asylum policy** was mentioned by 57% of them, while 10% disagreed with it.



According to the recent survey, 2 percentage points more people (67%) in the newly joined EU member countries tend to agree that the **European Union should work to guarantee human rights around the world** than did six months ago, while 16% disagree. On the EU 15 level, 76% think that the Union should **guarantee human rights around the world**.

Sixty-two percent of NMS respondents said they tend to agree that the **EU should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council**. As mentioned before, this statement shows the biggest drop in support since last autumn (-4% points). At the same time in the previous EU member countries – after a 1 percentage point increase – almost two-thirds of the citizens (65%) agree.

Today somewhat fewer people (-2% points) in the new EU member countries agree (61%) that the **EU should have its own Foreign Minister**, who can be the spokesperson for a common EU position, while 16% definitely oppose it. The proportion in support (64%) of the need of the EU **Foreign Minister** in the previous EU member states is 1 percentage point higher than it was in the previous survey.

Accession country citizens – and people in the previous member states as well – are the most divided on whether or not **neutral member states should have a say in EU foreign and defence policy**. A full 48% tend to agree, but 26% of the respondents are opposed. On average there are no significant differences between the opinion of EU 15 citizens and the future member states' respondents. Exactly 50% in the previous member states tend to agree, while 27% tend to disagree. It is rather characteristic of the three candidate states to not be able to decide or not want to answer, but they tend to agree (51%) more than disagree (13%). (ANNEX TABLES Q.30)

11.4 Who should make decisions on European defence policy?


We asked respondents whether individual governments, NATO, or the European Union should make policy decisions on European defence. The European Union is currently much more trusted in European defence matters than national governments or NATO. The data show that the European Union is by far the preferred option in almost every country. EU 15 citizens are somewhat more likely to say that the European defence policy should be decided on the EU level (46%) than the new member countries' citizens (40%), while the CC opinion is between them (44%).

The second most widespread opinion is to keep the decision making about EU defence policy on the country level, and on average the fewest people think that decision-making is a NATO job.

A tendency for keeping decision-making in defence issues at home

In the last six months, on average, more and more people in the accession and previous member countries think that decision making regarding European defence policy should be made by the national governments themselves rather than on the EU level. There is a clearly observable increase in those who support the national governments' decisions and nearly the same fall in the number of people who support European level decision making.

On the other hand, we can see a nearly inverse process in the CC states. Today, 10 percentage points fewer (24%) mentioned national decision making than did six months before (34%), while support for NATO and EU decision making remained the same proportion. It means only that the number of the uncertain respondents has grown by 10 percentage points in the last period.




On average, in the future member states (of which the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia joined the Iraqi coalition) now 40% of citizens trust the EU the most in European

defence issues generally, 27% prefer to keep those decisions on a national level, and 18% would delegate these decisions to NATO². (see EU28TABLES Q.31)

Only in Malta and in the Czech Republic would the relative majority of citizens prefer to have their government decide defence issues (46% and 34%, respectively would choose national competence).

The percentages of people who think this question should be handled on a national level are practically equal in the previous member countries, the newly joined member states and in the CC zone (25%, 27% and 24%). Support for NATO is somewhat more articulated in the previous member countries than in the new EU member states – 14% of the citizens in the previous member states trust NATO regarding this question while 18% do on the NMS level. In the three candidate countries only 9% of the people think that decision making has to be done by NATO.



Results by country show that Cypriots (73%) are by far the most likely to prefer the EU to make defence policy decisions, followed by the people in Bulgaria (64%) and in Slovenia (56%). The European Union is preferred by the absolute majority in Slovakia (53%), Hungary (52%) and Romania (51%), as well. Among the candidate countries the relative majority, still above the NMS average, chose the EU to make defence policy decisions in Latvia (47%), Estonia (45%) and Lithuania (44%). At the bottom of the list of support for EU defence policy decisions we find Turkey (39%), Poland (34%) and the Czech Republic (32%).

Hungary (an ally in the U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq and a member of NATO) is the only country that trusts NATO decision-making more than their own government's (19% to 14%). In Slovenia the difference is marginal (16% prefer NATO, 17% national government). The lowest level of trust in a national government to make these decisions is seen in Hungary and in Bulgaria, where only 14% and 15% trust their own government in questions of war and peace. (see EU28TABLES Q.31)


If we consider the demographic groups, men are more likely than women (47% vs. 38%) to say the EU should be where decisions about European defence policy are made. Those who are under 55 (15-24

¹ Turkey has been a long-time member of NATO; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have been members of NATO since 1999, and with EU enlargement and the admission of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, all but two candidate countries will become members of the military organisation in 2004.

years old: 46%; 25 to 54: 45%) are more likely than those who are over 55 (34%) to agree. Those who are currently unemployed (48%), managers (47%) and manual workers (46%) most strongly believe that the European Union should be entrusted with the issues of European defence policy. Demographic analyses also show that people with less education think in the lowest proportions (36%) that defence decision making should be made by the EU, while respondents who finished their full-time education at age 20 or older said in significantly higher proportions that this process should be made on an EU level (49%). It is also worth mentioning that, along with education level, grow the proportions who are willing to answer this question: of those who left school before age 15, 27% could not or did not want to answer, compared to 8% of those who stopped full time education at age 20 or later.

The proportion not able or willing to give an opinion is relatively high in all demographic categories, varying from 7% among managers to 31% among house persons and 27% among those who belong to the least educated group.

The attitudinal analysis shows that 48% of respondents who regard their country's membership in the European Union as a good thing support EU-level decision making about European defence policy, 14% support NATO, and 23% prefer home governments. Among those who regard their country's membership as a bad thing, 36% are for decision making by national governments, 16% by NATO, and 30% by the European Union. Those who could not decide whether their country's membership is a good thing or not, more often mentioned the EU level (40%) than the national government (27%) or NATO (12%) as the desired level of decision making in European defence matters.



If we look at how opinion has changed in the new EU member countries during the last year, we can see that the proportion who rather support EU level decision-making has increased by 2 percentage points, the proportion who think it is a national government issue has increased by 3 percentage points and the role of the NATO has decreased with 5 percentage points and stabilized on 18%; meanwhile, the rate of the unsure has decreased by 8 percentage points.

Citizens in the new EU member countries are now more likely to think that European defence policy should be decided by **national governments** than did in the autumn survey (+4 percentage points).

The proportion of those who prefer **European Union** level decision making in defence matters decreased 3 percentage points on the NMS level, and the proportion who think that it is a task for NATO stayed at 18% since last two surveys. (see EU28TABLES Q.31)


V. Globalisation

In the course of the survey we investigated the citizens' views on globalisation. We asked our respondents to tell us whether they tend to agree or disagree with 10 statements about globalisation. Five statements expressed the advantages of globalisation in various aspects, and another five expressed critical notions. The statements were as follows:

- Overall, globalisation is a good thing for (OUR COUNTRY)
- Overall, globalisation is a good thing for me
- Globalisation leads to power being concentrated in large companies, at the expense of others
- Globalisation increases global environmental problems
- Globalisation represents a good opportunity for (NATIONALITY) companies
- Globalisation represents a threat to employment in (OUR COUNTRY)
- Globalisation increases the variety of products for sale in (OUR COUNTRY)
- Globalisation cuts the prices of products and services through increased competition
- Globalisation makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products sold in (OUR COUNTRY)
- Globalisation leads to a duller and more uniform world

12.1 Views on globalisation in the three country groups

Although globalisation is an issue generating high media coverage, it is a phenomenon that is not easy to define and understand. Citizens of the EU 15 zone have the most decided views, while the citizens of the candidate countries are the most uncertain on this issue: the citizens of the previous fifteen EU countries were likeliest to have a decided opinion, while the largest proportion of undecided respondents were found in the candidate countries. On EU 15 level, the percentages of those who could express a view range between 74-81%. In the new EU member countries, these percentages are between 61-69%, while in the candidate countries they range between 47-56%. The proportion of the uncertain is also high among women: while on average every third male respondent could not make a decision whether he agreed with the statements (32-40%), approximately half of women (46-54%) could not form an opinion.



Only two statements found majority agreement in new EU member countries, while five statements got majority agreement in the EU 15 states. In the new member countries, more people tended to agree more than disagree with most statements regarding the negative effects of globalisation – in eight statements out of 10, the critics of globalisation are in the majority. Globalisation is considered to be advantageous only in two aspects (“Globalisation increases the variety of products for sale in our country”, and “Globalisation cuts the prices of products and services through increased competition”) to the majority of respondents.

In the EU 15 countries, the majority agrees with the two positive statements noted above, as well as “globalisation represents a good opportunity” for their country’s companies. However, in seven out of the 10 statements are critics of globalisation the majority, but they are more critical than new EU member countries in every case. (In four out of the seven statements, over 50% of the population perceives unfavourable tendencies, while among the citizens of the newly joined EU member countries there is only one such statement.)

The three candidate countries (or, more exactly, that part of the population that volunteered to take a stand on the question) look upon globalisation much more optimistically. In these countries critics of globalisation are the majority in only three aspects, and they constitute only a third or fewer of the respondents. (“Globalisation leads to power being concentrated in large companies at the expense of others” (33%), “Globalisation increases global environmental problems” (27%), and “Globalisation makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products sold in one’s country” (27%).) It is true, however, that in six statements about the advantages of globalisation the majority spread is only 40-27%, and in one statement, those who agree and those who disagree are in equal numbers (“Globalisation represents a threat to employment in our country”). (*EU28 TABLES Q.36*)


Table 12.1 Views on globalisation						
	NMS		EU 15		CC	
	Citizens criticising globalisation	Citizens look at advantages	Citizens criticising globalisation	Citizens look at advantages	Citizens criticising globalisation	Citizens look at advantages
Globalisation leads to power being concentrated in large companies, at the expense of others	55% (agree)	14%	64% (agree)	17%	33% (agree)	16%
Globalisation increases the variety of products for sale in our country	17%	52% (agree)	21%	59% (agree)	12%	40% (agree)
Globalisation increases global environmental problems	48% (agree)	18%	55% (agree)	21%	27% (agree)	21%
Globalisation makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products sold in one's country	42% (agree)	23%	57% (agree)	22%	27% (agree)	22%
Globalisation cuts the prices of products and services through increased competition	24%	41% (agree)	34%	44% (agree)	17%	33% (agree)
Globalisation represents a threat to employment in our country	39% (agree)	25%	57% (agree)	23%	24% (agree)	24%
Overall, globalisation is a good thing for me	38%	23% (agree)	45%	29% (agree)	23%	30% (agree)
Globalisation represents a good opportunity for our country's companies	37%	27% (agree)	31%	45% (agree)	18%	34% (agree)
Overall, globalisation is a good thing for our country	35%	31% (agree)	40%	39% (agree)	19%	37% (agree)
Globalisation leads to a duller and more uniform world	33% (agree)	28%	39% (agree)	36%	20% (agree)	27%

Advantages of globalisation

In the new member countries, as mentioned above, the majority regard globalisation as advantageous in two aspects.

More agree than disagree in all surveyed countries and demographic groups with the statement that **globalisation increases the variety of products for sale** in one's country. More than half of the population share this view in the new EU member countries and the previous member countries. In the new EU member countries, 52% of the citizens agree and 17% disagree; in the EU 15 countries 59% agree and 21% disagree, while 40% in the candidate countries agree, and 12% disagree. (EU28TABLES Q.36)

The Cypriots support the statement in the largest proportion: almost two-thirds (62%) of them think that globalisation will bring an increased variety of products to markets of the island, and only 8% of them refute this. Sixty percent of the Slovenians, and 58% of the Maltese, agree as well. In the highest numbers, Hungarians disagree that globalisation brings more product variety: 24% of them share this view, as do 22% of Estonians, and 21% of Latvians.




The younger, the more educated, and the EU supportive are likelier to think globalisation will increase product variety than are the older, the less educated, and the respondents opposed to Union membership. While somewhat more than half (51%) of the 15-24 year olds agree with the statement, 36% of those 55 and older share this view -- the older age groups do not refute the statement, but are less able to form an opinion about it (52%). Only 34% of the 15-24 year olds are unable to decide what effect globalisation will have on product variety. A similar tendency is seen when looking at attitudes in light of education: while 57% of the least educated could not take a stand and 31% agreed, only one-fifth (20%) of the most educated are uncertain and 62% of them agree with the statement. The proportion of those disagreeing with the statement is 12% in the least educated and 18% in the most educated groups.

Among the employment groups, managers are likeliest (67%) to believe that globalisation increases product variety, and other white collars are least likely (21%). Both those who think EU membership is good and those who consider it bad agree more than disagree that globalisation will increase product offers. Nearly half (49%) of the membership supporters agree with the statement, and 13% of them

refute it. Thirty-nine percent of those opposed to EU membership agree, and 24% disagree. Among those who do not know whether EU membership is good or bad 48% agree that globalisation will increase product variety, and 17% disagree.

The citizens of all three country groups also tend to agree that **globalisation cuts the prices of products and services through increased competition**. However, the majority is not absolute either in the average of the new EU member countries or the EU 15 countries. Forty-one percent of the population of the new EU countries tend to agree and 24% tend to disagree with the statement; in the EU 15 countries the proportions are 44% and 34%, and in the candidate countries 33% and 17%, respectively.

In the highest proportion (56%), Slovenians agree that **globalisation cuts prices**, followed by the Czechs (45%) and the Maltese (44%). Estonians (35%), Hungarians (33%) and Latvians (27%) are the likeliest to doubt it. It should be noted, however, that only in Estonia does the proportion of those agreeing not exceed the proportion of those disagreeing; here the proportions of the two groups are the same. Romanians are least able to give an opinion: fewer than half of them could make a decision, 34% agree, and 13% disagree.




The younger can express more decided opinions about the statement, and the highest proportion attach a price decreasing effect to globalisation. While 63% of the youngest could take a stand and 42% of them agree with the statement, 46% of the oldest age group could express an opinion, and 28% say globalisation will cut prices. We did not find significant differences between any of the age groups' disagreement. The most educated respondents could express their opinion in a higher proportion (77%) than their least educated counterparts (41%). At the same time the proportions of both those agreeing and disagreeing are higher among the most educated: slightly more than half (52%) of the most educated agree with the statement and one-fourth (25%) do not, while among those who left school before the age of 15, one-fourth (25%) agreed and 16% did not. The proportion of agreement is higher among EU supporters (41% agree, 18% disagree), but one-third (34%) of EU opponents believe globalisation does not reduce prices, and according to one-fourth (26%) of them it does. Those who don't regard EU membership as either good or bad maintain majority agreement (in a 37/23 rate) with the statement.

Disadvantages of globalisation

As regards the other eight aspects mentioned earlier, the majority of the new EU member countries is concerned about the negative effects of globalisation.

The majority (55%) in new members agreed that **globalisation leads to power being concentrated in large companies, at the expense of others**. The proportion of disagreement (14%) was the smallest found in response to any of the questions. An even more significant majority (64%) in the previous EU countries agreed, and 17% disagreed. Agreement in the candidate countries is significantly lower (33%), but they disagree in similar proportions (16%) to the other two groups. This statement garners more critical response than any other one in the candidate countries. It should be noted, however, that in these three countries the proportion of those who agree that globalisation increases product variety is bigger than the number who think globalization concentrates power in big companies.

The majority in every surveyed country agree with the statement that globalisation causes power to be concentrated in large companies at the expense of smaller ones. Among the citizens of the new EU countries, Cypriots and Hungarians (both 61%) accept the statement in the largest proportion, and Maltese (24%) and Slovenians (23%) refuse it in the largest proportion. Among the candidates, Bulgarians agree most: 48% of them accept and 9% refute it. Among the Turkish, agreement is at 31% and 19% disagree; and 31% of Romanians agree while 13% disagree. (EU28TABLES Q.36)




Among employment groups, managers agree in the largest (64%) proportion, and house persons in the smallest (24%) proportion that globalisation concentrates power in large companies. Forty-two percent who say EU membership a good thing agree, while somewhat more than half (51%) of those who tend to regard EU membership a bad thing disagree with the statement. On the other hand, among those supporting membership, the proportion of people who don't know is higher than the proportion who disagree: 41% of them could not answer the question, while one third (32%) of EU opponents disagreed that globalisation leads to excessive corporate power. Nearly half (49%) of the respondents who are unable to form an opinion on EU membership agree, while 14% of them do not agree with the statement.

A majority in every surveyed country agreed with the statement "**globalisation increases global environmental problems**". This statement had the lowest ratio of undecided responses in the EU 15

zone; 55% of them agree, while 21% disagree. In the new EU member countries, nearly half (48%) believe that globalisation endangers the environment in some way, and 18% oppose this view. Significantly fewer candidate country than EU 15 citizens could express an opinion: on average, 27% agree, and 21% disagree that globalisation increases environmental problems. It should be noted that, unlike the accession country responses, this answer is not second, but fifth on the globalisation list: three other critical views are represented in higher proportions (globalisation represents a threat to the respondent, it represents a threat to employment in his country, and it makes food quality control more difficult to maintain).

The list of countries agreeing globalisation threatens the environment is led by Hungary, Slovenia and Latvia (55% all). The statement finds the least agreement in Romania (26%). It is refuted in the largest proportion in Malta: here 28% of the citizens disagree, while not significantly more (31%) agree. Twenty-four percent of the population in the Czech Republic, and 22% in Turkey, disagree with the statement.




The majority in every surveyed demographic agree that globalisation increases global environmental damage. Again, managers show the highest proportion of agreement (55%), and the lowest proportion of uncertainty (21%). The highest proportion of disagreement, 28%, is found amongst those still studying. While 37% of EU membership supporters think that globalisation increases global environmental problems, and 22% of them disagree, EU opponents criticize the detrimental effect of globalisation on the environment in a higher proportion. Forty-five percent agree and 20% disagree. In the case of those uncertain about accession to the EU, the rate of supporters and opponents is 40/19.

The majority in all three country groups say **globalisation makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products**. Citizens disagreeing with the statement in all three groups of countries represent 22-23%, but we measured significant differences in the acceptance of the statement. While in the new EU member countries the proportion of those agreeing with the statement is 42% on average, the same proportion in the previous member countries is 57%, and in the candidate countries it is 27%.

In all new member countries, and -- with the exception of Romania -- in all the candidate countries a majority agrees that "globalisation makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products sold in their own country". The highest numbers are found among Latvians (52%), Estonians and Cypriots

(both 48%). Disagreement is strongest amongst Hungarians (31%), Slovenians and Bulgarians (both 25%). As mentioned earlier, in Romania a somewhat higher proportion refute the statement (23%) than agree with it (21%), while the proportion of the uncertain is the highest (56%).



We find only one group among the examined demographics in which the number of those agreeing is not larger than those disagreeing: students, of whom 32% agree, and 32% disagree that globalisation reduces control of food quality. Among the eldest, not atypically for these questions, uncertainty is rather high. Among the middle aged group, somewhat more people tend to agree with the statement and fewer refute it than among the younger age group. Consequently, among those younger than 55, 15-24 year olds are the least concerned that globalisation would spoil the quality control of food products: 34% of them are concerned, and 27% think that this threat is not real. Among the 25-39 year olds the ratio of agreement vs. disagreement is 37/24, and in the 40-54 age group the rate is 37/22. Respondents with the highest educational attainment have more resolute opinions on the issue; among them the proportions of those accepting and refuting the statement are higher than among their less educated counterparts.


Although the majority in both groups believe that the statement is true, agreement is higher and disagreement is lower (38% accept, 23% refuse) among EU opponents than among the pro-EU population (33% accept, 26% refuse). That is, EU opposition again couples with a more critical stance towards globalisation. On the other hand, it should be noted that within the demographic subcategory of EU support, we find the highest proportion of agreement among the respondents uncertain about EU membership: 42% of them agree that globalisation can degrade food quality, and 18% disagree.

In newly joined EU countries, the majority (39% to 33%) believe globalisation renders negative consequences, at least in regard to the other five questions we asked.

The difference in agreement regarding **the effects of globalisation on the national labour market** are not so dramatic; nevertheless, citizens of the EU 15 and NMS countries perceive globalisation to be a larger threat than do the citizens of the candidate countries. (In the case of the latter, those agreeing and those disagreeing represent identical proportions, 24%, but it should be noted that over half (52%) of the candidate countries' population could not form an opinion on the issue.) The citizens of the EU 15 countries are most concerned: 57% of them agree that globalisation represents a threat

to their country's employees, while 23% disagree. In the new EU member countries 39% perceive the globalisation process to threaten the labour market, and one-fourth of them disagree.

Cypriots are likeliest to agree and least likely to disagree: more than half (52%) believe globalisation threatens Cyprus' labour market and 15% disagree. Forty-six percent of both Slovenians and Hungarians agree with the statement, while nearly one-fourth (26-27%) in each country do not. The rejection of the statement is the highest in Malta (34%), Slovakia and Bulgaria (both 31%).



Among the age groups, the middle-aged are likeliest to regard globalisation as a threat to employment in their country: 34% of the 40-54 years age group agree with this statement, and 24% of them disagree. Among the youngest, 31% agree and 30% disagree. The proportion of the uncertain is the highest (55%) among those above 55.


When looking at employment groups, we find other white collars, in the largest proportion (40%), agree that globalisation threatens employment, and managers disagree in the largest proportion (however, among them the proportions of those agreeing and disagreeing are practically equal: 38% and 39%, respectively). The proportion of the uncertain is significantly lower among the population with higher levels of educational attainment: 61% of those who left school before the age of 15 could not make a decision, as did 27% of the most highly educated. On the other hand – with the exception of those still studying – a majority in every employment group believes globalisation threatens employment. Among students the proportions are relatively balanced: here we found 31% agreeing and 33% disagreeing.

EU membership supporters also have equitable opinions: 29% of them believe that globalisation represents a challenge to the national labour market, and 29% of them do not. This threat is more affirmed (44%) within the group of EU-opponents than not (21%). Among those without an opinion about whether EU membership is a good thing or not, there are more who agree with the statement (37%) than who disagree (22%).

Both in the EU 15 and new EU member countries, the statement that **globalisation is a good thing for the respondent** provoked the highest proportions of disagreement. In the previous EU countries 45% do not agree with that globalisation would be personally a good thing for them, and only 29% think it would. In the candidate countries those who agree with the statement outnumber those who do

not. On average 38% disagree and 23% agree in the new EU member countries. A significant difference was found in the three candidate countries: 30% believe globalisation to be personally good, while 23% believe the contrary. Citizens of the candidate countries are rather more optimistic about the globalisation process.

In the examined countries, a smaller proportion says that globalisation is a good thing for them personally. Among the citizens of the surveyed countries, the Maltese are likeliest to find individual benefit in globalisation: 42% believe so, while only 18% share the opposing view. Besides Malta, there are only two countries in which a majority believe globalisation to be a personally good thing: Romania (51%) and Turkey (50%). The Latvians have the least confidence: only 18% say globalisation is personally good for them, and 47% are convinced of the contrary.




The younger age group looks on the globalisation process more optimistically: while 37% of the 15-24 year olds think that globalisation is personally good for them, only 17% of those above 55 years concur. Uncertainty among the older is also higher: 37% of the youngest and 54% of the older age group could not form an opinion on the issue. In the employment groups, again, managers trust in globalisation the most (38%), while the most significant group of the distrustful is other white collars (42%). EU-membership supporters are likelier than not to see personal gain (34% believe globalisation to be personally good, and 25% don't), while the opponents of membership tend to say that globalisation will not be a good thing for them personally (every second member of the group shares this opinion, and only 15% believe that this process is personally good for them). This latter opinion characterizes those who are undecided in the issue of accession, as well: 36% of them think globalisation is not a good thing for them personally, and one-fifth of them believe the opposite (20%).

Unlike responses to previous questions, opinions in new EU member countries and the previous EU countries diverge as to whether **globalisation represents a good opportunity for the country's companies**. The previous EU member states and the candidate countries tend to share the opinion that globalisation is advantageous for the companies of their respective countries, but in the new member countries the majority doubt it. Somewhat more than one-fourth (27%) of the new EU member countries do agree with the statement, while 37% of them disagree. Citizens of the EU 15 countries could form an opinion in the largest proportion on this issue; according to 45% of them globalisation offers opportunities for the home companies, and 31% disagree. Only about half of the candidate

countries' population were able to express an opinion in the issue; 34% of them agree with the statement while 18% refute it.

Among the surveyed countries, Malta is likeliest to think their businesses will profit from globalisation: every second resident of the island shares this opinion, while only 14% disagree. On the list of those who agree globalisation is good for local business, the second and third places are taken by countries in which only about half the population could take a stand in the issue: 38% of the Lithuanians agree, 13% of them do not, and 36% of the Romanians agree, while 12% don't. In a further three countries, those who agree with the statement are in the majority: in Turkey the rate of agreement and disagreement is 34/19, in Bulgaria it is 29/24, and in Estonia the results are much more balanced -- out of 100 respondents, 34 say globalisation is good for their businesses and 32 disagree. The proportion of disagreement is the highest among Hungarians (42%), Latvians (41%) and Polish (39%).




The younger, the more educated and the pro-EU respondents are likeliest to say globalisation is good for their country's businesses. While 38% of the youngest respondents agreed, only 22% of those over 55 share this view. At the same time, among the older respondents, it isn't the number disagreeing with the statement that's higher than that found in the younger age group, but the proportion of the undecided. Nearly one-fourth (24%) of those who stopped education before the age of 15 agree, as do 38% of those who left school after the age of 20. Conversely, among the more educated, the proportion of those disagreeing with the statement is also higher (36%) than among the less educated respondents (19%), not unrelated to the fact that significantly more respondents with higher levels of education could answer the question. Like the questions discussed previously, managers could respond to the statement in the highest proportion among the employment groups: 43% of them agreed, and 37% of them did not.

As seen earlier, respondents regarding the European Union membership as a good thing express more approval about globalisation than their anti-EU membership counterparts. This trend applies to the responses given to the present question, as well: 38% of the pro-EU camp believes that globalisation offers opportunities for national companies and 22% disagree, while only 18% of those against membership agree, and 47% of them disagree. Among the population uncertain about EU membership, the proportion of agreement is 26%, and one-third of the group disagree (33%).

As regards the statement that **globalisation is a good thing for one's own country**, in both the accession and previous member countries, the larger proportions disagree and are critical of globalisation. But in the candidate countries the relative majority is formed by people looking at globalisation favourably. Nevertheless, the proportion of those who do not agree with the positive statement is somewhat higher (35%) than those agreeing with it (31%) in the new EU member countries. In the previous member countries the ratios are relatively balanced (40% disagree and 39% agree with the statement). On the other hand, in the candidate countries, almost twice as many say that the globalisation benefits the national economy (37%) as say the opposite (19%).

In four out of the 10 new EU member countries, the majority disagree that globalisation would be a good thing for their own country (Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary and Poland). About as many people think globalisation is good for the country in the Czech Republic as don't (one-third agree, and one-third don't). In the three candidate countries the majority accept the statement. Across the board, first on the list is Malta -- half (51%) of them agree, followed by the Romanians (44%) agree that globalisation, in total, is a good thing for their own country. The statement is refuted in the highest proportion by Latvians and Cypriots (both 44%). Slovenians proved to be the most decided on the issue; four-fifths of them expressed an opinion: 43% of them agree with it, and 37% disagree. Lithuanians proved to be the least decided (somewhat more than half of them took a position in the issue: 34% agreed, while 18% disagreed).




Uncertainty is greater in the older age group, and there are fewer among them who think globalisation is good for their own country. Fifty-one percent of the oldest age group is undecided vs. 31% of the youngest. Furthermore, 46% of the youngest age group believe the globalisation process to be a good thing for their own country, as do only 24% of the oldest. When looking at employment types, we find that managers agree in the highest proportion (48%), while other white collars disagree in the highest proportion (37%). The more educated respondents were more often able to voice an opinion on globalisation at home: among them the proportions of both agreement and disagreement are higher than among their less educated counterparts.

EU membership supporters tend to regard globalisation to be a good thing for their country, and those believing membership to be a bad thing also regard globalisation a bad thing for their country. Among EU supporters the proportions of those regarding globalisation as good vs. bad is 42% and 22%, respectively, while among EU membership opponents 18% trust and 48% distrust globalisation. The largest proportion of those who are undecided on the issue of EU membership are also uncertain

about globalisation's effects on their country, but there are somewhat more among them who think globalisation is not a good thing for their country (31%) than who think it is (29%).

The population of the three candidate countries is again more optimistic than the citizens of the EU 15 countries and the new member states that the **globalisation process will lead to a duller and uniform world**. While the majority on the EU 15 and NMS level tend to agree, the majority in the candidate countries disagree. In the opinion of one-third (33%) of the population of the new EU member countries, the world will be duller and more uniform (28% believe the opposite). Thirty-nine percent of the population of the previous member countries think that globalisation would make the world dull, while 36% disagree. At the same time, 27% of the CC zone are optimistic, while 20% believe globalisation will unpleasantly homogenise their environment.

In the highest proportions, Slovenians (40%), Latvians and Hungarians (both 39%) think that globalisation will lead to a duller and more uniform world. In Malta (35%), Bulgaria (34%) and Hungary (32%) the majority disagree.



The youth are less concerned than their elders that globalisation would make their world more dull: while one-fourth (25%) of the 15-24 year age group agree with the statement and 34% disagree, among the 40-54 years olds 31% agree and one-fourth (25%) don't. Over half (59%) of those above 55 are undecided, and the rest share the two opinions in nearly identical proportions. Among the different employment groups we found balanced results in general. The largest difference between the two opinions is found among managers: 41% of them don't believe, and 37% do believe that the world would be more uniform because of globalisation.

Similarly to the earlier statements, EU supporters again have more faith in globalisation than do those regarding EU membership as a bad thing. Twenty-six percent of those regarding EU membership to be a good thing believe that globalisation would lead to a more uniform world, while 30% of them do not. More respondents who think EU membership is a bad thing believe that the world would be made duller by globalisation (32%) than believe the threat is nonexistent (26%). Their opinion is closer to the opinion of the people undecided on the issue of EU accession: 29% of them agree with the statement about the uniform effect of globalisation, and one-fourth (25%) disagree.

12.2 Controlled globalization

We also examined which institutions – government or non-government, political or civil, profit or non-profit –, people trust most to regulate globalisation. In a question, we listed 14 organisations and groups, and asked the respondents to decide which they trust the most to control the effect of globalisation. The organisations were the following:

- *Political parties*
- *The (NATIONALITY) government*
- *The European Union*
- *Green/environmental/ecological groups*
- *Trade unions*
- *Consumer rights associations*
- *Multinational companies*
- *The World Trade Organization*
- *The United Nations*
- *The World Bank / The International Monetary Fund*
- *The United States' government*
- *Anti or alter globalisation movements*
- *Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)*
- *Citizens themselves*

The respondents were allowed to select more than one institution or – in case they did not find their preferences on the list – name other groups. They could also say that they do not trust anyone on this issue.

Somewhat surprisingly, the European Union (an agent of globalisation for some people) was the most trusted in the newly joined EU member countries: 27% of the respondents said they trust the Union to be able to control the globalisation process. This proportion is identical in the previous member countries, where citizens also trust the EU the most.

In the new EU member countries, optimistically, the second largest group trusts the citizens themselves: one-fourth of them said they believe citizens will be able to control globalisation. Consumer protection organisations were mentioned third most often in the new members, with 24%. The previous EU member countries named these three groups, but the European Union is directly followed by consumer protection organisations (26%), then the citizens themselves (23%).

In the candidate countries trust in the national governments is the most significant – 37% of the people mention this – and trust in the European Union comes only second on the list (29%). This result, however, is not due to a phenomenon characteristic of all three countries, but to Turkey -- a very high number (44%) trust the Turkish government most. High levels of trust are also characteristic of the two islands of the Mediterranean, Cyprus (47%) and Malta (31%). In the three candidate countries trust in citizens takes third place (22%). (EU28TABLES Q.37)


The European Union is among the first three groups mentioned in all 13 surveyed countries. In half of the new EU member and candidate countries, the largest proportion of the citizens mentions the EU. The exceptions are Turkey and Cyprus (where most people said national government), Malta (where consumer protection organisations top the confidence ranking) and Poland (where consumer protection organisations and the citizens lead the list), and two Baltic countries, Estonia (where greens, environmental organisations are trusted by most) and Latvia (where anti-globalisation movements receive the most trust).

Table 12.2 From the following list, who do you trust most to get the effects of globalisation under control?

(% of mentions, by country and NMS average)


NMS		CC	
The European Union	27	The (NATIONALITY) government	37
Citizens themselves	25	The European Union	29
Consumer rights associations	24	Citizens themselves	22
Bulgaria		Malta	
The European Union	41	Consumer rights associations	32
The United Nations	25	The (NATIONALITY) government	31
The World Trade Organization	24	The European Union	26
Cyprus		Poland	
The (NATIONALITY) government	47	Consumer rights associations	24
The European Union	42	Citizens themselves	24
Citizens themselves	36	The European Union	19
Czech Republic		Romania	
The European Union	33	The European Union	43
Green/environmental/ecological groups	25	The (NATIONALITY) government	25
The United Nations	24	The United Nations	21
Estonia		Slovakia	
Green/environmental/ecological groups	29	The European Union	37
Consumer rights associations	25	Consumer rights associations	37
The European Union	24	Citizens themselves	30
Hungary		Slovenia	
The European Union	43	The European Union	28
Green/environmental/ecological groups	32	Citizens themselves	27
Citizens themselves	30	Consumer rights associations	19
Latvia		Turkey	
Anti or alter globalisation movements	27	The (NATIONALITY) government	44
The European Union	26	Citizens themselves	24
Citizens themselves	25	The European Union	21
Lithuania			
The European Union	37		
Multinational companies	24		
Citizens themselves	23		

Below we discuss the new EU member countries' results of individual institutions in rank order.



As already mentioned, both the new and previous member countries primarily trust **the European Union** to control globalisation (27% both). The percentage of trust in the EU is even higher in the candidate countries, 29%, but the EU is nonetheless the second most frequently chosen.

Among all new members and the candidate countries, Romania and Hungary trust the EU in the largest proportion (both 43%), followed by Cyprus (42%). In the smallest proportions are Poland (19%), Turkey (21%) and Estonia (24%).



Younger respondents name the EU in higher proportions: while nearly one-third (32%) of the 15-24 age group has faith that the EU can control globalisation processes, and slightly fewer than one-fourth

(24%) of those over 55 agree. Among the employment groups, managers (40%) and manual workers (32%) have the most trust in the Union. Looking at the issue from the point of view of education, the likeliest to trust the EU are students (36%) and people who left school at 16-19 years old (33%), while only one-fifth (20%) of the less educated said they trust the Union.

One-fourth (25%) of the new EU member states' citizens most trust **citizens** themselves to control globalisation. Though this is the highest response rate for this statement in any country group, the other two follow closely, 23% in the previous member countries 22% in the candidate countries. Among the new member and the candidate countries, Cypriots (36%), Slovaks and Hungarians (both 30%) are likeliest to trust citizen activity. At the end of the list we find Romanians (16%), Bulgarians (19%) and Czechs (22%).

We measured higher levels of self-confidence among the youth: one-fourth of the 15-24 group and 26% of the 25-39 year olds trust citizens to control globalisation, while 21% of those over 40 share this view. In the employment groups, other white collars (28%), followed by manual workers (26%), are likeliest to trust citizens. Students are likeliest to trust citizens (28%), as well as the EU, to control globalisation. There is no significant difference on the issue between citizens supporting and opposing EU membership: 23% and 24% of them, respectively, have confidence in the control of citizens over globalisation. However, this proportion is somewhat higher (27%) among the population uncertain on the issue of accession.

Consumer rights associations enjoy higher levels of trust among the citizens of the previous member countries (26%) and the new members (24%) than from the citizens of the candidate countries (14%). Among the 13 surveyed countries, Slovaks (37%), Maltese (32%) and Hungarians (27%) are likeliest to have confidence in consumer rights associations to oversee and cut back the adverse effects of globalisation. Lithuanians are least likely to rely on them: only 6% believe consumer rights associations can ensure some amount of control over the globalisation processes. The ratio is also low among the Turkish (13%) and Romanians (14%).

Confidence in consumer rights associations is higher among the more educated respondents: while 12% of those who left school before turning 15 trust consumer rights groups, twice as many, 24%, in the highest educational echelon concur. In the employment groups, managers (30%) and other white collars (26%) are likeliest to trust consumer rights groups. We measured the highest rate of trust among those with no opinion on EU membership: 21% believe that these organisations can control globalisation processes to some extent, while this proportion is 19% among the EU supporters, and 17% among those against accession.

Greens, environmental and ecological groups get the most trust from citizens of new EU member countries: 22% of them believe that these organisations have influence over the effects of globalisation. Sixteen percent of the previous member countries and 12% in the candidate countries share this opinion.

Environmentalists enjoy the highest level of trust in Hungary: one-third (32%) believe greens can control globalisation effects. Twenty-nine percent of Estonians, and 28% of Slovaks, share this opinion. Romanians (9%), Lithuanians (11%), Turkish and Cypriots (both 13%) trust these organisations the least.

The younger and the more educated respondents have more trust in environmentalists. Of the 15-39 year olds, 18-19% have confidence in greens, as do only 13% of those over 55. Among those who studied beyond the age of 16, slightly more than one-fifth (21-22%) believe environmentalists can control globalisation's deleterious effects, as do only one-tenth of the least educated.

Once again, the new EU member countries have the most positive opinion of the **United Nations**: 18% of them have confidence in the world organisation as an institution capable of positively influencing globalisation. In the three candidate countries 14%, and in the previous EU member countries 13%, have trust in the organisation. Bulgarians mentioned the UN in the highest proportion: one-fourth of them believe in the world organisation, as do 24% of Czechs and 21% of Romanians. On the other hand, only one-tenth of the Turkish, and 13% of both Slovenians and Latvians, trust in the UN.

Managers trust the world organisation in the largest proportion, 28%. Nineteen percent of the youngest, and 14% of the eldest, mentioned the UN among the organisations they most trust. Only 9% of the least educated respondents, and 23% of the most educated, mentioned the UN. Almost twice as many in the pro-EU membership camp (19%) as their anti-membership opposites (10%) trust the UN. Sixteen percent of those uncertain about EU membership believe in the influence of the UN over globalisation.


Trust in the **World Trade Organisation (WTO)** is highest in the previous EU member countries and lowest among the candidate countries. WTO is regarded to be capable of influencing the effect of globalisation by 17% in the EU 15 countries. This proportion is 15% in the new EU member countries, and 13% in the candidate countries. It is mentioned by 27% of Slovaks, 24% of Bulgarians, and 19% in both Malta and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, WTO was mentioned by only 8% in Lithuania, 10% in Turkey, and 11% in Slovenia.

Among the surveyed groups, most frequently managers mentioned the World Trade Organisation in this regard. The younger, the more educated and EU supporters mention WTO in higher proportions than the older, the less educated and those against EU membership. Sixteen percent of the youngest, and 11% of the oldest believe WTO can control globalisation's effects. Eight percent of the least educated, and 20% of the most educated, mention WTO. Trust in this other international organisation is higher among EU supporters. Sixteen percent of them trust in WTO, while 9% of those opposing EU membership do so.


The citizens of the newly joined countries have the highest percentage of trust (15%) in **anti or alter globalisation movements**. As they do with green organisations, anti or alternative globalisation movements receive the highest trust from Hungarians and Latvians (27%), Slovaks are third with 24%. The list ends with Lithuania far behind: only 3% of Lithuanians believe anti or alter globalisation movements can control globalisation. One-tenth of Cypriots, and 11% of both the Polish and Romanians, share this view.

Opinions about anti-globalisation movement divide respondents into two age groups. Levels of trust are higher among those younger than 40 (16% of them trust anti-globalists), while among the older population this proportion is lower (11%). We measured the highest proportion of trust among the other white collars, one-fifth. One-tenth of the least educated, and 17% of the most educated, mentioned anti-globalisation groups. We did not find significant differences between groups based on attitude towards the European Union.

Trust in the **national government** is strikingly lower in the new member states than in the candidate countries. Compared to the outstandingly high proportions measured in the candidate countries, only 13% trust their own government in the new EU member countries (in the previous member countries this proportion is just marginally higher, 19%). When looking at the phenomenon more closely, we see that the dividing line is between the former Socialist block and the democracies (formerly) outside the Union (Cyprus 47%, Turkey 44% and Malta 31%). In the post-Socialist countries, a heritage of decades of dictatorship most probably influences general trust in national leadership unfavourably.



In general the younger respondents have more trust in their country's government: 30% of the youngest respondents said the government is among the organisations that are expected to control globalisation processes. Among those over 55 years, 22% share this opinion. In the employment groups, we measured the highest trust in governments among the self-employed (35%, who otherwise have generally average or below the average trust levels) and house persons (34%). On the other hand, managers and other white collars (18% both), who usually lead trustfulness rankings, are at the bottom of the list of those who trust their government to rein globalisation. The less educated respondents place their trust in the government in a higher proportion (34%) than those with higher education levels (19-20%).



Next we look at trust placed in the **World Bank** and the **International Monetary Fund**, the organisations that are, along with WTO, often blamed with unconditionally promoting globalisation. Accordingly, 11% of the new EU member countries' population trust these organisations, while one-tenth of both the candidate countries and the previous member countries citizens do so.

Bulgarians (23%), Slovaks and Czechs (both 19%) are the most likely to trust the big financial institutions to control globalisation's effects. At the end of the list we find the Turkish (5%), Estonians, Slovenians and Polish (6% all).

Managers place trust in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in an outstandingly high proportion compared to the other employment groups: 21% of them share this view. They are followed by other white collars: 12% of them have confidence in these organisations. Among the least educated respondents only 5% mentioned the two institutions, while 16% of the most educated concurred. Trust toward the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is higher among those who support EU membership (12%) than among those who are undecided about the Union (9%) or do not favour it (7%).

Among the three country groups, confidence in the **non-governmental sector** is surprisingly limited. It is the strongest in the candidate countries (15%), while 13% of the previous member countries, and only one-tenth of the new member's citizens, share such trust in NGOs. The highest level of trust was measured among the Turkish: 19% of them believe that the non-governmental sector can effectively control the globalisation processes. In Slovenia this proportion is 17%, and in Slovakia, 16%. On the other hand, in Cyprus only 6% share this opinion and a mere 7% in both Lithuania and Estonia do so.

Fifteen percent of those younger than 40, and one-tenth of their elders, trust NGOs to control globalisation. Managers, the more educated and EU supporters have higher levels of trust than the average. Eleven percent of those who left school before the age of 15, and 15% of those who studied past the age of 20, trust in the non-governmental sector. This proportion is 16% among those still studying. Fourteen percent of EU supporters and one-tenth of those against EU membership think that non-governmental organisations can have influence over globalisation's effects.

Fewer than one-tenth in all country groups trust **trade unions** to control globalisation: 9% in the previous member countries, 7% in the new EU member countries, and 6% in the candidate countries. The highest levels of trust were measured among the Maltese (20%), Lithuanians (19%), and Slovenians (16%). At the end of the list are Hungary (4%) and Poland (5%).

Among the surveyed demographic groups, only managers (12%) and other white collars (11%) mention trade unions more often than 10%. The trust placed in trade unions is somewhat higher among the more educated than among the least educated: 8% of the most educated, and 5% of the least educated trust them.

Multinational companies enjoy the trust of 7% of the new EU member countries' population, and 5% in both the previous member countries and the candidate countries. Among the surveyed countries, the level of trust in multinational companies is outstandingly high in Lithuania, where nearly one-fourth (24%) of the population believe they can effectively control globalisation processes. This proportion is 13% in Slovakia, and 11% in both Hungary and Bulgaria. The Cypriots, Turkish and Polish trust multinational companies the least: in these countries only 3% mentioned them as organisations able to control globalisation processes.

Among the employment groups, managers have the highest proportion (14%) of trust. The proportion is higher among the more educated respondents: 10% of the most educated, and 3% of the least educated, say they trust multinational companies to keep a firm hand on globalisation.

There are only two groups or entities that people regard even less trustworthy than multinational businesses in controlling globalisation. **Political parties** are mentioned by 5% in the new EU members, and 7% both in the previous member countries and the candidate countries. Fourteen percent of Cypriots, 12% of Slovenians, and 9% in both Hungary and Malta trust parties when it comes to controlling the effects of globalisation. In the smallest proportions are the Polish, Lithuanians and Estonians (3% in each country trust political parties).

Even less, five percent in the new EU member countries mentioned the **government of the United States**. In the candidate countries, 6% trust the U.S. government to control globalisation processes, as did 3% in the previous member countries. In Romania, 11% of the respondents placed their trust in the U.S. government, 9% in Bulgaria, and 8% in both the Czech Republic and Lithuania. At the end of the list are the Estonians, with a 1% ratio.

When looking at socio-demographic breakdowns, we find managers are likeliest to trust in the power of the U.S. government to get globalisation under control: one-tenth of them share this opinion. The proportion of those believe in a positive role of the American government is somewhat higher among the more educated and the pro-EU respondents.

Sample Specifications EB61

Between 20th February 2004 and 28th March 2004, the European Opinion Research Group, a consortium of Market and Public Opinion Research agencies, made out of INRA in Belgium – I.C.O. and GfK Worldwide, carried out wave 61 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls.

The Standard EUROBAROMETER 61 covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union Member States, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the Member States. The basic sample design applied in all Member States is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the "administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective EU-nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language.

Countries	Institutes	Number of Interviews	Field Work Dates	Population 15+ (x 000)
Belgium	INRA/IPSOS BELGIUM	1,012	25/02 – 28/03	8,458
Denmark	GfK DENMARK	1,000	21/02 – 24/03	4,355
Germany(East)	INRA/IPSOS DEUTSCHLAND	1,037	22/02 – 11/03	13,164
Germany(West)	INRA/IPSOS DEUTSCHLAND	1,032	20/02 – 10/03	56,319
Greece	MARKET ANALYSIS	1,005	29/02 – 26/03	8,899
Spain	INRA/IPSOS ESPAÑA	1,000	22/02 – 18/03	34,239
France	CSA-TMO	1,019	22/02 – 10/03	47,936
Ireland	LANSDOWNE Market Research	1,001	23/02 – 19/03	3,004
Italy	Demoskopoea	1,025	25/02 – 16/03	49,531
Luxembourg	ILRes	619	23/02 – 23/03	357
The Netherlands	INTOMART	1,044	25/02 – 24/03	13,010
Austria	SPECTRA	1,052	24/02 – 22/03	6,770
Portugal	METRIS	1,000	23/02 – 17/03	8,620
Finland	MDC MARKETING RESEARCH	1,027	26/02 – 28/03	4,245
Sweden	GfK SVERIGE	1,000	23/02 – 19/03	7,252
Great Britain	MARTIN HAMBLIN LTD	1,035	22/02 – 14/03	46,370
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SURVEYS	308	25/02 – 17/03	1,314
Total number of interviews		16,216		

For each country a comparison between the sample and the universe was carried out. The Universe description was derived from Eurostat population data or from national statistics. For all EU member-countries a national weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, minimum gender, age, region NUTS 2 were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. EU averages), INRA (EUROPE) applies the official population figures as provided by EUROSTAT or national statistic offices. The total population figures for input in this post-weighting procedure are listed above.

The results of the Eurobarometer studies are reported in the form of tables, datafiles and analyses. Per question a table of results is given with the full question text in English, French and German. The results are expressed as a percentage of the total. The results of the Eurobarometer surveys are analysed and made available through the Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls of the European Commission, rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels. The results are published on the Internet server of the European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion. All Eurobarometer datafiles are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D-50869 Köln-Lindenthal), available through the CESSDA Database <http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html>. They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real percentages vary within the following confidence limits:

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence limits	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

Sample Specifications CCEB 2004.1

Between the 20th of February and the 17th of March 2004, The Gallup Organization Hungary carried out wave 2004.1 of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, at the request of the European Commission, Directorate-Generals Press and Communication.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1 covers citizens of each of the countries that are applying for European Union membership aged 15 and over, with the exception of Estonia, Latvia and Cyprus. In Estonia and Latvia, the survey covered permanent residents aged 15 and over. In Cyprus, the sample covered the territory of the Republic of Cyprus only. The basic sample design applied in all Candidate Countries is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each country, a number of sampling points were drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the "administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Candidate Countries Region according to the EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent; if there are no such regions, we used NUTS 3 or equivalent regions for sampling) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language. In countries with significant minorities the respondents had a chance to respond in their mother tongue (in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Russian, and in Romania in Hungarian).

Countries	Institutes	Number of Interviews	Field Work Dates	Population (x 000)
Bulgaria	VITOSHA RESEARCH	1000	25-February - 14 March	7,891
(Republic of) Cyprus	CYMAR MARKET RESEARCH	500	24-February – 9 March	689
Czech Republic	THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, CZECH REPUBLIC / CVVM	1000	21-February - 11 March	10,226
Estonia	SAAR POLL	1004	21-February -3 March	1,360
Hungary	THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, HUNGARY	1012	24-February -14 March	10,195
Latvia	LATVIAN FACTS LTD.	1006	27-February -11 March	2,345
Lithuania	BALTIC SURVEYS	1016	20-February - 4 March	3,475
Malta	MISCO	500	23-February -12 March	386
Poland	THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, POLAND	1000	21-February -7 March	38,632
Romania	THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, ROMANIA	1019	20-February -8 March	22,435
Slovakia	FOCUS CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND MARKET ANALYSIS	1053	25-February - 10 March	5,331
Slovenia	CATI D.O.O.	1014	24-February - 17 March	1,980
Turkey	KONSENSUS RESEARCH & CONSULTANCY	1000	21-February -11 March	67,803
Total number of interviews		12124		172,748

For each country a comparison between the sample and the universe was carried out. The Universe description was derived from population data from national statistics. For all Candidate Countries a weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out, based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, gender, age, region NUTS 2, settlement size, household size, and education level were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. CC 13 averages), Gallup applies the official population figures as provided by national statistics. The total population figures for input in this post-weighting procedure are listed above.

The results of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer studies are reported in the form of tables, datafiles and analyses. Per question a table of results is given with the full question text in English. The results are expressed as a percentage of the total. The results of the Eurobarometer surveys are analysed and made available through the Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls of the European Commission, Office: Brey 7/41, B-1049 Brussels. The results are published on the Internet server of the European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/. All Eurobarometer datafiles are stored at the "Zentral Archiv" (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D-50869 Köln-Lindenthal), available through the CESSDA Database <http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html>. They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real percentages vary within the following confidence limits (in case of a sample of 1000 people – confidence intervals for N=500 sample are larger):

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence intervals	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.2%